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ABSTRACT 
Financial literature is replete with theoretical and empirical evidence 
suggesting financial development has a causal effect on economic growth. Yet 
there is no consensus on the finance-growth nexus. The direction of causality is 
still controversial. In fact, classical economists argue that financial factors are 
neutral and hence cannot have real effects. Critics argue the traditional methods 
of identifying long run economic relationships fail to address the methodologi-
cal conflict between equilibrium implied by theory and the diseq uilibria in. the 
data. The rise of new representation techniques such as the General Methods of 
Moments (GMM) and vector autoregression [VAR] brought with them empiri-
cal flexibility, which facilitates the re-examination of several theories. VAR 
characterization permits the economic system to determine the behavior of 
macroeconomic variables simultaneously. The endogenous growth theoretical 
literature gives credibility to system-wide VAR financial models. 
This research is both critical (in its search for a common framework to in-
form debate on Zimbabwe) and positive (to the extent it undertakes an empiri-
cal investigation.) Empirically, the study examines the nature and intensity of 
links between financial intermediation and econo:r.:i.ic performance in a small 
developing economy. A Vector Autoregressive IVAR] framework is applit:d to 
model and estimate the temporal and dynamic relationships between financial 
aggregates and economic activity. Cointegration among the variables is exam-
ined to determine the degree of heterogeneity and coevolution. The general im-
pulse response function [GIRFJ and variance decomposition [VDC] analytical 
techniques are applied to throw light on the speed and direction of the causal. 
links and the persistence of shocks over time. 
Branches of financial theory, e.g. agency risk, corporate governance and 
information asymmetry have taught us economic activity does not take place in 
a vacuum or perfect market. To put this research into perspective, the shldy 
critically examines the evolution of Zimbabwean instihltional structures in 
3 
search of a new conceptual framework with potential to inform debate. The 
works of Levine (1997, 1998) LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997,1998, 2000), Beck, Levine and Loayza (2000), Kane (198i, 1983, 2000) Jen-
sen and Meckling (1976) and Stiglitz (1989) give consideraJe prominence to 
I 
., 
governance and institutional design. Allen and Gale (1994, :°f'lO) emphasized 
that institutional settings underlie the process of financial irtii.ovation. In fact, 
" Schumpeter (1954, p12) exalts history, statistics and "theory" as the three pillars 
of economic analysis. Stiglitz (1989, p199) agrees that partic111Iar localized his-
torical events could have permanent effects. More recently,' Beck, Demirgi.i.(;-
Kunt and Levine (2001) summarized the theory and provided an empirical ex-
ami.nation of the links between laws, politics and finance. 
4 
DECLARATION 
I certify that this thesis does not, to the best of my knowledge and belief: 
(i) incorporate without acknowledgment any material previously submitted 
for a degree or diploma in any institution of higher education; 
(ii) contain any material previously published or written by another person 
except where due reference is made in the text; or 
(iii) contain any defamatory material. 
Signature 
Date 24 December 2001 
5 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
.I 
I 
1: 
I thank my supervisor, Professor Dave Allen, for inspiration, extraordinary 
" 
understanding, great encouragement, and expert guidance i~·· bringing this re-
search to fruition. My fortunate association with him has hE!fped rekindle my 
smouldering interest in financial economics as well as nurture an appetite for 
research. When I arrived in Australia my experience in researbh and economet-
rics were next to nil. Though not yet self evident, I believe my reluctant tryst and 
often-painful collusion with econometrics was a potent rite. It is impossible to 
express sufficient gratitude to AusAID whose financial support enabled me to 
undertake my studies in Australia. Their generosity is greatly appreciated. 
I am especially grateful to my wonderful wife, Millicent, and my remarkably 
studious two-year-old daughter, Vanessa, for their genuine support and appre-
ciated company. I am deeply indebted to my mother, Maude, to an extent I can 
hardly express in words. Her financial and moral support through many years 
and difficult times is sincerely appreciated. My friends' advice, correspondence 
and interesting discussions also provided valuable moral support. In addition 
library staff at various institutions have helped in one way or another towords 
the fulfilment of this work. Naturally, the views expressed in this study, conclu-
sions arrived at herein, and any remaining errors are entirely my responsibility. 
Nevertheless Schumpeter wisely notes "books, like children, become independ-
ent beings when once they leave the parents' home." I give the greatest credit 
to the Lord for His great mercy, love and wisdom. I praise Him for the natural 
gifts of creation and the uniqueness of being. For, "Everyone has a view of the 
world that is unique," Johnson, Jr., Johnson and Buse (1987, p395) dare cha~ 
lenge their readers. 
6 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................................................ 3 
DECLARATION ........................................................................................................................................ 5 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ......................................................................................................................... 6 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ........................................................................................................................... 7 
LIST OFT ABLES ..................................................................................................................................... 9 
LIST OF FIGURES ............................................................................................................................. , ... 10 
GLOSSARY OF MAJOR TERJVJS AND CONCEPTS ........................................................................ 11 
MAIN ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS .................................................................................... 12 
1. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................ 14 
I.) BACKGROUND .................................................................................................................................. 18 
).2 RESEARCII OBJECTIVES ................................................................................................................... 22 
).3 IMPORTANCE OF SlUDY ................................................................................................................... 22 
1.4 T!IEORETICAL VALUE ........................................................... , ........................................................... 23 
1.5 EMPIRICAL IMl'ORTANCE ................................................................................................................. 24 
1.6 STRUC'TlJREOFTIIESIS ..................................................................................................................... 25 
l.7 PROBLEM STATEMENT ..................................................................................................................... 26 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW .................................................................................................................... 28 
2. l INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF FINANCIAi. INTERMEDIATION ............................................................... 28 
(a) Early developments lo modelli11gfi11ancial i11termediatio11 ........................................................ 29 
(b) The Key11esiu11 revolraion ........................................................................................................... 34 
(c) Fina11d11/ .\ystem re1111i.1·s,mce11nd the corm/er movemenls ......................................................... 37 
(d) Op1;'11111/fimmcia/ s1111c111n' ........................ , ................................................................................ 41 
2.2 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: DUES FINANCIAL DEVEI.Ol'MENTPROMOTEGROWTII? .............................. 43 
2.3 TIIE TJIEORY OF FINANCIAL INTliRMEDlATION ...................................................... ._ ......................... 48 
2.4 TIIEORETIC'AI. PERSl'l'("{IVES IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ........................................................... 52 
2.5 Al'l'IWACll!:s l() ECONOMIC GHOWTll AND D1:v1,1.0PMENT ............................................................ 59 
3. FUNDAMENTAi, BACKGROUND TO THE ECONOMY ............................................................ 66 
3.) AN ANAl.YTICAl.0VERVIEW ........................................................................................................... 66 
3.2 COMl'ETING PARADlliMS ................................................................................................................. 68 
Colonial derdopment apology ......................................................................................................... 68 
Underdeve/opmenl /hem~' ................................................................................................................ 72 
Poivad-" 11e11·Jh1mework ............................................................................................................... 79 
3.3 ADDITIONAi. REMARKS AND WAY FROWARD .................................................................................. 85 
4. THE Zll\.1BAB\VE FINANCIAL SYSTEM ...... : ............................................................................... 87 
4.[ EVOLUTION OF THE ZlMHAllWEF!NANCIAL SYSTEM ....................................................................... 87 
The Era of Free Bw1ki11g (1892- 1939) ........................................................................................... 87 
Tise So11ther11 Rhodesia Crll"rency Board .......................................................................................... 92 
The Lund 1111d Agriculturnl Bank ...................................................................................................... 94 
4.2 ARCIIITECTURE OFTIIEPRESENTFINANCIALSECTOR ..................................................................... 95 
Overall Policy Ana(11sis .................................................................................................................... 95 
The Reserve Bank ........................................................................................................................... I 00 
Discount Houses ............................................................................................................................. 109 
Merchant Bunks .............................................................................................................................. I JO 
Commercial Banks ......................................................................................................................... 111 
7 
Fi11a11ce Houses ................................................................................................. , ............................ 116 
Buildillg Societies ........................................................................................................................... 117 
People's Own Savi11gs Da11k ............................................................................. ,.f ............................ 122 
Development /11slil11tionv ................................................................................................................ 123 
Representative Offices ..................................................................................... ~ ............................. 125 
lns11r1111ce and Pension Fund!>· ......................................................................... ,11 ............................. I 26 
The Zimbobl\'e Stock Erchange ....................................................................... t ............................ I 29 
Governmellt Sec11rilies .................................................................................... .J1 .............. .............. 139 
4.3 TltECl!ANGING LANDSCAl'E .................................................. • ......................... J:.' ............................ 140 
" S. DATA COLLECTION ....................................................................................... ;,,_.; .......................... 148 
. 
5.1 SCOl'EOl'!NDICATORS .................................................................................... !,( ............................ 148 
5.2 ANALYSISOl'JNDICATORS .............................................................................. : .............................. 149 
5.3 OTIIER VARIABLESCON'stDERED ................................. ., ................................................................. 152 
5.4 SOUR[ESOF DATA .......................................................................................... ! .............................. 153 
5.5 LIMITATIONS ................................................................................................... , .............................. 153 
6. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY ..................................................................................................... 154 
6,1 INIBODUCTION ............................................................................................... 1 .............................. 154 
6.2 VAR USES AND PROCEDURE .......................................................................... : .............................. 154 
6.3 TIIE ANALYrlCALFRAMEWORK .................................................................................................... 155 
6.4 TllE VEClDR AUTOREGRl:SS!VEMETHOD ..................................................................................... 156 
6.5 ORIGINS 01' VAR MODELLING ....................................................................................................... 157 
6.6 DISSATISFACTION WITH LSM MODELS .......................................................................................... 159 
6.7 BASIC CONCEl'J'S OF VAR ANALYSIS ............................................................... , .............................. 161 
(a) Types of VAR models ................................................................................................................ 161 
(b) Sttt1iv11ari(\' ............................................................................................................................... 162 
(c) As.v11mptio11s ....................................................................................................... .' ...................... 162 
(d) /mwvalion processes and unit roots .................................................. .'.' ..................................... 163 
(e) Testing for unit roots ................................................................................................................. 164 
6.8 PRELIMINARY DATA ANALYSIS ..................................................................................................... 166 
6.9 MODEL SPECIFICATION .................................................................... ,, ............................................ 172 
(a) The Statistical Jv!odel ........... , ................. , ................................................................................. 172 
(b) The Dynamic VAR Model ......................................................................................................... 174 
6.10 MODEL ESTJMA TION .................................................................................................................... 177 
7. COINTEGRATED VARS ................................................................................................................. 179 
7. J INTEGRATED VARIABLES ............................. , ............................ '; ..................................................... 179 
7.2 CotNTEGRATION ............................................................................................................................ 179 
7.3 THE JOHANSEN COINTEGRATION PROCEDURE ............................................................................... [79 
7.4 VECTOR ERROR CORRECTION I\10DEL ............................................................ : .............................. 180 
7.5 FORMALCOINTEGRATION ANALYSIS .............................................................. ; .............................. 181 
7.6 VAR ORDER AND 0["J"ERMINISTIC VARIABLES .............................................. ~ .............................. 188 
7.7 IMPULSERESPONSEANALYSIS ...................................................................................................... 188 
7.8 VARIANCE DECOMPOSITION .......................................................................................................... 190 
7.9 LIMITATIONS OF VAR ANDCOtNTEGRATlON ANALYSIS ................................ , .............................. 190 
(a) The atlieoretical natrll'e of VAR models ..................................................... : .............................. /90 
(b) Mitigation: social sciences ,1/'e no/ perfect ............................................................................... 191 
(c) Starisrical /imilalions of VAR and cointegration a1ia~vsis ...................................... :::: ............... 193 
(d) Mifig(1tion: str11ct11ral considerations ....................................................................................... 194 
8. EMPIRICAL COINTEGRA TION TESTS RES UL TS .................................................................. 195 
8.1 FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARY DEVELOPMENT ................................................................................... 195 
8.2 SELECTED INSTITUTIONAL DETERMINANTS or DEVELOPMENT ....................................................... 208 
8.3 EXPLORATORY REMARKS ON FINANCIAL EFFICIENCY .................................................................... 21 l 
8.4 S!IORTRUN DYNAMICS ....................................... !.' ......................................................................... 225 
9 CONCLUDING REMARKS .................................................................... ; ......................................... 241 
10 SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH ........................................................................... 244 
APPENDICES ........................................................................................................................................ 247 
8 
APPENDIX I: VAGUE CONCEPTS: CAPITAL AND MONEY ...................................................................... 247 
APPENDIX 2: Tl IE COMPLEX ROOT CIRCLE AND EIGENVALUES ............................................................. 250 
(a) The complex imit root circle ..................................................................................................... 250 
(b) Eigenvecfors anti eigenvalues ................................................................................................... 250 
APPENDIX 3: STANDARD BANK STAFFPORTP.AITS .............................................................................. 25 J 
APPENDIX 4: SOURCES OF DATA .......................................................................................................... 253 
BlllLIOGRAPHY .................................................................................................................................. 266 
REFERENCES ....................................................................................................................................... 282 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1 Counh)' Classification of Financial Structure ....................................... 16 
Table 2 Stylised rads on Economic Growth & Financial Sector Development49 
Table 3 US Real GDF Growth During Democratic And Republican 
Administrations .......................................................................................... 67 
Table 4 Black Miners' Death Rate 1906-50: selected years ............................. 75 
Table 5 Early Building Societies ..................................................................... 118 
Table 6 ZSE Statistics: selected years ........................................................... 135 
Table 7 Selected IPOs on the ZSE ................................................................ 137 
Table 8 Unit root tests for variable liquid liabilities (LQL ................................ 167 
Table 9 Unit root tests for various financial aggregates ................................. 170 
Table 10 Unit root tests for various economic aggregates ............................. 171 
Table 11 Testing for the rank of cointegration ................................................ 196 
Table 12 Estimated cointegration coefficients ................................................ 197 
Table 13 Normalised estimates of cointegration coefficients ......................... 198 
Table 14 Cointegration estimates subject to over identifying restriction ......... 199 
Table 15 Summary of time series modelling results ....................................... 201 
Table 16 Banking sector estimated cointegrated vectors ............................... 205 
Table 17 Banking sector exactly identified cointegration vectors ................... 206 
Table 18 Required reserves and liquid asset ratios - percentages ................ 221 
Table 19 Generalised Forecast Error Variance Decomposition Analyses ...... 234 
Table 20 ECM for variable LGPCY estimated by OLS based on cointegrating 
VAR(4) ..................................................................................................... 237 
Table 21 ECM for variable DMB estimated by OLS based on cointegrating 
VAR(4) .................................................................................... : ................ 238 
Table 22 Summary results of error correction relations in the VAR model ..... 239 
Table 23 Original data set .............................................................................. 259 
Table 24 Transformed data set and proxies ................................................... 261 
9 
Figure 1 
Figure 2 
Figure 3 
Figure 4 
Figure 5 
Figure 6 
Figure 7 
Figure 8 
Figure 9 
Figure 10 
Figure 11 
Figure 12 
Figure 13 
Figure 14 
Figure 15 
Figure 16 
Figure 17 
Figure 18 
Figure 19 
Figure 20 
Figure 21 
Figure 22 
Figure 23 
Figure 24 
Figure 25 
Figure 26 
Figure 27 
Figure 28 
Figure 29 
Figure 30 
Figure 31 
Figure 32 
Figure 33 
Figure 34 
Figure 35 
LIST OF FIGURES 
.I 
. I Categories of sources of finance among firms ........ l~ ...................... 40 
Caught short on empathy or just free riding? .......... 1 ....................... 78 
A cartoonist's impression of an electoral campaign i,., ...................... 82 
The first official currency of Zimbabwe .................... , ........................ 89 
Standard Bank issued bank notes ........................... j~.· ..................... 90 
A Procedure to test for unit roots ............................. ~! .................... 166 
Currency in circulation to GOP ................................ '. ..................... 202 
Government expenditure to GDP ............................ 
1 
..................... 203 
Zimbabwe current account balance .............................................. 204 
Trends in commercial banks' real depos!t rates ... ' ...................... 212 
Trends in other real interest rates for savings ............................ 213 
Spread between deposit and lendinq r_ates ......... '. ..................... 214 
ELA to loans and advances: commercial banks ........................ 218 
Excess liquid assets to loans and advances: merchant banks .. 218 
Excess liquid assets to loans and advances: finance houses ... 219 
Excess liquid assets to loans and advances: building societies 219 
Trends in real GDP: 1975 - 2000 .............................................. 220 
Stock market capitalisation to GOP ........................................... 222 
Total value traded to GDP ......................................................... 223 
Stock market turnover 1980 - 2000 ........................................... 224 
Real Industrial Price Index and Value Traded lndex .................. 225 
PP of the effect of a system-wide shock to Equation A ............. 225 
PP of the effect of a system-wide shock to Equation 8 ............. 226 
PP of the effect of a system-wide shock to Equation E ............. 226 
GIR to one S.E. shock in the equation for LGPCY .................... 227 
GIR to one S.E. shock in the equation for CIC .......................... 227 
GIR to one S.E. shock in the equation for G .............................. 228 
GIR to one S.E. shock in the equation for CAB ......................... 228 
GIR to one S.E. shock in the equation for DMB ......................... 229 
GIRs to one S.E. shock in the equation for LGPCY ................... 230 
GIRs to one S.E. shock in the equation for CIC ......................... 230 
GI Rs to one S.E. shock in the equation for G ..... L .................... 231 
GI Rs to one S.E. shock in the equation for CAB ....................... 231 
GlRs to one S.E. shock in the equation for OMB ....................... 231 
Images of institutionalised racism at the work pla'ce? ................ 252 
10 
GLOSSARY OF MAJOR TERMS AND CONCEPTS 
Cointegration exists if, and only if, there is a weighted combinat;on of inte-
grated variables that is driven by common trends. (See Verbeek 2000 Ch. 9) 
Corporate governance collectively refers to the internal and external man-
agement of non-trading risk and competing interests within institutions. Most 
problems emanate from the separation of ownership from management and in-
formation asymmetries. 
Economic development, in Kindleberger and Herrick's (1977, p1) view, in-
cludes improvements in material and general welfare; the eradication of mass 
poverty with its correlates of illiteracy, disease, and early death; shifts from agri-
cultural toward industrial activities; promotion of high employment; and greater 
participation in economic decision making process and otherwise. 
Economic growth is usually measured by the rise in GDP or GDP per capita 
over time. The growth rate depicts the rate of change over two time periods. 
Financial intermediation is the process of mobilizing financial assets from 
many depositors (or savers) and the conduct of separate and independent con-
tractual transactions with borrowers. Financial intermediaries "go between" eco-
nomic units with surplus financial assets and borrowers in need of financial re-
sources for investment and I or other transactions. 
Underdevelopment denotes poorly developed and undiversified economic 
sectors; over reliance on production of primary products; as well as economic 
domination by external market forces. Mass poverty; foreign currency short-
ages; debt and balance of payment crisis are also common features. 
Vector autoregression is a multivariate econometric process, which estimates 
the temporal fluctuations and dynamic interdependence among current and past 
realisations of variables in a time series vector up to a specified Jag length. 
11 
MAIN ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
CIC - Currency in Circulation 
CMB - Commercial Banks 
CMLA - Commercial Banks Loans And Advances 
CPI - Consumer Price Index 
DFI - Development Financial Institutions 
DH - Discount Houses 
DMB - Deposit Money Banks 
FH - Finance Houses 
FSB - Fiscal Balance 
GDP - Gross Domestic Product 
INS - Insurance Companies 
LQL - Liquid Liabilities 
MB - Merchant Banks 
MDC - Movement for Democratic Change 
NBFI - Non Bank Financial Institutions 
NCD - Negotiable Certificates of Deposits 
OBI - Other Banking Institutions 
,I 
" . 1·.·. 
. 
" '" 
POIVAD - Patronage, Ostracism, Impunity, Violence And Demise 
POSS - Post Office Saving Bank 
PCDMB - Private Sector Credit by DMB 
PSC - Private Sector Credit 
RBZ - Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe 
SMC - Stock Market Capitalisation 
TB - Treasury Bills 
ZANU PF - Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front) 
ZAPU - Zimbabwe African People's Union 
ZDB - Zimbabwe Development Bank 
ZSE - Zimbabwe Stock Exchange 
ZW or ZWE - Zimbabwe, formerly Rhodesia prior to 1980 
HRE - Harare, capital city of Zimbabwe formerly Salisbury 
12 
I 
Economists and politicians from all nations rich and poor, capitalist, socialist 
and mixed, have worshipped at the shrine of economic growth 
Michael Todaro (1994, p99), Economic Development, Longman. 
For as long as we are unable to put our arguments into figures, the voice of our 
science, although occasionally it may help dispel errors, will never be heard by 
practical men." 
Schumpeter (1933, p12), Econometrica, (first issue). 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
,I 
I 
Economists and politicians from all nations rich and poor, ~pitalist, socialist 
and mixed, have worshipped at the shrine of economic growth!1 .. , 
" Michael Todari>·, (1994, p99) 
,, 
" 
There is a growing theoretical and empirical interest I in the pedagogic 
' 
value of financial aggregates in relation to economic growth. In fact, financial 
aggregates constitute the core of observational data collected ·all over the world. 
Th1ee competing but not necessarily mutually exclusive hypotheses can be 
identified in the literature. Firstly classical economists argue finance has no real 
effect; it actually follows income. Secondly many financial economists find fi-
nance has a causal effect on grov,!1.h. The third view either takes causality to be 
mutual or argues that finance is detrimental to growth. The continual emergence 
of new and more sophisticated techniques, as well as broGi.d datasets, facilitates 
a rich re:;:ippraisal of this unsettled debate. This study therefore examines 
whether financial intermediation aggregates contain statistically significant in-
formation about economic performance or movements in real income. 
Recent evidence from Latin America and South East Asia demonstrates 
that a financial crisis can arise from (1) a currency crisis, (2) banking crisis (3) 
debt crisis or (4) stock market crashes. Most empirical studies are myopic in 
orientation hence the necessities for a broader focus. Researchers of different 
persuasions either exclusively focus on banking aggregates or stock market ac-
tivity. Financial intermediation literature is preoccupied with the size, organisa-
tion and stability of the banking sector. Empirical research in financial markets is 
preoccupied with the predictability of stock prices. Mills (1993, p3) cautions: 
We should avoid giving the impression that the only financial time 
series of interest are stock prices. There are financial markets 
other than those for stocks, most notably for bonds and foreign 
currency, but there also exist the various futures and commodity 
markets all of which provide interesting and important series to 
analyse. 
14 
It is important to stress that the financial sector consists of banks, non-
bank financial institutions (NBFls) and equity markets. Beck, Demirgii9-Kunt, 
and Levine (1999, p2) note that banking sector development and stock market 
development both "exert a causal impact on economic growth." Conventionally 
financial development is measured in terms of size, activity and efficiency. 
This thesis systematically relates economic performance to long run de-
velopment in banks, NBFI, and the stock exchange in a Zimbabwean context. 
The study amalgamates indicators such as size, activity, and efficiency from 
various sources such as Beck, DemirgGc;-Kunt, and Levine (1999), Lynch 
(1993, 1994), Levine (1998), and Rousseau P. L. and Wachtel P. (1998). 
Demirgii9-Kunt, and Levine (1999, p3) regard a country's financial system to be 
underdeveloped "if it has below median values of both bank and market devel-
opments" on a global scale. In practical terms both the claims of Deposit Money 
Banks (DMB) on private sector to GDP and the total value of securities traded 
to GDP are less than the global mean. Generally, the classification produces 
three categories of financial structure viz. (a) underdeveloped, (b) bank based 
and (c) market based. Due to practical complications Table 1 portrays four 
types of financial structure to distinguish the relative strengths of markets and 
institutions in less sophisticated financial systems. 
Financial intermediation should be of major concern given the current 
emphasis on the importance of private sector participation in economic devel-
opment. This process was further strengthened by the demise of most com-
mand economies at the end of the Cold War. Hellwig (1991 ), cited in Freixas 
and Rochet (1997, p?) stresses that banks exert a fundamental influence on 
capital allocation, risk sharing and economic growth. Jayaraman (1996, p 1), 
citing Killick (1993) adds: 
The . . . private sector cannot function unless there is a well-
lubricated financial system in place because, unlike the public 
sector, it cannot raise resources through taxation or from money 
creation. It must save or borrow to invest and the financial sector 
facilitates these tasks. 
Policy makers and applied economists additionally believe fluctuations in 
financial variables have real effects both in the short run (stabilization) and in 
the long run (growth) and hence warrant close attention. Multinational entities 
15 
Table 1 
Country Classification of Fiilancial Structure ,I 
Financially underdeveloped economies Flnanclally develo ad countries 
Country name Structure Country name Structure 
Index ,, Index 
Bank-based economies Bank-based economies 
Bangladesh -b.90 Panama ,·., -0.92 
Nepa! -0.87 Tunisia 
" 
-0.88 
... 
Egypt -0.62 Cyprus ·D.77 
Costa Rica -0.79 Portugal -0.75 
Barbados -0.78 Austria -0.73 
Honduras -0.75 Belgium -0.66 
Trinidad & Tobago -0.74 lta!y -0.57 
MaurlUus -0.70 Finland -0.53 
Kenya -0.69 Norway -0.33 
Ecuador -0.56 New Zealand -0.29 
Sri Lanka -0.54 Japan -0.19 
lndoi1esla -0.50 France -0.17 
Colombia -0.47 Jordan -0.14 
Pakistan -0.38 Germany -0.10 
Zimbabwe ~.34 Israel -0.06 
Greece -0.34 Spain 0.02 
Argentina -0.25 
Venezuela -0.15 Group mean -0.44 
lndla -0.14 
Ireland ·0.06 M:;irkel-based economies 
Netherlands 0.11 
Group mean ·0.54 Thailand 0.39 
Canada 0.41 
Markel-based economies Auslral!a 0.50 
Denmark 0.15 South Africa 0.83 
""" 
0.16 Korea 0.89 
Chile 0.25 Sweden 0.91 
Jamaica 0.28 Great Britain 0.92 
Brazil 0.65 Singapore 1.18 
Mexico 0.68 United States 1.96 
Philippines 0.71 Switzerland 2.03 
Turkey 1.23 Hong Kong 2.10 
Malaysia 2.93 
Group mean 0.52 Group mean 1.17 
Flnanclatly underdeveloped countries ·0.24 Flnancially developed countries 0.28 
Overall mean 0.03 
Source: DemirgG9-Kunt A, and Levine R (1999) Table 12.The conglomerate financial structure 
index is constructed from means adjusted average measures of (a) size-[Capitallzation vs. 
Banks] , (b) activity- [Trading Vs Bank Credit], and (c) efficiency - [Trading vs. Overhead.] A 
higher relative degree of stock market development in relation to the banking system develop-
ment results in a higher the structure value. Entries arranged in ascending order of sophistica-
tion. The index is however not foolproof. 
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such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and The World Bank now rou-
tinely include financial liberalization in any serious economic structural adjust-
ment program. Recent projects focussing on financial structure and economic 
development at the World Bank (Feb 2000) demonstrate the degree of impor-
tance the institution attaches to the topic. Mark Gertler (1988, p560), and 
Freixas and Rochel (1997, p176) concur that policymakers give close attention 
to financial markets and institutions because they affect real output both in the 
short run and in the long run. This draws attention to the services financial in-
termediaries provide to the economy and how they are organized. 
Theories of financial intermediation pJt greater emphasis on the "s_pe-
cialness", information services, liquidity, and economic importance of banks. As 
instanced by Allen and Gale (1997) the intermediary role of financial markets 
(eg. stock) is also stressed. The prominence of banks is also highlighted in pe-
riods of crises such as the Great Depression that coincided with the collapse of 
40% banks and disappearance of 44 % of demand deposits in the US, ob-
served Hixon (1993, p1). According to Friedman and Schwartz (1963) bank fail-
ures attenuated the severity of the depression. In all economies financial inter-
mediaries play a vital role in the payment system, liquidity services, asset 
transformation, risk management, and information services. Financial interme-
diaries increase productivity by lowering transaction costs; mitigate moral haz-
ard and opportunism; and support commitment through delegation. I discuss the 
details later on under the literature review. 
The opening quotation from Todaro (1994, p99) emphasizes that eco-
nomic growth is a universal concern for all peoples. Owoye (1997, p71) points 
out that fluctuations in GDP data depicts "the success or failure of current mac-
roeconomic policies ... " Owoye, like Schumpeter (1933) argues that knowledge 
about the informational content and the predictive power of financial aggregates 
helps authorities and policymakers to optimise economic decisions. Such infor-
mation invariably assists authorities in selecting appropriate policy targets. This 
thesis contributes to increasing scholarly output on financial institutions, capital 
markets and economic growth. It improves communication between the aca-
demic community, financial economists and policymakers. I agree with Bow-
brick (1988, p56) that accurate economic analysis can make a difference be-
tween life and death among less sophisticated communities. 
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1.1 ·3ackground 
,I 
The role of financial development in economic growth ~as attracted con-
siderable theoretical and empirical interest in recent years. Tajlput this research 
into perspective I begin with a brief glance at the overall landstape. This seives 
to highlight the direction of major studies in this important field.;.: .. 
" Martin and Win (1996, p19) suggest that the contribution of the financial 
sector can be examined at three closely-knit levels: 
(I) At a macroeconomic lev£' a positive correlation with' economic growth 
is expected. The contribution of the financial system is affecte,d by its efficiency 
as measured by "liquidity, volatility, transaction costs and transparency ... " (p 5). 
Poor performance by financial intermediaries retards economic activity. 
(II) By quantifying the direct benefits of the financial system. This involves 
es~imaUon of the vah.!e added to jobs, services and products generated by the 
financial sa:tcir. P. detailed quantification of processes, service flow, revenues 
and transaction costs is required to make an accurate assessment. A structural 
(production) or functional (intermediation) view of the financial system may be 
used. The perspective of financial structure adopted influences details of what 
to include in the analysis. 
(Ill} By examining the indirect benefits of the market. Financial develop-
ment comes with both general and institution-specific benefits to the economy. 
The general functions provided by financial intermediaries 8re economies of 
scale and scope in information services, liquidity services, consumption 
smoothing, transactions cost, and risk reduction services. Other institution-
specific functions include credit allocation; the payment system; money supply 
transmission; and credit substitution. The actual range of services provided de-
pends on the sophistication and regulation of the financial system in a particular 
economy. 
In practice, level II b difficult to calibrate while paucity of detailed trans-
actions data handicap empirical research. As a result, research grapples with 
methodological and measurement issues. Apart from Martin and Win (1996), 
and Brealey and Soria (1993) cited by the former authors, not much research is 
on record. The nearest studies deal with frontier analysis, also known as x-
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efficiency. Berger and Humphrey (1997) survey this literature and conclude that 
various efficiency methods do not lead to identical results because of methodo-
logical differences. According to them frontier analysis benchmarks "the relative 
performance of production units" and evaluates how close they "are to a 'best-
practice' frontier'' (p4 ). A parametric or nonparametric representation may be 
applied depending on assumptions imposed on data, the functional form, and 
the degree of efficiency. Parametric efficiency analysis specifies a deterministic 
functional form whereas nonparametric approaches presuppose less structure 
but do not model random errors. In both approaches some input and output 
definitional concepts remain controversial. Berger and Humphrey (1997, p32) 
note: 
The asset, user cost, and va!ue-added methods of assigning fi-
nancial goods to input and output categories all agree that loans 
and other major assets of financial institutions should count as 
outputs. However, there is a longstanding controversy whether 
deposits should count as inputs or outputs. Deposits have input 
characteristics because they are paid for in part by interest pay-
ments and the funds raised provide the institution with raw mate-
rial of ingestible funds. However, deposits also have output char-
acteristics because they are associated with a substantial amount 
of liquidity, safekeeping, and payments services provided to de-
positors. 
The dilemma is resolved by stripping deposits into input (interest paid) 
and output (amount of deposits) characteristics. Similarly the definition of 
money supply also wrestles with the categorization of various deposits. Regu-
latory differences also make cross-country comparisons very difficult. 
In the view of Freixas and Rochet (1997, pB) there are five issues at the mac-
roeconomic level that require attention: -
(a) the transmission channel of monetary policy. 
(b) the fragility of the monetary policy 
(c) the existence of financial cycles 
(d) the real effect (corporate investment) of financial intenmediation , 
and 
(e) the impact of financial intermediation on economic growth. 
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These subsections are major research areas in their own right. Kuh and 
Meyer (1963) and Elliot (1973), fur instance, analyse financial1factors in corpo-
rate investment. Financial fragility, recessions and crises feat4re prominently in 
the works of Kindleberger (1978,1996) and Minsky (1972, 19~6).' Comparative 
studies between bank-based and market-based financial syst~,r.n received a fair 
share of attention but are no longer informative, Levine (2000).;.:. 
My thesis is restricted to (e) because economic well-being has a univer-
sal appeal. lt motivates most economic transactions. Indeed Lewis (1995, p18) 
cited in Martin and Win (1996, p7) reiterates that the financiai!services industry 
is the major engine of economic growth. Prior studies directed at the relation-
ship between financial development and economic growth inClude Schumpeter 
([1911] 1936), Gurley and Shaw (1955, 1960), Goldsmith (1969), McKinnon 
(1973), Shaw (1973), Levine (1991, 1997, 1998) and Beck, Levine and Loayza 
(2000.) 
It was earlier noted that the contribution of the financial sector is affected 
by the efficiency of the financial intermediaries, characterized by the system's 
liquidity, volatility, transaction costs and transparency. Financial intermediaries 
provide economies of scale and scope in addition to acquiring information, mo-
bilising and allocating resources, managing risk, and exerting corporate control. 
Martin and Win (1996, p12) note that absence of financial intermediaries in the 
risk management process inhibits economic activity in the same way that the 
absence of financial intermediaries may inhibit economic activity. Reduction in 
the level of intermediation activity and liquidity will reduce the contribution of the 
financial markets to the economy. High transaction and information costs retard 
economic growth by lowering productivity. 
The World Bank (1989, p26) notes that resource accumulation has not 
predicted growth in the Malthusian context. '"In 1870, Australia, a country rich in 
natural resources, had twice the per capita income of Switzerland, which has 
few; today Switzerland's per capita income exceeds Australia's by more than 
half." The report notes that the success of Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea and 
Singapore does not resemble their resource endowment. 
" Details of these citations and those in the next paragraph are fully discussed under the literature review. 
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In this thesis I posit that the operations of financial intermediaries have a 
direct impact or. overall economic performance. Typical literature and research 
characterise economic development as a process amenable to sound and 
proper management and policies. There is no single measure of development 
because structural issues such as extent of poverty, income distribution, social 
and political change, literacy, leisure and economic well being come into play. 
The financial level of analysis generally equates development to the in-
crease in GDP per capita over time. The economic growth rate is given by the 
rate of change in GDP per capita over two periods in time. Strictly speaking, 
there is a distinction between economic development and economic growth. 
Positive growth rates derived from the GDP indicate economic growth but not 
necessarily economic development. A growing economy may remain underde-
veloped if other indicators highlighted supra are not improving. Conventionally, 
GDP is accepted as a measure of national income (Y) and economic size while 
GDP per capita is the most popular proxy for average human welfare. The rate 
of change in GDP per capita (GY), depicts the speed and direction of changes 
in wellbeing. For record and research purposes these proxies are measurable 
and expressible in pure mathematical form, and assist in the statistical testing of 
theories. 
Increased interest in economic growth and development literature has 
led to a proliferation of empirical work and theories. Michael Todaro, (1997, 
p70) who interprets development as a "multidimensional process" summarises 
development literature into five competing categories. These are (a) the linear 
stages of growth model; (b) theories and patterns of structural change; (c) the 
international dependence revolution; (d) the neoclassical, free market counter-
revolution; and (e) the endogenous theory of economic growth. Most theories 
concentrate on capital formation, a term used to describe increases in net in-
vestment in capital assets. 
Kindleberger and Herrick (1977, pp 179-89) adopt a leaner classification 
for economic development theories. This comprises neoclassical, radical or 
Marxist, and structuralist categories. Adam and O'Connell (1997) identify three 
policy phases categorised as the "capital shortage" diagnosis (1970s), "policy 
failure" diagnosis (1980s), and the "institutional" failure of the 1990s. 
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1.2 Research Objectives 
,I 
This thesis examines the nature and intensity of links bbtween measures 
of financial sophistication and economic performance in Zimtj~bweb for the pe-
riod between 1924 and 1998. It relates economic performan~e to the propaga-
tion of financial intermediation over a period of seventy-five (7.5) years in order 
' 
to identify any coevolution and I or long-term cumulative e~0cts. Quantitative 
tests were conducted to evaluate the speed and direction of causal links be-
tween financial intermediation and economic performance. A iector autoregres-
sive [VAR] approach is applied to fulfil the purpose of this investigation. To pro-
vide a philosophical background to the empirical analysis, tHe thesis explores 
the contradictory institutional developments in Zimbabwe over the years. 
1.3 Importance of study 
In this subsection I briefly outline the significance of this research. Con-
ducting this analysis is important as it helps researchers to gain insight into the 
finance-growth nexus. Tests were executed to determine whether stylised em-
pirical results are valid in a small developing economy. A range of alternative 
indicators is applied to gain the broadest perspective and to ensure an in-depth 
analysis. This approach is merited by the absence of a universally acceptable 
yardstick of financial sophistication. An appreciation of VAR time series tech-
niques is an added bonus meant to inspire new comers to the ·concepts. 
Very little scholarly work of this nature, if any, has been done in Zim-
babwe using the latest time series techniques. In particular both policymakers 
and researchers have largely ignored financial intermediatiorl. Apart from gen-
eralised newspaper articles, detailed research on financial institutions and mar-
kets is at best very sparse, and at worst outdated and wanting of depth. In my 
opinion there is much room for material improvement in LDC financial markets 
by virtue of their relatively low level of development. ln addition most clients in 
b The name Zimbabwe is used to cover the entire historical period under review. Before 1980 Zimbabwe 
was fonncr!y known as Rhodesia. The name Rhodesia was given Imperial sanction in 1895 as a collective 
name for the then two provinces of Matebeleland and Mashona)and. Prior to that present day Zambia and 
Zimbabwe were referred to as Northern and southern Zambezia respectively since l 886. Zambezia was 
declared a British sphere of influence in 1888. The name Charterland was used briefly. 
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these markets are not financially sophisticated. They stand to benefit from en-
lightened policy decisions and market-led innovation. Rousseau and Wachtel 
(1998) concur that countries in early stages of development are the most likely 
to benefit from financial development. While production to some extent follows 
consumer tastes, Schumpeter ([1911] 1936, p65) is emphatic that innovative 
producers could "as a rule" educate customers "to want new things." If this as-
sumption, like the concept of supply leading finance, is valid, financial sophisti-
cation could be instrumental in promoting economic prosperity. 
This endeavour will assist in comparative studies because current cross-
country studies give inadequate attention to small countries. Future scholars 
may learn from past documented experiences. Schumpeter (1936, p83) argues 
acquired knowledge is communally beneficial. Even an exceptional "giant of 
wisdom and will" cannot be materially and mentally self-sufficient. 
1.4 Theoretical value 
Empirical findings on the finance and development controversy are still 
contradictory; and the theoretical debate is unresolved. Applying new tech-
niques to an alternative data set sheds new light onto the course of the debate. 
This study makes a worthwhile contribution to the finance and growth body of 
knowledge. Demirgu9-Kunt, and Levine (1999, p1) point out that unresolved 
debate "hampers the formulation of sound policy advice." I support this view be-
cause sound economic policies require accurate judgements about causality. 
For academic and empirical purposes, this work hopes to stimulate and 
promote intellectual curiosity in time series analysis. To this end I present in 
detail, the VAR methodology in a pedagogic framework accessible to beginning 
researchers without specialist training in advanced mathematics. Existing formal 
works, though shining with elegant l'-revity and richness to an informed ear, feel 
esoteric and intimidating to would be converts not yet on the road to Damascus. 
Stock's (1994,p2745) comprehensive survey for instance, is addressed to 
"graduate students and applied econometricians." Is the mathematical rigor 
avoidable, one may wonder? However, in econometrics, running away from 
mathematical terminology and parsimonious "Greek" symbolism in favour of 
"learning for exams" under the guise of "appreciating the concepts" is not the 
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solution. See Spanos (1999, pp xvii - xviii.) According to Binmore (1992, p 
xxvi), as cited in Spanos on the same pages, inadequate dept~ is tantamount to 
an unwitting conspiracy between the teacher and thej1student to 
defraud whoever is paying the fees. The teacher rtretends to 
teach, and the student pretends to learn, material that[1~oth know 
in their hearts is so emasculated that it cannot be proAE;!rly under-
stood in the form in which it is presented. :·· 
" 
... 
Many bivariate and trivariate VAR systems are misspScified in order to 
accommodate small data sets and the resultant fast exhaus~ion of degrees of 
' freedom. Basing policy on flawed small scale VAR modelling systems can be 
disastrous. Indeed Watson (1994, p2901) asserts that it is "~ery important" for 
structural analysis to take into account all "important macroeconomic shocks" 
active in the economic process. This thesis uses a five variable VAR model; 
representing core economic sectors. 
One or two entirely new contributions contained herein are minor result 
of this thesis that requires further investigation by other interested researchers. I 
propose a new measure of inefficiency that regards excess liquid assets as po-
tential indicators of disintermediation, wh!::h variable is herein termed DRIFT. In 
this research I interpret the institutional landscape of Zimbabwe in an entirely 
new POIVAD framework. The new paradigm explores how value is created and 
distributed among economic agents in Zimbabwe. Despite the Soviet Union's 
technological advancement for instance, institutional constraints retarded pros-
pects for financial sophistication and economic prosperity.1 On the finance-
growth nexus, I urge financial researchers to make greater u~e of risk adjusted 
time series data being generated by prudential supervision. Historical cost 
based variables may inflate the depth of financial intermediation. On corporate 
governance I suggest that future research should conduct more fieldwork. 
1.5 Empirical Importance 
Charemza and Deadman (1992, p xi) suggest that cointegration and 
vector autore'.)ressive [VAR] modelling are "relevant for time series rather than 
cross-section econometrics." I agree with this conclusion, hence my focus on a 
single developing country. Most researchers have concentrated on more devel-
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oped countries or give a cursory examination to less developed countries 
(LDCs) in cross-country studies. The meagre depth of such studies means that 
individual LDC countries cannot draw detailed policy conclusions appropriate to 
their structures and circumstances. DemirgU9-Kunt, and Levine (1999, p1) note 
that existing comparative studies of the merits of market-based and bank-based 
financial systems have primarily focused on four countries namely the US, UK, 
Japan and Germany. In their considered view, similar per capita incomes and 
long run growth rates shared by these countries shroud the economic impor-
tance of financial aggregates. Beck, DemirgU9-Kunt, and Levine's (1999) online 
"New Database" (World Bank) allows financial analysts and researchers to un-
dertake detailed examination of financial sector development and structure 
"across counties and over time along many different dimensions," (p3). Unfortu-
nately, the newly constructed data set covers an inadequate span (1975 to 
1996) and a few variables on Zimbabwe. The archaeology of financial data in 
Zimbabwe should yield a rich treasure as the Central Statistics Office dates 
back to 1928. Paucity of data continues to retard research and policy analysis in 
LDC. This thesis therefore complements and extends the World Bank data set. 
Empirical findings should assist authorities in selecting appropriate policy tar-
gets. 
1.6 Structure of thesis 
Briefly the thesis is organized into eight major parts. Section 1 proposes 
the purpose of the study and its significance. The major research questions .are 
fully defined in section 1.7. Section 2 covers the literature review, summarising 
the stylised facts about financial intermediation theories and the relevant find-
ings of leading researchers in that discipline. To put my research into its proper 
context, background details of the Zimbabwean economic system are presented 
in Section 3. A new theoretical or philosophical framework, Poivad, developed 
herein attempts to resolve the inconsistencies and contradictory developments 
perversive in the Zimbabwean society. This is followed by a consideration of the 
evolution of the Zimbabwe financial system in Section 4. Section 4 also gives a 
very brief account of the structure of the Zimbabwe financial system. Chimombe 
(1983) and Mataruka (1999) provide full accounts on ihe financial structure. 
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These sources are at best general guides as the financial landscape continually 
changes with time. Section 5 discuses variables included in tl~e study and data 
transformations. Details of the applied methodology comprise1 Section 6, which 
discusses the VAR method, its applications and criticisms. Th~ characterisation 
' of the functional form of the equations initiated in Section 6 ~~ends to cointe-
grated VARs in Section 7. In Section 8 the results of the tests, their interpreta-
•·. 
tion and evaluation are presented. After highlighting the mai,(1 findings of this 
project, the last part of the thesis suggests directions for further research. 
I 
1.7 Problem Statement 
But research questions are not written in stone. They, like the researcher asking 
them, evolve as the research proceeds. 
Johnson, Johnson and Buse (1987, p394) 
This thesis is a study of financial intermediation and economic perform-
ance. It discusses and evaluates the significance of financial intermediation on 
real activity. The structural impediments to efficient intermediation and conse-
quently economic development are explored using both narrative and quantita-
tive frameworks. The three major research questions considered in the course 
of this study are briefly outlined below. 
Question 1: What relationship, if any, exists between·financial interme-
diation and economic performance? 
Discussion: This question looks at the economic significance of finan-
cial intermediaries. Finance theory has not has not yet resolv8d the issue. Clas-
sical theories ascribe no role to financial intermediaries because they owe their 
existence to market imperfections. Current literature suggests that banks do not 
just offer special services such as providing liquidity and risk management as 
economic agents, but could be entrepreneurs in their own right. Statistically the 
magnitude of parameters can shed light on whether financial intermediaries 
have a positive, negative or neutral effect on economic performance. 
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Question 2: Do financial aggregates relating to size, activity and the de-
gree of financial sophistication contain useful information about movements in 
economic activity? 
Discussion: Proponents of fina11cial intermediation have almost reached 
a consensus that intermediaries have a positive effect on real activity. They, 
however, differ on the actual mechanics operating the finance and growth inter-
action. This thesis uses a broad array of recently developed indicators to test 
the direction of causality and the persistence of shocks over time. 
Question 3: How relevant are institutional factors (such as governance, 
regulation, and societal relations) to the process of economic development in 
Zimbabwe? 
Discussion: Economic development in the Third World has been very 
problematic. Adam and O'Connell (1997) note that poor economic performance 
was initially blamed on "capital shortage", a phase that lasted throughout the 
1970s. When foreign aid and external debt failed to stimulate sustainable 
growth the "policy failure" diagnosis (1980s) emerged. The "institutional" failure 
diagnosis of the 1990s came as a result of bleak economic activity in spite of 
widespread liberalisation and economic structural adjustment programs. The 
emphasis is now on good governance, accountability, transparency and con-
tract enforcement. As Delhaise (1998) put it, the collapse of the Asian financial 
system was not a surprising due to fundamental weakness. According to him, 
what were surprising were the panics and not the crisis. Levine (1998), La Porta 
et al (2000) and Zingales (2000) ably incorporate these issues into the theory of 
financial intermediation I finance. 1 provide a Zimbabwean overview knowing 
that Schumpeter (1954, p12) hails history, statistics and "theory" as the three 
pillars of economic analysis. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
,I 
I 
The return to new knowledge is higher, the more you already ,tow. 
I 
Easterly W and Levine R (2000, p20) 
" 
1',•, 
2.1 Intellectual Origins of Financial Intermediation 
Money may be the oil of commerce, but intermediaries are its !ngine. 
Spulber (1999, p344) 
' 
Financial intermediation literature revolves around three competing hy-
potheses. Proponents of financial intermediation propose a positive causal ef-
fect on the financial and real sector interaction. Classical theory posits that the 
real sector (income) leads money, and the financial &ector with the exception of 
money supply, is neutral. The third view regards the rapid development of the 
financial system as detrimental to economic prosperity. 
Conceptually, the role of sundry financial variables on aggregate eco-
nomic activity has always been controversial. Alexander Hamilton (1871) cited 
in Beck, Levine and Loayza (2000, p32) argued that "banks were the happiest 
engines that ever were invented" for creating economic growth. Bagehot (1873) 
as reflected in Becsi and Wang (1997, p50) attributed the rapid 19~ century in· 
dustrialisation of England to sophisticated financial intermediation. On the other 
hand Levine et al (2000) note that US President John Adams (1819) considered 
banks to be harmful to the "morality, tranquillity and even wealth" of nations. 
This view supported Ricardo's conception as cited in Schumpeter (1936, p98) 
"that 'banking operations' cannot increase a country's wealth." Ajit Singh (1997) 
attacks financial sophistication as a luxury developing countries can ill afford. In 
his view, financial liberalisation, especially the rapid expansion of stock markets 
brings about increased financial fragility that is detrimental to economic per-
formance and development. Over the years financial institutions have been 
subjected to mechanical limits on liquidity, solvency and credit creation. A high 
degree of liquidity, high ratio of indebtedness, high concentration of financial 
assets as opposed to real assets, and close regulation distinguish financial in-
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stitutions, Lewis (1995, pxiii). The Glass-Steagall Act (1933) and "Regulation Q" 
institutionalised the distrust of banks in the US. In fact the reqent US Financial 
Modernization Act acknowledged that financial intermediatio~ is susceptible to 
government intervention and distortion at both a micro and mafro level. 
At a macro level, Mark Gertler (1988) and Mattesini (1993) concur on the 
" fact that theory and research on the linkages between financi~l,.8nd real sectors 
have been directed at (i) the relationship between financial :development and 
economic growth; (ii) financial factors in corporate investmenti and (iii) financial 
crises and business cycles. On a micro level, transaction costs, market organi-
sation and microstructure provide a valuable exposition to the understanding of 
financial intermediation. A new focus on information asymmetry, liquidity insur-
ance, deposit contracts, delegated monitoring has enriched the theory of finan-
cial intermediation. Baltensperger (1980), Gertler (1988), Bhattacharya and 
Thakor (1992) and Thaker (1996) provide comprehensive revJews of the litera-
ture. Rapid advances in the field have taken their toll on Baltensperger. How-
ever, the emphasis on complete endogenous models remains a potent chal-
lenge. Gertler remains a valuable and very accessible review of developments 
before 1988. Thakor's important synthesis brings out crucial advances in the 
literature with a particular emphasis on financial design. 
(a) Early developments to modelling financial intermediation 
Early studies in financial intermediation focused on credit expansion and 
creation of money by banks. The existence of financial interll1ediarles was as-
sumed. Edgeworth (1888), who regards probability as the "foundation of bank-
ing", formally demonstrated that banks could generate economies of scale as 
long as withdrawals remain stocl 1astic events and the behaViour of depositors 
independent of ec,ch other. A fractional reserve banking system translates into 
a money multiplier process. Outside the realms of money and credit creation, 
finance and economlcs theory regarded investment as the real engine behind 
economic activity and the monetary system was reduced to a neutral process. 
Monetary neutrality refors to the irrelevance of money in aggregate economic 
analysis as portrayed in classical economics. Classical dichotomy is the sepa-
ration of macroeconomics into real and nominal (monetary) variables. 
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Joseph Schumpeter ([1911) 1936) is credited with drawing closer atten-
tion to the importance of financial intermediation's influence on innovation and 
economic growth. His seminal work merits a closer examination because he 
considered the popular Keynesian role of savings and investment in "the tradi-
tional doctrine" of capital formation to overlook "essential factors", (p68) and in 
some cases amounting to "faulty analysis" (p71). I-ts a result I review his work 
at considerable length. This is important because available financial intermedia-
tion literature reviews by Baltensperger (1980), Gertler (1988), and Thaker 
(1996) all do not discuss his work. Alternative references such as Levine et al 
(2000) do not show how his work was linked with financial intermediation. 
The chief cornerstones of Schumpeter's analysis are grounded on the 
trinity of entrepreneurial talent, destructive innv·!ation [or progressive differen-
tiation], and credit funding. Innovation is tt"1a hallmark of entrepreneurial talent 
and economic development. Development is change. Schumpeter (1936,p67) 
believed that new firms are more innovative than old ones. In a competitive en-
vironment the predictable economic consequence is "the competitive elimination 
of the old" by drawing productive resources away from them. An important in-
sight in Schumpeter's work is his appreciation that disposable property gives 
producers command over means of production. While, with hindsight, this ap-
pears to be a self-evident privilege, the insight enabled Schumpeter to empha-
sise the importance of credit ahead of savings. If innovators are putting together 
entirely new processes, and have no previous production or disposable assets 
to draw on, it becomes imperative that they rely on credit. fait accompli, if pro-
duction is to continue. Even wealthy firms have to resort to credit if their savings 
are employed elsewhere and are not available for the new project. Credit also 
liberates individuals from reliance on inheritance and the extent of one's fortune. 
I cannot put more weight on the importarice of credit than Schumpeter's 
(1936, p70) own words when he declared "that talent in economic life 'rides to 
success on its debts' ... " Credit enables innovative entrepreneurs to have ac-
cess to existing productive resources. In market economies industrialisation 
cannot exist without credit (p 70). According to Schumpeter (1936, p108-9), 
credit granted to finance entrepreneurial activities results in an increase in real 
output while credit expansion to finance consumption leads to inflation. 
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The relationship between credit and capital is controversial. Schumpeter 
([1911] 1936, p98) acknowledges J. L. Laughlin's observationJhat "Credit does 
not increase capital (that is, means of production) but mobilis~s it and makes it 
more efficient and thereby leads to an increase in product (si~)." Mises ([1912] 
1934, p22t reiterates that the conclusk1n that expansion of cr~pit cannot form a 
substitute for capital cannot be disputed. Credit (or money) rn°.~tters and finan-
cial intermediaries facilitate and expedite the exchange proc~ss. According to 
Mises (p35) the relevant exchange is that of "facilitating credit transactions ... 
[which is] nothing but the exchange of present goods againstlfuture goods." Fi-
, 
nancial intermediaries, such as banks, create and mobilize financial "assets" 
from many depositors or savers and the conduct of separate· and independent 
contractual transactions with borrowers. In Gurley and Shaw's (1956) terminol-
ogy financial intermediaries go between economic units with surplus financial 
assets and borrowers in need of financial resources for investment and other 
transactions (deficit units). Schumpeter, however, suggests banks do more than 
providing a link between depositors and producers. Bank contracts in competi-
tive markets approve the nature of new real activity that can be undertaken with 
intermediary support. In a capitalist environment, Schumpeter (1936, p74) is 
unapologetic that the banking system, being "the ephor" of the exchange econ-
omy" "authorises people, in the name of society as it were, to" innovate. Theo-
retically, only the entrepreneur needs credit for innovation and economic devel-
opment. Granting credit in this sense "operates as an order on the economic 
system" to provide the entrepreneur with productive resources:· p106. 
Recent advances in financial literature focusing on the links between 
credit and corporate governance give Schumpeter little credit than he actually 
deserves. The basic idea is that financial intermediaries can influence corporate 
governance practices within firms via precontract screening and extending 
monitored credit. As early as 1911, Schumpeter controversially argued that the 
entrepreneur does not bear risk given his reliance on credite. Therefore financial 
intermediaries relate limits to credit extended to the borrower's productive ca-
c Although I have not yet read Mises' book "The Theory of Money and Credit", (which was not available 
to me) I am grateful to one ofmy anonymous examiners for bringing this point to my attention. 
d The Cassell Dictionary (1994) defines an ephor as "one of the five magistrates chosen at Sparta and 
invested with the highest power, controlling even the kings." 
• This ii ~e'f evident if the entrepreneur is totally dependent on credit. In practice financial intermediaries 
insist on owner contribution to increase commitment to the project and reduce ex-post effort aversion. 
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pacity. The granting of credit beyond entrepreneur's ability to produce com-
modities results in losses to financial intermediaries, Schumpeter (1936, p114). 
ln order to avoid "making bad commitments" banks devise rules to manage in-
dividual cases. This foreshadows concepts of monitoring, screening, adverse 
selection and moral hazard problems later pursued by Arrow (1974), Diamond 
('1984), Diamond and Dybvig (1986) and Stigiiiz. and Weiss (1990). 
Although entrepreneurship affects class po:.1ition, social history, style and 
values of life, Schumpeter (1936, p78) warns that it is neither a profession nor a 
lasting condition. This adds more weight to the need for monitoring and infor-
mation gathering services provided by financial institutions in general and banks 
in particular. In addition to entrepreneurship not being a profession, economic 
talent is however scarce because innovators employ "unused productive ca-
pacity." As Schumpeter puts it, "This mental freedom [to innovate} presupposes 
a great surplus force over the everyday demand and is somethinp peculiar and 
by nature rare", (p86). This is an important point because goo~ economic lead-
ership is not necessarily endowed with every talent. Good leadership should 
cultivate an economically conducive environment and permit all good stars to 
shine. Every constructive talent works for the good of all. Entrepreneurial talent 
thrives on competitive innovation. In turn, competitive innovation promotes 
prosperity. 
Despite these early leads, financial variables remained on the periphery 
of formal economic models. Since Adam Smith [1776] economic theory consid-
ered money and financial structure to be a function of the needs of the real 
sector (or trade). The classical model assumes capital markets to be perfect 
and frictionless. Money is rendered neutral, hence has no effect on capital ac-
cumulation other than being a transaction driven medium of exchange. Other 
financial assets are regarded as mere claims on physical assets. As late as 
1989 the World Bank (p26) was still regarding the provision of a medium of ex-
change as the financial system's biggest contribution to growth. The irrelevance 
of money in neoclassical real activity is termed monetary neutrality. Classical 
macroeconomic theory distinguisi1c3 between real variables and nominal vari-
ables. And the resultant separation is termed classical dichotomy. Relative 
prices are determined in the real sector while the general price level arises in 
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the monetary (nominal) sector. Therefore changes in money supply cause a rise 
in the relative price level but no effect on the real variables. .I 
Taylor (2000, pp xiv and 207) regards the failure to recdgnise importance 
of money as the major failure of classical theory. Stiglitz (199~) cited in Spulber 
(1999, p5) argues that the Arrow-Debreu framework is tantamount to "engi-
" 
neering economics" preoccupied with solving maximization problems. Clarke 
(1986, p14) argues that money is an "important motor" for ec'onomic develop-
ment: 
• 
Money, apart from being a financial asset itself, has historically 
been the most tangible measure and expression of financial activ-
ity, both at the 'micro' (firm) and, more relevantly, at the 'macro' 
(national) level. 
Joseph Schumpeter's work is also subject to controversial interpretation. 
Podolski (1986, Chapter 7) notes that there is a general tendency to over read 
Schumpeter's work. In Podolski' (1986 p181-3) view Schumpeter's work does 
not portray financial innovation as the principal determinant of economic evolu-
tion because in other works Schumpeter reiterated the primacy of real devel-
opment "with money and finance playing an adaptive, but not, a secondary 
role." In this framework technological innovation spearheads real development 
"with social, financial and managerial invocation being a necessary by product 
of technological change," Podolski (1986, p182) reiterates. In my opinion, the 
real and financial sectors must be given equal weight because the current state 
of knowledge suggests that financial innovation and sophistication augments 
productivity in the real sector. For instance, credit creation finances the process 
of technological change. When credit creation is not in proportion to techno-
logical change, inflationary booms arise to the detriment of real output. 
I agree with the verdict of Baltensperger (1980, p1) that financial inter-
mediation literature "is still unsettled and rather heterogenous" because there 
are numerous different approaches and techniques. However, while Balten-
sperger suggests that existence of rival models (a) "reflects the difficult nature 
of the topic"; (b) a "wide range of phenomena analysed (Mattesini, p 131)"; and 
(c) the diverse objectives pursued by researchers, I believe that a greater part 
of the problem lies in terminological inconsistence and cognitive heterogeneity. 
The economic distinction between money and credit in financial literature is 
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blurred. Some researchers refer to monetary aggregates as indicators of the 
financial system while others have credit aggregates in mind. See Appendix 1 
for details. Confusion about concepts can destroy the value of research. 
(b) The Keynesian revolution 
Before the Keynesian revolution, however, the business cycle theory was 
influenced by financial factors. The loanable funds theory of interest rates, for 
example, attributed business cycles to expansion or contraction of credit. Haw-
trey (1919, 1928), Wicksell (1935) and He:,ei< (1931) ail cited in both Gertler 
(1988, p562) and Mattesini (1993, pp 7-8) emphasized the tendency of banks to 
"over extend" and "over contract" credit due to imperfections in the credit and 
financial markets. The market anomalies and the tendency toward over-learning 
(overreacting) cause fluctuations in economic activity. 
Irving Fisher (1933), writing in the inaugural issue of Econometrica, at-
tributed the severity of the Great Depression to poor performance of financial 
markets. He outlined the theory of debt deflation - a phenomenon under which 
small shocks produce severe cumulative effects on highly leveraged borrowers. 
Real output also suffers greatly from distressed attempts to expunge indebted-
ness. Gertler traces Fisher's concept of debt - deflation to the works of both 
Veblen (1904) and Hawtrey (1926). 
Subsequent to the general acceptance of Keynes's liquidity preference 
theory in place of the loanable funds theory, money supply replaced credit and 
other financial aggregates as determinants of aggregate economic activity. In 
Keynesian analysis financial structure is not very important because output ls 
determined by investment behaviour, which in turn depends on 'animal spirits 
and spontaneous optimism'. The general political and social atmosphere will 
naturally influence investors' confidence in a particular economy. As Gertler 
(1988, p562), put it the "state of confidence" is depended on (a) the borrowers' 
views on projects' expected returns and (b) the extent of lenders' confidence in 
borrowers' "state of credit." According to Gertler, a collapse in the confidence of 
either lenders or borrowers could precipitate a downturn in economic activity. 
Recovery is dependent on restoration of confidence in both sections. Mattesini, 
closely led by Gertler, concludes that the Keynesi3n framework and subsequent 
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analysis by Hicks (1937) and Modigiliani (1944) put emphasise on the demand 
and supply of money. ,I 
After the Keynesian revolution macroeconomic theory dnly considered fi-
nancial intermediaries to the extent they affected the stock of money. Indeed 
monetary neutrality prevailed for over 50 years. In a neoclaSsical framework, 
" Tobin (1958) regarded the demand for money as a demand for an asset that is 
represented by a demand for other financial assets. Tobin (1965) and Johnson 
(1967) proposed a substitutability hypothesis, which considered money a sub-
stitute of physical assets. According to Tobin (1965) a high iJterest rate return 
on a monetary asset would result in a portfolio shift in favour of financial assets 
and reduced capital accumulation. Modigiliani and Miller (MMJ (1958 and 1961) 
formally proposed that financial structure and dividend policy are irrelevant to 
real economic decisions, if the market is perfect in an Arrow-Debreu sense. 
Therefore financial intermediaries were regarded as redundant, Following MM's 
' 
work, macroeconomic models, for example Fama (1980), did not consider fi-
nancial factors. Financial structure is irrelevant in the classical models because 
economic performance determines financial scope. Kutznets (1966) concept of 
modern economic growth, for instance, focused on structural change, physical 
and human aspects, but did not consider the role of financial intermediaries in 
economic growth. 
The primacy of savings and investment is not immune from attack. In an 
imaginary world of universally balanced budgets, Gurley and Shaw (1955 p259) 
note financial intermediaries are not likely to survive because each economic 
unit's level of investment equals its own current savings. The simple Keynesian 
income identity without government and external sectors determines output at a 
level where investment equals savings. Schumpeter, however, strongly dis-
missed the significance of savings and monetary policy in economic develop-
ment. Schumpeter (1936, p96) argues that there is no idle stock in the circular 
flow of income, and concludes that real activity cannot rely on savings without 
disturbing the relative p•Jrchasing power of individuals, but does not fully explain 
the migins of credit. Robertson (1926) cited in Taylor (2000, p108) suggests 
that savings precede investment. Robertson allows categorisation of voluntary 
savings, and involuntary (forced) savings. Forced savings refers to the excess 
of investment over voluntary savings. In Keynes's "General Theory" on the 
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other hand, investment always equals current savings but the source of the ini-
tial capital stock is not clearly spelt out. On the contrary Pagano (1993) con-
cluded that financial development increases savings allocated to investment as 
well as the social productivity of capital. Financial development becomes a pre-
condition for economic development. Notwithstanding the analytical weight the 
Keynesian paradigm put on investment, the current thinking (see Easterly and 
Levine [2000] and Pritchett [2000]) suggests investment accumulation is neither 
capital nor a significant determinant or economic growth. I will come back to this 
point in subsection 3.2. 
The Keynesian emphasis on money supply instead of the whole financial 
system received support in the unlikely quarter of monetary economics. Banks 
were the only important segment of the financial system and only to the extent 
their liabilities affected money supply. Government intervention is permissible in 
monetarist and Keynesian models. Monetarists emphasise the use of rules 
while Keynesians vouch for discretion. In tandem with Hicks' (1937) ISLM mac-
roeconomic models, Friedman and Schwartz's (1963b) analysis considered 
banks irrelevant as long as the central bank can influence real activity via con-
trol of money supply. Friedman and Schwartz's (1963a, 1963b) monetary study 
of the United States popularised money supply as the key financial aggregate. 
Their study found a positive correlation between money supply and output. 
They suggested that turning points in the money stock preceded turning points 
in nominal income. According to their evaluation the stock of money predicts 
output and business cycles better than investment or "autonomous expendi-
ture." This led to a series of studies testing the hypothesis that money leads in-
come. Modern sophisticated econometric approaches now permit researchers 
to test the alternative hypothesis that income leads money. 
Difficulties in modelling market imperfections and the behaviour of het-
erogeneous econm,iic agents did not help the case for financial variables. Ac-
cording to Gertler ( 1988, p565) it was very difficult to incorporate other financial 
variables in macroeconomic models because there was no rigorous analysis 
matching the MM elegance to justify their inclusion. Methodological approaches 
then existing were not theoretically equal to the challenge to jointly detennine 
an endogenous financial system with real output. Good forecasting ability of bi-
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variate VAR models of money and output strengthened the evidence for the hy-
pothesis that money has a strong causal role on output. ,I 
I 
(c) Financial system renaissance and the counter movem,~ts 
Gurley and Shaw (1955 and 1960) and Tobin (1963) retlved the study of 
" 
financial intermediaries and the overall financial system. r~·eir research de-
,, 
emphasised the "uniqueness" of banks by highlighting the inrnnse competition 
faced by banks at the hands of the non-bank financial instituti~ns. According to 
Gurley and Shaw's "new view", portfolio substitution and the role of economies 
of scale become important as the financial system grows in sophistication. In an 
. 
advanced financial system, money supply is not the only relevant financial ag-
gregate. In such an economy money supply is also a poor proxy for the level of 
financial intermediation. Lynch (1993) notes China has a money supply to GDP 
ratio equal to that of Japan and higher than Australia's but not equally sophisti-
cated. Gurley and Shaw suggest financial sophistication is good for growth. 
McKinnon (1973), Shaw (1973), and Fry (1981) advanced the complementary 
hypotheses. Baltensperger (1980, p2) finds the disregard of the financial sector 
in classical paradigms surprising given the magnitude of real resources such as 
labour and capital committed to the financial sector. 
Mattesini (1993, p1) attributes this renewed interest in financial structure 
to advances in information asymmetry theories and empirical evidence demon-
strating the explanatory power of alternative financial aggre~ates. Generally 
credit and equity market imperfections are sometimes attribut8d to informational 
' 
asymmetries. The emergence of new representation techniques such as the 
General Method of Moments (GMM), Impulse Response Function (IRF) analy-
sis, forecast error variance decomposition (VDC) and vector autoregression, 
(VAR) brought with them empirical flexibility, which lead to the re-examination of 
financial factors. Availability of these and other new econometrics techniques 
facilitated the formal characterisation of the financial system as an important 
determinant of aggregate economic activity, productivity and economic devel-
opment. 
Time series studies by Sims (1980, 1988) challenged the primacy of 
money as a determinant of output. Traditional inferences about causality were 
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considered 'incredible'. Mishkin (1978) found the collapse in households' finan-
cial net worth during the Great Depression was detrimental to aggregate de-
mand. Bernanke (1983) supports this finding and concludes that the collapse of 
the financial system, not just money supply, worsened the shrinkage in eco-
nomic activity. The acceptance of endogenous growth theories popularised by 
Lucas (1988) and others has resulted in revival of interest in the determinants of 
economic growth. In Farmers (1984) model [yes, Farmer not Fama], financial 
markets are imperiect due to asymmetrical information, and incomplete as a re-
sult of overlapping generations. The model demonstrates that both current 
stocks and the history of previous innovations affect real variables. In 
Greenwood and Javonic (1990) intermediation arises endogenously. 
Patrick (1966) cited in Jayaraman (1996, p8) argued that the direction of 
causality changes over time. Two patterns of causality were suggested namely 
demand following and supply leading. The demand following view postulates 
that economic activity determines the demand for financial services. On the 
other hand the supply-side approach suggests that development of financial 
services precede demand for the services. Jung (1986) investigated the direc-
tion of causality between financial development and economic growth in 56 
countries. The study found that developing countries were generally associated 
with a "supply-leading" causality. This indicates that causality runs from financial 
to real sector development. The result discredited Tobin's (1965) and Johnson's 
(1967) substitutability hypothesis, which considered money a substitute of 
physical assets. "Real assets do not bring the benefits of financial assets be-
cause they cannot be loaned to investors," Sudweeks (1989, p102) stresses. 
Financial economists have built considerable consensus on the impor-
tci,nce of the finance and real sector interaction. However the actual mechanics 
through which finance affects real activity is still debatable. Freixas and Rochet 
(1998, p161), among others, emphasize two monetary transmission mecha-
nisms namely the money and credit views. 
(i) The money view 
The mor.ey view, represented by the ISLM model, only emphasizes the 
bank's liabi!\ties, the main constituent of money supply. Short-term interest rates 
are determined by the interaction of demand and supply for money. Loans and 
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bonds are considered to be perfect substitutes for borrowers. •The central bank 
has control over monetary policy but prices do not adjust instc:Jntaneously to off-
set changes in the quantity of money. Short-term changes re~ult in real effects. 
In the long term adjustment is possible. 
(ii) The credit view 
1: 
1\, 
" .
,·., 
The credit view emphasises the asset side of the ban~J;· balance sheet. 
... 
Close substitutes to credit are ruled out for households and Small firms. Fama 
(1985), in contrast to Fama (1980), observed that some categpries of borrowers 
' could not perfectly substitute open market credit for bank credit. As a result 
bank credit is special to them. In addition information gathered by banks on bor-
rowers confers to them comparative advantages. 
Modern studies emphasize reputation in deciding sources of credit. Fig-
ure 1 below shows a spectrum of firms, blessed with differe~t capital endow-
ments, and their respective sources of funding. 
Density 
of Firms 
No finance 
[Source: Freixas and Rochet (1997, p185] 
Bank finance 
(Indirect Finance) 
Direct finance 
Cash assets of firms 
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Figure 1 Categories of sources of finance among firms 
In Diamond (1991) young firms and those with tainted reputation borrow 
from banks. Firms with high reputation investments need no monitoring; hence 
they use capital markets. Holmstrom and Tirole (1994, 1997) suggest small 
firms, virtually without capital (collateral) acceptable to the market receive no 
external funding. Bank credit is out of reach because they cannot afford the cost 
of monitoring. Medium firms obtain credit from the bank while large entities fi-
nance their requirements from the market. Monetary policy can have real effects 
by altering availability of credit. Therefore financial intermediation affects real 
activity. Zimbabwe, for instance, has many smali and medium size firms that 
might benefit immensely from bank finance. Monitoring uses resources. Inter-
mediaries must be financially sound and adequately capitalised. The need for 
financial intermediaries to invest in the building of their own capacity entails that 
not every firm in the economy can be monitored. 
The Structuralist Hypothesis, also known as the Gerschenkron Hy-
pothesisf had previously arrived at similar conclusions. Gerschenkron (1962), 
according to Chimombe (1983, p42) and Miwa and Ramseyer (2000), sug-
gested that appropriate sources of finance depend on "the relative degree of 
economic backwardness" and financial innovation within the economy. In es-
sence Gerschenkron argued that industrialised countries such as England could 
rely on financial markets for their requirements. Intermediate backward nations, 
then represented by C:. ermany had to rely on banks. Japan was also included as 
a bank-centred model. Economies still at the extreme stages of economic 
backwardness, then epitomised by Russia, should depend on "the visible hand 
of the czar", that is, government. Gerschenkron, by Chimombe's (1983, p42) 
account observed that 
The scarcity of capital in Russia was such that no banking system 
could conceivably succeed in attracting sufficient funds to finance 
a large scale industrialisation, the standards of honesty in busi-
ness were so disastrously low, the general distrust of the public so 
great, that no bank could ... successfully engage in long term 
credit policies in an economy where fraudulent bankruptcy had 
been almost elevated to the rank of a general business practice. 
r See Chimombe (1983, p41) though under a different spelling, 
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Miwa and Ramseyer (2000, p5) note that a vast body of financial inter- iiJ 
mediation literature such as superior monitoring, screening cqpabilities, agency 
theory, information asymmetries, adverse selection, moral h~zard, and credit 
rationing could "potentially" be traced to Gerschenkron's role of: banks. 
Since the classic study by Gerschenkron (1962) there ~as been a series 
" of debates on the comparati'Je merits of the "Anglo-Saxon" ~a·rketMbased and 
the "Continental" banKMbased views of the financial systeri{ DemirgG~-Kunt 
and Levine (1999) find the distinction between banks based and market based 
financial systems has run out of steam. There is a tendency fa~ both to increase 
as the economy gets sophisticated. Levine (2000) provides strong support to 
Merton's (1991) financial services view that regards bankS and markets as 
complementary vehicles for financial services. Building on this, La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny [LLSV for short] (1997, 1998, 1999, 2000) re-
ject the bank-based versus market-based debate. They propose a "legal-based 
view" which emphasises structural and regulatory factors influencing financial 
structure and performance. La Porta et al (1999, p24) view finance as a set of 
contracts: "In the end, the rights create finance." A competent legal environment 
is required to enable financial markets and institutions to fulfil their roles. LLSV's 
evidence supports the need for rule of law and efficient enforcement of con-
tracts. Levine (2000, p5-6) concludes that, 
There is no cross-country empirical support for either the marketw 
based or bank-based views. Neither bank-based npr market-
based financial systems are particularly effective at promoting 
growth .... Thus, cross-country comparisons do not suggest that 
distinQuishing between bank-based and market based is analyti-
cally useful for understanding the process of economic growth. 
(d) Optimal financial structure 
Baltensperger (1980, p3) argues that most theories of financial intenme-
diation are "partial" models that concentrate on portfolio aspects. This is rightly 
so since early models of banking either focused on liability management, asset 
management, or asset and liability management concepts. The banking chal-
lenge was to balance the conflicting demands of profitability and solvency. ln 
partial models the size and structure of the banking system are "assumed to be 
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exogenously determined." As a result partial models are preoccupied with allo-
cative and operational efficiency. Gertler (1988, p582) argues that disaggre-
gated results from partial models generate ambiguous policy implications. This 
makes it difficult to evaluate monetary policy. 
"Complete" theories of banking, as envisaged by Baltensperger should 
"explain the joint determination" of structure, size and portfolio: 
A complete theory of the banking firm, however, should not onl;i/ 
provide an integrated view of the firm's assets and liability choice, 
but also allow an endogenous determination of the total scale of 
operation of the firm (p 3). 
Baltensperger reviews Klein's (1971) monopoly model but disagrees with 
its strong reliance on the assumption of monopoly power. Other models of opti-
mal banking are based on risk aversion and they followed Markowitz's general 
portfolio theory. In Pyle's model (1971) [see Baltensperger pp 24-29], financial 
intermediation exists when there is a positive difference between the expected 
return on assets (loans) and liabilities (deposits). Arbitrage is limited by varying 
degrees of risk aversion among economic units. The model fails to account for 
input costs, solvency, liquidity and the endogenous origins of financiai interme-
diaries. 
Why will the bank find customers willing to hold a financial asset 
('deposits') at an expected rate below the one which the bank can 
obtain itself, and others ... willing to indebt themselves to the bank 
at an axpected rate [higher than] the bank has to pay itself? 
Santomero and Seater (1998) adopt the Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) 
framework to formally derive an optimal structure of banking. The optimal 
structure is not dependent on size or state of the economy but on the proportion 
of capital allocated to banking sector, degree of inefficient behaviour in the fi-
nancial system, and the impact of monitoring [financial intermediation] on out-
put. MonitDiing increases the productivity of middle firms, and affects the 
growth rate of the economy as well as output. It is my hope that researchers will 
soon confront this model with data to evaluate its empirical validity. 
With direct reference to Zimbabwe the quest for an optimal banking 
structure has caused needless disquiet in the financial circles. There has been 
wide speculation on whether Zimbabwe has an overbanked financial system. In 
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my view the conclusion that the Zimbabwe financial market :is overbanked is 
based on crude estimates. Mataruka (1999, p66-7), for insta~_ce used the Her-
findahl Index, normally applied to analyse monopoly power (m~rket dominance), 
to suggest that the "overgrazed" market had room for 5 co~~ercial banks in-
stead of 8 then in the market. There is a high risk of confu~,ifl9 concentration 
with optimality. Humphrey (1990) demonstrates that "the size of scale econo-
'·'. 
mies of banking" is affected by a number of economic and P.olitical issues as 
well as systematic biases. Different researchers, applying different cost defini-
tions and output measurements could arrive at conflicting pblicy conclusions. 
' Recent cross-country studies and panel data (See DemirgUg-Kunt and Levine 
1999 or Table 1 above) actually suggest Zimbabwe has an underdeveloped fi-
nancial system. Attempts to demmcate an optimal banking structure by legislaR 
tion or licence could create opportunities for rent seeking and inefficiency. 
2.2 Empirical Evidence: Does Financial Development Promote 
Growth? 
Freixas and Rochel (1997, p 176) note that classical theories fail to ex-
plain why macroeconomic variables (output, investment, employment) fluctuate, 
more than the fundamentals (productivity and demand parameters). Financial 
intermediation scholars attribute the residual cyclical fluctuations in macroecoR 
nomic variables to financial factors. Policymakers and applied economists also 
believe fluctuations in financial variables have a real effect both in the short run 
' 
(stabilization) and in the long run (growth) to the extent of w~rranting close at-
tention. ln extreme cases financial markets are regulated "to 'the point of finanR 
cial repression," Denizer, Desai and Gueorguiev (1998, p2). [~mphasis original.] 
Unfortunately financiai repression is usually detrimental to economic growth. 
Empirical evidence in favour of financial factors has been overwhelming 
although no consensus has yet emerged. Gurley and Shaw (1955, 1960) were 
the first to stress the importance of the financial structure or ''financial deepenR 
ing view" in economic growth. Their work promoted the establishment of a wide 
network of financial institutions. They argued that banks and other nonRbank fiR 
nancial institutions (NBFI) exist to transform financial contracts and securities. 
These institutions facilitate the circulation of financial resources between savers 
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and businesses. Benston and Smith (1976) and Fama (1980) extended this 
view. Financial intermediation is critical as it affects inter-temporal trade and 
general economic activity. In Body and Prescott (1986) financial intermediaries 
foster economic growth by enabling improved screening of projects. 
Goldsmith (1969) made a rigorous cross-section study to establish the 
causal links. A positive correlation was found between economic growth and 
the intensity of financial sector development. Mishkin (1978) found that aggre-
gate demand during the Great Depression was significantly affected by con-
sumers' net financial position. An important study by Bernanke (1983) con-
cluded that money supply alone could not account for the Great Depression. 
The depth and persistence of the depression can be attributed to the collapse of 
the financial system. In particular, Jiabllit;as of failed banks and interest differ-
entials on good and bad bonds had significant explanatory power. 
By the 1970s, seminal works of McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) es-
tablished that financial repression retards economic growth. In the wake of poor 
results from foreign aid, two views about financial development were proposed. 
McKinnon's (1973) Financial Repression Hypothesis promoted widespread fi-
nancial liberalisation in the 1980s as a precursor for economic development. 
Shaw (1973) popularised "financial deepening" denoted by the accumulation of 
financial assets, as a significant determinant of economic prosperity. Shaw 
traces poverty, unemployment and overvalued exchange rates to "shallow" fi-
nance and financial repression. 
Denizer, Desai and Gueorguiev (1998, p3) define financial repression as 
[Al set of policies, laws, formal regulations, and informal controls, 
imposed by governments on the financial sector, that distort finan-
cial prices - interest rates and foreign exchange rates - and inhibit 
the operation of financial intermediaries at their full potential. 
The reasons for and against financial repression are well known. See 
either McKinnon or Shaw for example. I have picked only "economic myopia" 
and seigniorage for closer scrutiny because they have a direct bearing on finan-
cial intermediation. McKinnon (1973, p22) suggests that authorities who suffer 
from "the Intervention Syndrome" promote financial repression as "second best 
optimisation." The typical arsenals of financial repression commonly deployed in 
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the financial market are exorbitant reserve requirements and artificial interest 
rates. Economic myopia, as depicted by Shaw (1973, p15), arise in an economy 
where there is no due regard for the consequences of partisan decisions made 
in favour of one section of the community. Apart from welfare concerns there is 
strong evidence that governments perpetuate financial repression either as a 
source of power and revenue. Ironically both the tame and wild characteristics 
of financial instruments make them a ready cash cow for fiscal imprudence. At 
the wild end, "Capital is so fungible, so slippery for regulation to cope with, that 
there is a strong tendency to multiply restrictions," Shaw (1973, p92). On the 
tame side, taxation of financial assets is usually more severe and effective than 
say taxation of real property and informal trade. The so-called "easy money" 
thesis views financial repression as a deliberate policy choice to transfer finan-
cial assets to the fiscus. According to Hayek (1976, p27)9 governments engi-
neer inflation for their own benefit. "As if the inflation tax were not enough", ar-
gues Shaw (1973, p90), 
[Other] taxes discriminate against income from financial assets. 
Suck income is conspicuous, unless it flows through the street 
market, and easily reached by the tax collector. 
The government. especially in economies where it grapples with low tax 
yield, costly public debt, and perennial fiscal deficits easily succumbs to the 
temptation to debase the currency in order to gain seigniorage revenue. In sim-
ple words seigniorage is the profit (purchasing power) raised by the government 
from printing money at a rate above its intrinsic value. Schuler's (1992) disser-
tation highlights that notes and coin do not pay interest unlike other securities; 
hence the issuer acquires purchasing power without sacrificing reserves or 
other resources. The Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland [FRB Clev.] (1995 
p9)1 traces the terminology to the "seigneur's" (French for feudal lord) "exclusive 
right to coin money on his manor" in the Middle Ages, which prerogative now 
vested in government. The risk of governments to "eventually abuse their pow-
ers" (FRB Clev.) is so real that some countries erect legislative barriers and 
grant cental banks ind1Jpendence from monetary authorities. 
g See The Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland (/995) "Governments and Money" essay. 
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The McKinnon - Shaw studies left a legacy of closer attention to finan-
cial liberalization. They argued that liberalisation would proviqf the market with 
a wide portfolio choice. High real interest rates were regardeq as favourable to 
savings, investment and economic growth. In the ZimbabvJkan context Chi-
• 
mombe (1983, pp 39-40) reluctantly blames financial repres~ipn for "inefficient 
credit allocation" and bias against green projects of all types. :.'.,. 
Subsequent financial instability at the heels of liberali~ation convinced 
many that the hypothesis was incomplete. Denizer, Desai and Gueorguiev 
(1998, p5) argue that the "easy cash" thesis of financial reJression is incom-
plete because policymakers facing the same budget constraints react differently 
and not axiomatically. Denizer et al observe that directed credi't is an exogenous 
cause of financial repression rather than an endogenous outcome of repression 
as hypothesized by the easy cash view. Their evidence gleaned from former 
Soviet transitional economies attributes financial repression to centralisation of 
political power and internal opposition to reforms within the government. Neither 
Shaw nor McKinnon drew attention to banking institutions' insolvency or the 
need for prudential supervision, observe Cole and Slade (1996, p7). Subse-
quent bank failures in all parts of the world convinced many that financial liber-
31ization without structural stability is a recipe for inevitable financial collapse. 
Fry (1988) was convinced that regulation and prudential supervision were the 
areas in need of critical research. 
Fisher's debt-deflation theory was reinvigorated by Minsky (1972) 2 who 
proposed the Financial Instability Hypothesis. In Minsky's world, financial sys-
. 
terns are pathologically unstable. Financial crises become systemic and 
endogenously generated events rather than accidents. If the economy is doing 
well, for instance, banks may over lend and the borrowers over borrow. When 
circumstances change both parties may fail to adjust resulting in bank failures. 
Kindleberger ([1978], 1996) like Minsky ar11ues that money and credit 
have never been properly managed throughout history. Society has a tendency 
to over learn resulting in a series of manias, panics and crushes. Fischer, 
Gueyie and Ortiz (1997), using a GMM statistical procedure, conducted event 
studies to determine whether financial liberalisation increases risk on banks' 
exposures. Their evidence suggests that financial liberalisation increases bank 
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risk. Fischer et al stress that while bank exposures are sensitive to both macro-
economic and management factors, management variables could be more criti-
cal. Ajit Singh (1997) suggests that rapid expansion of the financial system, es-
pecially stock exchanges, is detrimental to economic growth and stability. 
Singh's analysis implies that the bigger the financial system the more unstable it 
becomes. 
Miwa and Ramseyer (2000) argue that contrary to conventional percep-
tion Japan does not have a bank centred economy, but relies on equity finance 
sourced in competitive markets. However, Hoshi and Kashyap (1999) insist 
that dependence on capital markets is a direct result of 20 years of deregula-
tion, known as the "Japanese Big Bang." Their paper attributes the protracted 
Japanese recession in the 1990s to problems in the financial system. It must 
be clear that this Japanese debate is about the relative importance of segments 
of the financial sector which we have already seen to complement one another. 
For our purposes the debate does not dispute the significance of financial fac-
tors in economic activity. Rousseau (1999) argues that financial sector deep-
ening contributed to "Japan's rise to world prominence". Rousseau uses a 
cointegrated VAR system to demonstrate that unidirectional causality operated 
from financial factors to output and inves~ment. 
Levine and others have breathed a new lease of life in the finance and 
growth nexus. King and Levine (1992, 1993) found significant correlation be-
tween the degree of financial sophistication Emd real economic growth. Roubini 
and Sala-i-Martin (1991,p 1) arrive at similar results. Recently Beck, Demirgii<;· 
Kunt, and Levine (1999) popularised new ratios of size, activity and efficiency to 
measure banking sector and stock market development. Their study relates 
economic development to bank, nonbank and stock market development. In 
Demirgiic;-Kunt and Levine (1999) both foreign banks' share and public banks' 
share were found to have a statistically significant relationship with GDP. Levine 
(1998) shows that financial intermediation accounts for not only output growth, 
but capital stock growth and productivity growth as well. Kuh and Meyer's 
(1963) evidence suggests that financial factors are important in corporate in-
vestment. Elliot (1973) supports the hypothesis. In my view Levine's (1998) pa-
per opens interesting avenues for future research because productivity and fi-
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nancial intermediation are usually considered as separate determinants of eco-
nomic growth. ,I 
Table 2 shows some of the most important studies on\financial interme-
diation up to 1995. Monetary and interest rate aggregates w~re then the most 
popular indicators of financial activity. In most cases the resea}chers found for a 
" positive relationship between financial sophistication and eco~omic growth. The 
tendency was to analyse financial development in a cross se'ction pattern. De 
Gregorio & Guidotti (1992) demonstrate that cross-country studies are sensitive 
to the sample of countries included in the study. Technically ~oth cross section 
and time series studies are sensitive to the time period considered. Levine and 
others' popularisation of new indicators of financial sophistication coincided with 
new time series techniques. At the moment time series studies based on a sin-
gle country are becoming as common as their cross section counterparts. 
2.3 The Theory of Financial Intermediation 
This section consolidates the theoretical underpinnings in the financial 
intermediation literature. Integration of existing theories is important in order to 
explain the existence and significance of financial intermediation. In classical 
theories the financial intermediaries "exist by the grace of market imperfec-
tions", (Scholtens and Wensveen 2000, p1245) yet Eichberger and Harper 
(1997, p241) observe that both the theory and practice are rising. James and 
Smith (1994) agree that for the past two decades the theory of financial inter-
mediation was founded on trar,saction costs and asymmetric ·information. In an 
imaginary Marshallian and Walrasian world of perfect markets, Eichberger and 
Harper (1997, p246) stress, "Theory is quite unequivocal in its prediction that 
efficient markets render financial intermediaries obsolete." Benson and Smith 
(1976) are emphatic the raison d'e'tre for the industry is the existence of finan-
cial costs. Financial intermediation entails reduction in transaction costs and 
satisfaction of the demands for time dated consumption. Financial intermediar-
ies provide divisible purchasing power, which is converted into goods and serv-
ices at low cost at the right time. In this process banks gain economies of scale 
and scope, which individuals and markets cannot replicate. Spulber (1999, pix) 
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concurs that intermediaries emerge when the gains from intermediated ex-
change exceed gains from direct exchange. 
Author Year Coverage Financial development lndl- Impact on Economic 
cators Growth - Key Finding 
Table 2 
Stylised Facts on Economic Growth & Financial Sector Development 
Berthelemy & 1995 World-91 Broad money{GDP ratio Inadequate financial sector 
Varoudakls countries development can inhibit 
growth 
F,y 1993 Developing - Real interest rate Real interest rate extremes 
16 countries negatively related to growtt1 
King & Le- 1993 World-BO Liquid assets, commercial Financial sector dev~?lopmenl 
vine countries bank importance, private positively correlated with eco-
credit proportion of total nomic growth 
credit, private credit to GDP 
Levine & 1993 See Levine & Selection of indicators Financial development posl-
Zervos Renell lively related to economic 
growth 
World Bank 1993 Asia - 20 Real interest rates, Real curb Mixed evidence on real inter-
countries rates (Korea only) est rates, curb rates (Korea) 
have a positive relationship 
with growth 
De Gregorio 1992 World-98 Private sector to total domes- Ratio is posltively related to 
& Guidotti countries lie credit economic growth 
Levine 1992 World-87 Money, commercial bank im- Credit aggregates positively 
countries parlance, private credit pro- related to economic growth 
portion of total credit 
Levine& 1992 World-119 Domestic credit growth rate Not robustly related lo eco-
Renell countries and its standard deviation nomic growth 
Roubinl & 1992 World-50 Real interest rate distortions Financial repre~slon nega. 
Sa!a·l·Martin countries and bank reserves lively affects economic growth 
Dornbusch & 1989 Developing - Quasi-money f GDP ratio Evidence of positive Impact of 
Reynoso 84 countries financial sector development 
on growth episodic 
Gelb 1989 Developing - Real interest rates, Financial Positively related to economic 
34 Countries depth (M3) & Financialisalion growth 
Khatkhate 1988 LDCs - 64 Real interest rates Little impact on economic 
countries growth 
ADB 1985 Asia -14 Real interest {deposit) rates Positively related to economic 
countries growth 
IMF 1983 Developing - Real interest rate levels; three Positively related to economic 
21 countries categories growth 
Lanyl & 1983 Develop!ng - Rea! Interest rates Positively related to economic 
Saracoglu 21 countries growth 
F,y 1980 Oi;ve!oping - 3 equation model of growth, Financial repression nega-
61 countries saving and investment lively affects economic growth 
Fry 1978 Asia - 71 Real interest rates Real interest rates have posi· 
countries live effect on economic 
growth 
49 
[Source: Lynch (1994, p5) Table 1] ,I 
I 
Leland and Pyle (1977) propose an information-based theoryl/in which financial 
intermediaries resolve information asymmetry between borro~,ers and lenders. 
Loan contracts contain special clauses to ward off precontra'Ct adverse selec-
, ... 
tion, and ex-pas: effort -aversion and asset substitution moral hazard. 
Fama (1980), inspired by the theory of finance, prof.oses that banks 
perform two functions: (a) a transaction function and (b) a portfolio function. In a 
competitive world, banks are intermediaries that respond to the tastes of ulti-
mate borrowers and lenders (i.e. real activity.) The model 0xcludes costs as 
well as the liability side of the balance sheet. Kashyap, Rajan and Stein (1999) 
emphasize that the standard distinguishing characteristic of a bank is the si-
multaneous engagement in two distinct activities on either side of the balance 
sheet: That is [demand] deposit taking and extending monitored credit [lending]. 
The dual functions provide liquidity insurance at the cost of forgone interest on 
cash balances held and double taxation on securities. 
Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1984) and Diamond (1984) draw attention to 
screening and monitoring activities of banks. Ramakrishnan and Thaker (1984) 
propose that financial intermediaries arise endogenously to screen potential 
borrowers and provide signals about their creditworthiness. In Diamond's model 
monitoring requires considerable investment in human, capital and informational 
technology. Due to information asymmetry and opaqueness of bank loans 
(Merton, 1992) only specialised institutions, the banks, have the capacity to un-
dertake it. King and Levine (1993) add that intangible assets are difficult to 
value and only banks have the superior valuation skills to make a difference. 
King and Levine, as in Boyd and Prescott (1986), content that banks improve 
productivity by generating signals against inferior investments. According to 
Mayer (1988), and Shleifer and Summers (1988)3 the process of monitoring re-
sults in long-term relationships, which serve to reduce moral hazard. Economies 
with better financial intermediaries accumulate more capital, make more effi-
cient investments in intangible assets and human capital, and realise higher 
productivity. 
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Notwithstanding financial sophistication in the economy, Stiglitz and 
Weiss (1981) argue it may be optimal for banks to practice credit rationing be-
cause borrowers' credit risk is difficult to observe. High interest rates required to 
clear the market have a potential to crowd out good borrowers. Indeed Diamond 
(1991) considers the case where borrowers could substitute safe assets for risk 
ones to the lender's detriment. Adverse selection can engineer financial col-
lapse. Myers and Rajan (1998) argue the agency costs associated with holding 
liquid assets are potentially severe in financial institutions, as there is much 
scope for risk shifting or asset substitution. A very liquid stock increases mana-
gerial discretion and thus increases agency costs. In Diamond and Rajan's 
(1998) model, bank managers do not create value but merely redistribute cash 
flows once the loan is made. Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) examine the infor-
mational content of financial markets, which supposedly emit signals not avail-
able in other reported variables such as profits. Stock prices generate informa-
tion not available to managers, Holmstrom and Tirole (1994). 
The evolution of financial systems is sometimes characterized by the 
continuing dialectic struggle between financial markets and financial intermedi-
aries as alternative models of financial design. Since Gerschenkron (1962) 
banks are considered to perform fundamental functions of capital allocation, risk 
sharing and economic growth. More recently Allen and Gale (1994), King and 
Levine (1992), Allen and Santomero (1999) and many others have reconsidered 
the question of financial design and development. In another paper, Santomero 
and Seater (1998) formally prove that the size of an optimal bank structure is 
not sensitive to the size or state of the economy but the degree of inefficient be-
haviour, impact of monitoring on output, and proportion of capital allocated to 
the banking sector. 
Allen and Santomero (1997) emphasize that existing theories are too 
narrow, as they could not account for the survival of financial intermediaries in 
the face of falling transaction costs and superior information technologies. As 
market imperfections continue to recede one would expect financial markets to 
dominate financial intermediaries. In practice financial intermediaries improve 
their services, create new markets and new products, to retain their supremacy 
over market-based alternatives. 
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In Allen and Santomero's (1999) model the complexity and depth of 
modern markets increase opportunities for risk management.,V\s a result there 
is need to focus on participation cost, risk trading and risk nianagement. Risk 
management is one of the most important functions of financj~I intermediaries. 
I 
In my view the paper is therefore a very significant contributi9'1 to the theory of 
intermediation. However a brid critique by Scholtens and Wensveen (2000) 
'·'. 
suggests Allen and Santomero's analysis is incomplete beca~se risk manage-
ment is not a new phenomenon to the financial sector. Scholtens and Wens-
veen wholly agree that risk optimisation is crucial to financial Intermediation but 
' 
value addition is equally critical. The emphasis should be on value and financial 
innovation rather than costs and market imperfections. If a dynamic framework 
is adopted it would account for product differentiation and customer orientation 
to both depositors and borrowers. In their view the time has come for literature 
to stop seeing financial intermediaries as agents but entrepreneurs in their own 
right. Maybe Schumpeter (1936, p74) was again right to regard bankers as 
pathologically "the capitalist par excellence." 
2.4 Theoretical Perspectives in Corporate Governance 
First rule of leadership: Everything is your fault. It's a buggy, buggy world out 
there Princ&ss. 
Hopper in the classic Disney-Pixar animated movie" A Bug's Life." 
This subsection reiterates that both corporate governance (internal gov-
ernance) and external governance have great potential to ret9-rd or promote ef-
ficiency and creation of wealth. Corporate governance has attracted the atten-
tion of the pubhs, academics and researchers because of its connection with the 
origins of the fi':m, agency problems, creation of value, distribution of surplus, 
capital structure, distribution of risk, and the market for corporate control. With 
regards to financial intermediation La Porta et al (2000) and Levine et al (2000) 
demonstrate that indicators of governance have good explanatory power. In a 
financial framework corporate governance is traced to both Ronald Cease 
(1937) and Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means (1932). Corporate governance 
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comprises of ways in which agents with vested interests in an institution ensure 
themselves of getting a fair return on their investment. Separation between 
ownership and management create several agency problems that are explored 
in the path breaking paper by Jensen and Meckling (1976). Financing without 
control may be inadequate in an environment of incomplete contracts. Corpo-
rate governance is sometimes discussed jointly with theories of the origin of the 
firm. Among them the most common paradigms are the nexus of contracts ap-
proach, the property view approach, and the nexus of investment approach. 
In a broad perspective it is possible to refer to both internal and external 
governance. Internal governance describes policies, procedures and inte~al 
systems designed to manage interest in a firm. From a parochial financial point 
of view, Smithson (1998, p433) defines risk governance as (1) communication 
to senior management and Board of Directors (BOD) regarding trading and risk 
activities, and (2) oversight of a firm's risk exposures by senior management 
and the BOD. In banks and other financial institutions the BOD is tasked with 
overall risk oversight within the institution. It approves management policies 
and operational procedures. The board is expected to implement and enforce 
approved policies, ensure accumulation of technical and conceptual expertise, 
and evaluate performance of the inst!tution on an ongoing basis. 
Given my concern with overall economic performance, this research 
also focuses on the macro aspects of governance. External governance ema-
nates from ownership structure, the market structure, and the regulatory envi-
ronment. Although Alchian (1950) and Stigler's (1958)' evolutionary theory of 
economic exchange argues that competition takes care of corporate govern-
ance, it is widely accepted that market discipline is not perfect. In a world of in-
formation asymmetry, competitive markets cease to be perfect. In such a realm, 
economic agencies are not able to predict all future contingencies. In response, 
incomplete contracts are perversive. 
It must be emphasised that a reigning corporate governance system 
could promote or discourage efficiency. Ex-ante incentives of rational economic 
agents determine the actions they will take. Activities properly rewarded by a 
distribution system will receive an optimal amount of resources. Ex-post distri-
bution will determine the extent of ex-ante cooperation. Chandler (1966), cited 
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in Zingales (1997), discovers that corporate governance also affects managers' 
ex-ante incentives to invest or politicise allocation of resource.~. Managers also 
exhibit power-seeking tendencies. Dissatisfied economic unit' waste the firm's 
resources in an attempt to influence ex-post distribution in thei~favour. 
i 
A clear corporate governance system with distinct right's may also suffer 
" from inefficient ex-post bargaining. Defective decisions may ~e made because 
of information asymmetry, divergent political interests, and tree rider problems. 
Free rider problems violate Coase's principle of entrepreneur coordination and 
give managers greater discretion on the use of the funds. Agency problems, 
that is conflicts of interest, between (1) shareholders and managers, and (2) 
shareholders and debtors become inevitable. Rational share'.holders desire to 
maximise the value of the firm. According to Wildsmith, "Managerial Theories of 
the Firm", as cited 111 Brigham and Grapenski (1991, p10) the primary goal of 
managers is to maximize the size of the firm. A large firm guqrantees manage-
ment (a) increased job security, (b) increased power, status and salaries, and 
(c) create more opportunities for lower and middle managers. Management that 
is no tonger useful to a company sometimes self-entrench themselves. Now and 
then managers resist a loss of benefits and corporate mergers in self-interest. 
In an effort to minimise agency conflicts shareholders incur monitoring costs, 
bonding or structural controls, and residual loss (i.e. opportunity cost form re-
strictions imposed.) Jensen and Meckling (1976), the original sponsors of the 
concepts, collectively refer to these expenses as agency costs. According to 
Fama and Jensen (1983a, 1983b) corporate governance may also affect total 
value of the firm by influencing the distribution of risk. Recert research, (Lo-
renz, 1999), suggests that reputation and trust also play a cnucial part. A good 
reputation will however not ensure ex-post optimality especially in periods of fi-
nancial distress when it may be favourable for the borrowers not to repay their 
debts. 
Corporate governance entails control, which in turn influences the distri-
bution of resources and collaboration of other parties. Zingales (1997) defined 
corporate governance as a "complete set of constraints that shape the ex-post 
bargaining over quasi-rents generated by the firm." Generally the distribution of 
quasi-rents is affected by allocation of ownership, capital structure, managerial 
incentive schemes, labour, and external investors. According to Williamson 
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(1988) the purpose of economic organisation is "to craft governance structures 
that economise on bounded rationality while simultaneously safeguarding the 
transactions in question against hazards of opportunism." Bounded rationality is 
defined as behaviour intended to be rational but is not perfectly so. Both op-
portunism and gullibility taint rationality hence the acceptance of incomplete 
contracts in spite of contractual hazards. Often there is need to resort to force of 
law to address the shortcomings. Therefore governance extends to the eco-
nomic and legal institutions that may be altered through the political process. 
Siddique (1997) points out that literature on economic development is at 
a crossroads. On the one hand liberal economists consider globalisation ~nd 
free markets to be "the ultimate goal for developmental economics" which will 
eventually solve the problems of poverty and under-development. The other 
group now emphasises institutional issues (such as governance) ahead of 
structural prescriptions of the Bratton Woods Institutions. The failure of struc-
tural adjustment programs in Nigeria and Zimbabwe has been blamed on poor 
governance. Poor performance of Latin American countries has also been 
traced to their government's poor financial policies 
Africa has failed to use external aid for productive purposes. Adam and 
O'Connell (1997) highlight that Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is the poorest and 
most aid-dependent region in the world. It registered the slowest growth be-
tween 1960 and 1990. Michael Todaro (1994, p642) concurs that decline and 
deprivation were worse in Africa than in any other region in the 1980 and 
1990's. Todaro reiterates, "sub-Saharan Africa poses the greatest challenge to 
world development efforts ... " 
Many, including Joseph Stiglitz, the former chief economist at the World 
Bank, row doubt the therapeutical potency of the "capital storage" and "policy 
failure" diagnosis in absence the of strong institutional arrangements. Institu-
tional issues are very difficult to calibrate and notoriously very controversial. 
Sceptics argue that the issue of governance is a vanguard for liberal Western 
Ideology. Massive empirical evidence, however, suggest that governance and 
agency problems are essential issues both at corporate and national level. In a 
highly influential and critical paper Black, Kraakman and Tarassova (1999) 
blame institutional failure for rampant corruption, increase in organized crime 
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and economic collapse following economic liberalization in Russia.h The authors 
argue convincingly that good governance boosts economic :performance and 
give graphic accounts to demonstrate how an institutional va~uum breeds self-
dealing, dishonest, corruption and economic collapse. Marke~]transactions and 
contracts require a high degree of social trust and recourse tq)aw enforcement 
when necessary. " 
,·.,. 
" Hellman, Jones, Kaufman and Schankerman (2000) argue that corrup· 
tion thrives where there is weak rule of law and states are powerless to control 
the degree of discretionary power" of their own bureaucrats. ~ow accountability 
also reinforces corruption. Kaufmann et al (1999(a), p3) note, "available indica-
tors of governance are noise measures of true "governance ' ... which may un-
derestimate the impact of governance ... " Hellman et al (2000, p5) show that 
corruption is a multidimensional spectrum. lt ranges from bribery (grease pay-
ments) on a micro level to state capture on a macro level. State capture reflects 
grand corruption under which organs of the state and the legislative process are 
influenced, and directed through private payments and interests. Policy making 
ceases to be predictable and transparent while the legal system looses its po-
tency to "protect prope1ty and contract rights." In such an environment business 
shuns publicity and customers cannot effectively benefit from the infonnational 
role of prices. 
In the Zimbabwean context issues pertaining to governance, transpar-
ency and accountability are given lip service and seldom practised as a busi-
ness culture. Meda (1999, p 5) shows that the ruling party, ZANU PF, failed to 
' implement a self-imposed "Leadership Code" ostensibly due to semantic dis-
agreements on "a definition of a leader." The real threat was fear of exposure by 
those who had used their offices to amass wealth, because ~he code required 
declaration of personal assets. In the late 1980s, the very popular "Sandura 
Commission" (1989) confirmed fears of an increasingly sceptical general public 
that self-dealing and scheming were rampant among public officials. Govern-
ment largely ignored a lesser-known "Smith Report" (1989), which recom-
mended sweeping rationalisation of Zimbabwean parastatals, although the 
h Causation between governance and conuption is not yet clear. Siddique {1997, pl5] suggests conuption 
springs out of ponr governance. "Conuption springs out of poor governance. Accountability, transpar-
ency and free flow of information are all distasteful medicine to corrupt people". 
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commission worked on the project for about four years. After all public commis-
sions are expensive processes. The dismal Constitutional Commission and a 
resultant national referendum of 2000, set up by government to counteract a 
constitutional review process pioneered by an independent National Constitu-
tion Assembly (NCA), used about $767.2m.5 A number of other reports in colo-
nial and independent Zimbabwe were never implemented. Some as instanced 
by the "Matebeleland" and the "Chidyausiku" reports never saw the light of day. 
A well-known "Nyanga Bus Disaster Fund'', collected from well-wishers touched 
by the tragic death of 91 school children and teachers in 1991, had not yet been 
disbursed to the intended beneficiaries by December 20006. Trustees of the 
fund handed the money to Civil Protection officials in 1993 where it possibly 
disappeared into unknown coffers. l have argued elsewhere that the decadence 
is not exclusive to government officials. Standard Chartered Bank, the oldest 
and biggest bank in Zimbabwe, refused to reinstate 211 workers dismissed after 
a 1997 wage dispute despite a Supreme Court ruling and "condemnation by the 
International Labour Organisation."7 Given the difficult conditions prevailing in 
Zimbabwe in year 2000, ten of the employees who have since died might have 
been precluded from calling upon the fruits of their labour in the darkest hour of 
their need. A culture of skirting the law, whether in public or private sector, is 
tragic because sustainable long-term prosperity requires some degree of trust. 
The "Leadership Code" was not applicable to the private sector execu-
tives, a loophole quickly exploited by government officials as a personal disad-
vantage. Meda (1999) highlights the lack of appreciation among public officials 
of a "distinction between public and private resources.'' He acknowledges that 
the "Prevention of Corruption Act" does not foster a culture of business integrity 
because it is difficult to enforce. To resolve this predicament Meda suggests 
that an already existing "Standing Committee on Parliamentary Rules and 
Privileges" be upgraded into an independent people's commission reporting to 
parliament. 
Although Meda has very stimulating ideas regarding the constitution and 
operations of the commission, his proposed commission is not destined to be 
innovative. Why should all members of the commission be hand picked by the 
president (p6) with parliament subordinated to ratification? Under the present 
constitutional arrangements, the president currently appoints executives to head 
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government and quasi-government institutions, as well as 20 parliamentarians, 
but that does not guarantee their competency, impartiality antj1 intellectual inde-
pendence. In any case the immediate problems in Zimbabwe\do not stem from 
the want of adequate legislation and commissions, but lack !Pf political will to 
implement solutions already in our national cardboard. In D~~ember 2000 the 
magistrates' courts had a backlog of about 24000 cases and :was understaffed 
I,', 
to an extent of 37 magistrates.8 i,! 
I am not arguing away imaginative solutions to the problem. My point is 
unless we mean what we say there is no redress. We have ~ws but justice is 
not done. Creating institutions that cannot execute and discharge their declared 
mandates is not a meaningful economic exercise. Alfred Marshall, cited in Web-
ster put great emphasise on intangible assets (non-material wealth) by illustrat-
ing that it took centuries to replenish knowledge lost following the fall of the 
Roman Empire while destroyed materials were replaced within. decades. 
The constitution of good governance is another problematic issue. For 
some, democratic elections are not an accurate measure of political rights or a 
critical determinant of economic growth. Gastil [1991] cited in Barro (1997, p53) 
suggests "Political rights are rights to participate meaningfully in the political 
process ... vote and compete for public office, anct for elected representatives to 
have a decisive vote on public policies". Barro adds that minority parties should 
also have influence on policy. Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Labat6n (1999a, p2) 
regard rule of law, government effectiveness and extent of graft as the three 
fundamental aspects of governance. While the extent of graft·cannot be readily 
' 
assessed due to its secretive realm, Zimbabwe continues to tau short on rule of 
law and government effectiveness. [For justification see Freedom House and 
the World Economic Forum annual ratings.] Suffrage ls not an automatic guar-
antee for economic prosperity. ln Barre's view increase in democracy at, low 
levels of political rights stimulates economic growth. Barrow notes, "once a 
moderate amount of democracy has been attained further expansion reduces 
growth". 
It has been argued that dictators come in two types. Those who loot na-
tional wealth for personal gain (e.g. most African dictators) and those preoccu-
pied with economic development. The former is detrimental to economic 
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growth. Schwartz (1992) cited in Barro (1997, p51) notes that some OECD 
countries increased economic liberties before their democracies became fully 
fledged. Good governance does not need to find or create innovative ideas, as 
general society produce talented men and women to fulfil that role. This means 
that a good leader does not need to interfere with everything of economic and 
social significance. Subordinating economic opportunity and employment to 
partisan interests such as political affiliation to a ruling party, (ZANU PF in Zim-
babwe's case), could be detrimental to economic prosperity. Schum peter (1936, 
p88) suggests that leaders fulfil their function "more by will than by intellect" and 
more by "authority," "personal weight," and so forth than by original ideas. Kin-
dleberger and Herrick, (1977, p2) insist that matters of governance require 
foremost concern as they affect human condition. Haavelmo (1944, p115) 
agrees that economic research must pool its expertise and resources because 
national income and the welfare of "millions" might depend on it. 
2.5 Approaches to Economic Growth And Development 
"Development problems", Kindleberger and Herrick (1977, p21) reiterate, 
" ... are problems of policy." Typical literature and research characterise eco-
nomic development as a process amenable to sound and proper management 
and policies. There is no single measure of development because structural is-
sues such as extent of poverty, income distribution, social and political change, 
literacy, leisure and economic wellbeing come into play. Kindleberger and Her-
rick (1977, pp6-7) use terms such as "multiplicity", "multidimensional", "multi-
faceted" and "multivariate" to bring home the reality that economic development 
is idealistically a broad based spectrum of indicators. They propose a long defi-
nition that needs no edification to pinpoint issues involved. ''Economic devel-
opment", Kindleberger and Herrick (1977, p1) highlight, 
is generally detined to include improvements in material welfare, 
especially for persons with the lowest incomes; the eradication of 
mass povetty with its correlates of illiteracy, disease, and early 
death; changes in the consumption of inputs and output that gen-
erally include shifts in the underlying structure of production away 
from agricultural toward industrial activities; the organization of the 
economy in such a way that promotes ... [emp/oyment of many 
rather than] a privileged minority; and ... greater participation ... in 
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making decisions about the directions, economic and otherwise, 
... to improve their welfare. (P1, italics added.) 
,I 
Economic wellbeing is therefore a function of several p~oxles whose cali-
bration may not be easy in practice. Traditionally, Gross ~omestic Product 
(GDP) is accepted as a measure of national income (Y) aJIEI economic size 
" while GDP per capita is the most popular proxy for average hl.Jqian welfare. The 
. 
rate of change in GDP per capita (GY), over two periods ir\!time depicts the 
speed and direction of changes in wellbeing. 
I 
.f 
Development and economic growth theories gained popularity after the ,, 
Second World War (WW II). The literature is focused on unsophisticated 
economies such as Zimbabwe. Kindleberger and Herrick (1977, p4) note that 
poor countries were "initially known" as ''backward" after WW II, a term which is " 
"unfortunate, given its connotation of inferiority that go beyond simple lack of 
sophistication." The term "underdeveloped" was later preferred as it signalled a 
potential for improvement. However, Myint cited in Kanth (1994, p17) is of the 
conviction that underdevelopment means backward. The term implies "under-
developed resources and backward people, " a combination argued to consti-
tute the "Third World." The reader should note that by definition a "backward" 
people lack sophistication that is a prerequisite for development. This creates a 
vicious circle. Kindleberger and Herrick (1977, p4) disagree with this interpreta-
tion. In their view the term Third World was coined to indicate political non-
alignment with both NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) and the Soviet-
Eastern bloc. Schumpeter taught us that development requires emergence of 
innovators in society. Eventually the Third World was "apologetically," (Kanth 
1994 ), referred to as "developing countries" a term which Kindleberger and Her-
rick (1994, p4) consider flattering because it reflects diplomatic sensitivity rather 
than semantic accuracy. The authors are also uncomfortable with th13 popular 
initials "LDC" for less developed countries because this cold desitJnation re-
sembles the substitution of abbreviations such as "VD" to keep sensitive terms 
at "an arm's length." 
For the purpose of this research any term other than "backward" will do. 
The typical features are well known. Underdevelopment denotes poorly devel-
oped economic sectors, over reliance on production of primary products, as well 
as economic domination by external market forces. The bulk of export produc-
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tion is not diversified but typically concentrated in a few lines of items. In ex-
treme cases most manufactured products are imported. Foreign currency short-
ages, debt and balance of payment crisis are in most cases not uncommon. 
The proportion of inhabitants below the poverty datum line is typically high. A 
high proportion of agricultural output in an environment with insignificant serv-
ices and manufacturing sectors are often regarded as signs of underdevelop-
ment. Extreme poverty and heavily skewed income distribution are also wit-
nessed with disheartening frequency. 
Increased interest in economic growth and development literature has 
led to a proliferation of empirical work and theories. ~ichael Todaro, (1997, 
p70) who interprets development as a "multidimensional process" summarises 
development literature into five competing categorie!:i. These are (a) the linear 
stages of growth model; (b) theories and patterns of structural change; (c) the 
international dependence revolution; (d) the neoclassical, free market counter-
revolution; and (e) the endogenous theory of economic growth. Most theories 
concentrate on capital formation, a term used to describe increases in net in-
vestment in capital assets. 
The linear stages model was developed soon after World War II and 
dominated growth literature in the 1950s and 1960s. Rostow's Stages of Growth 
is the most well known. Rostow proposed that countries evolve from being un-
derdeveloped to development through a series of steps. In particular nations 
make strategic choices from ''take off' to "maturity." According to the model 
each economy needs to pass through five stages. These are (1) traditional so-
ciety, (i.e. pre-industrial), (2) preconditions for take off (use of scientific methods 
and structural change), (3) take off where growth is the norm and is facilitated 
by saving and investment, (4) maturity under which the focus is on improvement 
in an effort to expand technology, (5) mass consumption accompanied by an 
increase in per capita income. This model identified mobilisation of domestic 
and foreign saving as "the pre-conditions for take off into self sustaining 
growth." The successful US export of technical and financial resources to war 
torn Europe under the Marshall Plan lends support to the model. 
Lauded as an alternative to Marxism in the West, Rostow's model was 
severely criticised by its socialist opponents for being tautological. Critics con-
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sidered it to be a descriptive account rather than a theoretical, model based on 
scientific analysis. There is no good reason why social and,1economic forces 
should follow a deterministic sequence of development. \ 
The Harrod-Damar Growth Model explains how savin~ and investment 
ratios are related to economic activity. Damar (1957) posit~d that economic 
" growth is a function of the amount and rate of net capital in.Vestment. Capital 
accumulation in turn is causally linked savings. The latter in:·tum depends on 
surplus income. Surplus income itself is a function of increased productivity. 
Nurkse (1962)9 describes this chain of causality as a "vicibus cycle" where 
"success breeds success" and "poverty breads poverty". Poverty creates a vi-
cious developmental trap: murombo haarovi chinenguwo iS popular Shona 
saying. Theoretically, exogenous intervention is required to break the cycle. 
Popular solutions are foreign direct investment, external borrowing and export 
promotion. In practice not much improvement is noticed on the.ground. 
The Solow growth model, named after the Nobel Prize economist Robert 
Solow, assumes constant returns to scale in the growth of capital stock, labour 
force, and technological innovation. Critics condemn the model as mechanistic. 
Some economic growth theories have drawn attention to qualitative fac-
tors such to the development question. In Schumpeter's (1936, p66) view de-
velopment encompasses creating new products, "new quality", industrial reor-
ganisation and the "conquest of new sources of supply." The level of con-
sciousness, the value system, religion as well as other social beliefs are also 
regarded as Grucial determinants of economic prosperity. M~r>:. Weber's "Prot-
estant Ethic And The Spirit of Capitalism" (1930)10 is credited with the pioneer-
ing of individual-level theories as well as the "primacy of ideaf as an answer to 
Karl Marx's preoccupation with the organisation of society; Jaffee (1990, p20). 
Admittedly it is apparent that economic development is more than quan-
tifiable economic factors. However, the causality between social and cultural 
factors on one hand and economic development on the other is difficult to infer 
let alone interpret. Jaffee (1990, p21) argues, "Weber's analysis does not posit 
causal ordering" but mutually reinforcing ideas, since capitalism existed before 
Protestantism. In fact Portes (1976), in Jaffee (1990, p34) argues that subjec-
tive factors, including values, attitudes and beliefs are exaggerated. Ethnic "par-
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ticularism", like personal traits theories, whether individualistic or holistic, is 
fraught with bias and subjectivity. In Portes' view opportunities for acquisition 
are predetermined by "the socio-economic position of individuals" rather than 
level of consciousness. The "need for achievement" is also moderated by 
structural constraints. Take a practical example of Third World postgraduate 
international students in Western institutions. One finds accountants, bankers, 
economists, financial analysts, civil and electrical engineers - marooned by so-
cio-economic forces - unable to land part-time jobs in the fields of their calling. 
These men and women end up taking menial jobs such as brick packing, food 
processing and other forms of labouring. It would be naiVe and offensive to 
suggest they lack the determination to succeed. 
Causality between education and productivity is also open to question 
unless other necessary resources are available. Education without equal op-
portunity is dysfunctional. High literacy rate, for instance has not reduced pov-
erty in Third World countries. The educated that are unemployed, argues Jaf-
fee (1990, p40-42), "are likely to emigrate or to create political difficulties ... [and 
even] generate social regression and 'political decay' ... [because of labour's] 
ability consciously to reflect on its role and situation. " 
In many countries meaningful participation in the economic and general 
prosperity often followed reorganisation of political and economic structures 
against those with vested interests and patrons of privilege. In Britain feudalism 
had to collapse for the Industrial Revolution lo succeed. Remarkable Japanese 
economic prosperity after WW II is often traced to moderation of the Zaibatsu 
economic system. In the next chapter I propose that Zimbabwe needs to over-
come her Machiavellian economic practices to attain sustAinable economic 
prosperity. Class structures based on castes, apartheid or tradition usually 
come with unequal opportunity. The "American Dream", though not perfect, is 
based on equal opportunity. However, equal opportunity is not equity. 
Development economics often grapples with contradicting demands of 
equity and growth. Champions of laissez-faire economic policies believe income 
disparity or functional inequality is good for growth. They criticise extensive 
welfare policies; insisting on "growth first, [trickle down] latter" Economic activity 
based on redistribution (consumption), they argue, cannot be sustained in the 
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long term because it destroys incentives to increase productivity (production) 
hence retards economic growth. I agree with Jaffee (1990, R~07) who argues 
that the laissez-faire analysis is fraudulent. At least in the Thirp World, I qualify. 
Policies adopted by developing countries, with the blessi~b of the Bretton 
Woods institutions, to promote economic growth often res4.!t in what Jaffee 
terms a "trickle up effect" at the expense of mass poverty am?,~9 the poor. The 
socialist answer to the problem is redistribution first, growth i{.lter. Jaffee right-
fully notes that "the land reform version of the model" is most common across 
nations. One does not need to be a Rosa Luxemburg to fin~ that the original 
• 
objectives are never fulfilled. At any rate the dismal failure of Communism in 
Eastern Europe suggests that this extreme approach is counterproductive in the 
long run. At independence in 1980 Zimbabwe adopted an alternative approach, 
"Growth With Equity" also known as redistribute-with-growth. The intention was 
to promote investment and growth on one hand while ensuring equity by delib-
erate income policies, taxation, mass education and free health. Unfortunately 
Zimbabwe accomplished neither growth nor equity by the highly romanticised 
"Year 2000." Paul Streetten (1977}" criticises growth with equity's heavy reli-
ance on uncertain income policies that leave both growth and equity to chance. 
Under the basic needs framework government provide for essential material 
needs, services and public utilities unlikely to be optimised by pure market 
forces. In my view government has an option to provide for these services di-
rectly or indirectly through dole. Intuitively dole is more palatable in capitalist 
economies than direct government participation. However, growth is still not 
guaranteed and the equity - growth dilemma not resolved. 
According to Jaffee (1990, p26) there exist a penchant "to cite the most 
ideal and romantic elements of Western capitalist structure as the necessary 
conditions for the socio-economic development of Third World nations." The 
emphasis is on "stability and harmony" rather than struggles for positive change 
(p35). Even international institutions such as the IMF have been accused of 
peddling politics rather than policy. Internalisation of rose coloured Western 
Values in some ways retards Third World development. To quote Jaffee (1990, 
p35) who follows Portes (1976): 
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Third World individuals who have had the greatest exposure to 
Western Values of entrepreneurship and consumption, [have] a 
legacy of elite behaviour bordering on fraud, corruption, co-option, 
and conspicuous consumption. [They] squandered valuable for-
eign exchange [importing] Western luxury products. 
Results from Russia suggest that efforts towards incorporation and pri-
vatisation in an environment without sound institutional structures are destined 
for long term discredit; especially when the contracts cannot be enforced, and 
self-dealing kleptocrats1 remain untouchable. Black et al (1999, pp 3&10) iden-
tify lack of political will, "a punitive tax system, {rampant] official corruption, or-
ganised crime, an [business] unfriendly bureaucracy", and "a business culture 
[oij skirting the law" as the main "micro failures" behind the shrinkage of the 
Russian economy between 1991 and 1999. 
In any case the Japanese economic success prior to the 1990s taught 
the world that self-interest and "possessive individualism" are not the only 
panacea for economic prosperity. Furthermore I agree with Schumpeter (1936, 
p58) who is explicit "For the economic state of a people does not emerge simply 
from the preceding economic conditions, but only from the preceding total situa-
tion." 
Beliefs, even when backed by scientific evidence can sometimes go 
wrong. As Davies (1997, p88) put it 
[One can make a long list] of all the times religion has prevented 
scientific truths from surfacing. The reverse question is also inter-
esting: How often does science prevent other truths than its own 
from being heard? 
Students of finance need no prompting to recall problems and resistance 
Sharpe (1964), Black and Scholes (1971) and Bachelier (1900) encountered in 
order to publish their seminal papers. 
; In the Russian context most resources used to be state owned. Kleptocrats are defined as "a handful of 
well-connected men who made their first millions - and sometimes bihions - through sweetheart deals 
with or outright theft from the government, and then leveraged that initial wealth by buying major com· 
panies from the government for astonishing low prices." Kleptocrats sometimes give conniving state offi-
cials "financial inducement'> to put a good spin on a dirty process ... " Black et al (1999, p5). 
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3. FUNDAMENTAL BACKGROUND TO THE ECONOMY 
,·.· . 
. 
" 
... 
The modern state is nothing but a conspiracy to exploit, but ,post of all demor· 
a/ise its citizens .. .Political Jaws seem to me such prodigious' lies, that I fail to 
see how one among them can be better or worse than , any of the oth-
ers ... Henceforth I shall never serve in any government anY'tt1here ... Govern-
ments are intricate institutions, sanctified by tradition and custom, for the pur-
pcse of committing by force and with impunity the most revolting crimes.I 
L. N. Tolstoy in "War and Peace" 
3.1 An Analytical Overview 
To become a millionaire in our country it is not at all necessary to have a good 
head or specialised knowledge. Often it is enough to have active support in the 
government, the parliament, local power structures and Jaw enforcement agen-
cies ... In other words, you are appointed a millionaire. 
Pyotr Aven ( 1994) in Black et al ( 1999) 
The purpose of this section is to put in perspective governance, and the 
general mechanics of income generation, accumulation and distribution in the 
Zimbabwean economy. It is hoped to provide a better understanding of the 
economy's current, potential or realised productive capacity. Economics, fi-
nance and public administration coexist and cross paths on a daily basis. The 
evolution of the financial superstructure in Zimbabwe is not immune to the so-
cio-economic forces that ushered her birth. Understanding the Japanese Zai-
J I read "War and Peace" in 1990. Due to youthful and intellectual inexperience I did not take down 
proper page details. Though struck by Tolstoy's disillusionment, alternatives seem bleak. Without the 
government convention, life could also be "nasty, brutish and short" in Ute Thomas Hobbes sense. 
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batsu concept, for instance, throws more light onto their financial system. As 
forcefully put by Chimombe (1983, p56) " ... comprehension of that background 
facilitates evaluation" of the role of the Zimbabwe financial system. To augment 
Taylor (2000, pp13 and 197) current productive capacity in any economy at any 
given point in time is a legacy of past investment decisions, creation and distri-
bution of wealth. I agree with this assessment because abundance of produc-
tive resources, which is not necessarily a function of economic organisation, 
only provides the potential for economic growth; transformation to actuality is 
not invariant to institutional structures. Bartllet (1987, p12) quips, "Economics, 
unlike Justice, is by no means blind." Mankiw G. N. (1997, p371-372), citing 
Alberto Alesina's (1988) "Macroeconomics and Politics", found that the historical 
performance of the USA economy between 1948 and 1997 "is usually low, and 
often negative, in the second year of Republican administrations ... By contrast, 
the economy is usually booming in the second and third years of Democratic 
administrations." See Table 3 for full details that suggest the American people 
elect Democrats to fire up the economy and Republicans to cool it down. 
Table 3 
US Real GDP Growth During Democratic And Republican Administrations 
Democratic Administrations 
President 
First 
Truman 0.4 
Kennedy I Johnson 2.7 
Johnson 5.5 
Carter 4.5 
Cllnton 3.1 
Average 3.2 
Republican Administrations 
President 
First 
Eisenhower I 3.7 
Eisenhower II 1.9 
Nixon 2.7 
Nixon I Ford 5.2 
Regan I 1.8 
Year of Term 
Second Third 
8.7 9.9 
5.2 4.1 
5.9 2.6 
4.8 2.5 
4.0 
5.7 4.8 
YearofTerm 
Second Third 
-0.7 5.6 
-0.5 5.5 
0.0 2.9 
-0.6 
· 0.8 
-2.2 3.9 
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Fourth 
4.3 
5.6 
4.2 
-0.5 
3.4 
Fourth 
2.0 
2.2 
5.1 
4.9 
6.2 
Regan II 
Bush 
Average 
3.2 
2.5 
3.0 
2.9 
1.2 
0.0 
3.1 
-0.6 
2.8 
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, as cited In Manklw G. N. {1997, p372) 
3.2 Competing Paradigms 
Colonial development apology 
1,, 
" I',•, 
' 
" 
... 
3.9 
2.3 
3.B 
There are two competing nee-orthodoxy stereotypes conventionally used 
to interpret the behaviour of African economies: colonial development apology 
and underdevelopment theory. The implications of this philosophical dichotomy 
have rendered any debate in Zimbabwe very polemic.k I am not the only one to 
arrive at this deduction. Carol Summers (1994) in "From Civilization to Segre-
gation", is stunned, "Almost all the words available to discuss social change in 
Southern Africa carry either pejorative or problematic associations and implica-
tion", (pxi). More strongly she notes of the colonial sources, "None are neu-
tral"(pxi). In extreme cases, they amount to public propaganda. Yet some po-
litical science professors see polarisation as a mark of scholarship. As Masipula 
Sithole (2001) puts it, "For in scholarship, there is rarely room for compromise." 
A colonial development analysis regards the arrival of Europeans in Af-
rica and subsequent subjugation as a blessing in disguise thc:!t was essential to 
bring tee light of civilisation to The Dark Continent. Grant (1973, p3) acknowl-
edges that colonialists brought with them "a new pattern of law and order - if 
not justice; they introduced western educational and medical seivices, as well 
as sophisticated commercial and mining methods; ... brought' Christian religion 
... they provided roads, rail, telephone and postal links ... " A colonial develop-
ment analysis emphasises superior personal traits of Europeans over those of 
Africar.s. This disccurse may be equated to what Jaffee (1990, p7) character-
ises as individual l1~vel theories in a "nested hierarchy" of theoretical analysis 
k Readers ofa prudish disposition are hereby consoled that any pain suffered henceforth is not deliberate. 
The intention is not to pass a verdict on morality issues but to explore facts. On the academic front, the 
dichotomous debate on whether education should follow an intrinsic value or a utilitarian approach does 
not concern us here. Both have genuine merits and severe flaws and are not mutual exclusive. 
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stretching from individual theories at the lowest rung, through to organizational, 
societal and international theories at the apex. 
These [individual} theories of development focus on the values, 
motives, attributes, and characteristics of individuals as the source 
of socio-economic development. [They] emphasize individual traits 
such as the level of achievement motivation, the degree of entre-
preneurial talent, the attachment to modern ideas, or the posses-
sion of human capital. These perspectives share the assumption 
that individual characteristics translate into national social devel-
opment. 
In typical colonial myth "underdevelopment in Africa was due to the ab-
sence of an economic spirit among Africans," Mosley (1983, p1.) Settlers, 
Frankel (1938) elaborates, regarded African civilization as "meagre hoe-culture 
or pastoralism" which had to be "compelled to develop a new order." Even mis-
sionaries such as Robert Moffat, an eventually tr aacherous guest at King 
Mzi\ikazi's kraal, for years dismissed "natives" as a people with "nothing natu-
rally engaging, their extreme selfishness, filthiness, obstinate stupidity, and 
want of sensibility ... "12 Philip Mason (1958, p71) points out that some English 
observers once wrote off the Irish as rude, unclean, and lacking in "civility, hu-
mility, or any manner of decency ... " and considered their matrimony no more 
"than conjunction between unreasonable beasts." Similarly one would not miss 
the contempt with which Russian officials held German soldiers during Napo-
leonic Wars as depicted in Tolstoy's War and Peace, yet today their country is 
an economic powerhouse. Of course at their peak the Irish had considerable 
achievements in scholarship and missionary work. 
Early African achievers such as Hannibal of Carthage (247-182 BC), 
Augustine of Hippo (354-430 AD), Egyptian and Nubian dynasties (3100 - 332 
BC), Tshaka "The Zulu" (1787-1828), and Mwene Mutapa Kingdom (c1000 -
1837), which resisted Portuguese expeditions to Zimbabwe between 1561 and 
1667, are easily forgotten. The biblical Moses also received African instruction. 
Sympathetic observers such as Dr. David Livingstone noted that Africans had 
well developed ideas of what is right and wrong. He was advised, according to 
Mason (1958, p26), that they knew "we should not lie or kill or steal ... except 
that we must not have more than one wife." Persian and Arabian geographers 
report gold mining in Zimbabwe as early as 947 AD to 1060 AD.13 Meda (1999, 
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p4) notes that colonisers were "actively antagonistic" and contemptuous of Afri-
can social and religious way of life, whose complexity they dig not understand. 
ln the end Missionaries and settlers alike applied their own stfmdards and cus-
toms. Cattle for instance, were as valuable an African sourcei/of wealth and in-
surance against poverty as are equities in a modern market f~(::onomy, yet set-
tler governments in Zimbabwe insisted on compulsory de-stoc~lng. 
'·'. 
Apart from personal traits empirical research has va!idbted causal link~ 
have been suggested between economic performance and other societal and 
cultural values. I have highlighted earlier on that the direction ~f causality could 
be bi-directional. Marx Weber's "Protestant Ethic And The Spirit of Capitalism" 
' (1930) is one of the earliest to relate society's ideas, values, beliefs and the 
urge for achievement to economic activity; Jaffee (1990, p20). Frankel (1938, 
p2) continues the colonial argument, highlighting the supposed want of creativity 
among Africans. 
Unlike the Indians or Chinese, Africans had practically nothing to 
offer, and as little to demand, from traders who visited them. The 
only trade of real consequence which could be developed for 
centuries was the slave trade, the export of Africans themselves 'a 
trade which destroys all others'. 
Some colonial apologists accepted complete expulsion of Africans off the 
land into extinction. In Frankel's (1938, p8) opinion colonization could have pro-
vided automatic solution to African development: 
If the indigenous population had disappeared before the advance 
of the white man, as the Indians did in AmeriGa, and i{ its climate 
had favoured European settlement, ... [Fortunately] instead of 
decadent population, rapidly tending to extinction, the intending 
settlers encountered a race 11irile, increasing and racially potent. 
Philip Mason (1958, p 215) points out that the original inhabitants of 
North America and Australia disappeared with "some active assistance from the 
invaders." Indirect assaults included esoteric products and diseases such as 
"gin, tuberculosis and syphilis," and directly bullets and arsenic. The "persis-
tence and virility" of the Bantu peoples was considered undesirable. Ironically, 
Colonial Central Africa was also universally dependent on the labour of the in-
digenous population to safeguard the interests of a permanent European set-
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tlement. On the other hand African economies were self-sufficient hence had no 
incentive to work for the Europeans. Settlers introduced forced labour. Frankel 
(1938, p11) noted that "methods of compulsion" included direct force, conscrip-
tion and indirect taxes. Expropriation of land was designed to permanently de-
stroy traditional economic self-sufficiency. As noted by Mushayakarara 
(2001)14,"ln fact colonialism reinforced feudalism in Africa." 
Although personal trait theories incidentally promote ethnicity and other 
forms of discrimination based on race, colour, religion and sex, they continue to 
be proven empirically valid. A latest example is William Easterly's (2000) "Mid· 
die Consensus" that regards low ethnic diversity and low class heterogeneity as 
"critical determinants" of economic growth (p2). Economic shrinkage of the So-
viet Union, for instance, is liked to "hallowing out" of the middle class whereas 
poor economic policies and performance in India, Guatemala, Mexico, Kenya, 
Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Zambia and Africa in general are attributed to ~high lin-
guistic and or ethnic diversity, (p5). On the flip side miracles in Japan arid Korea 
owe their origin to a middle class consensus. Some races, for example Chinese 
in East Asia, Lebanese in West Africa and Indians in East Africa are found 
elsewhere to be more enterprising than others. Of course Easterly's conclusions 
are not new. Kindleberger and Herrick (1977, p28) found it "hard to avoid the 
conclusion that [ethnic} diversity is a handicap to development." 
Ethnic "particularism", like personal traits theories, whether individualistic 
or holistic, is fraught with bias and subjectivity. Rosenthal and Rosnow (1996) 
lament, "Belief ls easily confused with evidence, evidence is easily misunder-
stood, and misunderstanding perpetuated." Generally countries in Africa are 
larger than those in Europe; hence it is not surprising to find linguistic differ-
ences. In any case different peoples in say Nigeria and Indonesia were arbitrary 
put together by colonial masters. Agreed talent is not ubiquitous and all virtues 
not the same, but too much generalisation is harmful to economic prosperity. 
There is no reason why ethnic diversity, a worldwide phenomenon, should be 
the same as ethnic polarisation. Switzerland, for instance, has achieved re-
spectable political stability and economic prosperity despite linguistic diversity 
among member cantons and extensive political decentralisation. And contrary 
to Weber (1930) some non-protestant countries are economically successful. 
71 
In my view personal trait theories teach readers that sustainable devel-
opment requires sound economic institutions and willpower tq1 enforce the right 
decisions. Schumpeter (1936, p86-7) is again right that the iJ,syche of success 
economises decision-making and production because it is ~~bconsciol!s and 
thus works automatically. Primitive s11cieties are more resista~:, to change, sub-
ject innovators to "social ostracism ... physical prevention or td.'direct attack." 
, ... 
. 
" 
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Underdevelopment theory 
The underdevelopment theorist reads all the seeds at' African underde-
velopment in both slavery and co!oniarism itself. Propagate~ by socialist phi-
losophy, and abetted by communist ideology, the underdevelopment theory 
emphasises the materialist interests of colonial domination. This was forcefully 
argued by Lenin's (1917) "Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism", cited 
in Chimombe (1983, p44). In this light imperialism was a direct result of the 
struggle among colonial powers to establish monopolies over material re-
sources. In Zimbabwe, as elsewhere in Southern Africa, land expropriation 
decimated peasant economies. The results are still being felt today. Whereas 
forced !abour reduced skills in African areas compulsory land acquisition led to 
untold overcrowding in reserves designated for African use. Grant (1973) notes 
that the land would take years to recover even if left fallow. Stringent discrimi-
natory laws curtailed peasant industrial activity, as we shall see infra. Even 
Frankel (1938, p17) admits that European Settlers introduced policies of delib-
, 
erate economic exploitatim1. In his own words 
The mid Victorian Empire did not seek to colonize the wilderness. 
It was an imperialism that was mainly interested in colonieo and 
enterprises that could pay their way. 
Cecil Rhodes, cited from Lenin (1917) by Chimombe (1983, p45) was 
more forthright: "The Empire, as I have always said, is a bread and butter ques-
tion: If you want to avoid a civil war, you must become an imperialist." This view 
is supported by Schumpeter (1936, p10) who contends "Economic activity may 
have any motive, even a spiritual one, but its meaning is always satisfaction of 
wants." Several generations after cqlonisation, self appointed guardians of 
civilianisation in Africa were indeed forced to relinquish their empires, along with 
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the accustomed comfortable way of life, after many difficult years of resistance. 
African policymakers have sporadically raised the question of reparations with 
the West on the basis of the underdevelopment theory. Germany's obligations 
to make good the past misdeeds of the Nazi era seem to vindicate the claim. 
However, according to some critical Western scholars Africans exagger-
ate the 'supposed' demerits of colonisation. Colonial settlers introduced cloth-
ing, transport, education, hospitals, and advanced technology to an uncivilised 
society, they argue. Pre-colonial Africa is deemed to have been on the verge of 
total collapse due to tribal wars and raids. Those postcolonial African leaders 
given the opportunity to demonstrate otheiwise have dismally failed to rise up to 
the challenge. Septics argue there is nothing to write home about in Africa since 
the "winds of change" first swept across the continent in the midst of the last 
century. According to Mosley (1983, p1) settler colonialism as practiced in 
Kenya, Southern Rhodesia, Algeria and South Africa does not fit in the convec-
tional centre exploiting the periphery framework. In his view, these 
settler economies quickly develop[ed] an economic nationalism of 
their own and that extent fail to fit the classical-imperialist model of 
underdeveloped countries whose economic policy and develop-
ment are dictated by the needs of the European metropolis. 
A careful reading of other researchers' work suggests Mosley's thesis 
amounts to a generally creative interpretation of economic realities. According 
to Phimister (1988, p 117) the Letters of Patent authorising self-governance in 
Rhodesia were "considerably circumscribed" by reserved clauses. The clauses 
were designed to stop Southern Rhodesia from passing laws contradictory to 
Imperial interests as well as curb discrimination against Africans. Laws dealing 
with the railways were expected to meet British specifications. The colony had 
no jurisdiction over "extra-territorial matters" such as the currency. In fact thi;;,re 
was no Rhodesian citizenship before 1945. The 'Rhodes clause' stipulated that 
British goods could not be subjected to differential tariffs not levied elsewhere in 
the Empire. Ian Smith was actually the first and last native born Rhodesian 
Prime Minister. Technocrats heading important international companies sat in 
the Legislative Assembly. According to Phimister (1988, p119) closely knit eco-
nomic interest were concentrated in a few hands. One Sir Edmund Davis, an 
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Australian national, held influential positions "on the boards of more than 50 
[notable] companies." Phimister (1988, p119) reports that by 1 ~39 Davis was 
Powerful enough to 'make or break the Rhodesian ec~~omy' sev-
eral times over, Davis often loomed large in the calqulations of 
settler politicians. 'Everybody knows that the economi~ ,dictator of 
this country is Sir Edmund Davis'... ,', 
On the political front the relationship between Britain ahd Rhodesia has 
been described as an unconsummated union. The British government never 
took direct control of the colony. It soon abdicated its self-decl~red provisions to 
• 
protect Africans from settler discrimination. For the first 33 years since colonisa-
tion, the British South Africa Compa11y (BSAC), a private company founded by 
Cecil Rhodes, a colonial entrepreneur, empowered with a Royal Charter in 1889 
administered Zimbabwe. Despite fraudulent assurances to overseas investors 
regarding the vastness and richness of the 'New Eldorado' systematic looting 
soon became the main form of capital accumulation to both the settlers and the 
Chartered Company. 
Armed gangs of settlers and contingents of B.S.A. police equipped 
with Maxim guns, roamed across the country side, taking what 
they could ... [And] refusal to reveal where cattle were hidden 
could end in death, as indeed it did for four women 'shot in cold 
blood'. (Phimister 1988, p16) 
In the eyes of most Africans, Charter Rule was violent, manipulative, vin-
dictive and ruthless. Forced labour was widespread. According to Cobbing 
(1976)15 raids for forced labour and cattle were characterise9 by "violence, in-
cluding molestation and rape of women." Settlers lost no time.'to implement Ma-
chiavellian policies bordering on Dan.vinism. "Africa south of,the Zambezi," Sir 
Harry Johnson (1893), cited in Mason's (1958, p214) "Birth of a Dilemma", de-
clared, " ... must be ruled by whites, developed by Indians, and worked by 
blacks." By 1897 Johnson's (leading administrator in Malawi) stance had hard-
ened, "the weakest must go to the wall", the verdict descended, "and the black 
man must pay for the unprogressive tum his ancestors took some thousands of 
years ago ... "(lbid). Protective legislation was ignored with impunity. 
Phimister (1988, p55) characterises conditions then prevailing on the 
mines as "economics of death and neglect." Forced labourers were subjected to 
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low wages, physical assault, and restricted to prison type compound barracks 
under armed guards. Brutality and coercion on compounds was backed by force 
of law through the Masters and Servants Ordinance of 1901 and the Native 
Pass Ordinance of 1902. In Phi mister's ( 1988, p52-54) words the conditions 
were so grim that it was a "regimen guaranteed to produce thousands of cases 
and hundreds of deaths" from diseases such as scuivy and pneumonia. Cost 
conscious entrepreneurs left otheiwise curable and preventable disease "to cut 
a wide swathe through the ranks of black workers." 
As depicted in Table 4 mortality rate among the conscripted labourers 
was very high. 
Table4 
Black Miners' Death Rate 1906-50: selected yeans 
Yec1r Total Disease Accident All causes 
Employed 
Number of Death rate Number of Death rate Number of Death rate 
deaths per 1000 deaths per 1000 deaths per 1000 
p.a. p.a. p.a. 
1906 17 381 1163 66.91 157 9.03 1320 75.94 
1907 26 098 1486 56.94 102 3.91 1588 60.85 
1908 30 865 1397 45.26 132 4.28 1529 49.54 
1909 32 721 1383 42.27 161 4.92 1544 47.19 
1910 37 826 1682 44.47 182 4.81 1864 49.29 
1912 34 669 1073 30.96 163 4.70 1236 35.66 
1914 36 514 697 24.57 135 3.70 1032 28.27 
1916 40 749 911 22.36 172 4.22 1083 26.58 
1918 32784 3629 110.69 BS 2.69 3717 113.38 
1920 37 890 599 15.81 75 1.98 674 17.79 
1922 36 289 681 18.77 
"' 
2.37 767 21.14 
1924 41 372 665 16.07 89 2.15 754 18.22 
1926 42047 589 14.22 91 2.16 689 16.36 
1928 43 703 756 17.30 94 2.15 850 19.45 
1930 45 342 687 15.15 98 2.16 785 17.31 
1932 36 050 344 9.54 93 2.58 437 12.12 
1934 62 339 583 9.35 142 2.28 725 11.63 
1936 80092 794 9.44 198 2.36 992 11.80 
1938 87 847 906 10.31 153 1.74 1059 12.05 
1940 85 760 528 6.16 121 1.41 649 7.57 
1942 81 862 584 7.13 127 1.55 711 8.66 
1944 75155 567 7.55 82 1.09 649 8.64 
1946 70647 521 7.37 81 1.15 602 8.52 
1948 63 391 409 6.45 71 1.12 480 7.57 
75 
1950 59 548 513 8.62 92 1.15 6051 10.16 
[Source Phimister (1988, p53) Table 2.2] I 
Notwithstanding the political defeat of Charter Rule bJoon-elite settlers, 
the resultant regime was predisposed to crafting its own PriVileges based on 
state paternalism and institutionalised racial discrimination. ~ettlers' "reign of 
privilege" in Zimbabwe can be contrasted to Zaibatsu dominance in pre WWII 
Japan. According to Bison, cited in Miwa and Ramseyer (2odo), Zaibatsu fami-
' 
lies were "privileged groups [which] had exercised despotic power in every 
phase of economic life. Whether one looked at agriculture,' labour, industry, 
banking, or trade, the picture was the same." 
Prime Ministe, Godfrey Huggins, whose long 20 year reign is probably 
only second to that of President Mugabe, set about to implement 'Wilson's twin 
pyramid ideology'. Th'3 policy sought to cement once for all the dualisation of 
the Rhodesian society into black and white economies. A series of discrimina-
tor/ policies and legislation institutionalised "colour bars" to guarantee "the 'ul-
tra-exploitability and ultra-cheapness' of black labourers," Phimister (1988, 
p192). Education, training, employment and social opportunities were prede-
termined by one's racial category. African's long-term competitiveness was ef-
fectively curtailed. Rhodesia was deemed a white man's countiy. Prime Minister 
Huggins is on record declaring: 
The European in this countiy can be likened to an isla.nd of white 
in a sea of black, with the artisan and the tradesman forming the 
shores and the professional classes the highlands in the centre. Is 
the native to be allowed to erode away the shores and gradually 
attack the highlands? To permit this would mean that the leaven of 
civilization would be removed from the country, and the black man 
would inevitably revert to a barbarism worse than ever before. 
(Rhodesia Herald 1 April 1938, as cited in Phimister (1988, p192). 
A discriminatory and improperly named 'Industrial Conciliatory Act' of 
1934 excluded blacks from the definition of an employee. It was assumed "the 
white artisan with a century of training in his bones and the naturally indolent 
native with inherent slipshod methods of workmanship" (Phimister 1988, p92) 
could not strive for the same standard of perfection. In some cases white work-
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ers' claim for superiority was no deeper than the skin: "I do not think that any-
body loves the farmer because he is a farmer, or a 'brickie' because he is a 
'brickie.' In these capacities they have not much claim, but as white men they 
have a claim for fair treatment in this county." (Ibid) The Land Apportionment 
Act of 1933 was glorified as the "Magna Carta" of racial segregation. Africans 
were destined to be scapegoats of white Rhodesians' misfortunes. During the 
Great Depression, the Chief Native Commissioner bragged, "the Natives took 
the 'shock' so effectively that our Colonial Treasurer was able to balance the 
Colony's revenue and expendlture ... The Native ... has always been the shock-
absorber-the 'snubber' - in the State motor car." See Phimister (1988, p183). 
It appears the noble goal of bringing civilization to 'the dark continent' 
was a by-product rather than the primary goal of colonisation despite populist 
pretences of colonial development apologists. I am not suggesting no benEifits 
accrued to Africa as a result of the intercourse, whether consensual or looted. 
One of the greatest ironies of our country lie in the fact that it is the grandchil-
dren of ancestors who collaborated with settlers, rather than those who fought 
hardest for autarky, who were destined to be the new rulers. Some of the self 
confessed beneficiaries consciously pay homage to Rhodesia as a necessary 
foundation for Zimbabwe. Lupe Mushayakarara (2001)16, a prominent and elo-
quent Black critic of the Zimbabwean society confessed: 
I make no apologies about colonialism because I am one of those 
Africans who see it as having been a necessary evil. I am part of a 
much bigger family of individuals sharing a common political an-
cestor, Britain, in spite of what Mugabe may want people to be-
lieve. I am at home thi·oughout this entire continent [then studying 
in America] and around the world, unthinkable without the gift of 
the English language ... Whether Britain raped and plundered an-
cient Zimbabwe, the offspring of that relationship is present day 
Zimbabwe. 
On the other hand exploitation of resources and other sundry causes 
cannot be ruled out. As demonstrated in Belgian Congo, localised asset strip-
ping and exploitation often unfold in the full glare, and with the tacit consent, of 
the international community. Black, Kraakman and Tarassova (1999, p5) cyni-
cally regret recent collusion, "The 'Washington Consensus' supported dirty pri-
vatisation as better than no privatisation, and supported Russia's privatisation 
czar, Anatoli Chubias, as he pursued privatisation by any available means." 
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What then mattered was deliverance of a fatal blow to the socialist ideology by 
seizing "a political window of opportunity that might close if th~y waited" ... (p26). 
In retrospect Black et al (1999, p6) lament: "[Staged] privatisavon is not enough, 
it matters who the owners are." ll 
' • 
Figure 2 below illustrates that some sections within thisame community 
" do not care about social injustices that do not directly concer~·,them. University 
students, who fought sporadic battles with the police since 1988, and against a 
draconian University Amendment Act of 1991, were often condemned as hooli-
gans by disinterested spectators. The Zimbabwean middle c11ss in particular is 
many a time accused of political indifference. To political enemies, the middle 
class stand out as men and women who put themselves beto're their nation. To 
the down trodden, the local middle class reserve themselves even when the na-
tion is in need of their exact talents. However, it has not escaped notice of the 
middle class that the most marginalised often swell the ranks of violent brigades 
unleashed against political dissent. 
,,tz::'t!:l:,~ LE'r US PRAY FOR OUR CHURCH LEADERS 
Figure 2 Caught short on empathy or just free riding? 
[Source: Daily News 6 February 2001 J 
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Poivad - a new framework 
Having digested our challenging record it is my submission that lessons 
from both the past and the present have been the same. Though for want of 
vocabulary, I have recharacterised these forces under a new framework, the 
intention is not to provide yet another polemic interpretation if it could have been 
avoided. Unlike Philip Mason (1958, pv) who suggested potential academic ob-
jections to his work would be due to the "confused and complex" situation then 
in Central Africa, I welcome constructive criticism. 
The central point I am interested in discussing is my proposition that 
economic organisation in Zimbabwe has generally followed a pedigree of Ma-
chiavellian Economics I have christened POIVAD, an acronym for Patronage, 
Ostracism, Impunity, Violence And Demise. A Machiavellian system is unscru-
pulous, selfish, cunning, manipulative and ruthless. This economic phenomenon 
prevailed under Charter Rule, Settler Colonialism and Independence. ln my 
view, the fault does not entirely lie with successive governments, but is shared 
with general society, which - either too busy to realise it is doing nothing ur 
maximizing private value - has a predisposition to free riding. As a result thinly 
veiled, in some cases shocking, Machiavellian designs are blessed by acclama-
tion. Elections are triumphantly won despite bad policy, social and economic 
decadence. 
A Poivad framework does not require any hard thought out ideology to 
thrive. Predominantly turning to Bartllet (1987, p1-3) for support and motivation, 
three basic baits of human emotion: fear, greed and envy essentially carve out 
"the foibles, frailties and strengths of human beings" and personal motivation. 
Bartlett (1987, p1-4 and 130-134) argues that leaders strive for power without 
responsibility; rendering power an end in itself. Society in turn "abdicates" power 
to those who promise security and comfort as each individual considers the 
question: "What is in it for me?" Kindleberger and Herrick (1977, p128) add cru-
cial supplementary questions, "Who can protect me?" ''To whom do I owe alle-
giance and who owes me?" The politician answers by appealing to people's 
self interest and deliberate divide and rule tactics: instilling fear in the hearts of 
his enemies; promise riches to colleagues; and destruction of common enemies 
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to collaborators. ln moments of fear, greed and envy the majority handover 
power to a few without residual constraints and restraints1• ,I 
The contract is absolute despite subsequent regrets. I suppose subse-
quent rationalisation is periodic rather than continuous becau~e it is expensive 
not only in terms of time and productivity, but the obligation i'o have a reason-
" 
able collective consent. Unfortunately once power is given the:installed leader is 
beyond control. Unlike Grossman and Hart's (1986) property Hghts approach to 
corporate governance there is no residual right of control to matters within and 
not specified by the incomplete contract. The process of addicating power is 
often a conscious effort. For instance, students through time have helped over-
throw or prop up many a regime. The regalia of power never !"est upon them. A 
more discernable eye may find close examples of Garibaldi in Southern Africa. 
Bartlett argues that those who surrender power are weakened and made de-
pendent on whoever is installed. I however note that, with hindsight society has 
erected formidable customs and statutes around power to rein it within the pe-
rimeters of its prenuptial promises. Although people dread change fearing the 
unknown young regimes are typically benevolent, hence the limit to executive 
terms in some democracies. Indeed there is a trade off between stability and 
novelty. In an environment where alternative ideas are not allowed to compete 
for competence, and where the rule of law is flouted with impunity, of course re-
dress is attained at a very high opportunity cost. Contracting requires an ele-
ment of trust. If contracts cannot be enforced, risk cannot be trained to those 
who can best manage it. Bargaining is generally not Pareto efficient. Society as 
a whole cannot generate the highest possible wealth out of its :resources. 
Power, whether competent or otherwise, - and like Xenocrates's beautiful 
city17 - requires continued support of economic resources to Persevere. Bartlett 
identifies land and people as the most important economic resources. Land is at 
the apex of all resources because it does not deteriorate with use. Power, like a 
bee's sting, ironically depreciates with use. Those who make excessive use of it 
are unable to pass it to their preferred heirs. "The threat is many times more 
I Although democracy is traditionally defined as a "rule of the people, by the people for the people" the 
flow of ideas is typically top down. At rallies politicians sell their ideas by telling the audience what it 
wants to hear rather than harvest grass roots ideas. l11e smokescreen makes it possible for a few to subju-
gate the acquiescent many. For Bartlett ( 1987, p28) "Democracy remains as it is and will never approach 
that which it should be." 
80 
potent than the use", (p4). In my view, excessive use of power renders ii arbi-
trary. Lord Acton's famous remark is well known: "Power tends to corrupt, and 
absolute power corrupts absolutely." This increases uncertainty to sections that 
contracted for "security" and those who bargained for "riches". Even envious 
collaborators are unnerved by the growing multitudes of overt enemies. Com-
pradors held together by greed and not principle, could, when struck by 'a pris-
oner's dilemma', transform into turncoats. In a turbulent environment the op-
portunity cost for change diminishes hence absolute power cannot be main-
tained efficiently. As Edmund Burke (1777) observed, force can be used for 
both nation building and destructive purposes. See Figure 3 below that provides 
an appropriate contemporary illustration. 
Contrarily to power, land ownership entails absolute long-term advan-
tages and latent strength. As a result ownership of land is only relinquished as a 
last resort. To avert the real threat of social storms against overt concentration 
of ownership, land may be held under anonymous names, subordinates or other 
fronts. To devious opportunists, land, Bartlett (1987, p12) notes, "is a most con-
venient battle-cry, and an equally effective rallying call. The essence of persua-
sion is selfishness which is politically presented as selflessness." 
"O.fflOQ"Qtlc p-ocusis mult rt:tnain tM 
uc:lusiYc reJponslbllity of the r.otlons 
and pe<iplu in whose: domoifl they are 
Ufld,rt....,, and proetlsc<I ..... 
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Figure 3 A cartoonist's impression of an electoral campaign 
[Source: The Daily News 21 Feb. 2001: Details in the left panel m~ified] 
I 
People of sundry motives acquiescently hand over pq~er to politicians 
but cannot be relied upon for its retention because their un~'redictable prefer-
h• 
ences change with time. Although the state invests heavily toward the effort of 
1:•. 
reading human emotion, the leader, perhaps conscious of Qwn chicanery, is 
.,, 
most fearful of change. Confidence and escape hatches are not built on com-
petenc';) and vision, but entrenched on the status quo, glorified past success 
' and vain personal cults. Rhodesian confidence, for instance, was founded on 
elitist laws of patronage and exclusion, to the extent of requiring force of arms to 
dismantle it. In Zimbabwe, the hallmark of ZANU PF achievements rest on the 
historical foundations of having prosecuted a protracted liberation struggle. To 
date, most parliamentarians in the ZANU PF stable are either former security 
details and war veterans or ex-school teachers. Meda (1999, p5) agrees the 
new government at independence was largely composed of war veterans who 
lacked proper skills to manage the economy. Apologists for ZANU PF leader-
ship, as instanced by Mavunga (2001)18, never miss an opportunity to repolish 
the party's admittedly steady-fast liberation war credentials and the then eco-
nomically inevitable reconciliation. 
Since independence political campaigns have effectively milked both 
''war phobia" and "its non-realisation" for more than its worth. During dire plebi-
scites the party has not hesitated to fall back on its fighting competence in order 
to remain in office. See Bartlett (1987, p109) who argues, "No matter how ap-
palling the conditions, familiarity breeds preference." In Zimbabwe kujaira 
nhamo [getting used to difficult conditions] is considered an excellent social vir-
tue. Seen in a different light, the philosophy leaves room for 'stoic indifference, 
and according to Masipula Sithole (2001) the inculcation of 'fatalistic values." 
Sithole, who credits Mayo with the concept of "normalising the abnormal", sug-
gests the framework explains general acceptance of chronic shortages of basic 
necessities. In 2001 Mayo, probably in a different incarnation from the 1990s 
since joining government, denounced the concept as a phrase, which by defini-
tion is an incomplete sentence. Empirically, it would be interesting to investigate 
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the extent to which adaptive expectation (i.e. learning from the past) and ra-
tional expectations hypotheses hold for Zimbabwe. 
Despite very sceptical introductory and concluding remarks, the rest of 
Bartlett's thesis is surprisingly gullible. He has lost no love and faith in the pa-
ternalism and integrity of modern day princes, the politicians. To him, "Eco-
nomics is the study of integrity", (p131) and yet "'there is no morality in econom-
ics", (p104). Machiavellian economics is recast as a constructive "pre-
determinable pattern of behaviour in the pursuit of [man's] material gain and his 
self-preservation ... (p3)" In contrast to his heartfelt admiration of the Japanese 
economic organisation he laments the lack of economic philosophy in the f?rit-
ain of 1987. In his hands Machiavellian Economics simply meant British survival 
and prosperity depended on the nation's ability to "explore objectively and with 
integrity the probable alternatives open to it and then have the courage to take a 
series of predetermined steps, each of which is uncertain and confirmed only 
after commitment", (p28). Economic philosophy and policies are rendered vi-
sionary. The implied acceptance of Thomas Hobbes's anarchical "state of na-
ture" generates internal inconsistencies and contradictions with the envisaged 
archetypal Hegelian nation statehood. 
My point of departure is that Machiavellian Economics is more than de-
liberate economic vision. By definition a Machiavellian policymaker cannot have 
integrity. He or she does not mean what they say. In Bartlett's own words, "the 
democratic system is not conducive to the integrity of leadership. Democracy 
panders to human nature and therefore shuns, ignores or deliberately disbe-
lieves any adverse prognostication", (p90). Under Poivad resource managers 
use their proximity to state and commercial resources to craft an elitist society 
based on patronage and self-preservation. As Black, Kraakman and Tarassova 
(1999) note in their powerful and sombre paper, well-connected technocrats 
face two strategies to maximise private wealth. The choice is between honest 
entrepreneurship (which success is not guaranteed) and skimming revenue al-
ready there, (if vernal the proven skills could already be under their belts.) As-
set stripping; resource redistribution in favour of friends, kith and kin; and other 
dubious "trusteeships" are the major economic activities instead of increasing 
productivity. Pyotr Aven (1994), cited in Black et al (1999) depicts graphical 
decadence in post Soviet Russia: 
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To become a millionaire in our country it is not at all necessary to 
have a good head or specialised knowledge. Often it is enough to 
have active support in the government, the partian\ent, local 
power structures and law enforcement agencies ... ln o,her words, 
you are appointed a millionaire. I/ 
' I argue infra that politics of patronage has been thrivihg for many dee-
" ades. Hellman et al (2000, p24) define patronage as the hiring of friends and 
. 
relatives into official positions by public officials. Rhetoric, ratje, partisan affilia-
tion, discriminatory laws and regulations systematically alienate opponents. This 
ostracism is deliberately cultivated and nurturt.d to ensure Jelf-entrenchment. 
Except in very extreme cast?s there is usually no redress for injustice suffered 
by those outside the circle of patronage at the hands of the untouchables. Na-
ked misdeeds, bias and corruption continue with impunity due to token fines, 
inconclusive investigations and suspect (if not suggestive) executive clemency 
orders. Pretences at the indispensability of the 'godsend' lead.er along with any 
dirty methods are not uncommon. The means are condoned 'in the name of na-
tional interest'. What excruciating dehumanisation has mankind suffered at the 
hands of fellow man professing to be just doing their jobs? Although each gen-
eration makes its own heroes, and the spirit of life is destined to eternity, re-
source managers often have a contemptuous view of posterity. Phimister 
(1988, p229) recounts that a typical m\'" .. o vision concludes, "After me, the de-
sert." As we have noted earlier on, excessive reliance on despotic power de-
preciates its potency. Openly sponsored social contempt, vigilantism, anarchism 
and anachronistic barbarity, even by a small section of the community, in-
creases general despondency and violence as affected communities take steps 
to safeguard their security and self-preservation. Black et al (1999) demonstrate 
that despotic tendencies by government such as unfair taxes and deliberate 
non-payment of bills owed to private companies "[reinforce} disrespect for 
rules." A Zimbabwean saying advises big baboon to earn respect. Violence, 
being a sword of fire, is by definition double edged. In progressive hands it has 
a potential to be revolutionary, purificatory and therapeutic. In the dark realms of 
anarchists, bandits, criminals, demons and totalitarians; condemns and exe-
cutes anything not part of its vortex - good or bad - just or without cause or 
form. Violence during a revolution and violence under a repression are as dif-
ferent as chalk from cheese. If fear of "violent death" is man's worst phobia, 
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(Hobbes) a regime that brings fear of death to the doorstep of its citizens on a 
daily basis is building bridges on the Rubicon of their desire for change. It was 
argued above that desperate times decrease the opportunity cost for change. 
As in any struggle, potential for demise is inevitable though the course is unpre-
dictable. Demise takes several forms ranging from destruction, demolition, dev-
astation, decimation, dismemberment, downfall or death. 
The Poivad premise propagated in this thesis unifies the colonial apology 
proposition and the underdevelopment theoiy into a single framework. A Poivad 
perspective attempts to resolve the seemingly perplexing thesis that Zimbabwe 
amounts to "The Terrain of Contradictory Development" perfected in Sylve~ter 
(1991 ). No any one way of looking our past activity can b,, final. Even Bartlett 
(1987, p64) who believes human nature does not change, agr;ses that changing 
circumstances eliminate benefits of experience and necessil.ate "a constant re-
turn to basic studies ... " Zimbabwe has a long history of economic oppression. 
Without a consolidated conceptual framework, it is difficult to appreciate funda-
mental forces operating beneath her economy. In my view, corporate govern-
ance and institutional structures have a significant effect on the economic and 
financial developments to warrant a serious study. Although a full analysis of all 
the issues raised in the Poivad paradigm is well beyond the scope of this thesis, 
the framework is a valuable springboard for further analysis.m 
3.3 Additional Remarks and Way Froward 
Zimbabwe's nationalist pride has been battered chronically by disap· 
pointing economic results. Despite our collective quest for improvement, our 
dreams have often gone wrong. Part of the vertigo lies in exultant incorrigibility. 
Society should regard with suspicion men and women who believe only their 
habits, persuasions and pretensions contain the truth and substance. Height-
ened intolerance to non-partisan views and innovation, accompanied by ribald 
self-righteousness to the point of autolatry (i.e. self-worship), is ironically a re-
ceipt for sectarian violence and mass poverty. Unfortunately, all regimes Zim-
'" A more detailed analysis applying a POJVAD framework to the major historical developments in Zim· 
babwe, namely Charter Rule (1890- 1923), Settler Government ( 1923- 1953), The Federation ( 1953 -
1963), Unilateral Declaration of Independence [UDIJ ( 1965 - 1980). Independence and Post Colonial 
Contradictions ( 1980 -200 I) is available to serious researchers on request to giftezh@hotmail.com. 
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babwe has known believed that the country's destiny was only safe in their 
hands; to the extend of blaming everyone except themselve~1 for their failures. 
Maybe it comes naturally. I have yet to meet a man who belieyes his wife might 
be better loved elsewhere. In the end, politicians sometime1/ put personal as-
cendency and superiority over others above needs of the nat\8n. As if that was 
not enough Bartlett (1987, p34) argues, "He [the politician] nj~y be wrong and 
the destination may not be worth the journey and that he will n~ver know." 
Dysfunctional self-interest does not guarantee economic efficiency or 
sustainable socio-economic transformation because the markets are not con-
testable in a logical way. In the year 2001 life expectancy was 40 years, unem-
• ployment above 70% and inflation around 100%. Real return on most financial 
and physical asseti:, including labour, was negative - paralysing economic ac-
tivity. The chronic "inability" of several "employers" to pay positive real wages, 
above a basic poverty datum line, renders the employees a c::aptive market for 
corporate subsidies. In spite of outrageous mark-ups on commodities such as 
furniture and electrical goods for instance, a lot of Zimbabwean firms still fail to 
make a grade in the world of business. In my view, this is a classical case of a 
failure of principles rather than effort on part of both government and industry. 
Innovative ways must be found to give practical effect to contract en-
forcement, transparency, accountability, stakeholder empowerment and com-
petition. In my view, all governments have to be held accountable for macro-
economic performance under their reign. Politicians seek and renew their man-
, 
Jates to govern ostensibly on that account, in the name of doing what is good to 
' the general public. They are quick to claim all credit even for fortuitous prosper-
ity. Management by crisis and failure to take into account predictable factors 
beyond one's control is an unjustifiable strategic deficiency. 
Above all, Taylor (2000) emphasises that economic prosperity is within 
the reach of every nation provided there is will power to take the right dt::cisions: 
There is, therefore, no 'secret' or 'holy grail' of economic devel-
opment, no secret formula of growth that is applicable to a poor 
economy but not to a rich economy. The only secret is an open 
one: For growth to occur, there must be in place policies that fos-
ter the formation of [human and non-human] capital and its sub-
sequent investment in produced means of production ... [Other-
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wise,] The search for a 'chemistry of growth' nevertheless remains 
an ignis fatuus, a deceptive hope. 
,I 
In Zimbabwe there is an urgent need for a conscious \effort to enhance 
the productivity of (and return on) all assets. Financial sectfr reform may be 
one way of improving overall economic performance through'·. ,more efficient ft-
.. 
nancial intermediation and increased competition. Improved a~cess to financial 
setvices at all levels of society might be useful in breaking tH6 vicious cycle of 
poverty in small economies such as Zimbabwe. The regulatory framework in 
which financial intermediaries operate ls considered an import~nt determinant of 
financial sophistication and economic growth. 
4. THE ZIMBABWE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
Pecunia non olet: money does not stink. 
Roman emperor Vespasian [on taxing public toilets] as cited in Askes (1971, 16) 
4.1 Evolution of the Zimbabwe Financial System 
The Era of Free Banking (1892 -1939) 
Similar to the experiences of many former British Territories, the financial 
landscape in Zimbabwe witnessed episodes of free banking, ·a currency board, 
and a correspondent system centralised around a central bank. Free banking 
refers to a monetary system in which banks issue their own currency and keep 
their own reserves without control of a central bank. Bagehot in "Lombard 
Street" [as reported in Goodhart 1988] considered this to be the theoretical 
"natural state of banking." In a series of provocative articles, Hayek suggested 
that banks in a free system should be allowed to compete on the basis of the 
standard value of the notes they issue. Other proponents of free banking argue 
that central banks are too conservative. They (central banks) prevent innovation 
and reduce competition by a plethora of regulations. In Bagehot's view a cen-
tralised "one resetve system" makes the financial system more delicate by re-
ducing the overall amount of resetves retained in the money market. Such a 
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system is much more likely to frequently draw on state help. In my view, Bage-
hot's most important argument is that a "one reserve system" ,is run by a single 
board of directors thereby making society "dependent on the Vo{isdom of that one 
only, and cannot, as most trades, strike an average of the wis~om and folly, _the 
discretion and indiscretion, of many competitors."19 However, ij1,~gree with Henry 
Thornton (1802, p94), also cited in Goodhart (1988,p18) tha\.:..a system envis-
aged by Bagehot will be ravaged by moral hazard as each inS,titution pursue its 
own interest. levy inflation tax, at the peril of financial stability. 
For a very long period of time banking operations in Zi~babwe depended 
on two expatriate institutions - the Standard Bank of South Africa Limited and 
' Barclays Bank (Dominion, Colonial and Overseas). Standard [Chartered] Bank 
was the first bank in Zimbabwe. It was established in 1892, two years after the 
arrival of the Pioneer Column, at the personal request of Cecil John Rhodes. 
The parent Standard Bank was conceived in South Africa hJ 1857 and latter 
founded in London in 186220. It had a nominal capital of £1m subdivided in £100 
shares of which £500 000 was paid up by 1864. From inception the bank rapidly 
expanded through a policy of deliberate amalgamation with other South African 
based institutions. "The early policy of absorbing other banking institutions had 
the advantage of removing rivals but retaining goodwill, local knowledge and 
existing clientele," reveals Standard Bank (1967, p4). The bank expanded into 
Malawi (1901), Zambia (1906), Kenya (1911) and Uganda (1912). Growth of the 
bank in Africa was solidified by the acquisition of the Bank of West Africa in 
1965 with more than 90 branchss in Ghana, Nigeria and Sierra Leone. Accord-
ing to Newlyn and Rowan (1954, p74) the Bank of British West Africa had been 
established in 1884. Standard Bank merged with the United Kingdom (UK) in-
corporated Chartered Bank in 1969 to establish the present day Standard 
Chartered Bank. The Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China was incorpo-
rated in 1853 in the UK. The Zimbabwean entity is a fully owned subsidiary of 
Standard Chartered pie of the UK, via another subsidiary - Standard Chartered 
Africa Holdings BV incorporated in the Netherlands. 
Banking philosophy and activities in Zimbabwe were closely linked to po-
litical developments from inception. By its own admission the Standard Bank 
(1967, p9) had close links with the BSAC. Its interests were indiwctly "repre-
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sented in the Pioneer Column by the youngest son of one of the General Man-
ager and the eldest son of another." Rhodes's personal friendship with the then 
General Manger, Lewis Mitchell, facilitated establishment of operations in Zim-
babwe. The BSAC offered to underwrite the bank's risk of loss from African 
raids in 1890. Expansion into Zimbabwe was delayed until a telegraph line 
reached Harare. n Business was launched from the BSAC premiset1, shared with 
the entire colonial administration. The bank quickly opened branches in all ma-
jor town centres in the country. 
In the absence of proper banking facilities the white settlers had hitherto 
relied on the BSAC's cheques as the chief medium of exchange because cash 
was scarce. Easy credit was prevalent as cheques took almost a month to clear 
with the nearest facilities in Mafeking, South Africa. Figure 4 below illustrates a 
stamp based currency introduced by the BSAC pending establishment of bank-
ing institutions. To this day this type of currency is still a popular form of deposit 
documentation among r• 1ral social clubs. 
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Source: Standard Chartered Bank (1967, p20) "Three Quarters of A Century ... " 
Figure 4 The first official currency of Zimb;;1bwe. 
n After deliberations between Rhodes and Mitchell on one Sunday morning in 1892, the telegraph line 
between Cape Town and Harare was cleared for an hour to enable Mitchell to consult Jameson on pros-
pects of opening a bank in Zimbabwe. Rhodes' personal influence secured the prospective officials "pri-
ority seats" on the Chartered Company's four-passenger carriage for the l 8 days' journey from then Fort 
Tu\i to Harare, Siandard Bank (1967, pl l-12): "Three Quarters ofa Century: of banking in Rhodesia." 
89 
A stamp based currency lacks the quality of divisibility ,and suffers from 
limited transferability. The BSAC's need for financial accomwodation and the 
breakdown in communication lines between Rhodesia and s9uth Africa during 
the First Chimurenga War of 1896 gave the Standard Bank l~n opportunity to 
print the first locally produced notes. Standard Bank ably ros~. to the challenge 
and supplied the much-needed acceptable currency, illustrat8i:t in Figure 5 be-, ... 
low, in addition to opening local accounts. Prior to that mos~inotes and coins 
were printed and minted in London. The minting of coins remained a responsi-
bility of the Royal Mint in London. The South African branch hf The Royal Mint 
' 
later issued some coins, (Official Year Book 1930, p568.)21 Barclays Bank is-
sued additional notes when it joined the Zimbabwean market in 1912. 
Barclays Bank (Dominion, Colonial and Overseas) was established in 
1926 through the amalgamation of the Colonial Bank, the Anglo-Egyptian Bank, 
and the National Bank of South Africa. Sowelem (1967, p57) noted that the ori-
gins of Barclays Bank "can be traced to the Bank of Africa and the National 
Bank of South Africa which commenced operation in Southern Rhodesia [Zim-
babwe] in 1895 and 1911 respectively." The amalgamation brought with it vast 
experience from as far a field as the West Indies, the Middle East as well as 
from South Africa. Newlyn and Rowan (1954, p76) observed that regional cen-
tres of the bank exercised considerable autonomy. 
~ ............ ,-.,..-,···-····--·····--·. '·' ..... , . ., ,.,. ,.., .. ,_,.,,_., 
Source: Standard Chartered Bank (1967, p21) "Three Quarters of A Century ... " 
Figure 5 Standard Bank issued bank notes. 
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Notwithstanding the existence of local notes, bank notes issued in the 
"Gape Colony" in South Africa were recognised as legal tender in Rhodesia. In 
deed, prior to the passage of th0 Southern Rhodesia Coinage and Currency Act 
of 1933, British and South African coins circulated freely in the country. How-
ever, from 1933 South African coins were no longer acceptable as legal tender. 
British coins were unacceptable as legal tender from 1939, but remained ac-
ceptable in Zambia and Malawi even after the establishment of the Federation. 
According to the Standard Bank (1967, p23) established commercial 
-~ 
"'r 
•• 
" 
banks actively promoted the use of bank notes rather than coins that were sub- i 
ject to exorbitant transport costs. However, employers accustomed to paying 
low wages preferred to transact in coins: 
Supplying cash to the new colony was a costly undertaking. Coin 
was preferred to notes and gold to silver, particularly for African 
wages. To bring gold coin from London to Bulawayo cost 30 shil-
lings per£ 100, and to bring silver coin from Cape Town cost £3 
10s. 5d. per cent (sic). To [Harare] the corresponding expenses 
were £112s. 6d. and £4 5s. 5d. 
There is inadequate documentation of the country's banking history and 
the respective time series data. Apart from Newlyn and Rowan (1954), Sow-
elem (1967), Chimombe (1983), and a series of articles IJy Cole in the 1970s, 
there is very little documentation let alone scholarly analysis of this important 
sector. Empirical research is constrained by lack of time series data. 
From an analytical point of view, 'Three Quarters of A Century: of bank-
ing in Rhodesia 1892-1967" by the Standard Chartered Bank (1967) is a 
graphical illustration of a wasted opportunity to document the country's banking 
activities. As the country's first bank, Standard Chartereu Bank was in a better 
place to trace the course of financial evolution in the country. Unfortunately 
authors of the document chose to eulogize "pioneering conditions" (p51) and 
address a colonial audience rather than a financial clientele. For a piece done 
as late as 1967, it compares very unfavourably say :o Herbert Frankel's (1938) 
"Investment in Africa" in teims of detail and authority. Although this work con-
tains no statistical or graphical portraits of the bank's activities it found space for 
a "gang of [African] labourers (p37) in addition to leaving other African employ-
ees nameless in annotated staff photographs. See appendix 3. This confirms 
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that political developments had a strong influence on the local financial scene. I 
do not attempt to judge the bank as politically incorrect in retrpspect, but argue 
that the subject matter of banking was not competently addre~sed. The indiffer-
ent attitudes criticised reinforce Theresa Chimombe's (198~) conclusion that 
I 
interests of foreign owned institutions lay elsewhere. Had Standard Bank been 
a locally owned institution, it might have evolved into the courifry's central bank 
"'. 
by virtue of its prominence and close liaison with the governl'U€nts of the day°. 
The Bank of England, Banca d'ltalia, Banque de France, and the Common-
wealth Bank in Australia are successful examples of such I a transmutation. 
' 
Banque de France was founded in 1800 at tile prompt of Napoleon, but was not 
owned by the State (Goodhart 1988, p1140). 
The Southern Rhodesia Currency Board 
The Coinage and Currency Act of 1938 provided for the establishment of 
the Southern Rhodesia Currency Board. Prior to its establishment UK coins, 
Southern Rhodesian coins, and bank notes issued by the Standard Bank and 
Barclays Bank were all recognised as legal te.nder in terms of the Southern 
Rhodesia Coinage Act of 1933. The Currency Board was tasked to ensure that 
profits arising from the issue of notes and coin accrued to the governmcn+ Sec-
ondly the board had a mandate to facilitate quick conversion of local currency 
into pound sterling at a fixed rate. It had no supervisory role in relation to other 
banks and non-bar,k financial institutions. Although it was subject to Southern 
Rhodesian (Zimbabwe) law, agreements were in place with Northern Rhodesia 
(Zambia) and Nyasaland (Malawi) for the circulation of its r· 1-rency in those 
countries. The distributior. ratio set in 1947 stipulated that profits were to be 
shared as Zimbabwe (10 %), Zambia (7 %) and Malawi (3 %) provided the 
board attained a 110% sterling cover against the currency in circulaticn. The 
chairman of the currency board doubled as a financial adviser to the govern-
ment. 
With effect from 1939 to March 1940 commercial bank issues ceased. 
However StandarrJ Chartered Bank was retained as an agent to transact the 
pfmmer bank employees found their way into cabinet positions while ex-government officials such as Sir 
Robert Hudson and Dr. liuggins, a fom1cr Prime Minister served on Standard Uank 's Board. 
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board's London business presumably up to the establishment of the Central 
Bani,. The Currency Board took over liability of the outstanding Southern Rho-
desian currency and replaced it with its own by March 1942. The Sterling assets 
held to support the currency were also transferred to the Board. A Rhodesian 
pound (R£) was introduced in 1942 at the rate of 1R£ to 1£ Sterling. Its tenor 
expired in 1970 when the decimalised Rhodesian Dollar {R$) was introduced. 
Similar to the Australian currency which was decimalised on 14 February 1966 
a conversion rate was 1 R£ = 2R$ was adopted. The new currency only lasted 
10 years from 1970 to 1979. A newly designed currency, the Zimbabwe Dollar 
(ZWD or 2$) was introduced at par in 1980. 
During the Federation, the board was briefly renamed Central Africa Cur-
rency Board with effect from 12 March 1954. Southern Rhodesian currency re-
mained the sole legal tender because the Federation did not issue a currency of 
its own. However, surplus income was now earmarked for preparations to es-
tablish a cental bank rather than for distribution. 
As part of the preparations for the establishment of a central bank, the 
Southern Rhodesian government contracted a Bank of England official, H.C.B. 
Mynors, in 1948 to report on the subject. According to Sowelem (1967, p33) 
The Mynors report, issued in January 1949, advised against establishment of a 
central bank because the economy was dependent on external rather than in-
ternal problems. Existing banks were prudently managed hence required no su-
per.,isory authority. In Mynors' view, the central banking function potentially 
useful to the country were of a personal rather than institutional nature. To this 
end, Mynors recommended the appointment of a financial adviser to the gov-
ernment capablr. giving policy guidance and of maintaining close liaison with the 
financial sector. Sowelem (1967, p34) argues that the Mynors report placed 
unwarranted confidence in moral suasion and failed to consider the important 
role a central bank could play to foster financial deepening and economic de-
velopment. With hindsight Sowelem's criticisms are justified because estab-
lishment of a central bank later enhanced the depth of the money market. 
On its part, Sowelem obser.,ed that the government was craving for 
greater monetary autonomy from financial policies in South Africa or London. 
Creation of a central bank was a vehicle to put financial policy in local hands. In 
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fact it was realised that the Currency Board's 100 % coverage of the local cur-
rency with British securities and sterling was wasteful. The pra.~tice was blamed 
for the flight of liquid financial assets from the country as well as capital short-
age that was perceived to be retarding general development. Ef5tablishment of a 
central bank provided the government with a mechanism cap~ple of controlling 
undesirable expansion in bank credit, which could be inflatioO'ary. Indeed from 
'·'. 
March 1950 the Southern Rhodesian government took concr.~te steps toward 
the establishment of a central bank. Progress was only hampered by politico·! 
considerations pending establishment of the Federation of R~odesia and Nya-
' 
saland. The Bank of Rhodesia and Nyasaland commenced operations on 1 
April 1956 and took over the assts and liabilities of the currency board. 
The Land and Agricultural Bank 
This bank had its roots in the Land Bank that was established in 1912 
with a share capital of £25 000. The Land and Agricultural bank was established 
in 1924 to provide long-term loans for agricultural development on the security 
of first mortgage bonds. Operations were confined to European agricultural 
sectors because Africans had "no assignable title which would be acceptable for 
mortgage," Newlyn and Rowan (1954, p124) insist. By 1950 about 80 % of the 
European agricultural community had made use of the Land Bank at some time. 
Small loans were only extended to farmers in the African Purchase Areas from 
1945. However, Sowelem (1967,p191) reiterates that less than 1 % of African 
farmers had title to their land hence very little credit was av8ilable to the Afri-
cans. In 1947 functions of the Land Bank were extended to cover urban housing 
due to the limited development of Building Societies. 
The Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC) was fomned in 1971 by the 
merger of the Agricultural and Land Bank and the Agricultural Assistance 
Board. This is a public owned institution that is entirely owned and funded by 
government via control of the Ministry of Agriculture rather than of Finance. The 
AFC also had access to donor funds targeted at rural labour cooperatives 
through the Collective Self Finance Scheme (CSFS). Activities of the CSFS 
were augmented by another donor sponsored scheme known as the National 
Association of Savings Cooperatives and Credit Unions of Zimbabwe 
(NASCCUZ). The AFC is affected by inadequate capitalisation and autonomy. 
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After independence, government guaranteed the upsurge of loans to the 
small-scale agricultural sector. High volumes of delinquent facilities plagued the 
sector. Government, however, was slow in making good its guarantees. By 
June 1993, the corporation was seeking a banking licence to enable it to sepa-
rate development activities from commercial ones. It was not until 1999 that the 
Agricultural Bank of Zimbabwe (Agribank) commenced operations as a com-
mercial bank. Progress was slow due to inadequate capital and lack of trans-
parency between the bank and unprofitable non-bank divisions that could jeop-
ardise depositors. Recapitalisation of the bank via conversion of government 
debt into equity meant that no cash inflow would accrue to the bank. Since 
2001, government was again desirous to reconvert Agribank into a Land Bank. 
4.2 Architecture of The Present Financial Sector 
Overall Policy Analysis 
This section evaluates the structure of the Zimbabwean Financial System 
over time at a macroeconomic level. Disaggregated micro-level analysis such 
as the relative performance of individual entities, for example, is outside the 
scope of this thesis. The intention has not been to describe in detail the organi-
sation and operations of the constituent units but to sketch an analytical appre-
ciation of the main sectoral features of ths financial system. The banking sector 
comprises of the cental bank, commercial banks, merchant banks and discount 
houses. Among others the main non-bank financial intermediaries operating in 
Zimbabwe are building societies, finance houses, the POSB, insurance compa-
nies, pension funds, micro finance, and several development Institutions. 
The Zimbabwean financial sector, like its real and service industries 
counterparts in the economy, is characterised by concentrated (local and for-
eign) ownership, high proportion of foreign ownership, and high degree of gov-
ernment control. According ta Chapman (1992) the government controlled 
about a third of total financial assets through the Zimbabwe Financial Holding 
Limited (Finhold) Group, Commercial Bank of Zimbabwe, and the People's Own 
[ex-Past Office] Savings Bank (POSS). Foreign direct ownership accounted far 
at least 28% of total deposit taking institutions. In 1992 for instance, all privately 
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owned commercial banks, including the largest - Standard Chartered Bank and 
Barclays Bank were foreign owned. Since then the number,1of locally owned 
commercial banks has increased significantly. Chapman alsdi emphasised that 
Old Mutual, the largest insurance and pension fund manager if the country, had 
a 12% controlling interest in deposit taking institutions. Old M4\ual had substan-
tial ownership in the Merchant Bank of Central Africa (MBCA)!'CABS - the larg· 
'·'. 
est building society; and in FMB - acronym for First Merchant l'!ank. 
Most deposit taking institutions in Zimbabwe are still mesmerised by the 
big bank concept hence the sector is prone to aggressive Jergers and take-
overs. In an economy where business success often depends on connections, 
vertical integration is also motivated by the need to create loYal entities across 
the entire financial spectrum. In 2000 there were 35 banks in Zimbabwe with no 
less than 10 banking groups. ln the 1990s bank holding companies were ex-
empted from the 25 % prudential limit on equity subscription tp a financial insti-
tution's shares by a single investor. This provision prevented dilution of owner-
ship in influential government and foreign owned financial institutions, and many 
players quickly exploited the loophole to carve closely held financial empires. 
By world standards Zimbabwe's financial system is underdeveloped. 
Demirgui;-Kunt, and Levine (1999, p3) propose that a country's financial system 
should be regarded as underdeveloped if its ratios for bank and market devel-
opment are both below median values approximated for the global financial 
system. Table 1 shows that Zimbabwe does not pass the test. Nevertheless 
Zimbabwe's financial system is usually regarded as relatively sophisticated for 
an economy of its size. The Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) (1980, p9)22 at· 
tributes this to the designation of Harare as the financial centre of the Federa-
tion of Rhodesia and Nyasaland between 1953 to 1963; strict exchange con· 
trols; and restricted access to international money and capital markets between 
1965 and 1980. The country crafted a sophisticated payments system and a re-
spectable spread of institutions to facilitate the mobilization of savings, promote 
economic growth, and financing of the budget deficit via domestic borrowing. 
Banks and government accommodate each other's needs. Successive 
governments have tolerated some sort of laissez-faire banking practices as long 
as banks gave practical effect to government controls and directives even at the 
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expense of sound financial intermediation. On their part, banks accommodated 
government policies and controls as long as concentration of ownership was not 
diluted; and the regulatory burden could be passed on to clients in the form of 
guaranteed margins and a limited range of service. As Harvey (1996, p2) puts 
it, "the system lacked effective competition, and had many of the negative char-
acteristics of oligopoly." Financial innovations such as automated teller ma-
chines (ATMs), telephone banking and derivatives took a very long time before 
being adopted into the country. In other words both government and financial 
institutions guaranteed their interests at the expense of the customer. Positive 
real interest rates are elusive in the Zimbabwean financial sector. However, 
neither government nor banks worry about thl~ persistence of financial repres-
sion as both can get income to the detriment of weak clients who have no re-
course. 
Very few changes were made to the financial sector after independence. 
In spite of ZANU PF's socialist rhetoric the Companies Act did not forbid 100% 
foreign owned subsidiaries. However, in practice no new 100% foreign owned 
banks were tolerated as government policy required new entrants to have at 
least 30% local shareholding. According to Harvey (1996, p1) "two American 
banks closed their representative offices in Zimbabwe in 1983 and 1984, having 
failed to get full banking licences.'' Officially, government at the time attached 
great importance to local ownership of economic resources. For instance, the 
Insurance Act of 1987 required at least 51 % of the institutions to be localised. 
The Act paved the way for a localisation programme pursued from 1988 to 
1994. In fact Exchange Control (EiC) spearheaded the localisation of foreign 
owned institutions in order to stamp out capital flight. Apart fron1 the registration 
of subsidiaries of foreign owned banks as Zimbabwean versions, and the floa-
tation of 34% of Barclays Bank's share capital on the Zimbabwe Stock Ex-
change, not much localisation emerged in the banking sector. In deed there was 
little cooperation between EiC and Banking Supervision departments of the Re-
serve Bank because the then powerful EiC department had no intentions to dis-
close its criteria. Fears of widespread nationalism proved unfound. Contrary to 
Chapman, Harvey (1996, p6) characterised the increased ownership of financial 
assets by government as "incidental nationalisation" driven by external events 
rather than conscious policy. This conclusior. is valid because the purchase of 
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the 62% equity in Rhobank, now Zimbank under Finhold, was precipitated by 
the intention of South African based investors - Nedbank to ;vithdraw from the 
market. Similarly, the Commercial Bank of Zimbabwe (CBZ), ~ow trading as the 
Jewel Bank, was localised after the worldwide collapse of ~CCI in 1991. In 
contrast, no localisation occurred when the Standard Ban~. of South Africa 
bought ANZ Grindlays in 1991 and branded it as Stanbic Bank!.' 
"'· 
In my view, there has been inadequate attention to fthancial reform in 
Zimbabwe. Notwithstanding the widespread agreement in financial literature re-
garding the causal effect of financial intermediation on ecoriomic growth, the 
financial sector formed a little part of government economic policy after inde-
pendence. Government might have misunderstood the cardin81 role of financial 
intermediation in economic development. ln contrast to elaborate discourse on 
education, rural and agricultural development, there were only two paragraphs 
on money and finance in the Growth With Equity economic pplicy statement of 
1981 (p3). The proposal to create a "Commission" to examine "the whole 
monetary and financial sector' has never been followed by the Wallis (1997) or 
Campbell (1981) type of inquiries, as held in Australia. Harvey (1996, p5) ob-
serves that in both 1982 and 1983 the Government of Zimbabwe proposed but 
failed to implement a Money and Finance Commission. By 1986 financial sector 
reform was no longer part of the government' development agenda. Apart from 
secretive IMF and World Bank analytical expeditions, financial sector reform 
was not given priority. Prospects for far reaching financial sector reforms were 
only rekindled in 1991 prior to the launch of the Economic Structural Adjustment 
Programme (ESAP). Ratts0 and Torvik (1998, p326) highlight that a team of 
UNDP-funded Australian experts secretly studied possible targets for trade re-
form for two years before the programme was announced in July 1990. The 
Canberra based Centre for International Economics was, in ten weeks, tasked 
to identify impediments to efficient intermediation and opportunities for financial 
sector reform. Among other constructive recommendations not adopted was 
the proposal to abolish rigid market segmentation in the financial sector. 
Harvey (1996, p3, and 6-9) advances five plausible reasons for limited 
banking reform after independence: The financial system was considered ex· 
tensively developed to warrant any material reform. Intervention in banking was 
curtailed to protect interests of the white business community on whose confi-
98 
dence the economy rested after generations of discr!'llination against black ad-
vancement. Government had also learnt about the cost of inappropriate inter-
vention from neighbouring countries such as Zambia and Mozambique. Wide-
spread nationalisation ran the risk of provoking direct South African military in-
tervention. A highly developed system of stringent l'.:ontrols inherited from the 
UDI era provided government with "de facto control over the allocation of 
credit." In Harvey's own words, "Direct credit control was therefore unneces-
sary; exchange controls provided the government with effective control over 
most of the economy, for the purposes of both economic management and po-
litical control." Although Harvey considers the last point as the most important 
one, the paper fails to explain why exchange controls were used to support.the 
status quo rather than restructure the economy to correct the perceived colonial 
imbalances. 
In the final analysis, in my view, only four hypotheses stand. Firstly, it is 
possible that the financial system was considered well developed, and had ac-
c1.1mulated reputable expertise to warrant any intervention despite much talk 
about colonial underdevelopment. Secondly, the allegations that "government's 
political and administrative powers were widely used to divert resources," to 
prominent individuals who deliberately avoided repayment (as in Harvey, p11-
12), implies that true reform might have been sacrificed for self-enrichment. 
Thirdly, there were a lot of specialist institutions and funds ostensibly targeted at 
the Small and Medium-scale enterprises SMEs) for poverty alleviation and eco-
nomic development. Such special vel1icle conduits for financial resources may 
have invalidated the need for radical reform to ensure efficient financial inter-
mediation. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the belated proliferation of in-
digenously owned banking institutions could have been considered the most 
appropriate organic remedy for financial and economic transformation. The fi-
nancial sector remained relatively the same from 1960 to 1980. There were 2 to 
4 accepting houses, 5 commercial banks, 2 discount houses, 8 to 5 financial 
institutions and 8 to 3 building societies. According to Mataruka (1999, p69), 
Between 1990 and January 1999 the industry witnessed the entry 
of 3 commercial banks, 6 merchant bankt;, one finance company, 
5 venture capital companies, 56 foreign burt;:;~11 .... ,, 51 money lend-
ers, 8 stockbroking firms and 9 unit trusts. 
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However this does not explain why no local commercial banks emerged 
between 1980 and 1996. Even under UDI no settler owned ~ommercial banks 
were registered. Incidentally there were considerable barriets to entry in the 
form of a conservative licensing policy and high minimum s~art up capital re-
quirements for commercial banks - set at Z$0.5m in 196~\,and 2$15.0m in 
1995. Harvey (1996, p22), citing unconfirmed rumours, sugq~sts that after in-
dependence some prospective African bankers failed to me¢ the set criteria, 
while white and Asian investors felt that government would not favourably cori-
sider their applications. Government might have realised th~t the licensing of 
• 
incompetent deposit taking institutions at a time when the regulatory environ-
ment was weak could have made the situation worse. The persistence of finan-
·cial repression, characterised by negative rates of return on deposits, is exoge-
nously determined sociopolitically, and by the government's appetite for funds. 
The Reserve Bank 
Friedman (1959, pp6-7), as cited in Goodhart (1988, p2) argued that a 
Central Bank is not essential to enforce reserve requirements, but it remains 
vital "in order to enforce that sanctity of contract, the prevention of fraud, and 
the effective working of the monetary system, in a world in which information is 
costly and scarce." Core functions of the central bank may be divided into 
monetary and supervisory activities. For Goodhart (1988, p7) the monetary 
(macroeconomic) policy functions play second fiddle "supervisory" functions 
such as managing the payment system, market liquidity and\soundness of the 
financial system. In my view, the debate amounts to splittihg hairs as some 
open market operations cut across the both functions. Solvercy and monetary 
policy are not mutually exclusive. Moreover the relative importance of monetary 
tools and targets change over time. The reassignment of prudential supervision 
functions to the Australian Pruden!ial Regulation Authority (APRA), away from 
the Reserve Bank Australia,. (RBA), proves supervisory functions need not be 
necessarily housed in a central bank despite their close connection with mone-
tary policy. What is undisputed is the conclusion tr.at the micro functions _of a 
Central Bank cannot be competently provided by a competing commercial brnk 
due to conflict of interest. 
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The Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) was established during the Fed-
eration of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1956 under different names. It is at the 
centre of the Zimbabwe Financial System. Sowelem (1967, p47) shows that 
since inception the Reserve Bank was not restricted from engaging in ordinary 
banking activities. No retail banking activities were ever undertaken. Govern-
ance of the bank and some of its core functions have changed very little over 
the years. From the time of its establishment government held the bank's entire 
share capital. In contrast, the paid up share capital of the South African Reserve 
Bank is entirely held by the private sector.' The Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe's 
prescribed capital of Z$2m and a general reserve fund of Z$6m has also re-
mained static through time despite chronic increases in inflation. Admittedly.the 
Reserve bank is authorised to hold special reserves and other investments. 
Broadly speaking, the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) has multifartous 
functions. The most important functions, as enumerated in section 6 of the Re-
serve Bank Act 1999 [Chapter 22:15], include regulation of the monetary sys-
tem; maintenance of currency stability; supervision of banking institutions, foster 
financial stability; manage the payment system; banker, financial adviser and 
fiscal agent of the state; formulation and execution of monetary policy; and ad-
vancement of economic policies of government. The Reserve Bank manages 
the issuance of notes and coins and the clearinghouse. It maintains statutory 
reserves and clearing balances for other banks. As banker and financial adviser 
to the government, the bank also acts as the government' agent in the weekly 
issue of tenders. Since 1957 the bank has been responsible for administering 
the country's exchange control regulations on behalf of government. The pre-
cise date on which exchange controls (E/C) were first introduced in Zimbabwe 
is not very clear. What is certain is that E/C was extended to cover the "Sterling 
Area" on 23 February 1961 to curb capital flight pending the dissolution of the 
Federation. Contrary to general perception, exchange controls were perfected 
rather than introduced during UDl. However, the common monetary system of 
the Federation was dismantled in 1964, resulting in the creation of central banks 
of Rhodesia, Zambia and Malawi. As noted earlier some functions of the bank 
remained stable over the years despite the Reserve Bank Act of 1964. 
1> However each individual shareholder can only hold up to 0.5% of the bank's share capital. The South 
African Reserve Bank cannot pay a dividend greater than 10% per annum on its nominal share capital. 
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Under the current law the bank's ability to lend to government is limited 
at a given tirne to a statutory maximum of 20% of the previot,.1s year's ordinary 
revenue of the government. Ordinary revenue excludes fun~s raised through 
loans and sundry forms of financial assistance. Advances tol(government (and 
statutory bodies) are required by law to be denominated in ~imbabwean cur-
rency and convertible into bearer securities if not repaid withiH ·12 months from 
'·'. 
the end of the financial year (or from date cf issue in case ofi,$tatutory bodies). 
Conversion of facilities into government marketable securities potentially en·-
ables the central bank to sell the bills on the market and kee~ government bar-
' 
rowing within the statutory limit of 20%. In the past a cap was also placed on 
purchases of government securities by the bank. The Rese"'.e Bank could not 
invest more than 20% of its liabilities to the public (including the bank's capital 
and general reserves) in government securities with maturities larger than six 
months. This provision is not part of the current Reserve Bank Act [Ch. 22:15]. 
There are a number of loopholes that could be used to evade the ceiling 
on advances to the state. Pursuant to monetary policy objectives of the nation, 
section 7 (3) (a) of the Reserve Bank Act [Chapter 22:15] empowers the bank to 
buy and sell government securities "on its own account" in excess of the statu-
tory limit. As banker to the government, the Reseive Bank is required by gov-
ernment under section 8, subsection (2) of the Act to facilitate transactions on 
such terms as the government may determine. In addition section 39 (5) 
authorises the Minister of Finance to prohibit the publication of the bank's 
statutory returns to the Treasury "if, in his opinion, it is in the public interest that 
they be suspended." The suspension can be indefinite. For instance, there 
were no official publications from the Reserve Bank throughout UDI from 1965 
1o 1980. 
Prior to UDI the Reserve Bani( was by law required to maintain 25% of 
its liabilities to the public in form of gold, sterling or other foreign assets con-
vertible ir.•o gold and sterling. In practice, the central bank initially dealt only in 
sterling, leaving the commercial banks to source other currencies on the Lon-
don market. The sterling link was de-emphasised under UDI. Under the current 
Reserve Bank Act section 33 (1 ), statutory reserves consist of gold and other 
foreign assets convertibie into gold. Section 33 (2) sets the minimum threshold 
at 40% of the bank's foreign liabilities. However, in section 49, there is no spe-
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cific benchmark for international reserves defined therein. Under section 49, 
subsection (2) the bank has wide discretion to determine and maintain interna-
tional reserves at levels it considers appropriate for the proper conduct of the 
country's monetary and exchange rate policies. 
Before the 1956 Banking Act there was no specific legislation regulating 
banking activities. To its credit, the Mynors report (1949) raised the possibility of 
conducting on-site banking supervision to mentor inexperienced and incapable 
entrants into the banking system. The Mynors report also recommended a sys-
tem of licensing br.nks to ensure that new entrants are adequately capitalised 
and managed prudently. In my view, Mynors' emphasis on the "personal" func,. 
tions ahe21d of the "institutional" activities of a central bank indirectly contributed 
to the subsequent emergence of two supervisory authorities to oversee the 
banking sector. Bank licensing was introduced in 1956 but was restricted to new 
entrants to the financial system. The Ministry of Finance was the licensing 
authority. The 1959 Banking Act provided for the appointment of the Registrar 
of Banks and Financial Institutions (now Registrar of Banking Institutions) under 
the Ministry of Finance empowered to license and de-license banks. According 
to Sowelem (1967, p52) the Registrar had authority to appoint inspectors to in-
vestigate any registered institution. However, supervisory objectives and re-
sponsibilities were not c:early spelt out. In the end the supervisory capacity was 
not developed. The Banking Sup~rvision function was only introduced in 1985 
at the Reserve Bank. Progress on establishing the relevant legislation was slow. 
There was considerable debate regarding the demarcation of the powers of 
Banking Supervision Department and the Reserve Bank on one hand, and the 
Registrar of Banking Institutions and the Ministry of Finance on the other. Much 
debate centred on the need for central bank independence, and harmonisation 
of the functions of bank licensing and supervision in line with international 
trends. The Reserve Bank considered the ability to withdraw a license a useful 
supervisory tool. Until August 2000 the law did not support the prudential super-
visory function of the Reserve Bank. From 1985 to 2000 Banking Supervision 
relied on prudential guidelines and moral suasion to promote prudent risk taking 
within the financial sector. 
As early as 1959 the central bank was granted authority to request in-
formation and issue directives under the 1959 Banking Act. All banks were ex-
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pected to submit regular returns on prescribed forms. Section 59 of the Reserve 
Bank Act [Chapter 22:15], authorises the Reserve Bank lo "establish and 
maintain an information network" for the benefit of banking institutions. How-
' 
ever, time series data is not fully developed and automated.1,~heoretically, du-
plication of effort between the office of the Registrar and BaJlking SupeiVision 
' 
cannot be ruled out. In practice there is constructive cooper0tion between the 
'·'. 
Reserve Bank, and the Registrar and Mini::.ter of Finance. TiMe Reserve Bank 
and the Registrar are required in terms of Section 78 of the Banking Act 2000 
[Chapter 24:20] to report on activities of banks and financiall institutions at the 
' 
end of each calendar year. The Minister of Finance tables the respective reports 
before Parliament. A more transparent arrangement would have been to make 
the Governor of the Reserve Bank answerable to Parliament. 
Under the Banking Act of 1959 four distinct institutions of banking busi-
ness were recognised, namely commercial banks, accepting_ houses, discount 
houses and financial institutions. Some institutions already in operation were 
immediately registered in their respective categorises. These archaic distinc-
tions were retained in the Banking Act of 2000 [Chapter 24:20]. The playing field 
is not level. Building societies for instance, have legal constraints on the interest 
they can pay on deposit or charge for mortgage bonds. As a result the mort-
gage business has been abandoned in favour of money market investments. ln 
2000 the capital adequacy ratio of building societies was on average 108% 
against a regulatory minimum of 10%. That year also saw the conversion of 
three merchant banks into commercial banks in order to have access to cheap 
funding in the form of retail deposits, which were not accessible to acceptance 
houses, that is merchant banks. 
Although the Reserve Bank has discharged its responsibilities with due 
diligence, its institutional structures are not appropriate for proper corporate 
governance. On a positive note, section 21 (1) of the Resetve Bank Act stipu-
lates that the board is responsible "for formulating the policy of the Bank's ad-
ministration and operations." Section 19 (1) renders the Governor responsible 
"for the day to day management, control, administration, operation and direction 
of the bank." Section 25 of the new Reserve Bank Act even requires the Gover-
nors and directors to disclose their interest and assets, as well as those of their 
spouses, to the state President. The Governors setve a maximum of two five-
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year terms in office although a Deputy Governor remains eligible for election as 
a Governor. Members of Parliament and officers, directors or employees of 
banking institutions are not eligible to simultaneously hold office as directors or 
Governors of RBZ. In section 22 (2) the term of directors was extended to four 
years from 2 years, to ensure stability of decision-making. The board approves 
all loans and advances by the Reseive Bank to the government and the dis-
counting of financial instruments with more than three months to maturity at the 
time of their acquisition by the Reserve Bank. 
However, in practice there is no clear-cut division of responsibilities be-
tween the board and management. Under section 27 (1) of the Act, the Gover-
nor of the Reserve Bank is the chairman of the board. In contrast, under section 
18 (3) of the Banking Act [Chapter 24:20] an executive officer of a banking in-
stitution cannot be chairman of the instituticn's board. The Governor and two 
Deputy Governors of the Reserve Bank are appointed by the state President 
and automatically sit on the board. Since by law, Reserve Bank Act (21) (2) the 
board cannot have more than seven members, and pursuant to section 26 (i) 
that specifies a quorum of four, only one non-executive dirGctor is required to 
pass crucial decisions at a meeting where all the Governors are present. Sec-
tion 28 (3) grants the presiding official a casting vote in the event of equal delib-
erative votes. Under section 30 of the Reseive Bank Act no decision can be set 
aside solely on the basis of the technical irregularity of the quorum. In contrast, 
the Banking Act prohibits the executive directors of any banking institution from 
forming a majority of any board quorum. Under the current arrangements [sec-
tion 36 (1 )] the Minister appoints the External Auditors for the Reserve Bank 
and is responsible for the publication of the bank's statutory returns in the Gov-
ernment Gazette. Unlike in the past, the new Reserve Bank Act does not spe-
cifically exclude employees and officers of government from serving as directors 
or Governors of the Reserve Bank. The provision was enshrined in the previous 
Reseive Bank Acts to ensure the independence of central bank advice to the 
state. In brief, authorities have set strict corporate governance articles in the 
Banking Act compelling banking institutions to adopt standards that are not fol-
lowed up in the law governing the operations of the central bank. In other words 
the authorities lay rules for others that they are not prepared to follow. Ideally, 
the board and Governors of the Reseive Bank should be answerable to a 
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statutory parliamentary committee. Otherwise the Reserve Bank is potentially 
vulnerable to Machiavellian Economics. ,I 
Nearer to Zimbabwe, control of the South African ResJrve Bank (S.I\RB) 
for instance, is vested in a 14-member board, seven of whom rre elected by the 
state President and the remainder by the bank's shareholder's. There are only 
" four executive members of the board; the Governor and the t~ree Deputy Gov-
ernors, who constituted the Monetary Policy Sub-committee of the board. The 
SARB is a relatively independent central bank answerable to its shareholders 
for internal governance and to Parliament for monetary policy. ( 
The ability of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) to discharge its mul-
, 
tiple funrtions is compromised by want of autonomy and lack of specific man-
dates. RBZ is expected to maintain the value of the Zimbabwe dollar. Implicitly, 
this encompasses the internal value (price stability) and the external value (ex-
change rate stability) of the local currency. Having said this, there are no clear 
targets for price stability and no one is held accountable for any eventuality. 
There is neither a definition of what constitutes price stability nor a firm com-
mitment to low inflation, which economic theory suggest is good for macroeco-
nomic planning. Whereas role ambiguity might have the virtue of flexibility, it 
has the potential to suffer from the vice of impunity. In the 1990s, a number of 
countries beginning with New Zealand followed by Canada, UK, Australia, Fin-
land, Spain and the US adopted clear inflation targets. Clear objectives foster 
good corporate governance via enhanced transparency and accountability. 
Meyer (2001, pB) argues that transparency is good for monetary policy because 
' it helps anchor market expectations. On the other hand accountability supports 
the cause for central bank independence. 
Meyer (2001, p4) argues that it is generally agreed that objectives of 
monetary policy depend on the structure of the economy and the preferences of 
its citizenry. RBZ is responsible for formulation and execution of Zimbabwe's 
monetary policy as stipulated in section 6 (f) of the Reserve Bank Act. There are 
no statutory prescriptions except that, by section 46, a monetary policy state-
ment is required in June and December of each year giving "reasons" for the 
policy to be followed, "principles" for its implementation, and an "evaluation" of 
the previous policy. However, in terms of section 45 of the Act, policy is formu-
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lated and implemented "in consultation" with the Minister of Finance, which im-
plies the need for agreement There is nothing patently wrong with that except 
the lack of clear policy goals and the degree of subordination. In fact most 
countries including the UK and Canada provide for consultation between the 
central bank and the Ministry of Finance. Although RBZ is required to generate 
independent advice it is ultimately subordinate to government, the sovereign 
authority and representative of the people. However, in South Africa SARB has 
full responsibility for implementation of monetary policy. In addition SARB has a 
clear mandate, enshrined in the constitution, to maintain the value of the cur-
rency. Under the current arrangements some of the Reserve Bank's functions 
are residual powers, which the bank can only exercise subject to the approval of 
the Minister of Finance, rather than statutory obligations. 
Contrary to public perception, in Zimbabwe as in South Africa for that 
matter, the exchange rcite policy is a responsibility of the government, imple-
mented by the central bank on behalf of the Minister of Finance. Zimbabwean 
exchange rate policy alter.1ates between a fixed regime and a managed system. 
The currency was linke<1 to the pound sterling from 1942 to October 1972 at 
which time a new gold parity standard was adopted. The managed exchange 
rate system was typically based on a currency basket. Ramsay (1976, p 170) 
strongly suggests that a currency basket was first introduced in Zimbabwe in 
December 1971. From 1975 to 1980 the country operated a dual exchange rate 
system under which the currency was fixed against the South African Rand but 
a trade weighted basket was used to determine the floating rate against all 
other major currencies on a daily basis. The Zimbabwe currency was floated 
briefly following the introduction of the IMF sponsored Economic Structural Ad-
justment Programme in 1995 until it crushed 75% on 14 November 1997. Since 
2000 the currency has been fixed against the US dollar giving rise to unprece-
dented black market trading and a high degree of unofficial dollarization. 
Incidentally successive regimes in Zimbabwe have resisted pressure to 
devalue the currency in fear of high prices. In my view the elasticity pessimism 
is well found given the nature of Zimbabwe's exports and her high affinity to im-
ports. Increase in exports a precondition for development. The Reserve Bank 
(1982, p13 Vol. 1) suggested economic fortunes between 1975 and 1982 mir-
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rared the BOP position. I agree with Girdlestone (1973, p90) that, "Devaluation 
is highly likely to be inflationary not because devaluation is iP,;:;o facto inflation-
ary, but because an inflationary situation already exists with ~bsorption higher 
than domestic output." Technically the Marshall-Lerner condij!on is not met. In 
my view fixing the currency is however not the best remedy .. ,r;naginative struc-
tural reforms are required in the long run. For now there is fl'eed for a proper 
I,'. 
use of the currency basket and to correct the macroeconomic f.~ndamentals. 
In Ramsay's view, it is conventional for a currency ba~ket to refer to the 
balance of payments on current account in order to determine an effective ex-
change rate. However, an exchange rate targeted on the domestic price stabil-
, 
ity, which according to Ramsay was the case in Rhodesia, will be based on im-
port weights alone. In practice, both import and export weights of the currency 
basket relevant to the bank are used to determine the rate of exchange on a 
key currency. The other rates are calculated from the cross rates in an influen-
tial exchange market. The Reserve bank of Zimbabwe does not divulge the 
relative weights in the trade basket, hence they are not known to outsiders. 
Profits accruing to the bank as a result of gold and foreign exchange op-
erations are transferable to the government's Consolidated Revenue Fund. 
Similarly, any exchange losses suffered on the currency are borne by govern-
ment. This said, section 34 (4) of the Act specifies that the government's 
Comptroller and Auditor General must certify the amount of profit or loss. It is 
not clear how this requirement will be fulfilled because in ,the past external 
audits at the Reseive Bank were conducted by private sector Practitioners. 
' 
The Reserve Bank conducts lender of last resort functions (as in section 
11 ), for liquidity support and/or pursuant to national interests, subject to ministe-
rial approval. Government is not obliged to support the centr.31 bank should the 
bank find itself with inadequate resources. Notwithstanding the statutory cbli-
gations to consult the Minister, section 34 (3) renders the Reserve Bank entirely 
liable for any losses suffered in pursuit of price stability and soundness of the 
financial system. Whereas the Registrar is responsible for granting and cancel-
ling bank licences (albeit in consultation with the Banking Supeivision), section 
34 (3) of the Reserve Bank Act holds the Reserve Bank liable for any losses in-
curred toward the promotion of a stable financial system. In 1995 the Reserve 
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Bank took upon itself the controversial goal of maximising contribution to the 
Consolidated Revenue Fund through cost effectiveness. The resultant restruc-
turing exercises coincided with high staff turnover in key departments. 
Given the extensive poverty in Zimbabwe, it is surprising that there are 
no references to economic prosperity and welfare of the Zimbabwean people in 
the Reserve Bank Act. Meyer (2001, p5), following Milton Friedman, acknowl-
edges that economic theory suggests that monetary policy "cannot affect the 
level of output in the long run," yet research supports the argument that mone-
tary policy may be influential for output stabilisation. Meyer reiterates that the 
notion of "self-equilibrating forces" in the long run may be misleading beca~se 
monetary policy affects both price stability and the variability of output from the 
economy's full potential. Indeed, "policy is made in the short run, not the long 
run." I agree with the conclusion that the central bank should be held account-
able for price stability but government is accountable for macroeconomic per-
formance, which it can influence through taxation, government expenditure and 
structural reforms. However, a central bank can foster sustainable economic 
growth and price stability by adopting appropriate financial policies. 
Discount Houses 
Discount houses played a crucial role in the development of a flourishing 
secondary market for a wide range of assets. The Zimbabwe money market 
predates UDI. Its depth was enhanced by the following the establishment of two 
discount houses: The Discount Company of Rhodesia (now DCZ) and the Brit-
ish and Rhodesian Discount House Limited (BARD) in March and August 1959 
respectively. Establishment of discount houses facilitated management of the 
monetary system by the central bank. Emergence of a local money market cur-
tailed the remittance of local financial resources to other financial centres such 
as London as was the case at the time of the Currency Board. The emergence 
of a local money market is also expected to enhance liqu!dity of financial institu-
tions as well as the marketability of government securities. 
Although the discount houses were modelled along South African and 
British models there were some important variations. Unlike the practice then in 
London in the 1950s, formal links between discount houses and commercial 
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banks were tolerated to stem out dysfunctional conflict. In deed the commercial 
banks were an important source of surplus funds for the m,q:,ney market. In 
South Africa discount houses were allowed to compete with bj1nks for deposits, 
but in Zimbabwe head on competition was avoided because!ldiscount houses 
thrived on the goodwill of banks. Similarly merchant banks we~~ not expected to 
compete with banks for retail deposits. The central bank alsO -issued a list of 
.... 
authorised institutions from which discount houses were "allo\iVed to accept of-
fers of call money directly," Sowelem (1967, 100). From 1960 there was close 
cooperation between the two discount houses on the weekly treasury Bills ten-
' 
der. As the discount houses were under no obligation to take the whole lot on 
offer, the agreement covered the price but not the volume of paper. Cooperation 
between the discount houses did not imply total monopoly because the central 
bank had an option to bid for the Treasury Bills in its own right. 
The core function of discount houses is accer,tance of call money from 
commercial banks, acceptance houses and other financial and non financial in-
stitutions for investment in short dated instruments such as Treasury Bills (TB), 
Banker's Acceptances (BAs), Negotiable Certificates of Deposits (NCDs), gov-
ernment and local authority stocks. Prior to 1998, discount houses provided the 
main link between the Reserve Bank and other financial institutions. Discount 
houses had had access to the Reserve Bank discount window and the later in-
stitution acted as a lender of last resort. There were no reserve requirements 
for discount houses because the bulk of their assets are highly liquid and most 
of their liabilities relate to inter-bank transactions. In September 1998, the Re-
serve Bank of Zimbabwe classified commercial and merchant:banks as primary 
dealers that could access the Treasury Bills market directly rather than through 
the discount houses. This move was motivated by a desire to increase compet!-
tion among the primary dealers in Treasury Bills. 
Merchant Banks 
Accepting Houses, popularly known as Merchant Banks, also played a 
significant role in the development of the Zimbabwe money market. They are 
modelled along the British System. The first two acceptance houses, namely 
the Merchant Bank of Central Africa and the Rhodesian Acceptances were 
founded hot on the hills of the central bank in 1956. 
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In contrast with early money market flops witnessed in South Africa 
(1923), Australia (1936), and New Zealand the Zimbabwean money market 
arose in a safe environment. Ironically, the National Finance Corporation estab-
lished by Act of Parliament in South Africa in 1949, later demonstrated the vi-
ability of money market operations subsequent to earlier flops in that country. 
Private entities, beginning with Union Acceptances founded in 1955, were later 
able to replicate the practice. Successful South African ventures played a sig-
nificant part in establishing money market institutions in Zimbabwe. The local 
money market also had sufficient surplus funds and short-term paper to sustain 
the market. Last but not least, the central bank was anxious to see the market 
prosper, hence the provision of lender of last resort facilities. 
The merchant banks sector has low entry barriers relative to commercial 
banking. Merchant banks deal with discerning clients who require limited regu-
latory protection. In the late 1990s merchant banks and discount houses re-
corded the greatest number of new entrants to the banking sector. In aggregate 
indigenous merchant banks have been successful beyond the expectations of 
most sceptics. Some of the most successful merchant banks, namely National 
Merchant Bank, Trust Merchant Bank, and Kingdom Merchant Bank have since 
converted into commercial banks to tap retail deposits. However two of the early 
entrants into the merchant banking business - United Merchant Bank {UMB) 
and Universal Merchant Bank (Unibank) - have since failed due to poor man-
agement, high volume of non-performing loans and fraud. Mataruka (1999, p5) 
observed that the Reserve Bank provided $2.311 billion liquidity support to new 
financial institutions following the collapse of Boka's United Merchant bank. 
Commercial Banks 
From 1892 until the 1950s only two commercial banks, Standard Bank 
and Barclays Bank comprised the entire banking sector in Zimbabwe. Govern-
ment kept substantial balances with the commercial banks because there was 
no central bank. The only real competitor for deposits before 1950 was the Post 
Office Savings Bank (POSB) now known as the People's Own Savings Bank 
but retaining an identical abbreviation. Financial sophistication really began in 
the 1950s. The Netherlands Bank of South Africa (Nedbank) commenced op-
erations in 1951 with two branches. The National and Grindlays Bank soon fol-
111 
W &!Wi B m WWWEZ&U2EL& h1i£iilwiM@tr .& L 
' ' 
, MSW r==w =-
lowed it in October 1953. A few years latter, the Ottoman Bank was established 
in August 1958. Up to 1963, Standard Chartered and Barclays Bank between 
them still accounted for 90% of total deposits and 85% of loa~s and advz.nces. 
Interbank price competition was curtailed by "the existence at/ a deiailed Bank-
ing Agreement regulating the various bank charges," Sowele~ (1967, p63) in-
sists. Cole (1974, pG1) confirms that price competition arHong commercial 
'"· 
banks was eliminated by a formal agreement known as the.:/Register of Co-
operation" under which the banks operated as a cartel in fixing service tariff$, 
the deposit and lending interest rates. ! 
Cola argues (1974, p64) that the practice enabled banks to pay artificially 
' low intP.rest ra~es to "small depositors with insufficient knowledge of the market 
or insufficient funds to go elsewhere." In other words banks enjoyed undeserved 
profits at the expense of small depositors. Needless for me to say there was no 
room for redress. Newlyn and Rowan (1954, p245) observed )hat the" laissez-
faire" banking policy has never subject of any official investigation report. The 
Register of Cooperation lasted well into the 1990s until it was decimated by fi-
nancial liberalisation, which enabled new players to enter the lucrative market. 
Economic theory suggests that reduced competition and concentrated owner-
ship results in misallocation of resources. 
Mergers and acquisitions also reduced the number of competitors on the 
market. The National and Grindlays Bank acquired the Ottoman Bank in 1969 
following a worldwide takeover. The bank also absorbed the Manica Board of 
' Executors in 1971 to establish Grindlays International Finance. Years later, the 
' Grindlays group became subject of a regional takeover by the'Standard Bank of 
South Africa. Since 1991 operations of the group are now run under the Stanbic 
Bank brand name. The name differentiates the group's acti~ities from the UK 
headquartered Standard Chartered Bank. Nedbank of South Africa registered a 
local subsidiary called the Netherlands Bank of Rhodesia in 1967. Thirty per-
cent of the bani< 's equity was floated on the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange in the 
same year. In 1972 the bank changed its name to the Rhodesian Banking Cor-
poration (Rhobank). At independence the bank was rechristened the Zimbabwe 
Banking Corporation (Zimbank) following government's acquisition of Ned-
bank's equity. Zimbank established ownership of Syfrets Merchant Bank and 
the Scottish Rhodesian Finance (Scotfin) through a series of further acquisi-
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iions. According to Cole (1974, p55) Standard Bank acquired a unance house 
called National Industrial Credii Corporation in 1968, which was designated 
Standard Finance. The Standarc Merchant Bank was created in 1973 following 
the purchase of a controlling interest in the Accepting Bank of Rhodesia. In the 
current market, merchant banking and finance house business are no longer 
core functions of the Standard Chartered Bank. The debt ridden finance house 
was disposed to ZDB where it operates as ZDB Financial Services. 
Prior to the establishment of the Reserve Bank, interest and credit condi~ 
lions in Zimbabwe were linked to the Bank Rate in the UK. Standard Bank 
managed the clearing system and the settlements were made daily in Lon~on. 
Independence of the Zimbabwe Financial System from conditions prevailing in 
London was one of the major objectives of the new central bank. Local clearing 
accounts were opened with the Reserve Bank when it adopted ihe administra-
tion of the Salisbury Clearing House. With the arrival of discount houses on the 
local scene, banks were able to invest daily surplus balances as money on call. 
A local Bank Rate was introduced for the first time in August 1957 to anchor the 
nascent money market on its own feet. According to Sowelem (1967, p287) all 
money market rates were linked to the Bank Rate: deposit rates on savings 
were fixed at 1 % below the rate while the minimum overdraft rate was fixed at 
2% above the Bank Rate; originally fixed at 4.5%. Cole (1974, p58) argues that 
interest rates in Rhodesia were low by international standards. It seems to me 
that the low rates could be attributed to excessive regulation on part of the 
authorities as well as collusion and lack of concern for the customers by the 
banks, which is evidenced by the Banking Agreement. 
Following the establishment a central bank in 1956, commercial banks 
became subject to reserve requirements from 1957 thus providing the Reserve 
Bank with additional domestic resources to manage the monetary system. The 
requirements were first set at 8% for demand deposits and 3% for time depos-
its. Ranges permissible under the law were 6 to 25% and 3 to 10% respectively. 
The 1959 Banking Act introduced a Liquid Asset Ratio (LAR), derived from Lo-
cal Liquid Assets and External Liquid Assets. Negative balances on extemal 
liquid asset were ignored to enable local branches of expatriate banks to over-
draw their head office accounts. The LAR ratio was enforceable from July 1962 
at a rate of 25% for commercial banks and 20% for merchant banks. In theory 
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the central bank had conslderable power to vary the ratio, but ,in practice moral 
suasion was preferred to using formal powers. ,I 
Before the establishment of the central bank govemmeht could still influ-
ence banks' liquidity through moral suasion. In the 1950s t1k government is-
sued a number of directives advising banks to restrain lendirig. Zimbabwe has 
.. 
always had a high marginal propensity to import. Rapid expa.hSion of commer-
cial bank lending between 1948 and 1951 from £13.4m to £3~:1m facilitated the 
tremendous increase in imports from £58.9m in 1950 to £85.8m in 1951. Sow-
elem (1967, p302) suggests that depletion of external asset~ financed the in-
crease in commercial bank !ending prompting official pressure on banks to re-
strain credit. However banks remained exposed to prior contraCtual obligations. 
The establishment of a Cental Bank facilitated the redistribution of exter-
nal assets, comprising of gold and net foreign assets, "in favour of the central 
bank at the expense of the commercial banks;· Sowelem (1967, p242). From 
1965 the Reserve Bank replaced London merchants as the sole buyer of local 
gold. Adopting Sowelem's (1967, p233) data, the trend depicts the following: 
31 December 
Annual Average 
1958 1959 
£12.5m £4.5m 
£9.1m £9.1m 
1960 1961 
-£2.5m £3.5m 
-£2.4m -£0.3m 
1962 1963 
£1.6m -£3.0m 
£3.7m ·£0.4m 
In spite of the extreme fluctuations in the UK Bank Rate between 1957 
and 1960, and official pressure for banks in Zimbabwe to restrain credit, the lo-
• 
cal Bank Rate remained fixed. The plight of commercial banks' was exacerbated 
• by capital flight induced by both fixed interest rates and political uncertainty as 
regards the future of the Federation. Typically, Zimbabwean officials were anx-
ious to maintain the cost of short-term government borrowin9 at artificially low 
levels. In May 1960, a so called "Commercial Banks' Revolt" was launched. 
Commercial ban~s flouted the Reserve Bank's authority and unilaterally in-
creased their deposit interest rates. On 2 August the commercial banks served 
notice of further increases in deposit and lending rates. The Reserve Bank was 
forced to hike the Bank rate of the following day to 5%; two percentage points 
below the London rate of 7%. Central bank authorities were hesitant to invoke 
untested formal powers provided in section 25(a) of the 1959 Banking Act. Al-
though commercial banks succeeded in changing government policy, the victory 
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was short lived. In the long run public opinion was sympathetic to increased 
government control. In deed Exchange Control (EiC) regulations were extended 
to cover Sterling Area transaction from 23 February 1961. Remittances to Lon-
don were subject to prior consultation with the central bank. 
Participation in the banking sector was limited. No new commercial bank 
was licensed between 1960 and 1980. There were only four commercial banks 
in 1980 operating 113 branches in various parts of the country. Only one bank, 
Zimbank, was locally incorporated. The other three were branches of interna-
tional banks. A wide range of products and services were offered, including de-
posits, loans and advances, share floatation, mer'!,Jers and takeovers. As arg~ed 
at the beginning of section 4.2 very few changes were introduced after inde-
pendence until 1995. Commercial banks continued to provide funding to gov-
ernment through their high holding of prescribed paper. At independence TBs 
comprised 18% of commercial bank assets. Commercial banks were required to 
meet a statutory liquid asset ratio of 35 % of their liabilities to the public. Ac-
cepting houses and finance companies faced ratios of 30 % and 15 % respec-
tively. 
Harvey (1996) exaggerates the financial condition of Zimbabwean banks. 
A 1992 study by Chapman found that only Standard Chartered Bank and Bar-
clays Bank complied with the standard 8% capital adequacy ratio in that year. 
Whereas Harvey (1996, p2) argues hypothetically that banks "managed to avoid 
or at least contain political pressure to lend on non-commercial grounds," the 
paper nevertheless suggests that BCCI licence "was the result of improper lob-
bying of politicians," (p12). In fact, surprising deficiencies, including poor asset 
quality, high concentration risk, weak internal controls, poor data integrity, and 
inadequate board oversight were L'nearthed following the launch of on-site in-
spections from 1996. Banking Supervision Department (BSD) Annual Report 
(1997, p6) states that eight on-site examinations were conducted that year and 
four Corrective Orders were issued to eliminate problems and restore the banks 
to a safe and sound condition. Special vehicle companies such as Apex and 
CBZ Nominees were established to house bad loans from Zimbank and Com-
mercial Ban.'< of Zimbabwe (CBZ) respectively. A Banking Supervision Annual 
Report for 2000 (p19) reveals that the banking sector was still plagued by poor 
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corporate governance, high volumes of :1dversely classified l0ans, low capital 
adequacy ratios, insufficient provisions for bad and doubtful de.~ts, and failure to 
adhere to laid down procedures. I 
On average, however, the banking sector was stablt and performed 
·, 
better than the real and service sectors of the economy in ~000. In nominal 
terms this is not surprising because BSD Annual Report (20tlO, p2) highlights 
" that on average lending rates were "68.2% for commercial bari'ks, 73.7% for ac:-
cepting houses, and 76.1% for finance house hire purchaser at a time when 
demand deposits were attracting 10% at commercial banks~ Increased bank 
profitability also benefited governnifmt, which introduced a SPf;Cial tax on banks 
in 2001. 
In recent years some high leveraged clients have argued that they are 
being overcharged in additio:i to being subjected to high inter~.st rates. Violation 
of the in duplum rut:::, which states that outstanding interest cannot be higher 
than the principle amount, has been the major bone of contention. In most 
cases there was no redress because the government maintained the issue was 
a civil rather than a criminal offence. Logically a finically ruined entity is not in a 
position to drag banks before the courts to the logical conclusion of the case. 
Finance Houses 
Cole (1973, p207)' points out that the first finance hoµses were estab-
lished before World War II. A number of the institutions operat8d as subsidiaries 
' 
of merchant banks or commercial banks. Before the 1964 Banking Act several 
unregistered finance houses opere.ted in the sector. The nu~ber of registered 
finance houses has remained static for a long time. There were five finance 
houses in 1962, seven in 1973, six in 1980 and 2000. According to Cole (1973, 
p 208) the 1964 Banking Act permitted only registered institutions to take de-
posits from the public. In return, finance houses were expected to hold pre-
scribed liquid assts not lower than 15% of their liabilities to the public. However, 
finance houses are restricted to long term deposits ranging 30 days to five 
years. The value of this restriction is academic as most finance houses are af-
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filiated to commercial banks or merchant banks. There is a heavy bias toward 
negotiable certificate of deposits (NCDs), which are tractable in the money mar-
ket. Beginning with the 1969 amendment to the Reserve Bank Act, finance 
house are expected to comply with statutory reserves requirements, originally 
set at 3%. The Minister of Finance also fixes terms of hire purchase. Strict con-
trols helped to preserve profit margins by restricting competition. 
With effect from 1965, finance houses shifted from the core business of 
hire purchase to target the productive sector. Import substitution during UDI 
fostered the growth of leasing facilities to meet the needs of firms that could no 
longer access external funds. Cole (1973, p212) observed that from 1969 _the 
value of leasing agreements has been greater than the traditional hire purchase 
business. In addition finance houses were under pressure from the Reserve 
Bank not to extend leasing facilities for consumer goods except television sets. 
Deposits that find their way to finance houses are interest sensitive. As a 
result finance houses are exposed to competition from commercial banks, mer-
chant banks and building societies. There were exorbitant interest rates in the 
market in 2000. Finance houses experienced some funding problems arising 
from the flight of deposits into the money market. On their part, the institutions 
curtailed loans in favour of low risk, high return money market instruments. 
Building Societies 
The concept of modern building societies is known to have originated in 
Birmingham, Britain, in 1775 although the sale and purchase of houses could 
be traced into the annals of history/ Early friendly societies terminated after 
each member was granted a house. The emergence of permanent societies in 
place of terminating societies enabled participants and investors to separate 
borrowing from lending. These developments enhanced the intermediary role of 
building societies by facilitating capital accumulation, which helps to raise a 
community's productivity and output. As regards the essential function of inter-
mediation, there is no distinction between banks, finance houses, insurance 
qThis paragraph draws heavily on Cole (1973) "The Finance houses in R11odesia," The Rhodesian Jour-
nal of Economics, December Vol. 7 No. 4 
'This subsection is based on Chirozva ( 1991) ''The Role of Building Societies in Zimbabwe." unpub-
lished essay. 
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companies, building societies, investment trusties, or any other- type of interme-
diary. The distinction lies in the nature of claims and services '1'.lffered to borrow-
ers and lenders. Regulation also buttresses artificial market se~mentation. 
In Zimbabwe, Cunningham (1964), cited in Cole (1973~, p59), identifies 
:I., 
the Midlands Building and Investment Society founded in ),924 as the first 
building society to be established. The Genta\ Africa BuildinfSociety (CABS) 
followed on 15 August 1949 after the merger of a number o(Societies. It grew 
into the dominant building society in Zimbabwe. Early buildi'g societies oper-
ated under the Companies Ordinance because there was no 'appropriate legis-
lation. Reliable records can be traced back to 1952. However Sowelem (1967, 
' 
p181) argues prior to that the sector was rather small. This might be true given 
that total assets as at 31 December 1952 were only $4m. However, it must be 
borne in mind that some societies failed to meet the registration deadline. That 
said it is self evident that sustainable expansion was realised· after 1951 when 
new laws were enacted to reorganise the industry. The Building Societies Act 
1951 drew insight from South Africa. Officially the Act was designed to prevent 
the mushrooming of unsafe and unsound institutions. Societies that failed to 
register in terms of the Act were either dissolved or allowed to merger with an 
existing institution. The legislators, recalls the Registrar in the First Annual Re-
port, designed building societies to provide a medium for "investment for the 
small man". In my view, building societies have borne the heaviest regulatory 
burden. 
As shown in the table below Beverley Building Society was one of the 
earliest societies to be incorporated in 1952 in terms of the 1951 Building So-
cieties Act. Indeed the table shows that the 1950s were characterised by ex-
pansion of the building societies movement. Sowelem (1967, p183) insists that 
up to 1960 building societies in Zimbabwe were able to attract foreign funds es-
pecially from South Africa. 
Table 5 
Early Building Societies 
Name of Society Head Office Date of Registration 
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Beverly Building Society• Harare 1 April 1952 
Central Africa Building Society [CABS] Harare 10 April 1952 
Midlands Building and Investment Society Gweru 28 November 1952 
Centenary Building Society Bulawayo 7 May 1953 
Founders Building Society• [lntermarket B. S.]# Harare 12 February 1954 
Rhodesia Building Society Harare 26 August 1954 
Old Mutual Building Society of Central Africa• Harare a September 1954 
Commonwealth Building Society Harare 8 August 1955 
Rhodes Building Society N/A 14 June 1958 
* These societies still existed in 2001. CABS was actually taken over by Old Mutual Society who decided 
to retain the name of the former. # Founder was acquired by the lntermarket Group In 2001 and changed 
its name to lntermarket Building Society. [Source: Registrar of Building Societies Annual Report-various] 
The proliferation of building societies was short lived. Reports of the 
Registrar of Building Societies attribute problems in the sector in to events in 
the Belgian Congo in July 1960, and uncertainty about the future of the Federa-
tion. However, Sowelem (1967, p183) points outthat the accelerated withdrawal 
of funds was precipitated by a 1960 run on Kenyan and then Zambian building 
societies. Extension of exchange controls to cover sterling area transactions in 
February 1961 also affected the confidence of foreign investors. The resultant 
liquidity crisis was so severe such that no new mortgage lending were extended 
between July 1960 and December 1961. The crisis brought with it compulsory 
consolidation and amalgamation of building societies in Zimbabwe in order to 
restore confidence in the building society movement. 
Although seriously affected societies received government, central bank 
and peer surport mergers and amalgamations reduced the number of societies 
from 8 to 3 between 1957 and 1962. One of the earliest mergers took place on 
1 July 1957 when Midlands Building and Investment Society merged with Bev-
erley Building Society. Assets of the short-lived Rhodes Building Society were 
taken over by the Commonwealth Building Society on 1 March 1961. On 30 
May 1962 assets of the Commonwealth Bank were transferred to Beverley 
Building Society. Meanwhile Rhodesia Building Society had amalgamated with 
Founders Building Society on 1 July 1961 to create a new society, which re-
tained the name Founders Building Society. As at 1 July 1961 Old Mutual 
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Building Society took over the Centenary Building Society (which had changed 
its name to Bulawayo and National Building Society on 8 Dec.~mber 1960) and 
the Central Africa Building Society. Following the acquisition ~f the two institu-
tions, Old Mutual Building Society assumed the name Cent~I Africa Building 
Society or CABS for short. By the end of 1962 the building ~9cieties left were 
CABS, Beverley and Founders. " 
!,( 
Sowelem (1967,p184) highlights that the amalgamation were initiated by 
the central bank. However neither Sowelem nor the Registrar pt Building Socie-
ties provide the exact details of the role played by the Reserve Bank. In fact 
footnote 14 in Cole (1973b, p147) demonstrates that all societies that survived 
• 
the crisis "had close connections with other powerful financial institutions: CABS 
with [Old Mutual]; Founders with the Anglo-American Corporation; the Beverley 
with the Pearl Assurance Company." Composition of the societies' board of di-
rectors also reflected the close ties. The phenomena of close ties in the Zim-
babwe financial system has already been discussed at length in this thesis. 
As expected no new entrants joined the building societies movement 
between 1962 and 1990. Obviously at independence in 1980 there were three 
building societies occupied with the provision of mortgage finance to existing 
and new building construction. Two new building societies, Zimbabwe Building 
Society (ZBS) and First National Building Society (FNBS), joined the sector in 
the 1990s. However these non-aligned societies have not faired very well. ZBS 
was taken over by the Reserve Bank in 1999 to save the society from imminent 
collapse due to high volume of arrears, poor management and: poor records. 
On average building societies operated under difficult conditions in the 
1990s. Their problems emanated from stringent regulatory constraints and an 
adverse macroeconomic environment. Regulation of building societies is em-
bodied in the current Building Societies Act (Chapter 24:02). The law, which 
gives them a unique cooperative status, has over the years subjected building 
societies to strict state control. Unlike other financial institutions, building socie-
ties' operations are entirely domestic because the law forbids them from oper-
ating from other countries. In contrast, Sowelem (1967, p182) observes that 
building societies in neighbouring Zambia and other British Commonwealth 
countries were not subject to this restriction. According to Cole's (1973b, p140) 
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analysis, in 1972 building societies ranked as the second largest group of 
banking institutions as measured by asset values. The BSD Annual Report 
(2000, p3) demonstrates that building societies were ranked third after 
commercial and merchant banks in 2000. 
Nevertheless, building societies have a monopoly in mortgage finance, 
which is protected by law. Building societies have minimal reserve requirements 
in return for government administered interest rate caps on deposits and ad-
vances. In addition it must be acknowledged that building societies do not pay 
taxes on any of their earnings. Investment income accruing to depositors on 
Class "C" share certificates is also tax exempted. Interest expense on mort-
gages loans is also tax deductible in the hands of a borrower liable to tax. 
Building societies, however, compete with other deposit taking institu-
tions, including the POSB and the stock market for deposits. By law building so-
cieties are expected to maintain a liquid asset ratio of at least 15% of their li-
abilities to the public. Under the banner of maintaining confidence and liquidity 
in the financial system legislators guarantee subscription to government stocks, 
bills, bonds, and debentures even at times when the yield is unattractive. 
Therefore building 5-ocieties provide funds to government through their holdings 
of government paper. Building societies also fund government and local 
authorities low cost housing schemes. 
Zimbabwean building societies have over the years been encouraged by 
the regulatory framework to conform to the ideological persuasions of the time. 
Building societies are answerable to the Registrar who in turn reports to the 
Minister of Finance and Economic Development. Politicisation of the housing 
policy and the ever-increasing cost of building materials have challenged the 
service delivery potential of building societies. Building societies are not allowed 
by law to own industrial and commercial properties in their own right. The ca-
pacity of building societies to invest in residential properties has been conw 
strained by a number of factors; among them are administered lending rates 
and bureaucratic inefficiency in the public sector. Building societies have not 
been given the opportunity to field their own land surveyors. As a result they 
depend on resource constrained local authorities to approve projects and serv-
ice new stands. The retention of administered interest rate regimes for building 
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societies and the POSS in 1992, at a time when commercial,bank rates were 
being liberalised, exposed them to severe liquidity problems. ,I 
Although many writers portray building societies as a trainchild of early 
industrial workers and tantamount the societies to a "rebe11lbn" against poor 
housing conditions, a critical evaluation of their subscriptio~S suggests they 
were predominantly middle-class oriented in origin and tasle. Cole (1973b, 
" p142} found evklence that building societies cut down on lendi'ng even when the 
liquidity ratios were on average in excess of 20%. In practicei smoothening ad-
vances is a preferred strategy at a time when inflation fed investment demand 
for housing is high. Cole's poetic characterisation of the 1972 housing market is 
' 
still valid today in that the rich continue to benefit at the expense of the poor; 
property owners at the expense of first time buyers; and the old at the expense 
of the young (p146-7). The only notable exception is that residents can no 
longer benefit at the expense of the immigrants if the later has· foreign currency, 
a highly priced commodity on the black market. 
In my view, Zimbabwe probably experienced a general market failure in 
year 2000. Exorbitant interest rates on the money market, which were fuelled by 
rampant inflation, led to a credit crunch. Most investors switched their savings 
into the money market where returns were high and risk low. Like other deposit 
taking institutions, building societies experienced acute funding problems. The 
societies resorted to expensive NCOs for deposits. Building societies, in tan-
dem with other financial institutions, also abandoned their car~ business of pro-
viding risky !ow yield mortgage loans in pursuit of high return ~reasury Bills. 
People's Own Savings Bank 
The POSS is a joint responsibility of the Ministries of Finance and the 
Post and Telecommunications. The Post Office Savings Bank Act [Chapter 
24:10] regulates it. According to Mataruka (1999,p4) the POSS falls under the 
trusteeship of the Secretary of the Treasury, the Governor of the Reserve Bank, 
and the Postmaster General. The institution does not lend to the private sector. 
Its intermediary role is limited to the channelling of deposits to government. A 
large portion of the POSB's liabilities is in the fomn of saving deposits as per 
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statutory requirements. Theoretically the POSB has some discretion over the 
composition of its asset portfolio, but in practice it grapples with political pres-
sure to hold government securities. The POSB is in fact usually the largest sin-
gle holder of government stock among all the banking and financial institutions. 
The whole of its asset portfolio is sometimes invested in government paper. 
Development Institutions 
Zimbabwe has over the years witnessed a plethora of development in-
stitutions although their activities are not very conspicuous to the general public. 
Most of these institutions are now defunct but some have endured to the pres-
ent day in one form or another. Barclays Overseas Development Corporation 
Limited, a subsidiary of Barclays Bank D.C.O., was established in 1947 to cover 
several colonies. Its initial capital was £5m. It provided medium-term loans for 
development purposes and provided underwriting seivices for non-government 
projects. The Anglo-American Development Corporation provided funding for 
projects in the natural resources sector run by government or the private sector. 
This institution also provided offshore finance. A Standard Chartered Bank af-
filiated institution known as Standard Bank Finance and Development Corpora-
tion was incorporated in London in 1946 with a capitalisation of £500 000. 
The Zimbabwe Development Bank (ZDB) was established in the early 
1980s. Government held 51 % of its equity. The bank specialises in medium 
term lending but expects project promoters to also contribute a substantial por-
tion of the equity. ZDB works in close conjunction with the Venture Capital 
Company of Zimbabwe (VCCZ), a company set up at the insistence of the Re-
serve Bank. As implied in its name VCCZ provides capital for start up ventures. 
It also offers entrepreneurial guidance through the provision of board director-
ship, accounting, and management services. Promoters of successful ventures 
are expected to buyout the VCCZ within five years. 
IPCORN, acronym for Industrial Promotion Council for Rhodesia and 
Nyasa land was established in 1960. It was run as an independent, privately 
owned development board financed, controlled and owned by leading banking, 
insurance, mining and industrial companies. Its name was changed to Industrial 
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Promotion Corporation of Central Africa in 1964. The institution focused on the 
provision of medium-term capital and managerial advice. F,lroject promoters 
were expected to meet 50% any project's capital requireme~ts. The Southern 
Rhodesia government in 1959 established a related instituti1r, namely the In-
dustrial Development Board. i\, 
" . 
Eventually the Industrial Development Corporation, IDC for short, was 
" also created in 1963. It provided long-term capital, via loans a.'nd equity partici-
pation, to new and established ventures that were in tum sub.feted to manage-
rial supervision. A lesser-known subsidiary known as Zimbabwa Development 
Corporation (ZDC) was also active in this respect. IDC also built factories for 
' 
rent or sell to business concerns. Unlike conventional financi81 institutions, ac-
tivities of the IDC are not very accessible to the general public. The institution 
operates like a government investment company with very broad objectives 
ranching from industrialisation, research, employment and promotion of new 
technologies. Its Greenfield portfolio expanded drastically after independence. 
At one time both the IDC and ZDC housed some of the worst performing and 
debt-ridden companies. Among the projects were notable insolvent entities such 
as National Glass and Cone Textiles. As is typical of many state owned corpo-
rations, divesture from troubled investment was very slow and fraught with bu-
reaucratic wrangles. The need to guarantee employment often had precedence 
over economic and financial acumen. 
The performance of special soft windows for developfT!ent has been dis-
mal, providing no significant contribution to economic develo~ment. The Devel-
opment Finance Corp (DFC), a parastatal, was established in 1979 to carter for 
the financial needs of the small and emergent businesses. Harvey (1996, p15) 
notes that the institution was overwhelmed by rapid expansion, bad debts, and 
political pressure to lend to the politicians themselves. By 1981 the new lending 
was stopped, the board of directors was dismissed and the administration of the 
parastatal was handed over to I DC. 
A new organisation, the Small Enterprises Development Corporation 
(SEDCO) was created in 1984 to replace DFC, which was wound up in 1985. 
Harvey reiterates that SEDCO continued to make losses despite access to con-
cessionary grants from government. Like the AFC, SEDCO suffered from in-
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adequate capital and want of autonomy. Apart from SEDCO there were several 
other schemes in the 1990s under which the cost of borrowing was subsidised. 
A parallel entity, known as the Credit Guarantee Company (CGC), jointly owned 
by the Reserve Bank (50%), commercial banks and ZDB, provided funding to 
SMEs at 5% at a time when banks were lending at 39% in the market and de-
posit rates were in the region of 20%. The scheme was politicised. Government 
guaranteed loan repayment hence there were huge incentives for moral hazard 
behaviour on part of both the banks and the borrowers. Even the most sound 
privately owned banks carried disastrous CGC portfolios in the late 1990s. 
Other subsidised credit schemes such as the Social Development Fund 
(SDF), and the Z$100m, Z$400m, 2$700m, 2$1 bn facilities provided for through 
donor assistance did not fair any better because recovery rates were next to nil 
and there was no resolute follow up on defaulters. Theoretically, these facilities 
should have enhanced the viability of SMEs, and indirectly promoted economic 
prosperity because credit was usually accessed at 5% at a time when market 
rates were in the region of 30 to 40%. Harvey (1996, p26) emphasised that de-
fault rates on these soft windows were "typically above 50%, and ranging as 
high as 97% for the [SDF] which was used most extensively for political patron-
age ... " Despite constitutional complications regarding the appropriation of state 
resources, it seems that a National Investment Trust (NIT) is being established 
on the sidelines ostensibly to facilitate the transfer of state owned assets to the 
indigenous population. There is no mechanism to ensure that the scheme will 
benefit the most disadvantages citizens. Listing the NIT on the stock market, for 
example will benefit the rich. Until Zimbabwe starts to give practical effect to fi-
nancial safety nets such as disclosure, transparency and accountability nothing 
will come out of the numerous soft windows for development. 
Representative Offices 
The Registrar of Banking Institutions' Annual Report (1994) shows that 8 
representative offices were operating in the country that year. These included 
the African Development Bank (ADS), World Bank, Societe General, State Bank 
of India and the Bank of Yugoslavia. In the previous Banking Act [Chapter 188] 
registration of a representative office was not a legal requirement. However, 
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representative offices were restricted to arranging external loans subject to prior 
Exchange Control approval. Nevertheless registration was rei;:iuired in terms of 
the Companies Act and for tax purposes. Section 28 of the 1new Banking Act 
[Chapter 24:20] irons out these inconsistencies. Under the n~w Act the Regis-
trar's approval is required to open a representative office. Th~, applicants must 
have support of their home country's supervisory authorities. ;~o banking busi-
ness can be conducted from a representative office. AlthoughJhe new Banking 
Act section 8 (4) provides for the establishment of foreign owned banking insti'-
tutions, none has opened for business since financial liberali~ation in the early 
' 
1990s. However, the degree of foreign ownership is subject to prior approval by 
Exchange Control and the Zimbabwe Investment Centre (ZIC)1s own criteria. 
Insurance and Pension Funds 
Insurance companies, pension and provident funds play a pivotal role in 
mobilising savings and capital formation in Zimbabwe. Payment of insurance 
premiums and pension contributions are an important source of personal sav-
ings in the country. Insurance companies and pension funds are an important 
source of long-term capital for new and existing projects. In fact there is a heavy 
presence of pension and insurance funds in government securities, fixed prop-
erty, shares, and the money market. Government sets high liquidity levels. 
According to Paul Mkondo (1992, p25) there were one or two British life 
Insurance companies in Zimbabwe by 1898. However, a more authoritative ac-
count by Chimombe (1983) suggests that there were three !nsurance compa-
nies originating from South Africa, Britain and Australia by 190.2: Old Mutual, the 
biggest insurance company was registered in South Africa in 11888. It began in-
surance operations in Harare and Bulawayo in 1900. Norwich Union Insurance 
Society, a British Company, opened an agency office in Zimbabwe in 1901. Its 
representatives commenced both life and fire insurance in 1903. Colonial Mu-
tual Assurance Company, which was founded in Australia in 1873, commenced 
operations in Bulawayo in 1902. However, Colonial's activities were directed 
from South Africa where the group had established in 1883. 
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Evolution and structure of the Zimbabwean insurance industry is docu-
mented in detail in Chimombe (1983,p190-230). Her account, which covers 
about 40 pages, is still very accurate except for a localisation campaign spear-
headed by Exchange Control between 1987 and 1993. In brief, Chimombe 
demonstrated that foreign owned companies dominated the industry. In 1971 
for example, Cole (1974b) noted that only seven out of 76 companies had local 
head offices, the rest being branches of British or South African companies. In-
surance companies exercised profound influence in the economy, particularly in 
the firancial sector, through interlocking directorships. Compulsory insurance 
with a preselected insurer was a condition to get a mortgage from any building 
society. The industry served a predominantly white clientele until 1980. Chi-
mombe, who had great faith in state ownership of resources to accelerate eco-
nomic growth, supported wholesale localisation of the industry to curtail capital 
flight through external reinsurance premiums, management fees and transfer 
pricing. History has not been kind to her conclusions, as evidenced by the de-
mise of communism and poor economic growth in postcolonial Zimbabwe. 
The idea that overt state control would pertect the allocation of resources 
misses the point indirect control was already too high. There is heavy purchase 
of government securities by insurance companies and pension funds. Life in-
surance companies are required by law to maintain an unimpaired pool of as-
sets equal to the sum of their liabilities in Zimbabwe. Both Chimombe 
(1983,p206) and Cole (1974b, p67) attribute the high holdings of government 
securities to "lack of other suitable investment opportunities" given a small eq-
uity market "in relation to the funds whirh the insurance companies have to 
place ... " Good quality local script is closely held. Exchange controls regulations 
preclude fund managers from investing in externally registered shares. Property 
development is retarded by exchange controls and foreign exchange shortages. 
Tax concessions also make high concentration on government paper an attrac-
tive financial investment. Chimombe, closely led by Cole, correctly noted the 
"protiis on the realisation of government, municipal and statutory corporation 
securities are generally not 'liable to tax." Of course the law also prescribes high 
concentration in government securities. Holdings in excess of the legal require-
ments are also reinforced by moral suasion. The transaction demand for money 
motivates investment into me,rketable securities. 
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The insurance industry also experienced a number of mergers in the 
1970s. As in other industries in the financial sector the lnsurar;ipe Association of 
Central Africa enforced collective tariff agreements in the ~on-life insurance 
market. The long established agreement helped to eliminat~ cut-throat price 
competition. The UDI era monopoly and improvement in seiice delivery also 
helped to increase profitability before independence. " . 1·,, • 
. 
" About 50 insurance companies operated in the countl'Y by 1980 down 
from 76 recorded in 1971. According to Cole (1974b, p59) Jhe 1971 industry 
comprised of 17 life only, 21 life and non-life, 35 non-life, and' 3 funeral only in-
surance companies. About 18 brokers were part of the service delivery chain . 
• 
Since 1980 the sector has experienced substantial growth and now carters for a 
wider section of the population. The Registrar 0f Insurance Companies dis-
closed that there were 9 life only (including 3 life re'nsurers), 24 non-life (5 rein-
surers), 18 funeral assurers, 41 brokers, 40 l;jLJltiple agents and 2424 sole 
agents by mid 2001. The industry controlled about $55 billion in total assets of 
which $1 O billion was in prescribed assets. Mkondo identifies aids, inflation, 
taxation, and political stability as the major threats to the insurance industry. 
Life insurance is still dominated by Old Mutual. The Zimbabwe Inde-
pendent Insurance Survey 2001 indicates that Old Mutual accounted for 70% of 
gross premiums, 72% of the net premiums and 77% of the total assets market 
share in 1999. Total assets of the industry amounted to $39.6 billion in the 
same year. Old Mutuai has investments cut across the entire spectrum of the 
Zimbabwean economy. The society has a substantial stak~ in almost every 
counter on the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange. State owned Zimbabwe Reinsur-
. 
ance (ZimRe) controlled 65% of the reinsurance business (or $1.9 billion in 
premiums) in 1999 because it is given preferential treatment' by the insurance 
law. Mandatory reinsurance with ZimRe may be phased out following the listing 
of the company on the stock exchange. 
All pension, provident and retirement annuity funds are registered, and 
comply with the Pension And Provident Fund Act of 1976 [Chapter 24:09] as 
revised in 1996. Not much is recorded about these institutions prior to that date. 
It is strange that the first annual report is dated as late as 31 December 1977 
yet it records that about 1192 funds were inexistence. Ironically these private 
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and quasi-government pension funds are significant participants on the ZSE 
and the local money market. In my view, the treasure of insurance records prior 
to 1977 must be laying forgotten somewhere. 
Until the launch of compulsory membership to state owned National So-
cial Security Authority (NSSA) in 1994 there was no national scheme for retire-
ment pensions. The authority is now a major investment player on the Zimbab-
wean equity market. However, it is a moot point whether future NSSA pensions 
will sustain life given the paltry contributions levied. Nevertheless there is strong 
support for flexible yet compulsory contributory pensions in the literature. Aus-
tralian "Superannuation" allow beneficiaries to choose their own fund managers. 
Civil servants were exempted form joining NSSA because government 
could not afford the obligatory employer's contributions that go with the scheme. 
However, civil servants are entitled to contributory Government Pension 
Scheme at a subscription of 7.5% of one's monthly salary. According to Cole 
(1974b, p92) contributions are paid into the Consolidated Revenue Fund as no 
pension fund was established. Payments are also made out of this fund. Fol-
lowing upon this it might be possible that taxpayers collectively undeiwrite civil 
servants' pensions in addition to paying the salaries out of which the contribu-
tions are made from in the first place. In contrast a few private pension schemes 
operating in the market are self-administered while the bulk of them are under-
written and administered by insurance companies. 
As a developing country Zimbabwe does not have old age pension or 
unemployment benefits despite a need for the services. Before independence 
the state administered a complicated non-contributory old age pension scheme 
for non-Africans who qualified. Nowadays all the destitute who are informed ap-
proach the Social Welfare Department for assistance. If pegged against inflation 
the allowances disbursed are meagre and cannot sustain a decent livelihood. 
Given the vicious poverty and scarcity of funds chances of reform are remote. 
The Zimbabwe Stock Exchange 
In recent years financial literature has shown great interest in "emerging 
equity markets" as ideal for diversification and good returns. Emerging markets 
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are regarded as countries showing high potential for economic growth alongside 
with high political, fiscal, economical and market related risks 11 Historically capi-
tal markets and financial institutions were regarded as alternative approaches to 
financial architecture. This research, following Beck, Demirgll~Kunt, and Levine 
(1999, p2) and others, emphasises the complementary roles b~,tween the two. 
" 
In theory there are many benefits and costs to equit;{market develop-
" men\, as argued in Sudweeks (1989,37-47) and Cla!idge and Box (2000) for 
example. Apart from raising capital, equity markets facilitate! economic devel-
opment in a number of ways. Sound equity markets increase the efficiency of 
the financial system via multiple investment opportunities, which implies more 
' 
choice. Increased competition for funds among firms enhances financial system 
efficiency if the competitive forces result in a fair return on investment. 
Claridge and Box (2000, p~ 1) bring home the point that capital markets 
help close the gap between domestic and international cost of capit~I. Integra-
tion of capital markets improves the quality of price signals on the local market. 
This development enables investors to assess the true value of investment op-
portunities more accurately thereby facilitating the efficient allocation of re-
sources. Following upon this, productivity is also expected to increase. 
Sudweeks emphasises that equity markets contribute to "financial sys-
tem solvency" by lowering the debUequity ratios among firms. Existence of deep 
secondary markets increases the supply of long-term funds tc:, government and 
private firms. Emerging equity markets such as Zimbabwe ,.have potential to 
lower the external debt through increased mobilization of local resources and 
the use of debt equity swaps. Equity markets also facilitate the transparent pri-
vatisation of state owned firms. Listing on the exchange often entails adoption 
of better accounting and disclosure standards, which facilitates better economic 
decisions. Claridge and Box support the view that capital markets improve allo-
cative efficiency through greater transparency, reduced favouritism, rent seek-
ing (corruption), and regulatory avoidance. 
Broadening the ownership base of firms through capital markets helps 
eliminate monopolistic tendencies in the economy. Schumpeter has taught us 
that competitive markets facilitate constructive innovation. Claridge and Box 
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(2000) reinforce this idea by emphasising the potential of capital markets to 
"encourage innovation and efficiency in domestic financial markets" and the use 
of sophisticated instruments such as futures, "which stimulates further trade". 
Singh (1997) strongly argues that there are greater costs than benefits to 
equity market development in emerging markets. Minsky (1977) and Kindleber-
ger (1996) both emphasise that the financial system is inherently unstable. 
Critics argue that developing countries lack the sophistication and willpower to 
manage the inevitable turbulence. Unsophisticated capital markets are more 
vulnerable to the possibility of low investor confidence, speculative attacks, in-
terest rates repression, high intermediation costs, loss of local ownership, capi-
tal flight. and inefficient allocation of resources from a national viewpoint. 
Therefore capital markets could harm economic activity in small open econo-
mies. 
A lot of other costs are associated with the free flow of international funds 
into small economies as highlighted during the East Asian financial crisis of the 
late 1990s. In Claridge and Box's (2000, p32) own words, "the real economy 
responds to change more slowly than financial capital" which could result in se-
vere real adjustment costs to sudden flow of funds. In their view, excess liquidity 
in the market exaggerates changes in market sentiment giving rise to the risk of 
contagion. Furthermore rapid capital movements could increase interest rate, 
exchange rate, and asset prices volatility to levels not supported by economic 
fundamentals. Distortions in asset prices may be inflationary whereas exchange 
rate shocks could lead to "resource misallocation, particularly between trade-
able and non-tradeab\e sectors." Externally induced asset price bubbles have 
the potential to magnify inequality. In Zimbabwe, for example, customers with 
foreign currency were given first preference in the property and motor vehicles 
industries in 2000/1. High reliance on foreign capital may constrain fiscal and 
monetaiy policy options to the state as well as create current account deficits, 
which could raise "the cost of borrowing for the country as a whole." (Ibid p31) 
This said, the barriers are solvable and the long-term benefits are great. 
As with anything in life, the long run cost of doing nothing could be more severe. 
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The International Encyclopaedia of the Stock Market (Volume 2, p1186) 
regards the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE) as a small (b~;world standards) 
but active stock exchange in Africa second only to the Johan~esburg Stock Ex-
change (JSE). It is at the pinnacle of the equity capital mark~t in Zimbabwe. It 
I 
operates under an act of parliament as well as self-imposed:i.regulations. Until 
the late 1990s, membership of the exchange was limited t(.individuals. New 
members were required to have prior experience with an existing broker. The 
ZSE requires that companies wishing to go public must make at least 30% Of 
the shares available to the public on listing. No less than 1 oobooo shares must 
• 
be issued and the number of shareholders must be more than 300. 
The first exchange was established in 1896 in Bulawayo. It was followed 
by other exchanges in various centres of the country. A modem stock exchange 
was established and located in Bulawayo in 1946. According to Newlyn and 
Rowan (1954, p143) the exchange had 22 trading brokers and was modelled on 
the lines of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. A duplicate floor was opened in 
Harare in 1951. Brokers also met in Harare for a daily call over of prices, which 
were telephoned to Bulawayo for amalgamation and compilation. Sowelem 
(1967, p166) noted that there were 96 listed companies in 1963, but the number 
of practising brokers had dropped to thirteen: five in Bulawayo, one in Mutare 
and the remainder in Harare. The ZSE has been based in Harare since 1975. In 
2000 the Stock Exchange had 13 Stockbroking firms in its membership. Each 
firm employed a number of advisors who specialised in a wide range of services 
such as investment, financial planning and research. The range of services of-
fered differs from firm to firm. 
The exchange provides a primary market for equity issues and a secon-
dary market for all government registered stock; all local' municipal stock; 
shares (ordinary and preference), and debentures of listed local companies 
(Newlyn and Rowan p145). Parastatal paper, for instance the Zimbabwe Elec-
tricity Supply Authority (ZESA) bills, also make its way onto the ZSE. Brokers 
meet in Harare for a daily call over of prices. De Caires and Fletcher (1990, 
p210) noted that stocks are traded in alphabetic order. Open call overs are held 
in mornings and afternoons at the ZSE premises where individual brokers an-
nounce buying and bid and selling offer prices for listed stocks in a mini-auction. 
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The system is paper based. Settlement is required on the day of delivery 
against the physical delivery of scrip on a Trade date+ seven days (T+7) basis. 
Clearing is handled on a transaction-by-transaction basis. Regular board lots 
comprise of 100 shares. Brokers can act as agents of buyers and sellers or in 
own names as principals. 
A trading record stipulating bid and offer prices and the volume of sales 
is circulated to all broking firms and published in the daily press by the ZSE. 
There are two major indices, the Zimbabwe Industrial Index and the Zimbabwe 
Mining Index. Index calculations are based on the capital weighted method. 
Plans are underway to design a composite index that incorporates all traded 
stocks. However, private asset management firms have introduced several indi-
ces of their own, some of which are based on recently introduced derivative 
products. Although the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange boast of having share prices 
for every trading day since 1946 the data is not in useful form5 • The exchange 
does not have a single record documenting the appropriate time series data. 
Whereas the base date for the ZSE Industrial Index is 1967= 100, reliable data 
produced by the Reserve Bank dates back to 1975. Furthenmore, the market 
capitalisation attribute is not part of the series kept by the Reserve Bank. The 
central bank's data on share turnover is in index format, which renders com-
parative studies with other bourses difficult in the absence of market capitalisa-
tion figures. Market liquidity for instance, is commonly defined by expressing 
turnover over market capitalisation. In this regard Zimbabwean researchers re-
sort to the Emerging Stock Markets Factbook(s) for appropriate statistics. The 
pedagogic value of empirical research has not been taken seriously. Research 
enhances market efficiency and adds new insights to the body of knowledge. 
The institutional features of the ZS E closely resemble the financial insti-
tutions with regard to concentrated ownership, limited participation and signifi-
cant government controls. A few shareholders control a high proportion of 
shares in companies listeC'i on the Zimbabwe stock exchange. In 1993 a single 
institution, Old Mutual, controlled at least 10% of the total market value of 
shares on the bourse. Two industrial giants of Southern Africa - Lonrho and 
Anglo American Corporations- controlled substantial holdings. The government 
'Sec: Speech by Mr. R. T. G. Williams, Chainnan of The ZSE to the ZNCC on 16 September I 988. 
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also exercised significant control on the ZSE through direct and indirect hold-
ings. To date Old Mutual is within the top ten shareholder'" of almost every 
counter on the ZSE. Supply of good quality scrip is limited ~ecause dominant 
institutional investors usually pursued "buy to hold" strategiesf/ A 1992 study by 
Chapman put the proportion of closely held shares at 81.1~%. Therefore the 
stock market was characterised by low depth as evidenced bYi.:~ery low ratios of 
turnover to market capitalisation. Participation by individual s~reholders is still 
limited due to ignorance, risk averseness and lack of adequate disposable iri-
come. There might be need to educate the public about stociJ. market activities . 
• 
Fiscal incentives such as tax benefits, positive real incomes, and better stan-
dard of living may be required to enhance market depth. 
Although Zimbabwe has maintained a relaiively vibrant private sector 
over the years there is little reliance on the stock market as a primary source of 
capital. In aggregate the exchange remains a minor source new capital, despite 
some episodes of high activity over the years. Hawkins (1976, p117) argues 
that the private sector was responsible for 60% fixed capital formation between 
1965 and 1974. Of this a mere 4.9% was raised through the public issue mar-
ket. Sowelem (1967, p 167) observed that on average $3m was raised annually 
between 1955 and 1959. Mataruka (1999, p54) argues that t11e 1980s were 
characterised by shortage of scrip. Hawkins suggests that listing rules militate 
against small companies that dominate the Zimbabwean economy. However, I 
agree with Sudweeks (1989, p61) that loss of control and disclosure require-
ments are major fears among owners of closely held family firms. A number of 
• 
firms only list the minimum percentage of shares allowed by the exchange. 
Authorities may also distrust free ownership and private enterprise resulting in 
inefficient or over-regulation. A considerable degree of confidence is necessary 
because investors are sensitive to political uncertainty. As highlighted through-
out this thesis the institutional framework must facilitate the transfer of informa-
tion, disclosure, transparency and accountability to instil confidence in the mar-
ket. 
In the mid 1990s there was a clear trend towards deregulation in Zim-
babwe. ESAP brought with it a significant relaxation of foreign investment 
guidelines. Prior to economic liberalisation, activity on the ZSE was adversely 
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affected by strict exchange control restrictions on dividend remittability and par-
ticipation of non-resident investors. At the end of 1980 there were 62 domestic 
companies quoted on the ZSE. The number of listed stocks fell to 55 in 1985 
and 53 between 1986 and 1988. The Zimbabwean stock market was opened to 
foreign investment in June 1993 up to a limit of 25% per counter, dividends of 
which were 100% remittable. The ceiling on foreign portfolio investment was 
progressively increased to 40% by December 1996. However, no single non-
resident shareholder can purchase more than 10% per counter. In July 1993 
capital gains on listed securities was reduced from 30% to 10%. Tax on divi-
dends was cut from 20% to 15% in 1994. The turnover ratio rose from 5.2% 
1993to 11.5% in 1994. 
Table 6 below shows the pattern of activity on the stock exchange in re-
cent years. On average liquidity, as depicted by the turnover ratio, has in-
creased since 1990. Market capitalisation rose steadily in US dollar terms until 
the onset of an economic crisis in 1997. In Zimbabwe dollar (ZWD) terms mar-
ket capitalisation continues to increase year after year due to high inflation. The 
Zimbabwe Stock Exchange performed exceptionally well in 2000 and 2001 de-
spite deterioration in economic fundamentals. Negative returns in the money 
market following the slashing of interest rates by the Reserve Bank in January 
2001 left many investors with no option but to switch to the stock market. To 
some extent buoyant share prices provided a hedge against inflation in 2001. 
Table 6 
ZSE Statistics: selected years 
1982 1985 1990 1995 1996 1998 
Number of Listed Companies 62 55 57 64 64 67 
Markel Capitalisation (ZWD) m 326 591 6373 18988 39337 48770 
Market Capitalisation (USD) m 355 360 2395 2038 3635 1310 
Trading Value (ZWD) m 57 14 126 1299 2555 3931 
Trading Value (USD) m 75 9 51 150 255 166 
Turnover Ratio(%) 3.3 2.9 7.6 8.8 9.2 
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[Source: Emerging Stock Markets Factbook- various ir,sues] 
Although market activity is on the increase in Zimbabw~ dollar terms, no 
clear-cut conclusions can be drawn with regard to efficiency. !n finance theory, 
market efficiency refers to the assumption that share prices rtflect all available 
information that investors consider relevant to decide wheth r to buy, sell or ,, 
hold on to their shares. Three form of market efficiency are Well known in the 
"'. 
literature; namely weak form, semi-strong form and the strong_i.form. These con-
cepts reflect respectively the degree to which all historical, all public, and all 
available information whether public or private is reflected inlthe share prices. 
' Empirically efficiency is evidanced by the absence of significant serial correla-
tions, i.e. price autocorrelations not significantly different fro[!1 zero. Generally 
emerging markets such as Zimbabwe are considered to be weak form efficient. 
There are some important dimensions of market efficiency other than 
price such as allocative, operational and structural efficiency. Conventionally 
operational efficiency is assessed on the basis on transaction costs and the 
length of the transaction cycle. Theoretically transaction costs reflect the cost of 
intermediation. Therefore the lower the transaction costs and the thinner the 
margins between bid and offer prices the more efficient the market is deemed to 
be. In Zimbabwe brokers do not compete on the basis of commission, as trans-
action costs are collectively determined, in concurrence with government, hence 
do not reflect competitive efficiency of the brokers. In practice there are long 
delays on the transfer of scrip. If one sells shares on the market through a bro-
ker, it takes in practice a standard two weeks to receive payment. Another week 
or two are required to clear the cheque with banks before vcllue can be given. 
Such transactional delays reduce the liquidity and turnover of the market. Tech-
nically, liquidity refers to the duration it takes to consummate' trade without un-
due lo,;s of value. From a liquidity point of view, an investor is better off placing 
money with a bank where access can be unrestricted. Nevertheless plans are 
underway to establish a central scrip depository to speed up transactions. 
Chronic negative real returns in the money market, however, make the 
sock exchange a relatively better medium for investment to enlightened inves-
tors. Table 7 below shows that a lot of Zimbabwean Initial Public Offerings 
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(IPOs) are oversubscribed several times over. Admittedly there are a lot of is~ 
sues on IPOs that are outside the scope of this thesis. 
Table 7 
Selected IPOs on the ZSE 
Year Company Issue Subscription Issue Opening Premium 
(Z$'00D) Times Price Price 2$ 
(cents) (cents) 
1960 Rhodesia Televlsion 15.5 
1967 Rhobank 1 050 4.5 150 164.3 9.5 
1969 Maceys 625 5.4 62.5 75.8 21.3 ' 
More Wear 733 16.0 66.6 120.5 80.9 
Freecor 883 6.7 60 68.8 14.7 
1973 Everglo 920 9.6 80 94,B 18.5 
RAHL 3150 13.3 210 307.5 46.4 
Gulliver 1 470 8.5 70 77 10.0 
1974 Ed gars 1 400 9.9 100 113 13.0 
2001 Trust Bank 358 000 21.6 1500 9600 81.0 
[Source: Table II Hawkins (1976, p123), amendments added] 
In financial theory it is generally accepted that expectations and investor 
preferences affect prices. And so do herd mentality and bounded rationality. A 
lot of speculators buy into IPOs in the belief that the issue is underpriced. It 
seems to me there is an element of herd mentality on the Zimbabwe Stock Ex-
change during listing, hence the very high opening price on the first day of 
trading. However, speculators are reluctant to commit their funds in the long 
term, which results in depressed stock prices in the medium term. Within a few 
years after spectacular debuts on the exchange, a lot of companies listed in Ta-
ble 7 traded below their issue price levels, let alone the opening price levels. Of 
course I agree that past performance is no guarantee to future success. 
Sudweeks (1989, p28) suggests that investor preferences to buy, hold or 
sell shares depend on market efficiency, liquidity and segmentation. With regard 
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to market liquidity, Sudweeks outlines three hypotheses that have been ad-
vanced to explain the sale of securities below the present v;.plue of their "risk 
adjusted discounted future cash flows." The liquidity premium,\ or price pressure 
hypothesis postulates that the price of shares falls when a lar~e block of shares 
is offloaded onto the market. The fall in prices for the durationi1pf the transaction 
is referred to as the liquidity premium. Recovery in prices u$.~ally takes place 
soon after the transaction. ln financial theory share prices haV.e a signalling ef-
fect, which conveys information not available to management of the firrri. 
Therefore the information effect hypothesis stipulates that 1rading in a com-
' 
pany's shares brings new information onto the market. As a result no recovery 
is envisaged after the fall in stock prices on the market. T~e substitution hy-
pothesis, however, presupposes that stocks are perfect substitutes. Therefore 
trading in any volumes of shares should not bring about any change in the 
price. Price movements only come about as a result of new information re-
ceived on the market. According to the modem portfolio theory assets bearing 
the same amount of risk should earn the same return in fully integrated markets. 
In practice capital markets are exposed to different cultures and resource en-
dowment even within the same country. Therefore in segmented capital mar-
kets different rates of return can be realised on assets bearing the same level of 
risk. Although segmented capital markets have the potential to reduce stock 
prices, they also provide an opportunity for diversification. 
From a structural efficiency perspective enforcement of ZSE guidelines 
' has been subject of a lot of criticism ranging from serious allegations of inside 
' dealing and preferential treatment. In the past broking firms were allowed to op-
erate with low asset values and a very small security fund compared to their li-
abilities. However bold reforms are in the pipeline. Listed c9mpanies are ex-
pected to adopt principles of good corporate governance to enforce good ac-
counting standards, disclosure, transparency, accountability, and shareholder 
participation. For instance, proposals are being made to publish the packages 
and salaries of chief executive officers in a move designed to curb self-dealing 
and to promote equity. A Draft Securities Bill ls under consideration. Efforts are 
also underway to harmonise listing laws in the 14-member Southern Africa De-
velopment Community (SADC) in order to facilitate dual listing. 
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Portfolio investment is not the only medium for foreign investment. Not-
withstanding restrictions on foreign investment of the stock market, the Zim-
babwe Investment Centre (ZIC) regulations permit 100% new foreign direct in-
vestment in priority areas such as manufacturing, mining and tourism. Invest-
ment in construction enterprises is limited to 70% external shareholding. For-
eign investment participation in reserved sectors such as agriculture, transport 
and retail is limited to 35% and can only be undertaken through a joint venture 
with a local partner. In all cases investment into existing companies other than 
through the stock exchange is approved by the Exchange Control Department. 
Foreign owned companies can borrow any amount for working capital on the 
local market. Capital projects can only be funded from inward remittances or 
through retained earnings. All companies, whether foreign owned or domestic 
can borrow offshore through a commercial bank. Loans above US$ 5 million re-
quire approval of the External Loans Coordinating Committee (ELCO). 
Government Securities 
In 1925 government put forward the first local stock issue of £1 million 
5% Southern Rhodesia Local Registered Stock 1945-55 at £99 repayable in 
Southern Rhodesia. The regular issue of Treasury Bills, first issued in 1952 ac-
cording to Harvey (1996, p3) was relaunched in September 1957. The exercise 
enabled banks to comply with prescribed liquid asset ratios. 
A consolidated sinking fund was established in 1948 in both London and 
Harare permitting the National Debt Trustees to retire any stock issue at their 
discretion, states Newlyn and Rowan (1954, p149). The objective was to enable 
a gradual redemption of government securities. Trustees regularly furnished 
stockbrokers with a list of indicative prices at which stocks could be redeemed. 
In fact the Trustees laid down the interest rate structure for medium and long-
term securities and there were no other ready cash buyers for government se-
curities. The Standard Bank acted as an agent of the Trustees up to 1959 when 
this function was taken over by the newly established central bank. From 1962, 
price list issued in the name of the Reserve Bank were partly influenced by a 
desire to smoothen prices of government stocks and maturities in the UK. Sow-
elem (1967, p170) highlights that the central bank came with greater financial 
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capacity than the sinking funds to deal with government securities on its own 
account. In early days, Treasury Bills were issued in excess Q;f government re-
quirements to support the emergence of a functional money m~rket. The central 
bank was able to buy excess securities offered until the marketJ needed them. 
11., 
Although the central bank was able to maintain reas?nable liquidity of 
government fixed income securities, it failed to stimulate the il1lerest of ordinary 
" investors apart from large mining companies and insurance:"companies. The 
market for medium and long-term government securities rem,ined weak. How-
ever, authorities were able to have an indirect sourGe of fu'nds from captive 
markets such discount houses, the POSB, pension funds, and other financial 
' 
institutions susceptible to regulatory minimum liquid assets requirements and 
moral suasion. To date there is no well developed secondary market in gov-
ernment securities because interest rates were in the past administered. De-
spite formalised liquidity requirements for holding government paper, there are 
no formalised secondary market arrangements for trading government stocks. 
4.3 The Changing Landscape 
In all progressive countries access to financial services is now consid-
ered a basic necessity. The Zimbabwean financial infrastructure continues to 
evolve over time, spurred on by global integration, technological progress, com-
petition, and commercial viability. Although banks, money and, finance are not a 
' creation of modernity, they continue to evolve with time as :.society becomes 
more informed and articulate in its preferences. Zimbabwe joi~ed the IMF on 29 
September 1980 and has in her own small ways strove to k8ep pace with im-
' 
portant financial developments in the international community. The cause for 
further financial liberalisation and the design of appropriate financial safety nets 
to suit Zimbabwe's circumstances remains very strong at the time of writing. 
In general government has adopted an incremental or gradual approach 
to financial liberalisation in Zimbabwe. In positive light, this approach gives in-
stitutions and individuals enough time to learn. According to the rational expec-
tations proposition, economic agents are likely to commit investments under a 
regime of reforms they expect to be sustained. However, timid reforms render 
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commitment to far reaching changes questionable. The gradual liberalisation 
process can easily loose momentum if the economy is faced with more urgent 
pressures. In any case, if the roots of financial liberalisation are shallow the op-
portunity cost of retrogression is low in the short term (but high in the long term 
considering damage to reputation and trust). Wavering economic polices make 
it difficult to assess the true impact policy decisions. 
A number of market-based reforms introduced in 1993/4 were reversed 
since the economic crisis bE:iginning in 1997. For instance, government some-
times confiscate corporate deposits in foreign currency denominated accounts 
(FCAs) to supplement dwindling official foreign exchange reserves. The IMF 
(2001, p18) estimates that usable foreign reserves were less than U$50 million, 
or one-week import cover at lhe end of 1999. Following the massive one-day 
currency crush by 75% on 14 November 1997 market determined exchange 
rates were purged. From January 1999, the exchange rate was pegged at 2$38 
to the US dollar but was devalued to 2$50 per US dollar on 1 August 2000. The 
rate rapidly depreciated to 2$55 and was pegged there throughout 2001. 
According to the IMF the economic crisis was sparked by low investor 
confidence following unbudgeted payments of War Veterans gratuities in 1997, 
reimposition of price controls, military intervention in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC) in 1998, and uncertainty on the direction of land reform. 
The high cost of borrowing in 2000 was also a burden to government, 
which was increasing dependent on domestic borrowing following the evapora-
tion of international funds. In January 2001, the Reserve Bank cut money mar-
ket interest rates by fiat to below 20% at a time when inflation was hoovering 
around 85%. This policy magnified negative returns on deposits. Some innova-
tive banks were able to increase fee-based income in addition to offering com-
pulsory services such insurance on bank loans and credit cards. It is not clear 
whether such schemes have the capacity to halt systemic and moral hazard 
risks. The ability to transfer risk partially explains the persistence of bank profit-
ability when a!I sectors of the economy are collapsing. The persistence of finan-
cial repression alongside with innovative continuity and globalisation suggests 
Zimbabwe has not yet escaped the tyranny of contradictory development. 
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The years 1999 to 2001 were, however, very important.for financial sys-
tem safety and soundness. Until then, the banking regulatory f1amework in Zim-
babwe was very weak because it had no support of law. Aut~orities have now 
put in place three important pieces of legislation. The Riserve Bank Act 
[Chapter 22:15], details of which have already been discussJQ under the sub-
·' 
section on the Reserve Bank, became effective in August 1 ggg_ The new Act 
I.', 
has strengthened the bank's supervisory role, which was noi.~dequately dealt 
with in the 1956 and 1964 Reserve Bank Acts as amended over the years. In 
brief there still is room to clarify the policy objectives of the c~ntral bank. In fu-
ture, the question of central bank independence might require further elabora-
tion. 
The long awaited Banking Act [Chapter 24:20], whose numerous drafts 
were debated since the early 1990s, became effective on 1 August 2000. Con-
trary to Reserve Bank expectations, the responsibility to lic.ense and cancel 
bank licences is still vested with the Registrar of Banking Institutions under the 
Ministry of Finance. It was hoped the capacity to withdraw licences would be a 
useful tool if it were transferred to the supervisory authority. As Claridge and 
Box (2000, p68) put it, 'the jurisdiction of decision-making should correspond to 
the jurisdiction of effects and costs." In other words, "People who make deci-
sions should be those who receive benefits and bear costs" (Ibid). Earlier on it ·~ 
was noted that the Reserve Bank solely bears the costs incurred in pursuit price 
stability and soundness of the financial system. However, the law, that is, sec-
tion 12 of the Banking Act, makes annual fees payable by all:registered institu-
tions remittable to the Registrar of Banking Institutions. 
This said, the Act provides for the Registrar to consult:Banking Supervi-
sion on licensing matters. Section 5 of the new Act does aw~y with contradic-
tory references to registration of persons as "banks" contained in section 5 of 
the previous Act [Chapter 188]. The Reserve Bank, through the Banking Super-
vision Department, is now empowered to conduct pre-opening inspections on all 
newly licensed institutions. Banking Supervision is required by law, section 45 
of the Bank Act, to "continuously" conduct off-site and on-site examinations on 
all banking institutions to ensure compliance with the Act. The Act also provides 
for the joint issue of banking regulations by the Registrar and the Reserve Bank. 
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Banking Supervision may recommend remedial action to the Registrar. The Re-
serve Bank is responsible for managing institutions in financial distress. 
Financial theory and experience have taught us that despite the best ef-
forts by the authorities to competently license, regulate and supervise banks, 
the potential for financial distress is inevitable. To paraphrase Lewis (1995, 
pxiv) the fragility of banks stems from the truism: Liabilities are liquid: Assets 
are risky. The promulgation of the Troubled and Insolvent Banks Policy of 2001 
clarifies the Reserve Bank's public interpretation of its lender of last resort func-
tion. The central bank reiterates that liquidity support will only be available to 
solvent banks that can demonstrate viability. Weak banks shall be required to 
merge or consolidate with a financially health institution. Insolvent entities will 
be allowed to fail. Existing banking laws and regulations provide for progres-
sively harsher "Corrective Actions" and "Orders" which may culminate in man-
datory closure and liquidation of insolvent or imminently insolvent institutions 
that cannot be recapitalised within stipulated time limits. 
Adoption of a standard framework for managing problem banks promotes 
a fair, transparent, con5istent and firm regulatory response to various degrees 
of financial distress. The policy enables early identification of potential problems 
and prompt responses to correct deficiencies. Corrective Orders will be tailored 
according to the institutions' overall risk profile. A banking institution's overall 
risk profile, as characterised by its performance on the individual components of 
the CAMELS1 standardized rating system, determines its composite rating and 
the degree of supervisory concern. 
It is hoped that the policy will rid Zimbabwe of what Kane and Rice 
(2000, p5) characterise as "zombie banks" which are, "Insolvent banks that en-
joy such an unnatural prolongation of their existence" "after its ownership capital 
has departed" due official indecisiveness. I cannot overemphasise De Juan's 
(1991) very influential paper: Does Bank Insolvency Matter? The paper force-
fully articulates that insolvent banks, whether financially ruined by micro issues 
such as mismanagement, ineffective supervision, political influence or are in a 
positioi1 to fraudulently declare profits and pay taxes for that matter, result in 
I Acronym for Capital Adequacy, Asset Quality, Management, Earnings, Liquidity, and Sensitivity uni-
fonn bank rating system developed in the United States. The system is widely used throughout the world 
by Banking Supervision authorities or agencies. 
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misallocation of resources at a macro level "that will ultimately materialise as 
fiscal deficit." (p1) ,1 
Nowadays effective banking supervision is regarded Js an essential fi-
nancial safety net required to bolster financial stability. For b~~king supervision 
to be effective, there is need for adequate capacity in term~· of competence, 
" 
skills and expertise to analyse financial products and data, m~.llitor early warn-
,, 
ing signs potential problems, and initiate adequate corrective responses to 
problems. Montes (1998) has attributes the 1998 East Asian crises to weak-
nesses in the financial system caused by the "twin liberalisations" of the finan-
cial sector and the current account in less developed countries. According to 
' him bank failures occur within two to five years if liberalisation is not accompa-
nied by development of a sound banking system. Delhaise (1998) concurs that 
the East Asian financial crisis was inevitable due to fundamental weaknesses. 
Capacity building has been a permanent feature in every Banking Super-
vision Annual Report since 1996. However, the department continues to lose 
staff to the regulated institutions at a high rate. Kane (1981) argues that Bank 
Examiners preoccupied by post-regulation career prospects will act in self-
interest to the detriment of effective prudential supervision. In extreme cases 
regulatory capture may occur where discriminatory regulations benefit the politi-
cally powerful institutions and customers. Given the value of its core functions, 
Banking Supervision should strive to reduce staff turnover and retain the best 
skills it can muster. Elsewhere supervision is increasingly becoming a knowl-
' 
edge-based profession in order to keep abreast with constant innovation. 
' 
Financial literature strongly supports a functional apprOach, also known 
as the financial serves view, to financial design. A functional, system does not 
support rigid demarcations between financial institutions. Hence the UK, for ex-
ample, has adopted the super-regulator concept where one regulatory agency 
supervises all the bank and non-bank financial institutions. In Zimbabwe the of-
ficial thinking is still dominated by the institutional approach, which supports 
separation of activities and institution specific legislation. Nevertheless, there is 
need for close cooperation among the various regulators of banks, building so-
cieties, insurance, pension and provident funds, collective investment schemes, 
micro finance and unit trusts. 
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Despite numerous regulatory authorities and over a dozen pieces of leg-
islation loopholes still exist. Until the late 1990s, no law governed unit trusts. In 
the mid 1990s, a lot of people fell victim to pyramid schemes because there was 
no legal recourss until the Collective Investment Schemes Act became opera-
tional in August 1998. The Securities Bill, which will replace the Zimbabwe 
Stock Act, is not yet law. In practice it is impossible to close every regulatory 
loophole because economic units act in enlightened self-interest. Kane (1981, 
1983) developed an insightful framework of cyclical interaction between oppos-
ing political and economic forces known as the "regulatory dialectic." The politi-
cal process of regulation and the economic process of "regulates avoidance" or 
"loophole mining" interact by interminably adapting to each other. 
Derived from the classical presentation of the philosopher Christopher 
Hegel, the word dialectic refers to change occurring through a process of action 
and reaction by opposing forces. A dialectic process comprises of a thesis (ini-
tial set of arguments and rules), the antithesis (conflicting responses) and a 
synthesis (the resultant modification from interaction of opposing forces). Kane 
(1981) stresses that there is an endless struggle between the invisible hand of 
economic power and the visible hand of political power. However the innovative 
lags are shorter than the regulatory lags due to institutional constraints. I agree 
with Kane that some innovations are overlooked unless they threaten a regula-
tory crisis because the political system can forgive excessive delay better than 
ill-conceived hasty action. Regulations that are severe, discriminatory or hard to 
avoid re.suit in the "politicisation of ordinary citizens," Kane (1981, p365) argues. 
Nevertheless, there is need to put in place mechanisms that compel fi-
nancial institutions to offer enforceable service guarantees to their customers. 
The current Banking Act has no provisions to empower customers against un-
fair practices or pricing. For instance, clients have no recourse against institu-
tions that offer compulsory services such as unsolicited insurance. Despite the 
provisions of the Moneylending and Rates of Interest Act [Chapter 14:14] intro-
duced on 1 October 1930, micro-finance institutions reputedly overcharge cli-
ents. Apart from banking supervision, no other comprehensive prudential su-
pervision arrangements exist to guide the activities of other financial institutions. 
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Section 66 of the Banking Act provides for the establishment of the de-
posit protection scheme (DPS), delails of which were still ~nder study by a 
standing committee. It is too early to evaluate the proposed s~heme. In theory, 
the success of a DPS requires support of additional financiariisafety nets such 
as effective supervision, good corporate governance, cont~ct enforcement, 
good accounting standards and practices, adequate disclos'Ure, and clauses ,, 
that ameliorate against moral hazard behaviour on part of b~nks and deposi~ 
tors. Attention must also be drawn to macroeconomic c:onditlons, state of the 
financial system, market discipline and the regulatory environnlient. 
• 
Notwithstanding the regulatory gaps, there are discernible trends toward 
' 
the adoption of innovative delivery channels and products. Automated teller 
machines (ATMs) have been well received and understood by the market. 
However current usage is limited to withdrawal of funds 24 hrs a day. Further 
deployment of this expensive technology has been adversely affected by the 
foreign currency shortage on the Zimbabwean market. ATMs are also widely 
used in conjunction with credit cards. The recently introduced in-store banking 
concept has met with considerable success among the lower end individual 
customers and of course the business corporations hosting the banks. 
Scope for use of Electronic Funds Transfer at Point of Sale (EFTPOS) 
and telephone banking is still hampered by backward telecommunication and 
information technologies. There is hardly any cash withdrawal at Point of Sale in 
Zimbabwe in contrast to Australia. Internet banking across nations is particularly 
constrained by exchange controls, the shortage of foreign cu.rrency, as well as 
affordability of equipment at private homes and small businesses. 
Confidence and trust in the alternative technologies has not yet perme-
ated across the entire fabric of society. A number of alternative service chan-
nels with potential to serve remote rural areas such as credit unions, community 
banks, third party agencies, and giro post have not yet caught the imagination 
of the Zimbabwean market. It seems to me both banks and clients are stm ob-
sessed with the big bank concept. Therefore increased competition among fi-
nancial service providers has increased services for those already well off to the 
detriment of small clients. This phenomenon is evidenced by the readiness of 
banks to put up tenders in order to secure banking business of blue cheap 
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companies. Nevertheless, the regional centres and rural areas may lack the 
economic clout to sustain viable financial services hence the agglomeration of 
seivice providers in major urban centres. 
In my view, authorities should leave no stone unturned to encourage fi-
nancial innovation. In fact Merton (1990, p270) considers financial innovation to 
"the engine driving the financial system on its prospective journey to economic 
efficiency." Even small benefits to individuals aggregate into enormous social 
gains for the economy as a whole. In the same vein the hours lost by Zimbab-
weans queuing for simple financial services aggregate into enormous loss of 
productivity at a national level. Although Van Horne (1985) labours the point 
that some innovations could be mere rent seeking "fads", "balloons", and "bub-
bles", he agrees that true financial innovation makes the markets either more 
efficient or more complete by lowering intermediation costs or inconvenience 
costs, (p622). 
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5. DATA COLLECTION 
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-5.1 Scope of indicators l 
" . ,:, 
[Prestige] in the econometrics profession hinges on technical 1.fpertise rather 
than on hard work required to collect good data. 
K~nnedy(1998,p2) 
' 
This section describes the sources and techniques use'd to construct the J 
time series data and indicators used in this research. Empirical evidence is ) 
based on annual data over the period 1924 to 1998. In fact, this study largely 
creates a new database because existing primary sources of data on Zimbabwe 
are not systematic, consolidated or in electronic format. In practice, financial 
development is measured against indicators of size, activity and efficiency of 
financial institutions and capital markets. This approach was popularised by 
Beck, Demirgu9-Kunt and Levine ('1999). Unfortunately, their database covers 
an inadequate span (1975 to 1996) and a few variables on Zimbabwe. 
There is no unique indicator of financial sophistication, hence the use of 
an array of indicators in the financial literature. Lynch (1993, p5) proposes that a 
full set of financial development indicators should include measures of credit 
intermediation, liquidity management, risk management an(j pricing mecha-
nisms. Lynch's paper identifies five categories of financial development namely: 
quantity measures, structural ratios, financial prices, product range and trans-
action costs. Quantity measures include aggregates of monetisation, credit in-
termediation, and financial assets, whereas structural measures indicate the 
relative importance of the different elements. Beck et al's (1999) choice of size, 
activity and efficiency indicators has a rich intuitive appeal because they clearly 
show the intermediary role of a broad range of financial institutions and the 
capital markets. Fischer et al (1998) use economic and accounting variables. 
Nevertheless, financial prices, product range, and transaction costs are useful 
indicators of the degree of financial sophistication. 
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5.2 Analysis of indicators 
This research, similar to several studies on financial intermediation, 
adopts the Beck, Demirg09-Kunt and Levine (1999) approach. Five different 
groups of financial intermediaries are identified. These are: the Reserve Bank of 
Zimbabwe (RBZ), which is the central bank; deposit money banks (DMB); other 
banking institutions (OBI); non bank financial institutions (NBFI); and develop-
ment financial institutions (DFl). Deposit money banks in Zimbabwe comprise of 
Discount Houses, Commercial Banks, and Merchant Banks, which are also 
known as Accepting Houses. DMB are distinguished by acceptance of deposits 
that are transferable by cheques. OBI refers to Building Societies, Finance 
Houses, and the People's Own Savings Bank (POSS). Insurance companies, 
provident and pension funds constitute the non-bank financial institutions 
(NBFI). Development financial institutions (DFI) are made up of the Agricultural 
Finance Corporation (AFC) and the Zimbabwe Development Bank (ZDB). 
Total assets of the respective intermediary group are used to determine 
the absolute and relative importance of each financial sector. The absolute size 
of each financial sector is obtained by expressing the relative assets to the size 
of the economy as denoted by the GDP, These indicators of ;;1.bsolute size 
measure the importance of financial services provided to the real sector, "in-
cluding government, public enterprises and the private sector" [Beck et al (1999, 
p6)]. The total assets of financial intermediaries (TFA) series is a sum of the as-
sets of the various categories of financial intermediaries. Ideally, the assets of 
each intermediary group are adjusted to reflect domestic intermediation of the 
respective category, and to net out cross claims on the financial sector. This 
practice was not followed in this thesis because, for the period under considera-
tion, operations of Zimbabwean banks were largely domestic partly due to ex-
change control restrictions. Furthermore, Zimbabwean banks were very small 
by international standards and thus could ill afford engagement in cross boarder 
intermediation. While banks such as Standard Chartered Bank and Barclays 
Bank are in fact locally registered branches of foreign owned banks, for all in-
tense and purposes their intermediary role is confined to the Zimbabwean 
arena. Claims on the financial sector have not been netted out due to poor dis-
aggregated time series data before 1975. 
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Beck, DemirgG9-Kunt and Levine (1999, pB) highlight the need for proper 
deflation to correct for timing differences that might affect mec1fiures of absolute 
financial size. Financial balance sheet items are treated a~ stock variables, 
which are measured at the end of the period. On the other h1~d GDP is a flow 
variable, which is defined relative to a period. Beck et al (199~., pB) recommend 
the deflation of financial balance sheet items (FBI) by end 6r year consumer 
"'· 
price index (CPI) while the annual CPI deflates GDP. No reliaple annual CPI is 
available in Zimbabwe for the period under review, thus end of period CPI waS 
used to deflate GDP. As typical in financial literature, all indlctors of size and 
• 
activity based on GDP as the denominator were, however, expressed as ratios 
of average real financial balance sheet items to real GO~. Mathematically 
O.S ( FBI, +FBI,_,) 
CPI, CP/1_1 
GDP, 
CPI, 
Henceforth all ratios refer to real ratios, unless indicated otherwise. 
(19) 
Traditionally, capital markets and financial intermediaries were regarded 
as alternative approaches to financial design. Current research emphasise their 
complementary role. The size or development of the stock exchange is given by 
the ratio of the stock market capitalisation (SMC) to GDP. Total size of the fi-
nancial sector (FS) is represented by the combined contribution of financial in-
stitutions and capital markets relative to GDP. Lynch (1993, p9) correctly notes 
that this indicator raises the spectre of double counting as insUrance companies 
and pension funds hold substantial securities. In this resea(ch, assets of the 
provident and pension funds are excluded from the calculation of the total finan-
cial sector to minimise chances of double counting of cross-financial claims. 
Apart from indicators of financial sophistir:ation based on the asset side 
of the balance sheet, Liquid Liabilities to GDP is considered a useful measure of 
the overall size of financial intermediation or financial depth. Liquid liabilities 
(LQL) of the financial system comprise of currency, demand deposits, and other 
interest-bearing liabilities of banks and non-bank financial intermediaries [Le-
vine, Loayza and Beck (2000, p37)]. Although commonly used, LQL is not ad-
justed for double counting of cross-financial sector claims. Liquid liabilities do 
not capture the cost and informational attributes of intermediation, for instance. 
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Relative measures of the size of financial intermediaries are computed 
as the contribution of a given intermediary category to GDP. Typical ratios cal-
culated are RBZ to TF A, DMB to TF A, etc. The relative importance of deposit 
money banks to the central bank (DMB to RBZ), or DMRB for short is consid-
ered an informative indicator of financial sophistication. The relative contribution 
of the central bank is expected to decrease with an increase in economic so-
phistication. This indicator has no direct linkage with other benefits of interme· 
diation such as exerting corporate governance on enterprises, risk manage· 
ment, reduction in transaction costs, quantity and quality of financial services. 
Nevertheless, financial theory suggests that DMB have better incentives to pro-
vide better monitoring and screening services than the central banks. 
Measures of financial institution activity relate credit issued to the private 
sector by different combinations of financial intermediaries to GDP. Common 
indicators are: Private Credit by Deposit Money Banks to GDP (PCDMB); Pri-
vate Credit by Other Banking Institutions to GDP (PCOBI); Private Credit by 
Total Banking Sector to GDP (PCBK); Private Credit by Non Bank Financial In-
stitutions (PCNBFI); Private Credit by Development Financial Institutions 
(PCDFI). Intuitively, total Private Sector Credit by all financial intenmediaries to 
GDP (PSC) is a superior measure of the full extent of financial intermediation in 
the economy. Indeed, Beck, DemirgGc;-Kunt and Levine (2001, p24) identify 
PSC as their indicator of choice. Other things being equal, high reliance on 
bank credit is associated with improved productivity on investment and eventu· 
ally sustainable economic growth. The indicators discussed in this paragraph 
exclude credit granted to the public sector by financial intermediaries. Credit 
issued by the cental bank is not considered. Although some researchers, for in-
stance Beck, Demirguc;-Kunt and Levine (1999, p7) exclude credits issued to 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs), I have not followed the precedent due to data 
limitations. However, on one hand SOEs comprise a significant share of eco-
nomic activity in small economies such as Zimbabwe and provide essential 
seivices in all mixed economies. One the other hand the transactions are not at 
anms' length and most likely to be politically rather than economically motivated. 
In order to have a meaningful impact on economic activity financial in-
termediaries should provide services in an efficient manner. The Campbell 
Committee's (1981) Final Report discussed three forms of fir,ancial system effi-
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ciency: operational efficiency measures economic use of resources; allocative 
efficiency directs resouri;es to areas of highest return on inveii,tment; while dy-
namic efficiency deals with the system'£ capacity to adapt to c~anges as well as 
generate innovations. In pmc.tice, financial institution effici~pcy is based on 
bank level accounting data for commercial banks. Typical i~c;licators adopted 
include the net interest margin (NIM); overhead costs to total ;~ssets; real inter-
est rates; and the spread between deposit and lending inter~st rates. For the 
stock market, measures of efficiency include stock traded value to GDP, and 
the turnover ratio, i.e. turnover value to market capitalisation. ! 
5.3 Other variables considered 
The principal conditioning variables applied in this research are dis-
cussed at length in Section 7.5. LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny 
. 
(1997) proposed an array of legal and regulatory characteristics that detenmine 
the level of financial development across counties. ln particular the legal origin, 
creditor and shareholder rights, contract enforcement, and accounting stan-
dards have empirically been found to be informative. The intuition behind these 
indicators is that sound institutional arrangements reduce the effects of transac-
tion costs, information asymmetry, agency risk, and moral hazard behaviour. An 
adequate regulatory framework ~meliorates the mobilisation and canalisation of 
financial resources to their most productive use. lnsecur!ty diminishes the ex-
pected value of real and financial assets and undermines inve~tor confidence. 
Whereas the legal and regulatory framework is very useful in cross-
country studies, some of the indicators (e.g. legal origin) cj!re time invariant 
hence less informative in time series analysis based on a single country. This 
said, there is need to use proxies that capture the same attribute in a fashion 
amenable to time series analysis. This research turns to proxies documented in 
Alesina, Ozier, Roubini and Swagel (1996). Reliance was placed on proxies of 
democracy (DMD); change in government (CGV); major change in government 
(MCGV); and armed internal conflict (WAR)23. I extended the span covered by 
these indicators on the basis of available historical knowledge on Zimbabwe. 
The use of indicators itemised in this paragraph is motivated along the same 
lines as the legal determinants discussed in the previous paragraph. 
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This thesis acknowledges that informational and technological advances 
largely determine financial services delivery channels, the range and quality of 
services provided. To this end, I propose an indicator that directly measures the 
degree to which an economy uses informational technologies. A new proxy, 
computed as the logarithm of telephone lines per capita (L TECH) is derived. 
Hypothetically, LTECH is an appropriate indicator for dynamic efficiency in a 
developing economy such as Zimbabwe. Telephone banking, POS debits, 
Internet banking, for instance, depend on sound communication technologies. 
5.4 Sources of data 
The present section describes the basic sources of data gathered as part 
of this research. A full description of the sources is given in Appendix 4. De-
tailed statistical notes are avoided due to space limitations. Econometric evi-
dence is based on transformed annual data in Table 24. Specifically, some 
variables are deflated to reflect real variables. Ratios of real financial balance 
sheet items to real GDP are expressed in natural log transformation and used to 
represent the variables in levels. Where appropriate, logarithms of ratios based 
on real financial balance sheet items have also been taken. Table 23 gives the 
data set in its original format. The electronic version has minimal rounding off. 
5.5 Limitations 
A Government Statistical Bureau was established in April 1928 but no ef-
fort has been taken to consolidate time series data into a user-friendly format. 
Chapman (1992, p52) emphasises, "delayed publication, lack of transparency 
or simple unavailability of information [as] shackling the working of the [Zim-
babwe] financial system ... " Statutory publications by the Central Statistic Office, 
The Registrar of Provident and Pension Funds, The Registrar of Insurance, and 
the Registrar of Banking Institutions are often delayed by a couple of years. 
RBZ Quarterly reviews were sometimes delayed. Although capital markets have 
existed in Zimbabwe for over a century, stock market data in Zimbabwe is very 
fragmented. Non-available and opaque financial statements increase the cost of 
information to firms. This affects capital allocation and economic £:uwth. 
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6. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
6.1 Introduction 
The genesis of scientific inquiry and analysis is usually the observation and in-
terrogation of manifest phenomena 
Weber (1999,p101) 
Vector autoregression [VAR] is a multivariate econometric proc~ss, 
which estimates the temporal fluctuations and dynamic interdependence among 
current and past realisations of variables in a time series vector up to a speci-
fied lag length. According to Schumpeter (1936, p64) economic performance 
depends on preceding development. l<ing and Levine (1993) among others pro-
vide empirical support to this suggestion. Clarke (1986, p6) argues that financial 
structure at a given point in time is an amalgam of past "active and passive in-
teraction" of finance and the real economy. Current development processes 
create "the prerequisites" for subsequent performance. This makes VAR, the 
principal technique applied to this research, very suitable to the task. Christ's 
(1966) properties of a good model encompass "relevance, simplicity, theoretical 
plausibility, explanatory ability, accuracy of coefficients and forecasting ability." 
6.2 VAR Uses and Procedure 
There are four main uses for VAR, namely (1) data description in the unit 
root context; (2) forecasting macroeconomic indicators; (3) policy analysis to 
study or infer on the sources, characteristics and persistence of economic flu:::-
tuations; and (4) testing competing theories (e.g., investigating validity, direction 
of causality, etc). The typical VAR steps are: model fonmulation, tests for sta-
tionarity (unit root tests), tests for cointegration, estimation of parameters, and 
analysis of the dynamic properties. Impulse response analysis, forecast error 
variance decomposition analysis, and forecasting are the usual post estimation 
evaluations in a VAR framework. For the sake of simplicity I present the theo-
retical VAR model before applying it to the Zimbabwean time series data. 
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6.3 The Analytical Framework 
,I 
For as long as we are unable to put our arguments into figure$, the voice of our 
science, although occasionally it may help dispel errors, will ~bver be heard by 
practical men." t. 
" ' 
Schumpeter (1933, p12) in the first issufof Econometrica 
" '" 
Hamilton (2000, p25) defines a time series as "a collJction of observa-
' 
lions indexed by the date of each observation." Reinsel (1997) adds, "multivari-
ate processes arise when several related time series proces~es are observed 
simultaneously over time instead of observing just a single series as is the uni-
variate time series." The trend, if any, depends on unknown parameters. 
Economic modelling assists policy makers and decision-makers to inter-
pret, influence, and forecast the behaviour of variables of interest. Recent time 
series econometric techniques have been applied to analyse the predictive 
power and informational content of financial aggregates with respect to eco-
nomic activity. The avalanche of authoritative seminal papers in various learned 
journals suggests that economic modelling has been fruitful but is far from being 
universally conclusive. 
This study principally turns to the methodologies and models applied in 
Spanos, Andreou, and Syrichas (1997), Rousseau and Wachtel (1998), Lynch 
' (1993, 1994) and Rousseau (1999) with appropriate modifications as and when 
' necessary. Spanos et al (1997) propose a VAR perspective,'in a "Probabilistic 
Reduction Approach" [PRA] to model relationships among macroeconomic 
' 
variables. Spanos (1999, p xi) defines the probabilistic reduction approach as 
the empirical modelling of observational (as opposed to experimental or survey) 
data. As conventional, the VAR framework starts off by formally testing time se-
ries economic data for stationarity and integration properties. Cointegration 
among the variables is examined to identify the long run equilibrium relation-
ships. This study applies the usual post estimation forecast error variance de-
composition [VDC] and generalised impulse response function [GIRF] analyses 
to Investigate the speed and direction of the causal relationship between finan-
cial indicators and economic growth, and the persistence of shocks over time. 
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6.4 The Vector Autoregressive Method 
The vector autoregressive [VAR] model, also known as vector autore-
gressions, is a multivariate econometric process, which estimates the empirical 
relationship among macroeconomic variables of interest. In its purest form, the 
model is concerned with temporal fluctuations and dynamic interdependence in 
a vector of time series variables without theoretical restrictions on the parame-
ters relating to endogeneity or exogeneity. As Amisano and Giannini (1897, p2) 
put it, "each series under study is regressed on a finite number of lags of all the 
series jointly considered." 
Yule (1926) and Granger and Newbold (1974) demonstrated the need to 
pay particular attention to the economic content of regressions. Ferson, Sarkis-
sian and Simin (2000) argue that despite tremendous advances in econometric 
literature and the use of large samples, spurious (counterfeit) regressions bi-
ases are still prevalent in financial economics. The problem is partially resolved 
by the use of lagged variables, which are common in VAR frameworks. 
Pure VAR models however do not shed much light on model specifica-
tion. Koopmans (1947, p164)24 argues that the relevance of variables selected 
for a particular study depend on the underlying theory. According to Koopmans 
"the spirit" of empirical research "gropes" for theoretical guidance (Ibid p163). I 
agree with Koopmans to the extent he argues that "measurement, without the-
ory" offers no policy guidance to the authorities (p167). In my view, the relation-
ship between quantitative research and theory is mutually beneficial in spite of 
the unsettled controversy on the reciprocity of theory-data confrontations. 
In a PRA the variables of interest (chosen data) are initially selected on 
the basis of the underlying theoretical foundation. The empirical properties and 
distributional features of the time series data are also taken into account. This 
gives rise to dynamic linear equations between a vector of variables and their 
past history, (Spanos et al 1997, p3). Enders (1995, p12) concurs that the iden-
tification of"the dynamic path of a series" enhances forecasting accuracy, inter-
pretation of economic data, and hypothesis testing. Spanos (1999, p263) views 
the purpose of time series econometrics as to estimate information out of 
chance regularity exhibited in the data. Technical wizardry is not an end in itself: 
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The ultimate objective of empirical modelling is not just the sum-
mation of the systematic information in the data in the form of par-
simonious parametric model but the use of such model~ to under-
stand economic phenomena (Spanos 1999, p368). I 
However, Spanos does not fully address the treatmentllf possible multi-
11., 
pie cointegrating VARs. Pesaran and Pesaran (1997, p437), P~saran and Smith 
(1999), Garratt, Lee, Pesaran, and Shin (1999) apply "Lo~$ Run Structural 
Modelling" [LRSM] to identify the most appropriate equilibrium. LRSM enables 
the researcher to choose among competing cointegrating vertors on the basis 
of theoretical plausibility. Signs on the parameters of the so-called "Great Ra-
tios", see Mills (1999) for instance, are predicted by theory. Such knowledge 
' 
assists in the selection of appropriate cointegrating vectors. Structural analysis 
accommodates the imposition of homogenous and non-homogenous restric-
tions on parameters. LRSM is therefore a very valuable extension of the Johan-
sen (1988, 1991) Maximum Likelihood cointegration analysis. In this thesis, 
LRSM is applied in cases where there are more than one cointegrating vectors, 
and in instances where there is a need to examine restrictions on statistically 
insignificant parameters. 
6.5 Origins of VAR modelling 
Watson (1994, p2844) and Spanos et al (1997, p3) agree that Christo-
pher Sims introduced VARs to economic analysis in 1980. The building blocks 
' 
were not new. In fact Spanos et al traces the introduction of the VAR concept to 
' time series analysis to earlier work by Razonov (1967) and Hanan (1970). Stock 
(W94, p2744) reveals that White (1958) advocated the use,of the "functional 
central limit theorem" (FCLT) to study "unit root" properties. Diebold (1997,p7) 
traces autoregressions to Slutsky (1927) and Yule (1927), and the concepts of 
"impulse" and "propagation" to Frisch (1933). In addition, Sargent and Sims 
(1977) and Geweke's (1977) dynamic factor model is related to cointegration 
because it is based on the idea that a large number of variables in a multivariate 
system could be driven by a few common trends or shocks. According to Die-
bold (1997, p12) Sargan (1964) introduced the error-correction concept, whose 
formal link with cointegra!ion was provided by Engle and Granger (1987). Us-
age of the VAR models has increased tremendously since the 1980s. Stock 
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(1994) and Watson (1994) provide authoritative surveys of the lite,·ature. They 
single out Philips (1988, 1992), Diebold and Nerlove (1990), Campbell and Per-
ron (1991 ), Banerjee (1992a) as some of the notable early works in the field. 
To appreciate the influence exerted by VAR models on the econometric 
tradition one needs to briefly consider the typical conventions prior to their use. 
Before VAR, the macroeconomic tradition used large structural models for hy-
pothesis testing and forecasting. Enders (1995, p5) defines a structural model 
as one that "expresses [an} endogenous variable as being dependent on the 
current realisation of [other} endogenous variables ... " On the other hand, a re-
duced form equation 
is one expressing the value of a variable in terms of its own lags, 
lags of other endogenous variables, current and past values of 
exogenous variables, and disturbance terms 
Traditionally macro-economic models are associated with the Cowles 
Commission for Research in Economics founded in Chicago in 1932 by Alfred 
Cowles originally to investigate stock market prices (Charemza and Deadman 
1992, p4). In the words of Diebold (1997, p3) the commission symbolised the 
"intellectual marriage of statistics and economic theory." Around the same time 
Frisch and Tinbergen, pioneered macro-econometric modelling in Europe, and 
were later jointly awarded the first Nobel Prize in Economics for their influential 
work (Charemza and Deadman [1992, p10]). According to Diebold (1997, p3) 
great talent assembled at Cowles included names such as Arrow, Debreu, 
Haavelmo, Klein, Koopmans, Markowitz, Modigiliani and Wald. Haavelmo's in-
fluential monograph unified the different approaches in 1944 in order to provide 
a "bridge" between "economic theory and actual measurements ... " The book 
classified the four problems of quantitative research as (a) construction of ten-
tative models, (b) the testing of theories, (c) the problem of estimation, and (d) 
the problem of predictions. It placed emphasis on testing theories on the basis 
of data (p10) rather than measuring parameters without rigorous, probabilistic, 
statistical analysis. According to Haavelmo (1943, 1944) this is important be-
cause researchers use observational data as a proxy for actual data to evaluate 
equations with unknown parameters; therefore "exact" predictions are impossi-
ble. 
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Haavelmo (1944) could have been far ahead of his time. Spanos et al 
(1997, p1) point outthat the econometrics profession ignored ~is work and con-
tinued with exactly ioentified structural models. Darnell and E1ans (1990, p114) 
observe that Tinbergen's (1939) work on business cycles spe~rheaded the con-
struction of large macro-economic models. According to Ch~ff3mza and Dead-
man (1992, p10) Tinbergen built the first multi-equation sfructural model in 
···. 
1936. It had 24 equations and was based on the Dutch eco,nomy. Charernza 
and Deadman document that researchers had a soft spot for enormous model$. 
The 1965 version of the Brookings Model, for example, had 160 equations while 
• 
the Brookings MARK TI model about 200 equations. 
6.6 Dissatisfaction with LSM models 
If I have one chicken to eat and you have none, we have on the average half a 
chicken each, so why are you hungry? 
Kindleberger and Herrick (1977, p10) 
The pedagogic value of the VAR approach is enhanced by its ability to 
circumvent the main limitations of the large structural macroeconomic models 
[LSMM]. Therefore, this subsection briefly highlights developments behind the 
erosion of the credibility of LSMM. Unlike the LSMM, model specifications are 
not implied by theory under the VAR methodology. VAR models are more par-
simonious than LSMM. The unrestricted VAR model is simple 13nd general. 
The Lucas Critique (1976) challenged the time-honoured assumptions 
about endogeneity and exogeneity among variables in LSMM. Sargent ( 1999, 
p15) points out that before the Lucas Critique LSMM were "being refined to en-
hance their fits to historical data and forecasting ability." Lucas argued that in an 
environment of policy intervention, good forecasts did not support the funda-
mental assumption of time invariance. In effect, consistent adjustment to inter-
cepts of important equations disguised the problem of drifting coefficients. The 
intertemporal parameter drift highlighted the instability of macroeconomic rela~ 
tionships. Lucas' critique resulted in the increased use of rotional expectations 
models, which took into account decisions made by economic units. Static neo-
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classical models assume that economic agents have no memory, and under the 
adaptive expectation hypothesis they only learn from the past. The rational ex-
pectations hypothesis incorporates all relevant information available. 
Empirical evidence suggested that sophisticated structural models failed 
ta yield superior forecasting results compared to the Box-Jenkins ARlMA mod~ 
els. VAR models take into account the intertemporal properties of parameters. 
Granger (1969, 1988) and Sims (1972) paid particular attention to the nature 
and direction of causality in multivariate systems. Their techniques aid predic-
tions about causality in VAR models. In Granger causality the cause comes 
before the effect and is not the same as correlation. The effect contains infor-
mation about the cause, and the future cannot cause the past. Granger causal-
ity is also useful for forecasting. LGtkepohl (1991, p55) identifies "potential in-
completeness" as the major limitation of Granger- causality. As in any other 
model, effects of omitted variables and measurement errors are taken as inno-
vations. 
Sims (1980) challenged the LSMM's "incredible identification restrictions" 
and their disregard of temporal dependence and the "problem of feedback." 
Quoting extensively from Tinbergen (1944), Charemza and Deadman (1992, 
pp6-8) document that traditional approaches necessitated the need to know ex-
act relation and exact factors. Parameters (regression coefficients) were con-
sidered to be invariant in time and structurally (movements in variables). The 
"causal ordering", i.e. cause - effect, was known in advance. This implies there 
is prior information regarding the exogenous and endogenous variables. In a 
pure VAR framework. there are no arbitrary lag patterns or normalization equa-
tions. Charemza and Deadman highlight that the unrestricted VAR model, "does 
not specify contemporaneous variables that require further ex-ante predictions." 
Garratt, Lee, Pesaran and Shin (1999) argue that the classic unit root 
studies pioneered by Nelson and Plosser (1982) "resurrected the spectre of 
spurious regression" in financial economics. Presence of unit roots in time se-
ries data raised serious problems on the validity of LSMM in the long run. 
Diebold F. X. (1997) argues that LSMM rose and declined with Keynesian mac-
roeconomic theory because of their strong dependence on theory. 
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VAR models are not the only successors lo the territory left by the de-
clining influence of LSMM. The Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium 
(DSGE) models were developed to incorporate issues raised py the Lucas Cri-
tique (1976). Briefly DSGE models are fully specified, that is, jhey take into ac-
count all information concerning tastes and technology impa~ing on economic 
units as they optimise their decisions.u The DSGE does not.' resolve the ten-
, ... 
dency for LSMM to be extremely large. Diebold (1997, p15).iargues that "the 
'new' theory is neither new nor radical; rather ... neoclassical" in emphasis. Gar~ 
ratt et al (1999, p10) support that conclusion and point out th~t the approach is 
' 
"potentially restrictive", with its proponents biased against the monetary sector 
and in favour af real shocks. Such bias is undesirable for the purpose of my 
thesis that envisages a positive role for financial intermediation. Both Garratt et 
al (1999, p8) and Diebold (1997, p17) concur on the point that VAR models can 
approximate DSGE models. In fact Garratt et al (1999, p7) insist that VAR mod-
els are used "as benchmarks for evaluation of [LSMM] and DSGE models." 
6.7 Basic Concepts of VAR analysis 
(a) Types of VAR models 
There are a number of versions for VAR models such as unrestricted, 
Bayesian, structural, and cointegrated VARs. I find LOtkepohl (1991) a very 
valuable early introductory text on the VAR literature. Unrestricted VARs make 
use of all available information without paying any attention, to theoretical re-
strictions. ln theory all variables are put on the same footing and treated as en-
dogenous. In practice the use of causal procedures such as the Choleski de-
composition adopted by Sims (1980) makes the model sensitive to initial order-
ing of the variables. There might be need to tailback on theory whose "incredi-
ble" restrictions the VAR model was ironically developed to circumvent. Koop, 
Pesaran and Potter (1996) and Pesaran and Shin (1998) developed a General-
ised Impulse Response (GIR) function to generate a general result that is in-
variant to the order of the variables. However economic interpretation of the 
" Keen readers are referred to Diebold {1998), Garratt, Lee, Pesaran and Shin { 1999) and collected work.~ 
by Cooley T F. {Ed) "Frontiers of Business Cycle research", Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
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shocks is difficult and controversial. Bayesian VARs [BVAR] permits the effi· 
cient use of prior information by allowing the researcher to incorporate other 
known facts about the system under consideration. Structural VARs [SVAR] 
have a stronger theoretical foundation. They supplement statistical information 
with theory-based restrictions on long run impulses and the covariance matrix. 
In stnuctural cointegrating VAR models, popularised by Garratt et al (1999) for 
instance, the restrictions on long run relationship, trends and intercepts are 
more explicit. In practice the specific requirements may be difficult to identify. 
(b) Stationarity 
The spectre of spurious regression among trended time series data has 
made stationarity an important issue in multivariate systems. Intuitively, if two 
variables trend upward over time, one could find a significant correlation be-
tween them albeit devoid of any logical economic explanation. A process is sta-
tionary if its innovations are not predictable from past history. Stationarity 
washes out dependence among past observation of the same variable across 
time. In Stock's (1994, p2748) terminology stationarity implies existence of "suf· 
ficiently many moments." It is a well-known mathematical fact that a stochastic 
process is stationary if its first and second moments are time invariant. Strict 
stationarity however implies that the joint probability distribution at any point in 
time does not change. Reference to stationarity in this thesis refers to weak sta-
tionarity, which is concerned with the stability of a series' means, variances and 
covariances. Stationarity is taken seriously in the cointegrating VAR literature as 
it poses serious challenges to theoretical (long run) relations in time series data. 
(c) Assumptions 
Judge et al (1988, p754) indicate that a vector stochastic process is stationary if 
(i) All random vectors have the same mean vectorµ, E(Y,) =µ,for all t. 
(ii) All variables involved have finite variances, Var(Y,), for all t. 
(iii) The covariance matrix, Cov[Y,, Y,,.] = E[(Y, - µ)(Y," - µ)'] = n does 
not depend on time(!) but on the lag length for all t. No trends, sea-
sonal patterns, or time varying variances are permitted. 
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(iv) The characteristic roots lie outside the complex unit root circle. 
The last property, (iv), begs for technical elaboration·~o appreciate its 
meaning. Stationarily of a dynamic system requires all roots o~ its characteristic 
equation to lie outside the complex unit circle. See Appendix~ for details. If all 
I 
the roots are non-zero the matrix is non-singular or invertible. i8y contrast when 
" 
we are considering the eigenvalues, (and the autoregressiv~·.·.polynomial) sta-
tionarity is attained if all eigenvalues have a modulus less th~h one. As Lutke-
pohl (1991, p456) put it, stationarity implies all eigenvalues have modulus less 
than 1, and the polynomial det(I -M) has no roots in and oJ the complex unit 
circle. If all the eigenvalues of the coefficient matrix M have modulus less than 1 
' the VAR(p) process is stable. The stationarity property is important to the in-
vertibility of autoregressive processes. In general references to unit roots in the 
time series literature is confined to autoregressive unit roots discussed below. 
( d) Innovation processes and unit roots 
"': 
'; 
·t 
i 
' Most researchers, for instance Maddala and Kim (1998, p3), acknowl- ,; 
edge that the unit root literature has revolutionalized the conduct of time series 
analysis. The new approaches criticise the traditional methods for washing 
away important information contained in common trends by detrending and dif-
ferencing the data. Traditional methods are further accuse::d of concentrating on 
"short run dynamics" at the expense of theoretical relations only valid in the long 
run. Presence of nonstationarity could invalidate suppose~ common trends 
among variables and by implication results in spurious regresSion. Spanos et al 
' (1997, p35) argues, "the time invariance of the statistical parameters of a VAR 
model are an essential prerequisite for reliable statistical in,ference ... " Orcutt 
(1948), cited in Stock (1948, p2740) found first order serial correlations in USA 
annual time series data and prompted other researchers to use first differences. 
By current conventions, differencing is no longer acceptable because we have 
noted that it removes important information from the series. Testing for unit 
roots is an important preliminary step in time series analysis because Nelson 
and Plosser's (1982) oft cited formal tests for unit roots in a Dickey and Fuller 
methodology has provided a solid foundation to unit root analysis. 
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The unit root test has become one of the most popular tests for station-
arity. Formal unit root tests help shed light on whether shocks on economic 
variables have permanent or transitory effects which information is useful for 
policy design and economic analysis. The unit root phenomenon is easier to in-
troduce in a univariate autoregressive process. An autoregressive process in-
cludes lags of the endogenous variables as explanatory variables. Supposing 
Y, is a time series process; a typical autoregressive model, AR(I), with order or 
lag 1 for simplicity, is mathematically given by: 
(1) 
Where Yi is a univariate time series denoted by a sum of a constant 
mean, µ; and the weighted sum of its own past up to a specified lag in the 
model; and the history of the innovation process ;, with zero mean and con-
stant variance. More compactly equation 1 is expressed as 
(2) 
Where y, is defined as Y-µ. The size of the autoregressive parameter 
p detenmines properties of the series. If the parameter is less than 1, the proc-
ess is stationary in levels or mean reverting and is said to have a general order 
of integration of zero, I (0), for short. A series has an autoregressive unit root if 
the autoregressive parameter is equal to 1. Such a process is nonstationary and 
its order of integration is one I (1 ). The order of integration refers to the number 
of times a series has to be differenced to render it stationary. Processes whose 
order of integration is 1 or greater are nonstationary. In presence of unit roots 
the time series has a long memory because innovations or shocks produce 
permanent effects on the process. 
(e) Testing for unit roots 
Tl1e standard procedure for formally testing time series economic data in 
a VAR framework starts off by testing for stationarity and integration properties 
of the series. Hence the properties of the individual series will be assessed. As 
noted before the formal identification of the correct order of integration of each 
economic variable in a model is a plausible starting point for VAR and cointe-
gration analysis. The practice takes care of possible spurious regression that 
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might arise from modelling variables at different degrees of tntegration. Most 
formal unit root tests propose nonstationarity, that is, they ~ypothesise exis-
tence of a unit root, as the null hypothesis. Considering equa;tion 2 the null hy-
pothesis of a unit root is tested i.e. H 0 : p = 1 against the altej~ative hypothesis 
of a stationary rootH,: Ip I< 1. Rejection of the unit root hypd\hesis implies the 
" 
series is stationary. Dickey and Fuller (1979) demonstratecl'.that asymptotic 
" normality could not be assumed on a series with unit roots beta.use it is nonsta,-
tionary. Verbeek (2000, p238) notes that under a nonstationa
1
ry null hypothesis 
the distribution of critical values is skewed to the right. Therefore conventional t-
ratios cannot be used as they lead to over rejection of the unit root hypothesis. 
Estimate 6..y1 = a0 +JY,_1 +a1t+ "f.J3/1y1_1 +;1 
Is r =0? No STOP: Conclude 
no unit root. 
Yes: Test for the presence No 
of the trend. 
Is r =Dusing 
ls a1 =0 No Yes Conclude ( y, ) has . normal distri- . 
- -given bution? a unit root. 
r=O? -
Yes 
Estimate No ,I STOP: Conclude 
.6.yr =ao +r.Y,-1 + LP/!1Y1-1 +i;, 
:I 
no unit root. 
ts r = O? 
Yes: Test for the presence No • 
of the drift. ' 
Is a0 =0 No 
Is r=Ousing 
Yes Conclude ( y, ) has given normal distri-
r =O? bution? a unit root. 
Yes 
Estimate No Conclude 
11y, =JY,-1 + L,P/J..Yr-1 +<;, r,o unit root. 
Is r =0? Yes 
-
Conclude ( y,) has a 
unit root. 
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Figure 6 A Procedure to test for unit roots. 
l 
~ 
' 
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By cor:vHntion and for analytical convenience the literature, .as exempli- ~ 
fled by Verbeek (2000, p238), expresses equation 2 in first difference form, Ji 
t.y, =(P-l)y,_, +4, (3) 
The noticeable effect of this linear transformation is to change the null 
hypothesis being tested to H 0 : r= 0, where r= (P-1), The AR(l)model in 
equation 3 can be exM·nded to include an intercept ( a0 ), a deterministic trend 
(a1t) and higher order autoregressive components (L,,B1l!..y1_1 } as given on ·top 
of Figure 6 above. In Figure 6 above, the determination of unit roots is shown to 
be sensitive to the presence of intercepts and trends. If the first order autore-
gressive parameter y is not zero (0) the process is deemed stationary, that is 
~] 
there is no unit root. However, as illustrated in diagram 6 existence of a unit root i 
requires further investigation because it may be attributed to other factors such 
as the deterministic trend. 
Verbeek (2000, p239) notes "the null hypothesis of a unit root also im-
plies that the intercept term [a0 in our case] should be zero." Therefore a joint 
null hypothesis can be formulated as H O: a0 = 0, r = 0. However, Spanos et al 
(1997, p38) dispute the validity of "a joint parametric test" of p = 1 and a,t = O 
because such a model does not permit the discrimination of the difference staR 
tionary from the trend stationary characteristics. 
6.8 Preliminary data analysis 
Most data analysis in this thesis is based on the Microfit econometric 
package developed by Pesaran and Pesaran (1997), The unit root tests per-
formed are based on th,, Dickey-Fuller (DF) and the Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
(ADF) tests, i,e, equations 4 and 5 below. The equations are preset in Microfit 
' 
~Y1 =aa +alt+ PY1Rl + Lri'~·YH +,;, 
,~1 
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(4) 
(5) 
Where D.y1 = y, - y,_11 a and pare parameters which pr,lj>vide for a mean, 
trend and drift, while p is the unknown root or lag length of th4 series. 
The appropriate lag length ( p) is not known in advanJe
1
/ and there is no 
I• 
guidance from economic theory. Fortunately Microfit automatically provides al-
1·., 
temative model selection criteria, based on Akaike Information Criteria (AJC); 
'" 
Schwartz Bayesian Criterion (SBC); and Hannan-Quinn Criteria, to assist in the 
assessment of the correct order of integration of each varia~le. Following Pe-
' saran and Pesaran (1997, p212), "The model with the highest value for the in-
formation criteria is selected." In case of conflict the order of integration with the 
most common results is selected. In tests where no common result emerged I 
followed the SBC. Pesaran and Smith (1999, p75) follow a similar rule. 
Table 8 illustrates the application of this procedure. In .Panel A the ADF 
regressions include an intercept but not a trend. In Panel B the equations incor-
porate both an intercept and a linear trend. Annual data, Gxpressed in logs of 
ratios of Liquid Liabilities (LQL) to GDP for the period 1924 to 1998 is used. Full 
data descriptions are given in Section 7. However, in Table 8, 1 have chosen a 
Jag of 5, therefore the data before 1930 is treated as a presample period. 
Table8 
Unit root tests for variable liquid liabililies (LQL 
Panel A: The Dickey-Fuller regressions include an intercept but norl a trend 
69 observations used in the estimation of all ADF regressions. 
Sample period from 1930 to 1998 
Test Statistic LL A<C sac 
"' 
-2.5110 60.9776 58.9776 56.7434 
ADF(l) ·2. 6330 61. 5566 56.5566 55,2054 
ADF(2) ·2, 7376 61.97S9 57. 9769 53,5007 
ADF(3) -2. 0228 62.2730 57 ,2730 51.6878 
ADF(4) -2. 5340 62.4641 56.4641 49.7618 
ADF(5) -2.5179 62.4948 55.4948 47, 6754 
<HOC 
!:iB,0912 
57,2271 
56,2043 
55.0572 
53.8051 
52.3926 
951 critical value for the augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic= -2.9035 
LL = Maximized log-likelihood AIC = Ak~ike Information Criterion 
SBC= Schwarz Bayesian Criterion ffQC = Hannan-Quinn Criterion 
I (OJ 
Panel B: The Dickey-Fuller regressions include an intercept and a linear trend 
69 observations used in the estimation of all ADF regressions. 
Sample period from 1930 to 1998 
Test Statistic LL 
DF -2.8073 62.6634 
ADF(l) -2.8798 63.0410 
A,C 
59 ,6634 
59 .0410 
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SBC 
56.3123 
54.5?28 
SQC 
58.3339 I(O) 
57.2683 
' 
ADF(2) 
ADF(3) 
ADF(4) 
ADF(S) 
-2.9300 
-2,9741 
-2.6450 
-2.6252 
63.2733 
63.4609 
63.8059 
63 .8350 
SB .2733 
57 .4609 
56.8059 
55.8350 
52. 6081 
50. 7586 
48.9865 
46.8986 
56.0575 
54. 8019 
53. 7036 
52.2897 
95\ critical value for the augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic = -3.4749 
LL ~ Maximized log-likelihood AIC = J\kaike Information Criterion 
SBC = Schwarz Bayesian Criterion HQC ~ Hannan-Quinn Criterion 
In both panels the model selection criteria suggests p =O, that is the or-
der of integration for variable LQL is I (0). The absolute values of the respective 
ADF test statistics, that is 2.5110 in Panel A and 2.8073 in Panel B, are below 
their 95 % critical values given at the bottom of the panels. Therefore, from a 
statistical point of view, the hypothesis that variable LQL has a unit root cannot 
be rejected. Notwithstanding this I follow the counsel from the model selection 
criteria and treat LQL as a I (0) variable. 
Theoretically both the VAR and ADF models demand a careful selection 
of the order of integration. Therefore I pertormed rigorous tests for unit roots for 
each variable over three (3) to seven (7) lags consecutively. However, the 
larger the lag (p) for the same sample sizes the lower the power of the tests. 
The well-known size-power trade off makes the selection of an appropriate lag 
crucial. Tables 9 and 10 below provide a summary of the results of the unit root 
tests for various financial and economic aggregates investigated in this study. 
The procedure outlined in Table 8 was followed to determine the lag length. 
It must be appreciated that there is no universally agreed framework for 
determining the appropriate lag length. Spanos et al (1997, p41) argue that ADF 
tests are preoccupied with autocorrelation at the expense of "other tests such 
as Normality, linearity, homoskedasticity, and parameter stability." Structural 
breaks are not taken into account. Other researchers go around this problem by 
using a "panel" of tests. The various unit root tests often produce mixed results. 
In the literature ADF tests are frequently used in collaboration with the Philips-
Perron (PP) tests. I have not followed this convention because Mc Aleer and 
Oxley (1998, p928) suggest that the PP test in Microfit "are incorrect, [and] 
should not be considered as a Philips-Perron-type test. No critical values are 
provided for this Philips-Perr0n-type test, which differs from the original Philips-
Perron test. .. " Thus, in my view, conventions should not be followed blindly. 
Computational errors creep oven into respected journals. Lovell and 
Selover (1994, pp 7134) draw our attention to a study by Dewald, Thursby and 
168 
,,:;; 
.. 
; 
• 
• 
·;; 
Anderson (1986) who demonstrated many results published in the Journal of 
Money, Credit and Bankinr could not be replicated. Dewal<11et al found "that 
only 15% of 154 authors" are able to furnish their original da\a sets. And "nine 
out of eleven articles contained non~reproducible results." i 
I,• 
" 1·.· . 
. 
" 
... 
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Table 9 
Unit root tests for various financial aggregates 
Variable Lag Series Ska Rbm Dmba obia Dmrt, CIC" TFA LQL RBZ DMB OBI NBFI DFI PCDMB PCOBI PCBK PCNBFI PCDFJ 
,, 
dll ra!los lag3 lnl no trend I (1) I (0) I (1) I (2) I {O) 1(0) I (0) I (0) I (0) I (1) I (2) 1 {2)" I {3) I (1)* I (2) I (1) I (1) 1 {3)" 
lnl & trend I (1) 1{0) 1 {1) J (2) I {O) I (0) I {2)" I (0) I (0) I (1) I (2) I {2)" J (3) I {1)" [ (2) I (1) I (1)" I (3)" 
lag 4 lnl no trend I (1) I (0) I (1) I (2) I (0) I (0) I (0) I (0) I (0) I (1) I (2) I (2)" 1(2)" I (1)" I (2) l (1) l (1} 1(3)" 
lnl & trend I (1) I (0) I (1) I (2) I (O) I (OJ I (2)" I (0) I {O) I (1) I (2) I (2)" I (2)" I (1)" 1(2) I {1) I (1 )" I (3)" 
lag 5 lnL no trend l (1) I (0) I {1} I (2) I (OJ r (OJ I (0) I (0) I {O) 1{1) I (1) I (2)" l (2) l (1)" I (2) I {1) I (1) I {3)" 
lnL & trend I (1) I {O) I (1) 1(2) 1(0) I (0) I (O)" I (0) I (0) 1 (1) I (5) I (2)" I (1)" I (1)" I (2) I {1) I (1)" I (3)" 
lag6 lnL no trend I {1) I (0) I (1) I {2)" I (0) 1(0) [ (0) I (0) I (0) I (1) I (1)" I (6) I (6) I (1)" I (2) I {1) I (1) I {3)" 
lnL & trend 1 (1) 1 {O) 1 (1) 1 (2) 1 (0) I {O) I (0) l (0) I (0) I (1) I (1) I (6) I {6) I (1) I (2) I (1) I (1)" I (3)" 
lag 7 lnL no trend I (1) I (0) I (1) I (2)" I (0) I (0) I (0) I (0) I (0) I (1) I (2) 1 {O) 1 (2)" 1 {1)" I (2) I (O) I (0) I (3)" 
JnL & trend I (1) I (O) I (1) I (2) I (0) I (0) 1 (0) I {O) I (0) I (1) I (2) I (0) I (1)" I (1) · I (2) l (0) I (0) I (3)" 
log ratios lag 3 lnl no trend I (1) I (0) I (1} I (2} I (0) t (O)" I (OJ I (0) I (0) I {1) I (1)# I (2)" I (2)" ! {0)# I (1) I {O) 1 (1) I {3)" 
lnl & trend I (1) I (O) I (1) 1(2) I (O) I (3} I (O) I (0) I (O) I (1) 1 {1) I {2)" I (O) I (O) I (1) 1 (0) I (1)• 1 (3)" 
lag 4 lnL no trend I (1) I (0) J (1) J {2) I (0) I (O)" I (O) r (OJ I (0) I (1) I (1) I {2)" I (0) I (0) I (2) I (0) I (1) I (3)" 
lnL & trend 1 {1) 1 (0) I (1) 1 {2) 1 {O) I {O)" I {2) l (0) I (OJ I (1) I (1) 1 {2)" 1 (0) I {O} I (1) I (0) I (1)" I (3)" 
lag5 lnL no trend I (1) I (OJ I (1) I (2) I (0) I (O)" I (0) I {O) 1(0) I (1) I (1)" I (2)" I (3) I (0) I {1) I {O)" I (1) I {2) 
Jnl & trend I (1) r (O) I (1) I (2) r (OJ I (O)" I (2) I (0) I {O) I {1) I (1) I (2)" I (0) I (0) 1(1) I (0) I {1)" I {4)" 
lag6 lnL no trend I (1) I (0) I (1) I (2)" [ (0) I (O)" I (OJ I (0) I (0) I {1) I (1)" I (2} [ (6)" I (O) I (1) I (0) I (1) 1 (3) 
lnL & trend I (1) I (0) I (1) I (2) I (0) I (O)" I (2) I (0) I (0) I (1) 1 (1) I (2) I (6)' I (O} I (1} 1 (0) I (1) I (6) 
lag 7 lnL no trend l {1) I {O) I (1) I (2)" I (OJ I (2) 1 (0) 1{0} I (0) I (0) I (1) I (0) I (2)" 1 {O) I (1} l (O) I (1) l (2) 
Int & trend I (1) I (OJ I (1) I (2) I (O) I (O)" I (0) I (0) 1 (0) 1(0) [ (1) I (0) I (OJ I (0) 1 (1) I {O) 1 (1) I {2) 
Notes 
Original data was transfonned into fully deflated ratios and log ratios. J (p) denote the order of integration. Tests for unit roots for each variable were performed over three (3) to seven (7) lags consecutively because VAR 
and cointegralion depend on the seleclion of an appropriate lag. !n tests where the information criteria gave conflicting results I c.'Jose the most commo.n result was selected. In cases where no common result emerged 1 
followed the SBC. The order of integration, I (p), may change with the lag length. Higher lag orders reduce the power of the tests as well as the useful sample size. The asterisks" denote rejection at 5 % critical value. 
1"/0 
Table 10 
Unit root tests for various economic aggregates 
Variable Lag Series PCNBFI PCDFI G OPEN GYN GY PCY GPCY LGY LPCY LGPCY RPI RVI CAB FSB 
' dft ra~os Lag 3 lnL no trend J {1) I (3)" I (2)" I (1) I (1)" I (O)" I (0) I (O)" I (3) I (0) I (O)' I (0) I (3) I (O) I (O)" 
Int. & trend I (1)" I (3)" I (2) I {1)" I (1}" l (3)" I (0) I {O)" I (3) I {O) I (O}' I (0) I (3) J {O) I (O)" 
Lag 4 Int. no trend 1 {1) I (3)" 1(2)" 1 (1) I (1)" I {O)" I (0) 1 {0)" l (O}" I {O) I (O)" I (OJ J (3) I (0) I (O)" 
lnl & trend I (1)" I (3)" I (2) I (1)" I (1)" I (O)" I (3) 1(3)" I (3)" I (O) I (O)" I (0) I (3) I (0) 1 (O)" 
Lag 5 Int. no trend J {1) I (3)" 1(2)" r c1J J {1)" I {O)* r co) I (O)" I (3)" r (OJ I {O)" 1(0) I (3) I (0) I (O)' 
Int. & trend I (1)" I \3)" I (2) I (1)* I (1)" I {0)* 1(3)" I (O)" I (3)" I (0) I {0)* l (0) I (3) I (0) 1(0)" 
Lag 6 Int. no lrend l (1) 1 (3)" I (2)" I (1) I (1)" I (O)" 1(0) I {O)' l (3)" I (0) I (OJ" I (0) I (3) l (0) I (O)" 
Int. & !rend r (1t I (3)" I (2) I (1)" I (1)" 1(3)" I (0) 1(0)" 1(3)" I (0) 1(0)" I (Di I (3) I (0) I (O)* 
L.ao7 Int. no !rend L (0) I (3)" I (2)" I (1) l (1)" l(O) I (1) I (0)* I (0) I (O)" I (0)0 1 {O) I {3) I (0) I (O)" 
lnl & trend I (0) l (3)" I (2)" I {1)" I (1)" I (O) I (3) I (O)* l (0) 1 {O)* I (O)* ·[ (OJ 1 (3) I (0) I (O)* 
log ratios Lag 3 lnl no trend I (1) I (3)* I (1)* I (0) I (1)* I (O)' I (OJ I (O)* I (3) I (0) I (O)" I (O) I (3) I (0) I (O)" 
Int. & trend I (1)" I (3)* t (O)" t (0) 1 {1)" I (3)* I (0) I (O)" 1(3) I (0) I (OJ* I (0) l (3) I (0) I (O)" 
Lag 4 Int. no trend I (1) J (3)* I (O)" 1(0) I (1)* I (O)* I (0) l (0)" I {0)" [ (0) I (O)* I (0) I (3) I (0) I (OJ" 
Int. & trend I (1)" 1(3)" I (O)* I (0) I (1)* 1(0)" I (3) I (3)" I (3)" I {OJ I (O)" I {O) I (3) I (0) I (O)" 
Lag 5 In!. no trend t (1) I (2J I (O)" 1(0) I (1)" I (O)" I (0) I (OJ" I (3)" 1(0) I (O)" 1 (OJ I (3) I (O) I (O)* 
Int. & trend I (1)' 1(4)* I (O)" I {O) I {1)" l(O)" 1 (3)" I (O)' I (3)" I (O) l(O)" I (OJ 1 (3J 1 (0) I (O)" 
Lag 6 lot.no trend I (1) I (3) J {0)" I (O) I {1)" I (O)" I (0) I (O)" r (3J" I {OJ I (O)* I (O) I (3) I (0) I (O)" 
Int. & trend I (1) I (6) I {O)" I {O) I {1)" 1(3)" I {O) J {O)" I (3)" I {O) I (OJ" I (OJ I (3) I {OJ I {O)" 
lag7 lr.t. no trend I (1) _ l (2) ... 1(0):. _l.(Q) I (1)" I (0) I (1) 1(0)" I (0) I_ {O)* 1(0)' __ I (O) _ _1(3) • .:.!{.Ol .... - _!.{OJ"_ _ 
lot.& trend I {1) [ (2) I (O)" I {OJ I (1)' 1(0) I (3) I {O)" I (0) I {O)" 1(0)" r (OJ I (3) -r(oi'. - r(o)" -
Notes 
Original data was transformed into ful!y deflated ratios and log ratios. I (p) denote theorderofintegraUon. Tests for unit roots for each variable were performed over three (3) to seven (7) lags consecuUvely because VAR 
and cointegralion depend on the selection of an appropriate lag. Where values of the information criteria gaveconfiicting resu!ts I chose the most common result was selected. ln rare cases where no common result 
emerged 1 followed the SBC. Pesaran and Smith (1999, p75) follow a simllar rule. The order of integration, 1 (p), may change with the lag length. Higher lag orders reduce the power of the tests as well as the useful 
sample size. The asterisks• denote rejection al 5 % critical value. 
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6.9 Model Specification 
For pedagogical completeness, it must be noted that model specification 
must pay particular attention to the attendant properties of the individual time 
series under consideration. Specification refers to the choice of a valid model. 
Spanos (1997) demonstrated that researchers have an option to specify the 
VAR model using a statistical approach or a systems approach. The methods 
are complementary rather than mutually exclusive. 
(a) The Statistical Model 
According to Spanos (1997, p14) a statistical framework requires the re-
searcher to spell out the assumed joint distribution properties of the multivariate 
process. The statistical method makes use of "graphical representations and 
descriptive statistics" to condense the properties of the data generating process. 
Assumptions help to simplify modelling and statistical inference. As in 
any statistical model, assumptions impose restrictions on the properties of vari-
ables in order to exorcise (or at least tame) the curses of dimensionality and 
over parameterisation. In fact, Mills ( 1993 p1 ?8) argues that the non-zero co-
variances in VARs allow temporal dependence among the time series observa-
tions thereby increasing unknown parameters with time. Restrictive techniques 
are imposed to limit the lag length and effects of over parameterisation. Pa-
rameter variances are sometimes assumed to decrease with the increase in lag 
length. The statistical concept of conditioning arrests the problems of dimen-
sionality (i.e. many unknown parameters) while the assumption of asymptotic 
independence enables generalisation of the statistical properties of data sets. 
Spanos (1999, p13) emphasises that model specification has to address 
three important assumptions pertaining to (a) distribution (b) temporal depend-
ence and (c) time heterogeneity. These assumptions "formalises the chance 
regularity" of a stochastic data generating process. In a Probabilistic Reduction 
Approach [PRAJ the statistical VAR model assumes that the distribution is nor-
mal, temporal dependence a Markov (p) process, and the degree of time het-
erogeneity to be given by second order stationarity. 
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Spanos et al (1997, p17) define the Statistical Generati~g Mechanism of 
a statistical VAR model as follows: 
,I 
I (6) 
1: 
11, 
" . i',,. 
. 
/I 
" 
' Z, = 8 0 + LB1Z1-1 +~, 
l=I 
The full model and its assumptions are documented in Spanos (1999) 
and Spanos et al (1997, pp 17-18). Their work suggests thal estimated coeffi-
cients are difficult to interpret since VAR is a statistical model whose parame-
ters represent "partial correlations." In their view, reliance shOuld be placed on 
statistical procedures such as Granger causality tests, impulse response analy-
sis (\RF], and variance decomposition analysis [VDC] for policy evaluation (Ibid 
p 24). I agree that VAR coefficients oscillate with successive .lags and are sen-
sitive to data sets. However, Granger causality, IRF and VDC are equally sensi-
tive to available information. In my view, the techniques buttress one another. 
Graphs provide a useful medium to express relationship among vari-
ables, and a visual expression of ideas. Spanos (1999, p14) suggests graphical 
analysis is indispensable in empirical modelling. He traces emphasis on graphi-
cal techniques to Turkey (1962), RA Fisher (1926) and Pearson (1892). 
As early as 1891, Keynes (p321-2) wrote: 
In the use of statisti,.;s, considerable assistance may often be de-
rived from the er.,ployment of diagrams. The graphical method is 
not only useful for ... enabling the mind more accurately to realise 
numerical ccmparisons; but it has also a genuine scientific value." 
Granger (1990), cited in Spanos et al (1997, p14) concurs, "The plotting 
of series, both individually and jointly, is an essential step in the modelling proc-
ess that it is too frequently missed by experienced researches." DemirgUq-Kunt, 
and Levine (1999) largely use graphs and correlations to demonstrate the styl-
ised facts relating to economic and financial development. In VAR literature, re-
sults of the \RF and VDC analytical techniques are usually presented in graphi-
cal format to map the causal links and the persistence of shocks over time. 
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The unrestricted VAR model may be used to test Granger causality. For 
economic purposes, causality is tantamount to prediction. Thus, X Granger 
causes Y (X -> Y) if past values of X provide better prediction of Y, other infor-
mation being equal. Adapting Charemza and Deadman's (1992, p192) bivariate 
model given in Equation 7, if B 1 =B 2 =···B1 =0, x does not Grangercausey. 
I • 
Yr= ao + LajYt-J + LB }xi-} +i;( (7) 
J=I i=l 
The basic insights are that a cause cannot come after the effect; and the 
future cannot "cause" ttie present. In addition Charemza and Deadman (1992, 
p189) observe that therP, is no simultaneous causation. Furthermore instanta-
neous causation does not exist due to the lags between independent actions. 
Granger causality tests are sometimes used to eliminate variables whose 
coefficients are not statistically significant. Darnell and Evans (1992, p127), cite 
several sources arguing that Granger non-causality is not a sufficient condition 
for exogeneity. Maddala and Kim (1998, p189) endorse Pagan's (1989) conclu-
sion that Granger causality "probably generated more nonsense results" than 
any econometric turning in the last two decades. Therefore, no Granger causal-
ity tests are performed in this thesis, since they are very sensitive to the infor-
mation set available and causal ordering regardless of strucl ·al relationships. 
(b) The Dynamic VAR Model 
Dynamic models take into account time lags to show the interdepend-
ence between current values of the regressand and past values of explanatory 
variables, including the predictand's own past values. The dynamic linear equa-
tion is divided into systematic and non-systematic components. It is regarded as 
the typical VAR representation. Dynamic VAR processes can be presented in a 
number of notations. Typical notations are the VAR(p) representation, where p 
denotes the lag length of a VAR process, and the polynomial lag operator (BL) 
format. A lag operator represents a number of algebraic manipulations that re-
place a current realisation by previous observations in the time series. It facili-
tates the generation of a weighted moving average of a given time series. 
Whatever notation one prefers the end result is the same. The lag operator is 
mentioned here for completeness and will not be discussed. 
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Given T observations, a simple unrestricted VAR mopel of order (p), 
VAR(p) for short, in a transposed matrix notation is formulated ,i"s follows:-
Z, = Bo +B1Z1-l +B2Z1-2 +···+ B pzl-p + ,;, I t E TJ, \- NJID(O,Q) (8) 
Ii 
Any VAR(p) process can be represented in a compact VAR(1) format !\, 
I e T,I;, - NIID(O,n) .. Z1 = B0 + B'Z,_1 + ,;, , 
..... 
(9) 
,, 
In this system of equations: "' 
Z, =(zi,z2 .···,zm1) 1 is an (n x 1) stochastic vector of cu,rent observations 
for each of the variables in the model. 
BQ =µ=(µ1,µ2 ... ,µm)'is an (n x 1) vector of constant ('or fixed) vector of 
intercepts to accommodate none zero means. 
are ,mm or ( m2 ) matrices of constant 
coefficients, /31 to /3 p whose ele-
ments are regarded as the theoretical 
parameters. 
i;, is an ( nxl) vector of normal, independent, and identically distributed 
(NIID) error terms, that is, I;, =(e,,e,, .. ·,e..,) with zero mean, E(I;,) = 0, 
and a non-singular, i.e. det(Q)"F-0, covariance matrix, E(e,,e;)=O, for all 
t (Vt). {,is the innovation process typically referred to as white noisev. 
In matrix notation the following vectors can be defined: 
z, B, B, B, Bp-1 B, ZH 
I 0 0 0 
e, 
z, 0 Zi-2 
, I;, := 
0 
z ·- 'Bo:= 'B:= 0 0 0 , 21-1 := , .
z, 0 zl-p 0 0 0 0 
Where z,_; denotes variables of Z1 vector lagged i periods. 
• Davidson and MacKlnnon (1993, p59) advise that the terminology comes from engineering literature. While light is 
known lo contain "equal amounts of light of all frequencies." Similarty, "white noise errors contain equal amounts of 
randomness of all frequencies." The authors make a strict distinction between residuals. whose properties depend on 
the da!a-fitting model (linear or non-linear) irrespective of the data generating process: and eiror tenns that are the un-
observable amounts (say omilled ~ariables and measurement errors) esUmable under assumptions for computational 
convenience. Violation of the assumptions necessitates transformation of the model to make errors N!ID. 
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As noted before, econometricians e.g. Spanos et al (1997, p13) divide 
the VAR model into systematic and non-systematic components. The system-
atic component determines intertemporal dependence, E( z, I Z,_1 ), whUd the 
non-systematic component summarises "the contemporaneous dependence of 
the process" E( ~1 I Z1_ 1 ), as depicted by a non-diagonal variance - covariance 
matrix of the residuals. The unobservable multivariate error term i;, determines 
the system's stochastic properties. All residuals gathered from all the equations 
help estimate the covariance matrix, n. Darrell and Evans (1990, p120) ccncur 
that each variable in vector z, has two parts: "its best predictor based on past 
values of all included variables and its linearly unpredictable 'innovation,'e, ." 
There is a dynamic linear dependence between the dependent variables 
in the (n x 1) vector Z, and "the past history of all other variables," Spanos et al 
(1997, p9). Generally, the dynamic properties ofVARs are more important than 
the parameter estimates. Enders (1995, p301), citing in particular Sims (1980) 
and Doan (1992) reiterates that VAR analysis is concerned with "dynamic inter-
relationships around the variables, not the parameter estimates". Therefore, 
most researchers, including this thesis, apply vector autoregressions in con-
junction with IRF and VDC analyses. 
In mathematical terms, Equation 9, duplicated here for exposition pur-
poses, denotes the unrestricted VAR model. 
Z, = 8 0 +B'Z,_1 +{1 , t e T,/;, - N//D(O,Q) (10) 
Alternatively: 
' Z, = 8 0 + LB,Z,_; +{,. t e T,/;, - N/JD(O,Q) (11) 
1~1 
Following Davidson et al (1978), Charemza and Deadman (1992, p182) 
refer to the unrestricted dynamic model as the general model. Enders (1995, 
p292) refers to this as the standard VAR form. Either terminology may be used. 
By definition, vectors and matrices are used to derive the VAR solution. Vectors 
and matrices thus facilitate the specification of economic relations as well as 
statistical inference. In fact Verbeek (2000, p12) notes "familiarity with [the] ma-
trix 'language' is a prerequisite to reading the econometrics literature." 
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6.10 Model Estimation 
,I 
Equations in the general VAR process are subject to lthe same lagged 
right hand side (RHS) variables. By definition the error terms ~re not correlated 
with the explanatory variables. Therefore, it is generally agr~ed that the solu-
1,' 
tion to the unrestricted VAR model can be "constantly" estimated equation by 
,·,, 
equation by the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). Davidsori,!and MacKinnon 
(1993, p685), Charemza and Deadman (1992, p183), and Spanos et al (1997, 
p21) support this view. It must be noted that VAR coefficiemts are subject to 
• 
multiple cross equation feedbacks and temporal variations. ln practice, for rea-
sons discussed below, multivariate regression is preferable to OLS. 
Residuals generated by the VAR system of equations are utilised to es-
timate a typically non-zero covariance matrix n. Its properties are important for 
both estimation and hypothesis testing. Conventionally, estimation of parame-
ters of interest, B and n requires the making of assumptions about the time se-
ries ( Z1 ) and the error ( ,;, ) processes. The multivariate error term ,;, is "as-
sumed to be contemporaneously correlated but not auto correlated so that it 
has a non-diagonal covariance matrix," Charemza and Deadman (1992, p182). 
The parameters of unknown coefficient vectors 8 0,Bi,8 2 ,· .. ,Br and n 
are estimated from available data. There are various approaches that may be 
used, including but not restricted to, OLS, quadratic equations, etc. The objec-
tive of the OLS method is to estimate parameters of B so that the sum of error 
term squares is minimized. Johnson, Johnson and Buse (1987, Chapter 7) pro-
vide a comprehensive step-by-step textbook analysis of how the well-known 
matrix solution is derived. On differentiating the OLS equation with respect to B 
and setting the derivative to zero, yields simultaneous equations and unknowns 
equal to the number of variables that are expressible in matrix notation. Solving 
forB, and following Spanos et al (1997, p21)'s notation, the least square esti-
mator of B which minimises the residual sum of squares is given by 
B-(Z'.,Z_,r'z_,z (12) 
The estimator 13 is orthogonal [independent] of the variance-covariance matrix 
of the error terms,;,. 
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It is a well-known fact that if no restrictions are imposed on the coeffi-
cients matrix B, the OLS and ML methods yield identical parameter estimates. 
Econometricians, for instance Davidson and MacKinnon (1993, p245) argue 
that ML estimators, i.e. ii will be consistent, asymptotically normal and asymp-
totically efficient. Following Harvey (1989), Charemza and Deadman (1992, 
p183) support the view that OLS and multiple regression approaches lead to 
same results if there are no restrictions on coefficients. However, multivariate 
regression is usually preferred to take an explicit account of non-zero covari-
ance matrix. Davidson and MacKinnon (1993, p685) emphasise the importance 
of the covariance matrix in generating maximum likelihood (ML) test statistics. 
Recursive and iterative procedures may be adopted for forecasting purposes·. 
ln their true spirit, VAR models are considered atheoretical hence identi-
fication becomes difficult and results are potentially very mechanical. Intuitively 
non-statistical information, such as institutional factors and theory, may be used 
to validate restrictions regarding the memory and evolution of the series ( Z, ). In 
fact imposition of linear restrictions generates a relationship among the system 
equations. Statistically the covariance matrix, n, might enter the estimator of B. 
The nature of the restrictions applied influences estimation procedures. 
Charemza and Deadman (1992, p184) support the use of Bayesian 
analysis. Davidson and MacKinnon (1993, p686) noted that Litterman (1977, 
1986) takes Bayesian VARs (BVAR) to "provide better forecasts than convec-
tional unrestricted VARs." These suggestions reinforce Cooley and LeRoy's 
(1985) argument that regards triangulated specification and systematic lags as 
structural transformations. However Spanos et al (1997, p22) prefer the em-
ployment of statistical to theoretical restrictions "to identify the restrictions on the 
VAR parameters" as the later are against the sprit of VAR. Restricted VAR's 
[RVAR] and incomplete VARs [!VAR], estimated by multi-variance regression 
concepts such as the Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SURE), are preferred 
to Bayesian restrictions. Davidson and MacKinnon (1993, p685) confirm that the 
VAR model has a SURE form. Nevertheless Kennedy (1998, p175) confirms 
that there is no benefit from using SURE because in VAR the explanatory vari-
ables are identical. A diagonal variance covariance matrix of error terms has a 
similar effect. Therefore, in this thesis, neither BVAR nor SURE are pursued. 
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7. COINTEGRATED VARS 
,I 
I 
7.1 Integrated variables t, 
Integrated variables are individually driven by perman¢nt (or nearty per-
" manent shocks.) Such variables are usually said to be non~Stationary, explo.-
sive, or to contain unit roots. The order of integration, I {d), derotes the number 
of times a series has to be differenced to render it stationary. 
7 .2 Cointegralion 
Cointegrated variables are individually integrated pr(?cesses that are 
jointly stationary; that is, jointly driven by transitory shocks. Co integration exists 
if, and only if, there is a linear combination of integrated variables that is driven 
by common trends. If variables are cointegrated there is a long run link among 
them. The weighted sum of cointegrated variables is mean reverting. Residuals 
obtained from such linear combinations are station,ary, i.e. I (0) processes, and 
hence are subject to time series modelling. The stationarity properties of VAR 
processes are used to derive the asymptotic properties of the parameter esti-
mators. According to Watson ( 1994, p2844) there are four alternative ways of 
representing cointegrated systems. These are the moving average, common 
' trends, triangular, and the vector error correction model (V~CM) representa-
' lions. This study adopts the VECM framework and follows the Johansen proce-
dure to test for cointegration and estimate the parameters. 
7.3 The Johansen Cointegration Procedure 
The Johansen cointegration procedure is one of the most popular ap-
proaches to cointegration analysis. Masih and Masih (1999, p8) argue that the 
Johansen procedure, unlike the Engle-Granger procedure, is not sensitive to 
the choice of the dependent variable and the variable being normalised. The 
procedure depends on the assumption that the error vector, i;,, is multivariate 
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normal across time and independent of observations (NID). Johansen (1988, 
1991, 1992, 1995) applies maximum likelihood (ML) to the VAR model and pro-
vides for the existence of more than one cointegration relationships. 
Johansen and Juselius (1990, 1992, 1994), JJ for short, extended the 
model. As noted in Maddala and Kim (1998, p174) Johansen and Juselius 
(1994, p8) distinguish among generic [linear statistical] identification, empirical 
identification and economic identification. For a start, the JJ approach is atheo-
retical with cointegration reduced to a statistical concept, possibly devoid of any 
structural interpretation. The model's dynamic properties are completely deter-
mined by the sample data under consideration. Theoretical restrictions are 
adopted ex-post, that is, after establishing the number of long run cointegrating 
relationships. Cointegration analysis of a VAR(p) model can easily be per-
formed by rewriting the VAR(p) model into the first difference version. This 
transformation takes the analysis to the VECM format. 
7.4 Vector Error Correction Model 
The Granger Representation Theorem states that a cointegrated VAR 
system has a short run error correction mechanism that drives variables to their 
long run equilibrium relationship. The error correction model (ECM) represents 
deviations from the long run equilibrium. Hoffman and Rasche (1997,p1) define 
error correction terms as "mean reverting weighted sums of cointegrating vec-
tors and dated t -1." The mechanism drives the system's short run dynamic 
properties. It forces adjustments in at least one series to correct for deviations in 
the long run relationship. In the Johansen and Juselius (JJ) approach there can 
be several short run mechanisms to reach the same long run equilibrium. Simi-
larly, it was noted that the Johansen procedure provides for more than one 
equilibrium relationship among variables in a model. 
There is a general consensus in literature that VAR models can be ana-
lysed and tested in a VECM formulation. Pesaran and Pesaran (1997, pp 132-3 
and 291) show that the Johansen ML cointegration options in Microfit provide a 
unified framework for estimating and testing cointegration relationships based 
on a generalised VECM framework. From Equation 8 a typical VAR(p) model is 
represented as: 
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Where as before B, (i = 1,2, .. , p) are parameters. I 
Under cointegration, the \/AR model in Equation 13 ca~ be reparameter-
ised in the error correction model as formulated in Equation 1~\Pelow. 
Where r, = (B, +B, + .. ·B,)-1, for (i = 1,2,··,p-I) 
II= (B, +B, +···B,)-1, and 
" . 
!',', 
. 
" 
., . 
. 
(14) 
µ::: vector of constants and any deterministic compone~ts of the system. 
Hoffman and Rasche ( 1997, p2) emphasise the well-known fact that a 
VECM represents a standard VAR model in the first difference ofz,, "aug-
'·' 
·, 
. 
' 
mented by the 'error correction' terms ... " The only difference between equation 1 
13 as a standard VAR model in the first difference and equation 14 is the error 
correction component nz1_P. Intuitively, if there is no cointegration the VECM 
has as many independent shocks as the number of variables in the model. In 
the presence of cointegration the model containsr individual error-correction 
components derived. from r cointegration relationships. The error correction 
terms represent the speed and direction of short-run (single lag) adjustments to 
deviations from the long run cointegration relationship. In summary cointegrat-
ing vectors are estimates of long run relationships in a VAR system. The sign 
' 
and size of the coefficients of error correction terms charactikrise the direction 
' 
and speed of sJ-,ort run adjustments in the cointegrating systerils. 
' 7.5 Formal Cointegration Analysis . 
In principle the cointegrating VAR model assumes endogenousJ(1) vari-
ables, which necessitates the use of a VAR model in first differences. It is a 
well-known statistical fact that if Z, is I (1 ), it follows that the first differences 11Z, 
and the r cointegration vectors are! (0). See Doomik, Hendry and Nielson 
(1998, p126) for example. Although Pesaran and Pesaran (1997, p286) reveal 
that Microfit presumes variables in a cointegrating VAR model to be 1(1) the 
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"Cointegrating VAR Menu" in Microfit permits analysis of cointegration models 
containing "I (1) jointly determined variables, I (1) exogenous variables, and 
I (0) exogenous variables," (Ibid p127). The order of variables is considered im-
portant for purposes of orthogonalized IRF analysis and orthogonalized error 
variance decompositions analysis. Furthermore Pesaran and Pesaran (1997, 
p322) suggest that inclusion of I (0) variables in the VAR "allow for the short-run 
movements in the 1(1) variables which moves away from their long-run equilib-
rium." Beveridge and Nelson (1981) as cited in Stock ( 1094, pp 2744 and ?.747) 
formally show that 1(1) processes can be decomposed into I(O) and !(1) com-
ponents. Luintel and Khan (1999, µ391) argue that when a VAR model contains 
a mixture of I (1) and I (0) variables the later may be considered as weakly ex-
ogenous variables. 
As the literature of cointegration progresses, new techniques are 
emerging that do not require rigorous determination of whether variables 
arel(1) or !(O). Pesaran and Pesaran (1997, pp 302 - 8) discuss an autore-
gressive distributed lad (ARDL) procedure in which it is not necessary to deter-
mine whether the regressors are !(1) or l(O). Haldrup (1998) reviews the 
growing literature on the econometric analysis of I (2) variables and polynomial 
cointegration. Shintani (2000) recently proposed fully nonparametric approach 
to cointegration that does not require VAR based tests. In my view, the chal-
lenge to develop proceduri::.:s that do not depend on fluid distinctions regarding 
the order of integration and extent of cointegration is strong. 
In practice the order of integration may vary from sample to sample if not 
from researcher to researcher, hence Z, is sometimes assumed rather than 
"proven" to be I (1 ). In this thesis, the real per capita income expressed in logs, 
LPCY, is the principal indicator of macroeconomic development. In Table 10, 
the information criteria su[1gest that LPCY is I (0). However, the test statistics 
does not reject the null hypothesis that LPCY has a unit root, i.e. is I (1 ). In a 
number of other cases depicted in Tables 9 and 10 the test statistics does not 
reject the null hypothesis of a unit root for some variables the information crite-
ria rendered I (0). Therefore, in empirical literatl•re some variables are treated 
as though they are I (1) or I (0) depending on the underlying assumptions of the 
adopted procedure. The next paragraph discusses some valid methodological 
considerations regarding the potential mixture of I (1) and I (0) variables. 
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If the vector Z, is I (O) the solution can be obtained by OLS methods. In 
deed Pesarao and Smith (1998, p65) point out that any linear combination of 
I (0) variables are also I (0) variables. In any case the unrestlicted VAR model 
has same variables in common hence yield the same estimate~ as the OLS and 
I 
Mb methods. According to Doornik (1998, p159) the asymptotic distributions of 
" the trace and maximum~eigenvalue test statistics are not affeG.ted by the pres~ 
' 
ence of I (0) components. Therefore Johansen maximum lik~Hhood estimation 
can still be used in order to take advantage of system wide diagnostic statistics. j 
This thesis employed Microfit's capacity to handle a VAR mo~el with 1(1) and 
I (0) variables. Some variables rendered I (0) by the information criter:a might as 
well be I (1) if reliance is placed on the fact that the null hypothesis of a unit root 
could not be rejected. Masih and Masih (1999, p8) however concur that "the Jo-
hansen procedure requires variables not to be 1(2), but can admit both 1(1) 
only and a mixture of I (1) and I (0) processes, in systems used for testing the 
order of cointegration rank." A temptation arising from Pesaran and Pesaran 
(1997, Chapter 16) to order the variables on the basis of endogeneity or exoge-
neity was avoided as it runs contrary to the VAR spirit; and restricts system~ 
wide interactions and by extension the number of cointegration relationships. 
The formal cointegration model specified in this thesis is principally 
based on a five series VAR methodology incorporating the core economic sec-
tors in a small open economy such as Zimbabwe. Watson (1994, p2901) as-
serts that it is "very important" for structural analysis to take into account all "im-
portant macroeconomic shocks" active in the economic procSss. In fact Luintel 
and Khan (1999, p383) concur that many bivariate and trivariate VAR systems 
are misspecified rendering the results questionable. Most researchers simply 
adopt low dimension models in order to accommodate small data sets and the 
resultant fast exhaustion of degrees of freedom. However, basing policy on 
flawed small scale VAR modelling systems can be disastrous. 
In this study, economic activity in Zimbabwe is assumed to depend on 
the monetary base, fiscal policy, international trade, and financial development. 
Therefore, a five variable VAR model incorporating indicators representing each 
these structural segments is employed to investigate the dynamic interrelation-
ships among the variables. Following a rich multivariate analysis is consistent 
with similar studies of Lehr and Wang (2000), Levine (1997), Levine et al (2000) 
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and Luintel and Khan (1999). In the j~rgon of econometrics, Lehr and Wang 
(2000) identify four important structural shocks viz: real supply shock (Real 
GDP), fiscal expansion shock ( Rea/ G ) , monetary shock (measure of 
Real GDP 
money) and a financial intermediation shock (proxy for financial intermediation). 
While their diagnosis is very persuasive, very few countries are closed econo-
mies. Economic activity particularly in small economies is vulnerable to the va-
garies of international developments hence the inclusion of foreign trade in this 
study. In fact Levine et al (2000, p45) include measures of government size, in-
flation, parallel market exchange rate premium, and openness to international 
trade in their policy conditioning information set. In footnote 12 on the si3me 
page Levine et al, however, acknowledge that inflation and government size 
both seive as indicators of macroeconomic stability. Similarly the parallel mar-
ket exchange premium could be regarded as a composite uindex of trade, ex-
change rate, and price distortions." I have not used the parallel exchange r3te 
premium because it is difficult to observe; and the available data does not cover 
the period under consideration. The data used in this study consists of annual 
observations for the period 1924 tc 1998 deflated to reflect 1995 quantities. All 
variables are expressed in natural logarithms to represent the levels of the vari-
ab!es. For computational convenience, growth rates are expressed as first dif-
ference of the logarithms of the variables. 
Two variables are employed as alternative proxies for economic activity. 
These are logarithms of real per capita in come (LPCY) and the rate of real per 
capita income growth (LGPCY). The monetary base is represented by the loga-
rithm of the ratio of real currency in circulation (CIC) to real GDP. Both Rous-
seau and Wachtel (1998) and Lehr and Wang (2000) include the monetary base 
as a separate conditioning variable in their study of the causal links between 
from the intensity of financial intermediation and economic activity. Real gov-
ernment expenditure to real GDP (G) and the fiscal balance (FSB) are adopced 
as proxies for government size or fiscal shocks. The current account balance 
(CAB) or the degree of openness to international trade (OPEN) as measured by 
the ratio of real exports and real imports to real GDP are treated as alternative 
proxies for foreign trade. Financial sophistication (Fl) is measured as a ratio of 
alternative real financial assets to real GDP or real credit aggregates to real 
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GDP. Apart from indicators based on financial assets and credit aggregates, 
some researchers often use monetary aggregates such as t:,(12 as proxies for 
financial development. Lynch (1993, p8) and Luintel and K~an (1999, p386) 
concur that the later aggrsgates measure the degree of m~netisation rather 
than financial deepening or financial development. Beck, O~fTlirgUy-Kunt and 
Levine (1999) developed a comprehensive array of indicator~: .. based on finan-
cial assets and credit aggregate, which have found a recepti~e audience in fi-
nancial intermediation literature. Some of the financial indicators adopted in thiS 
thesis include Liquid Liabilities (LQL), total financial assets /TFA) and private 
• 
sector credit (PSC). Each component of financial intermediation (Fl) is modelled 
separately in order to capture aggregates that determine econ~mic activity. 
Section 5 provided a discussion of some variables included in the study 
and data transformations. In section 8 the results of cointegration tests, their 
interpretation and evaluation are presented. Some useful fin,;1ncial aggregates 
identified in the financial intermediation literaturB were excluded from the rigor-
ous model due institutional and data constraints. Although Luintel and Khan 
(1999, p383) distinguish the real interest rate as an important determinant of 
financial development, the variable has not been used because administered 
interest rates were prevalent in Zimbabwe for the period under consideration. 
Furthermore market capitalisation (SMC) and turnover ( 10V ) were excluded 
from formal cointegration analysis due to paucity of quality data sets. 
To test for cointegration among financial development, economic activity, 
• 
and three conditioning macroeconomic variables the JJ approach is applied. 
' 
. ' Given a (5 by 1) vector z, = (LPCY, CIC,G,CAB, FI) of time series data at date 
t, the dynamic interrelationships of Z, are characterised by the system in 
Equation 14 duplicated below for exposition purposes: 
Where Z, = vector of (5 x 1) dimensional time series data. 
6. = difference operator 
(15) 
µ = vector of constants and any deterministic components of the system. 
,, = (5 by 5) coefficient matrices for periods (i = 1,2, ... , p) capturing short 
run dynamic effects or adjustments to changes in Z,. 
185 
IT = long run multiplier matrix or impact matrix, which determines the 
existence and extent of cointegration among variables in Z, . 
.;, = (5 by 1) vector of Gaussian errors 
Compactly, the cointegrating VAR can also be reformulated as 
,-, 
t:,,,Z,1 =µ+Lr,~,-, + nz,-p + 4, 
/o,l 
Where as before 
(16) 
r, = (B, + B, + · · · B,)-1, for (i = 1,2,-··,p - I) depicting short run dynamics 
IT = (B, + B, + · ·· B, )- I, or -(I - f B,) representing the long run effects. 
1 .. 1 
Under the Johansen procedure the first step is to test for, or to deter-
mine, the number of distinct cointegration vectors r of the matrix n. The 5 by 5 
impact matrix n summarises the long run relationships between ~ 1 and other 
components in the system in Equation 16. The null hypothesis involves estab-
lishing whether IT has full rank: H, : Rank(l1) = r < p. As Masih and Masih 
(1999, p9) put it, "If n has zero rank, no stationary linear combination can be 
identified," hence there is no cointegration among the variables inZ1 • In con-
trast, if n has a rank r greater than zero, there are r cointegrating relation-
ships or "possible linear stationary combinations" (Ibid). 
If cointegration exists among the variables, it follows that IT will be "rank 
deficient." Such a property implies that there will be O < r < 5 potential co inte-
gration relationships in the five variable models under consideration. It follows 
that the behaviour of Z, may be explained by a few O < ,. < 5 independent inno-
vations. Since the impact matrix n is rank deficient in presence of cointegration 
it can be decomposed as n :::aB' where a and Bare (5 x r) matrices. 
Substituting for 11, Equation (15) can be represented as follows: 
(17) 
Where [Z, - 1(1), 62., - 1(0)]. 
Compactly 
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6.21 = µ+ Z:r,.6.2'1_; +a(B'Z,_P)+~\ 
/,,! 
,-, 
=µ+ Ll,.6Z,_1 +aB'Z1_P +4, 
M 
(18) 
,I 
I 
1: 
11., 
Considering l1 =aB', it is well known that the rows of ;B denote the dis-
,·,, 
tinct cointegrating vectors rendering B'Z, linear stationary pronesses, 1(0). The 
... 
matrix a contains coefficients or loading factors of the error correction terms·, 
which indicate the speed of adjustment corresponding to edch of the cointe-
' grating vectors. In practice Bis not unique as more than one cointegrating vec-
tor may be identified O < r < 5. Restrictions found on economic theory may be 
applied in order to identify a unique long-run economic relationship. 
Statistically, the number of cointegrating vectors is equal to the number 
of non-zero characteristic roots (eigenvalues). Given n linearly independent ei-
genvectors (xi,x 2, .. ·,x,,) for- trix B, each eigenvectorx1 is associated with an 
[
.!, 
eigenvalue A;. A diagonalisation of the eigenvalues ~ ~ J emerges. ~ .. 
Verbeek (2000, p298) points out "each nonzero eigenvalue corresponds to a 
cointegrating vector." Hypotheses tests regarding the rank of TI are based on 
estimated eigenvalues. 
Johansen's full information maximum likelihood (FIMq approach uses 
two test statistics, namely the trace test l,,,"·,· and the max,imum eigenvalue 
test A"''"', to compute the number of cointegrating vectors. In brief, maximization 
of the likelihood function in the Johansen method corresponds to parameter es-
timation by setting a square matrix's determinant and cross products of the re-
siduals to a minimum. The eigenvalues l;, i = l,2,···n, are used to test alterna-
tive hypothesis regarding ihe order of r. The trace A.,,.,,u tests for a null hypothe-
sis of at most r cointegrating relationships HO : r::; r0 against an alternative of 
at least r + l cointegrating vectors H 1 : 10 < r::; 11. In effect the trace statistics 
checks whether the smallest n - 10 eigenvalues are significantly different from 
zero. The maximum eigenvalue Amax tests for a null hypothesis of at most r 
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cointegrating vectors H O : r ~ ,o against an alternative exactly r + I cointegrating 
vectors, H, : r = ,, + 1. Verbeek (2000, p296) notes that the maximum eigen-
value Am.,. test is based on the estimated (10 + !)11' largest eigenvalue. According 
to Masih and Masih (1999, p9), under the JJ approach, "larger eigenvalues are 
associated with the cointegrating vector being more correlated with the station-
ary component of the process." In the event of conflicting test results, Luintel 
and Khan (1999, p392) reveal that under the Johansen procedure trace tests 
have been found to be "more robust" than maximal eigenvalues tests. 
7.6 VAR Order and Deterministic Variables 
There are a number of data depended decisions which have to be made 
in conjunction with application of Johansen procedure. Apart from choosing the 
number and span of endogenous variables to be included in the model, a deci-
sion is required regarding the order of integration among the variables. Fur-
thermore an appropriated VAR order (i.e. lag length) needs to be selected in 
order to improve model performance. Low order VAR models are prone to serial 
correlation while higher order VARs run the risk of over parameterisation and 
fast exhaustion of the degrees of freedom. Microfit employs the Akaike Informa-
tion Criterion (AlC) and the Schwartz Bayesian Criterion (SBC) to facilitate the 
determination of the lag length. Cointegration analysis in this thesis is based on 
a VAR model of order of 4. Thus, the first four observations are treated as pre-
sample values. This results in the reduction of the sample size by the lag length. 
Number of varia!Jles included has similar effect£. Tests for cointegration are 
sensitive to the nature of deterministic trends variables (trends and intercepts). 
To this end, allowance has been made for a model with restricted intercepts and 
no trends in the VARs. This specification is valid because in the presence of 
cointegration trends can still be identified. Unrestricted SURE regressions not 
reported in this thesis found intercepts and trends to be statistically significant. 
7.7 Impulse Response Analysis 
According to Sims (1980, p21 ), analysis of a cointegrating system's re-
sponse to random shocks is a valuable post estimation tool that can shed light 
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on a system's speed of adjustment to the equilibrium relationship. The Gener-
alised impulse response functions (GlRF), popularised by Pes~ran and Pesaran 
(1997) among others, captures the short run dynamic properties arising form a 
' 
variable specific shock (or innovation) on the different varia~les in the cointe-
' grating VAR model. Shocks to variables in a VAR system ge,r,erate contempo-
raneous interactions among the endogenous variables. A giY,en shock affects 
the VAR system in several ways. It directly affects the depen~ent variable in its 
own equation. The shock is transmitted to other variables through the system of 
equations. Future values of all variables, including the origin~I. may also be af-
' 
fected since current realisations become future lagged values. If the impulse 
responses are zero, the shocked variable has no causal effect, on the system. 
Conventionally, the impulse-response function is represented by a graph 
characterising the effect of a unit shock (equal to one standard error) on one 
variable on the future s "1te of a cointegrating system. As Pesaran and Pesaran 
(1997, p444) point out, "the effect of shocks on cointegrating relations is bound 
to die out, and their time profile contains useful information on the speed of 
convergence of the model to its cointegrating (or 'equilibrium') relations." In 
contrast, the effects of variable specific or system wide shocks on individual 
variables in a cointegrating VAR model are persistent and may not die out "due 
to the rank deficiency of the of the long-run multiplier matrix, (Ibid, p443). 
Nevertheless, it is well known that impulse responses pertaining to vari-
able specific shocks are difficult to interpret. If the VAR system is incompletely 
specified standard errors of IRF tends to be large which renders 1RA "worthless 
for structural interpretations," Spanos et al (1997, p63). Similar concerns are 
raised in Rankle (1987) who suggests that no strong conclt•"ions should be 
drawn about the effect of innovations in time series data, as impulse response 
and variance decomposition are data and trend sensitive. 
The orthogonalized impulse response function is frequently used in fi-
nancial literature. Unlike the generalised impulse responses, the orthogonalized 
impulse responses are subject to many permutations if no prior causality tests 
have been conducted. Contemporaneous correlations among variables in a 
model render determination of unique impulse responses difficult. Modellers 
often resort to ordering a system's innovations into an orthogonal transforma-
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lion. In Sims (1980) Choleski decomposition was arbitrary applied to triangulate 
the variables. Ordering dictates the direction of causation among variables in 
the system. In other words, each error term is directed to affect only error terms 
in equations ranked below the given error term's own equation. Generalised im-
pulse responses are not sensitive to the way the variables are ordered. 
In real life, economic shocks rarely occur in one variable at a time. Thus, 
the persistence profile (PP) may be used to characterise the effect of system-
wide shocks on cointegrating relationships. By construction, the impact of a 
shock in the persistence profile has a value of unity, which tends to zero as the 
time horizon tends to infinity. 
Dynamic links in cointegrating systems may also be analysed through er-
ror correction terms. ln summary cointegrating vectors represent the long run 
relationships. The sign and size of the coefficients of error correction terms 
characterise the direction and speed of short run adjustments in the cointegrat-
ing systems. This approach was discussed in detail in Section 7.4 above. 
7.8 Variance. Decomposition 
The forecast error variance decomposition (VDC) provides another way 
to chart the short-run properties of the dynamic behaviour of a VAR model. Ac-
cording to Spanos et al (' 997, p 63) "It breaks down the variance of the forecast 
error for each of variable [in the VAR model] into components that can be attrib-
uted to each of the endogenous variables [at different time horizons.]" 
7.9 Limitations of VAR and Coin1egration Analysis 
Linearity is an aesthetic possibilffy but not an aesthetic necessity. 
Davies J. P. (1997, p87) 
(a) ·:he atheoretical nature of VAR models 
The atheoretical nature of VAR models has been subject to criticism in 
financial literature. Failure to select variables on the basis of prior knowledge 
could result in mechanical policy analysis. The economic meaning of VAR coef-
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ficients is embroiled in controversy. Sims (1980, p20) argues VAR coefficients 
tend to oscillate with successive lags and are subject to "<;:pmplicated cross 
equation feed backs" and time variations. Spanos et al (19~7, p24) conclude 
that Granger causality tests, impulse response analysis, and])variance decom-
position produce better distinctive results than VAR coeffi~ .. if::!nts. Following 
Cooley and LeRoy's (1985) persuasive view, Darnell and Eva)is (1990, p127-8) 
argue that in absence of theory VAR representation amountS.ito a summary of 
correlations in the data. Therefore, impulse response functions cannot be val-
idly accepted as causal orderings. I 
Cooley and LeRoy (1985, p306) accuse some proponents of VAR to be 
"more interested in econometrics than economics." In fact, Bciwbrick (1988, p9) 
warns that econometrics may be used for image projection to impress layman 
and colleagues. Darnell & Evans (1990, p126) hammer on the methodological 
limitations, which in their view, fail to reduce economic ignorance through a re-
futable representation that can critically test theories. Summers (1991) is even 
more pessimistic about the contribution of all econometric work to the develop-
ment of macroeconomics. Darnell & Evans (1990,129) conclude that VAR "ap-
proach is not a part of science" because it does not contribute "to the scientific 
method of economics ... " and its proponents offer nothing new. If the models 
are interpreted as non-structural, the VAR itself become.:; the structure and is no 
more than a superficially sophisticated summary of the historical correlations of 
the economic time series. Runkle's (1987, p13) conclusion is well known, ~In 
other words, vector autoregression may let the data speak for themselves, but 
the data are not talking very loudly." 
(b) Mitigation: social sciences are not perfect 
These views run contrary to Leamer (1983) and Sims (1995). I agree 
with Sims (1995, p15) that some criticisms amount to "forensic exaggeration." 
Although economists are the most vocal critics of econometrics, economic sci-
ence is not immune from criticism. Bowbrick (1988, p120) argues, "Pure eco-
nomic science is nothing but a string of tautological logic, going from arbitrary 
assumptions to conclusions ... " In Sims' (1995, p8) opinion the hypothesis test-
ing view of science has several limitations because theories cannot be "tested~ 
as "true" or "false" on the basis of decisive confrontations with data. Indeed 
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Sims (1995, p2) proposes that all science is a data compression exercise. In 
this context, it is possible to have a continuum of theories rather than a single 
true theory. Weintraub (1998, p1845) maintains that, "The concept of a true sci-
entific theory itself has changed as the image of mathematical knowledge has 
changed ... " Thus, the concept of economic and financial knowledge changes 
with time. No wonder Sims (1995, p8) regards "orthodoxy, hierarchy and meth-
odological prescriptions as potential tools of priestly resistanc~ to change." 
In any case perfect knowledge is not available. Leamer (1983, p 36) ar-
gues that, "All knowledge is human belief: more accurately, human opinion," 
hence no one can design an experiment free of bias (p33). According to 
Mccloskey (1983) as cited in Sims (1995) even the most rigorous writings in 
economics is engaged in persuasion. Although economists try to emulate the 
rigor of physics Sims (1995, p9) retorts that, "Economics is not physics." There 
is no scape for clean consensus in social sciences unlike natural sciences. 
Moreover, the difference between scientific experiments and natural experi-
ments is one of degree rather than kind. For instance, there is a lot of scientific 
knowledge on astronomy though there are no experiments. As cited in Wein-
traub (1998, p1839) Mccloskey (1994) concedes that mathematical models 
contribute to the advancement of economic knowledge: "Econon1ics made prog-
ress without mathematics, but has made faster progress with it. Mathematics 
has brought transparency to many hundreds of economic arguments." 
Whereas economists provide the most vehement criticism of their cous-
ins in econometrics, the question of formalism in economics itself has never 
been settled. According to Taylor (2000, p2130) no discipline has yet achieved 
that feat "including physics, the science that economics most aspires to emu-
late." Physicists themselves are still debating "whether mathematics is 'nature's 
language' or is simply a tool for discovering her laws." Despite these methodo-
logical limitations, I agree with Mattesini [1993, p153] who notes that VAR tech-
niques provide insight into the informational content of selected macro-
economic variables. A theory !,hould not be criticised on the validity of its as-
sumptions but validity of its implications. Criticising VAR for lack of theoretical 
context is logically inconsistent as the model's objective is to curb arbitrary re-
strictions in mc1cro-economic models. Krugman (1998, p1829) advise readers 
not to confuse a complaint about quality with a compl2i11t about methodology. 
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(c) Statistical limitations of VAR and cointegration analysis 
,I 
Unrestricted VAR models are over parameterised and non-parsimonious. 
Unknown parameters in the unrestricted models increase wit1,i both the number 
of variables in the model and lag lengths. Increasing the nurr;iber of repressors 
:I., 
rapidly increases the number of parameters to be estimated.;·, The degrees of 
freedom are reduced and out of sample forecasting capat1ility limited. VAR ,, 
models require availability of long data sets (i.e. large samplei' size) as a direct 
result of the over parameterisation problem. Increasing the time span and fre-
quency of observations to a fixed span increases power of the•tests. 
Time series analysis, like derivatives, has acquired a habit of excessive 
proliferation. Nordhaus (1984) refers to thta Balkanisation of econometrics. As 
Rankle (1987, 7) put it, "Vector autoregressions have brought with them their 
own terminology and folklore." Anything that works on the canonical data sets 
such as Box and Jenkins (1970) or Nelson and Plosser (1982) is considered an 
adequate model. While this practice has got an advantage of providing a stan-
dard yardstick to justify the relevance of results, the proliferation of jargon has 
made some to regard econometrics as a Babel Tower. The multiplication of 
conflicting unit root tests indicates the need to develop more robust approaches. 
Haivey (1997) strongly attacks the whole concept of unit roots and vector 
autoregressions. Maddala and Kim (1998, pp 45, 92, 99, 486-8) strongly contest 
that "the unit root mania has gone too far' yet ADF, PP, and KPSS tests are 
useless and should not be used. They charge that there is currently too much 
asymptotic theory whereas significance levels upon which tests are based have 
been found misleading unless samples are very large. In my opinion 100 to 200 
years used in some VAR models is too long a time span for effective policy 
analysis. A retractable model should produce results preferably in a generation 
if not a decade. It is customary to test the hypothesis that there is no cointegra-
tion, a practice that increases the probability of finding "spurious cointegration." 
In practice, most tests for cointegration search for a linear relationship among 
the variables. Following from this fact, if no cointegration is found, this would not 
rule out existence of a long-term relationship other than a long-term linear rela-
tionship. Fractional unit roots and fractional co-integration may not be ruled out. 
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(d) Mitigation: structural considerations 
Spanos et al's (1997, p10) encourage the use of the Probabilistic Reduc-
tion Approach [PR] that takes into account theoretical and statistical considera-
tions. Proponents of the PRA argue that theory should not exclude other infor-
mation because the theoretical data concept is often different from the observ-
able data series. Spanos et al (1997 p12) writes, 
The theory still determines the structural form, lhe relevant vari-
ables, and the general form of the statistical model, but the par-
ticular statistical specification is also influenced by the data. 
Statistical inforence, causality tests, and post regression analysis dep8nd 
on validity of the assumptions. Logically, evaluation of the statistical adequacy 
of the model is an important step in the Probabilistic Reduction Approach. An 
accurately defined model uniquely summarises the nature and structure of data 
without contradicting the theory. 
VVithout a statistically adequate model that captures the system-
atic information in the data, no valid statistical inference is possi-
ble, irrespective of the sophistication and/or the potential validity of 
the theory (Spanos 1999, p16). 
Similarly, the Johansen procedure frequently used in cointegration tests 
employs statistical properties to determine the rank of cointegration. Overall, the 
economic system determines the behaviour of macroeconomic variables si-
multaneously. Therefore every variable in VAR is regarded as endogenous and 
regressed on its own lagged values and that of all other variables. The Lucas 
Critique insisted that that the economic system and policymakers are interde-
pendent rather than independent. If more than one cointagrating vectors are 
identified Pesaran and Pesaran's (1997) Long Run Structural Modelling (LRSM) 
could be used to select the appropriate model on the basis of theoretical con-
siderations. Admittedly, Goodhart's Law", (1978) as cited in Kennedy (1998, 
p7), states that all econometric models break down when used for policy. In the 
final analysis, a model assists rather than substitute decision-making. Robert-
son and Tallman (1999, 4) concur that, "No model can he left on automatic pilot 
for too iong." Throwing away VAR on the rational of its limitations would be 
tantamount to throwing away the baby with the bath water. 
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8. EMPIRICAL COINTEGRATION TESTS RESULTS 
,I 
I 
8.1 Financial Intermediary Developmen~ 
1\. 
" .. 1:, 
Methodology, like sex, is better demonstrated than discussed, ;f/,ough often 
... 
better anticipated than experienced 
LJamer (1983, p40) 
' 
This section reports the main cointegration test results estimated under 
' the Johansen full information maximum likelihood (FIML) approach. The idea is 
to determine the long run relationship between economic activity and an array 
of financial intermediation indicators. Intuitively model reliability should be ad-
dressed before it is used for statistical inference if it is to mimic:: the true data 
generating process. Three conditioning macroeconomic variables have been 
added to the model to address specification problems. Most cointegration tests 
conducted in this thesis are, therefore, based on a five variable model. 
The JJ approach requires prior specification of an optimal autorcgression 
orderw. In all cases a maximum VAR order of 4 was chosen. As noted in Sec-
tion 7.6 low order VAR models are prone to serial correlation and over rejection 
of the null hypothesis of no cointegration, while higher order VAR models run 
the risk of over parameterisation and loss of power. Furthermore, tests for 
• 
cointegration are sensitive to the presence of trends and intercepts. An allow-
' ance has been made for a model with restricted intercepts arid no trends in the 
VARs. This specification is given by "Case I I" under the "Cointegrating VAR 
. 
Option" in Microfit. If cointegration exists "common trends" can: still be identified. 
Table 11 overleaf depicts the tests for the number of cointegration rela-
tionships. The table is divided into Panels A to C. Panel A gives the test results 
for the number of cointegration results based on maximal eigenvalues, which 
are listed in descending order on the table. Panel B employees the trace statis-
tics to specify the number of cointegration relationships. ln Panel C the model 
selection criteria is used to determine the number of cointegration vectors. 
" In this thesis the JJ and Johansen approaches are used interchangeably. 
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Tabie 11 
Testing for the rank of cointegration 
Cointegration with restrictetl intercepts and no trends in the VAR 
Panel A= Cointegration LR Test Based on Maximal Eigenvalue of the Stochastic Matrix 
*•············································································ 
71 observations from 1928 to 1998. order of VAR~ 4. 
List of vnriables included in cointegrating vector: 
LGPCY CIC CAB 
'"' Intercept 
List of eigenvalues in descending order: 
.39955 .20360 .16197 .11230 . 037350 .0000 
NUll Alternative Statistic 
"' 
Crit1cal Value 
'" 
Critical Value 
r • 
' 
r 1 36.2149 34.4000 31.7300 
r<• 1 r 
' 
16.1633 28,2700 25,8000 
r<= 
' 
r 
' 
12.5459 22.0400 19.8600 
r<= 
' 
r 
' 
B.4574 15. 8700 13.8100 
r<= 
' 
r 
' 
2. 7033 9.1600 7,5300 
********************••························································ Use the above table to determiner {the number of cointegrating vectors). 
Cointegration with restricted intercepts and no trends in the VAR 
Panel B: Cointegration LR Test Based on Trace of the Stochastic Ma.tri~ 
•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
71 observations from 1928 to 1998. Order of VAR 
List of variables included in the cointegrating 
LGPCY CIC G 
Intercept 
List of eigenvalues in descending order, 
= 4. 
vector, 
""' 
,39955 .20360 .16197 .11230 . 037358 
'"' 
.0000 
•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
r 
Null Alternative statistic 
'" 
critical Value 
'°' 
Critical Value 
r • 0 r>= ; 71L0848 75.9800 71. 8100 
r<= ; r>= 
' 
39.8699 53.4800 49.9500 r 
r<" 
' 
r>~ ; 23.7065 34.8700 31.9300 
r<" 
' 
r>• 
' 
11.1607 20.1800 17.8800 
r<• 
' 
r • 
' 
2.7033 9.1600 7.5300 
•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Use the above table to determiner (the number of cointegrating vectors). 
Cointegration with restricted intercepts and no trends in the VAR 
. 1 
. ; 
Panel C: Choice of the Number of Cointegrating Relations using Model Select! n Criteria 
···········~·································································· 
71 observations from 1928 to 1998. Order of VAR 
List of variables included in the cointegrating 
LGPCY CIC G 
Intercept 
List of eigenvalues in descending order, 
... 
vector, 
CAB 
.39955 .20360 .16197 .11230 . 037358 
'"' 
.0000 
•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Rank Maximized LL UC sac ,oc 
r 0 3'10.2543 265.2543 180 ,4038 231.5120 
r 
' 
358 .3618 273.3618 177 .1979 235.1204 
r 
' 
366.4434 273.4434 168.2288 231.6029 
r 
' 
372.7164 273, 7164 161.7137 229.1765 
r 
' 
376.9451 273.9451 157.4171 227.6056 
r s 378,2967 273,2967 154 .5060 226.0574 
•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
AlC Akaike Information Criterion 
HQC ~ Hannan-Quinn Criterion 
SBC: Schwarz Bayesian Criterion 
r . ' 
Note: Logarithm of real per capita income growth (computed as first log 
c,c 
G 
CAB 
'"' 
difference of real per capita income) 
Logarithm of real currency in circulation to real GDP 
Logarithm of real government expenditure to real GDP 
Logarithm of real exports minus logarithm of real imports 
Logarithm of total real assets of demand deposit taking banks to real 
GDP . 
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In Table 11 both the maximal and trace eigenvalue statistics strongly re-
ject the null hypothesis that there is no cointegration (i.e. r = O) cmong the five 
time series data. Taken literally, Table 11 shows that the tea) statistics for the 
null r = 0 is larger than the respective critical values at 90°/il and 95% signifi-
cance levels in both Panels A and 8. The hypothesis that th~re is one cointe-
" gration relationship r = I among the variables cannot be reject~d against r = 2, 
. 
etc. Turning to Panel C, however, the rank of cointegration is !ihdeterminate be-
cause there is no agreement among the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), 
Schwartz Bayesian Information Criterion (SBC) and the Hann~n-Quinn Criterion 
' 
(HOC). Each information criterion suggests a different number of cointegration 
vectors. Notwithstanding this, it seems reasonable to follow: the JJ approach 
and assume that there is one cointegration vector. 
Table 12 presents the estimated cointegration coefficients in a just-
identified model. Microfit gives the equation vertically. The-.results are unin-
fom1ative because there are no asymptotic standard errors to evaluate the sig-
nificance of the variable-::.. A normalising (or exactly identifying) restriction is re-
quired to estimate (or identify) the cointegration relationship together with the 
asymptotic standard errors. 
Table 12 
Estimated cointegration coefficients 
Estimated Cointegrated Vectors in Johansen Estimation (Normalized in Brackets) 
Cointegration with restricted intercepts and no trends in the :vAR 
•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
71 observations from 1928 to 1998. Order of VAR~ 4, chosen r =1. 
List of variables included in the cointegrating vector: 
LGPCY CIC G CAB DMB 
Intercept 
' •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Vector 
' uaeCY -3.4524 
I -1.0000) 
c,c .21148 
I .Obl2S6) 
G .033647 
. 0097461) 
CAB ,15250 
I .044172) 
DMB -.30651 
I - .088784) 
Intercept .50075 
.14505) 
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In Table 13, the estimated cointegration relationship is normalised on the 
coefficient of LGPCY; denoted by A 1 =1 representing the coefficient of LGPCY, 
the first variable in the cointegrating VAR. In practical terms, therefore, all co-
efficients are divided by the coefficient of LGPCY. Standard errors are in the 
brackets below the coefficients. The maximized value of the log-likelihood func-
tion subject to exactly identifying restrictions LL ( r = I ) = 358.3618 given at the 
bottom of Table 13 is identical the maximized log-likelihood value for r = 1 in 
Panel C, Table 11. This suggests the restriction is not significant and cannot be 
rejected. Standard errors are employed to facilitate the elimination of insignifi-
cant variables via the imposition of over-identifying restrictions. 
Table 13 
Normalised estimates of cointegration coefficients 
ML estimates subject to exactly identifying restric~ion(s) 
~stimates of Restricted Cointegrating Relations (SE's in Brackets) 
Converged after 2 iterations 
Cointegration with restricted intercepts and no trends in the VAR 
****************************************************************************** 
71 observations from 1928 to 1998. Order of VAR= 4, chosen r ~1. 
List of variables included in the cointegrating vector: 
LGPCY CIC G CAB DMB 
Intercept 
List of imposed restriction(s) on cointegrating vectors, 
Al=l 
Vector 
' LGPCY 1.0000 
*NONE*) 
c,c -.061256 
.020303) 
' 
-.0097461 
( .030366) 
CAB -.044172 
• 035271) 
DMB • 088784 
• 041160) 
Intercept - .14505 
. 058932) 
LL subj~ct to exactly identifying restrictions= 358.3618 
****************************************************************************** 
The t ratios computed Gy dividing the estimated coefficients in Table 13 
by the respective standard errors indicated that the variables G and CAB are 
statistically insignificant. Pesaran et al (1997, p 139) recommend one over-
identifying restriction per cointegrating vector at a time. Variable G is relatively 
more insignificant hence is eliminated first by imposing the restriction A3 =O. 
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Table 14 
Cointegration estimates subject to over identifying restriction 
I 
ML estimates s..:..iject to over identifying restriction(s) 11 Estimates of Restricted Cointegrating Relations (SE's in Brack ts) Converged after 2 iterations 
Cointegration with restricted intercepts and no trends in the ivAR 
........................................................................ ~#******** 
71 observations from 1928 to 1998. Order of VAR" 4, chosen r 
List of variables included in the cointegrating vector: 
LGPCY CIC G CAB 
Intercept 
List of imposed restriction(s) on cointegrating vectors: 
. 
.. 1. !',•, 
. 
DMB IJ 
alcl ; a3"0 
******************************************************************"***,****"***"** 
Vector 1 
LGPCY 1. 0000 
*NONE*) 
,,c 
-.064069 
.018363) 
' 
-.0000 
*NONE*) 
CAB -.051971 
, 025640) 
OMB .085555 
.040048) 
Intercept -.14407 
.059010) 
LR Test of Restrictions CHSQ (1) ~ 0,10279[0.7491 
DF,,Total no of restrictions(2) - no of just-identifying restrictions(l) 
LL subject to exactly identifying restrictions" 358.3618 
LL subject to over-identifying restrictions" 358.3104 
........................................................................................................................... 
Table 14 reports the computed ML estimates of the cointegrating rela-
tionship. The results were obtained after 2 iterations. Microfit automatically gen-
' 
erates a log-likelihood ratio (LR) statistic for testing the sighificance of over-
' identifying restrictions. This LR test statistic is computed as cHso (1} = 0.10279 at 
the bottom of Table 14. Pesaran and Pesaran (1997, p140) show that these 
statist:cs "are asymptotically distributed as ,r 2 variates with degrees of freedom 
given by k = r 2 , where k is the total number of restrictions and r 2 is the num-
ber of just-identifying restrictions." In this case the restriction A3 = 0 is not sta-
tistically significant because the level of the LR test statistics [0.749] is below the 
95 per cent critical value of the ,r 2 distribution with one degree of freedom. It 
follows that the restriction cannot be rejected. (Literally, the level in parentheses 
is compared to 0.05.) All the remaining variables in the model are statistically 
significant hence there is no basis for further restrictions. 
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As before the resultant long run relationship is given vertically in Table 
14. There is a positive empirical relationship between the size of the DMB and 
economic activity, which is denoted by the positive coefficient of 0.086. The re-
sults suggest that an exogenous increase in the financial assets (size) of DMB 
has a positive effect on economic activity and vice versa. The empirical findings 
are consistent with the theoretical model that the financial sector matters for 
growth. Prima facie, the more developed the financial intermediaries in an 
economy the better they are able to provide information gathering, screening, 
monitoring, allocative efficiency, and risk management services. Reliance on 
financial intermediaries for credit may provide banks with an opportunity to exert 
better corporate governance on enterprises, ceteris paribus. Hypothetic8.lly, 
provision of these essential services enhances productivity of investment and 
ultimately economic growth. Screening and monitoring projects improves "total 
factor productivity" as argued in Easterly and Levine (2000) as well as Pritchett 
(2000). Before analysing the short-run dynamics of the model it is useful to con-
sider other cointegrating vectors. 
Table 15 summarises some of the cointegrating relationships identified in 
this study. The cointegrating vectors are presented in a horizontal format; and 
are labelled A to N for easy of identification. Numbers in parentheses are stan-
dard errors of the coefficients. A variety of alternative financial intermediary de-
velopment indicators were employed to examine the nature of their effect on 
economic activity. These sensitivity analyses help evaluate the robustness of 
findings. Potential legal and institutional determinants of financial development 
were also evaluated for their effect on economic development. 
Starting with indicators of financial development, the VARs yield positive 
coefficients on most measures of financial size. [Indicators of financial devel-
opment appear in bold face in Table 15 below]. The positive signs are consis-
tent with the prediction that a growing financial system enhances the allocation 
of resources and general economic pertormance. The coefficient on Liquid Li-
abilities (LQL) in Equation B, Table 15, is significant and has the right sign. 
When the indicator of macroeconomic activity is changed to per capita income 
growth (GPCY) in Equation C all explanatory variables enter the model with 
significant and economically large coefficients. In Equation D, the coefficient on 
DMRB, the ratio of DMB to RBZ. the Central Bank, is not statistically significant. 
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Equation B 71 LPCY CIC G CAB LQC Intercept 
1928-98 -0.12235 0.091481 -0.13128 0.14036 -0.18346 
[0.0206511 [0.026848] {0.031128] [o.0000411 [0.042385] 
Colnlegrallon Observa- Dependent Conditioning Varlables and Flnancla1 lndical Included In the Model 
Vector tlons and Variable I 
span 
Equation A 71 LGPCY CIC G CAO o~• Intercept 
1928-98 -0.064071 0.0 -0.051974 o.d85555 -0.14407 
,·., 
[0.018363] (NONE] [0.025640] [0.040048] [0.059012] 
Equation C 71 GPCY CIC G CAB L(=!l Intercept 
1928-98 -13.2186 9.2253 -13.8877 16.1195 -20.2109 
(2.2004] (2.8156] [3.2959} 
''IB"' [4.4572] 
Equation D 71 LPCY G OPEN OMRB Int rcept 
' 1928-98 -2.5377 5.4224 1.6302 -5.9774 
{0.53020] [1.7148] [1.4070] [0.63699] 
Equation E 1 71 LPCY CIC G CAB BKA Intercept 
1928-98 -1.0395 -0.72097 0.0 5.7567 -8.0909 ·l 
. 
[0.42938] (0.34550] [NONEJ [1.4076] [0.98713] 
Equation E 2 71 LPCY CIC G CAB BKA Intercept 
1928-98 -0.94420 0.0 -0.87628 3.4936 -8.3572 
[O '10121] (NONE] (0.40247] [1.4238] {1.0292) 
Equation F 71 LGPCY LTECH G CAB CIC Intercept 
1928- 98 0.032220 0.055676 -0.093530 -0.051556 -0.13795 
[0.010368] [0.029264] [0.034618} [0.019450] [0.0620691 
Equation G 71 LGPCY LTECH G CAB Intercept 
1928-98 0.026284 0.0 0.0 -0.037866 
[0.0096269] [NONE] {NONE] [NONE] 
Equation H 71 ~GPCY LTECH G CAB CIC 
1928-98 0.038426 0.037311 -0.063153 0.0 
(0.010717) [0.0070210] 0.029042 {NONE] 
Equation I 71 LPCY CGV BKA Intercept 
1928-98 4.0593 5.8362 -4.4803 
[1.6836] 11,95621 [1.0176] 
Equation J 71 LPCY WAR CGV BKA lnlercepl 
1928-98 0.12920 3.4595 5.6459 -4,4321 
[0.42141] {1.2047] [1.5323] [0.82320] 
Equation K 46 LGPCY LTECH WAR RBZ lnt.ercept 
1953- 98 --0.75535 0.048124 0.80058 -0.065857 
[0.020572) (0.016280] {0.174821 [0.024256] 
Equation L 49 LGPCY LTECH CGV TFA Intercept 
1950-98 0.0 0.073525 0.13266 -0.029547 
[NONE] (0.031032] [0.051909] [0.010628] 
Equation M 49 LGPCY LTECH WAR TFA 
1950.98 0.0 -0.028808 0.1667 
[NONE] [0.011233] (0.034488] 
Equation N 71 LPCY G OPEN TREND 
1928- 98 -1.4493 4.0404 -0.016914 
[0.46307] (1.1551] [0.0042014] 
Table 15 
Summary of time series modelling results 
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Note: The colntegrating equations in thls table are given horizontally. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors of the 
coefficients. Variable descrlp~ons and definitions are given In the text and !n Appendix 4. Financial Indicators In bold. 
Although the monetary base aggregate, denoted by Currency in Circula-
tion [CIC], was found to be statistically significant, the empirical relationship with 
real output was found to be negative. This result is contrary to the positive rela-
tionship established in Rousseau's (1998) empirical study of Meiji-era Japan 
(1880-1913). The differences may be accounted for by omitted variables in 
Rousseau's trivariate model. Intuitively, a negative relationship between real in-
come and the monetary base is not surprising given the high incidence of infla-
tion tax and seigniorage revenue in less developed countries such as Zim-
babwe. Thus, theoretically, expansion of monetary aggregates could be harmful 
to real activity. In any case, the ratio of real currency in circulation to real GDP 
is expected to decrease as the economy evolves over time. Figure 7 shows that 
the ratio of Currency in Circulation has tended to decrease at a decreasing rate 
since 1964. The trend has occasionally been punctured by expansion phases 
noted in 1980 to 1982 and 1998 to 2000. 
Figure 7 
0.2 
0
·
0P924 1934 1944 1954 1964 19 4 1984 1994 
Years 
Currency in circulation to GOP 
/ CIC 
1998 
The econometric evidence on the relation between Government Size (G) 
and economic activity was found to be ambiguous. Although the coefficients on 
G are statistically significant, the variable enters VARs with wrong signs save 
for Equations D, E1 and N. Most researchers, for instance Levine, Loayza and 
Beck (2000, p55) and Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1992, p19) report negative co-
efficients on "non-productive" government spending. It must be noted that the 
series employed by Roubini and Sala-I-Martin (1992, p19) excludes expenditure 
on defence and education. The theoretical position is not crystal clear either. In 
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a Keynesian framework, government expenditure can stimulate economic activ-
ity. Persistent government deficits are, however, not sustaina~le. The financing 
of government deficits through the banking sector is known \lo be inflationary 
and detrimental to both financial and economic development. iithough the gov-
1 
ernment might benefit from financial repression, distorted in~~ntive structures 
and price signals curtail the capacity of financial intermediariE!_'s to monitor and 
'·'. 
screen projects. The resultant decrease in total factor pro~µctivity weakens 
macroeconomic activity. 
/G 
0.1 
o. ~i24 1934 1944 1954 1964 19 4 1984 19~4 11998 
Years 
Figure 8 Government expenditure to GDP 
The ratio of real Government Expenditure to real GDP in Zimbabwe is 
captured in Figure 8 above. Apart from the Federal decade (1953 to 1963) suc-
cessive government have not resisted the temptation to increase fiscal expen-
dihJre. A high government deficit is expected to retard growth. In fact, critics 
partially attributed the unfolding economic crisis in Zimbabwe to fiscal indisci-
pline. 
By late 2000, the country was in the midst of a serious economic 
crisis and was saddled with a sizeable stock of public debt and 
external payments arrears, while usable foreign reserv1.::s had 
dwindled and inflation was on an upward trend. [IMF Country Re-
port (2001, p5)] 
A substantial body of research suggests that the degree of openness to 
international trade [OPEN], measured as the sum of real exports and real im-
ports to real GDP, has a positive effect on economic activity. The literature on 
trade regimes suggests that reliance on autarky in a small economy diminishes 
prospects for technical progress, and allocative efficiency, while promoting rent 
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seeking activities. As expected, OPEN enters Equations D and N with the right 
sign and is statistically significant. The coefficients are economically large. 
In my view, the economic gains from openness to trade presuppose fa-
vourable mow~ments in terms of trade and current account balances [CABJ. 
CAB is an important conditioning variable used in this research in place of 
OPEN. The CAB of Zimbabwe for the period under review is illustrated in Figure 
9. In order to circumvent the calculation of logarithms on negative values on the 
convectional CAB, the series is derived from log (exports) minus log (imports). 
Figure 9 
24 1934 1944 1954 196419 41984 1994 
Years 
Zimbabwe current account balance 
/ CAB 
1998 
The diagram shows that Zimbabwe enjoyed a positive CAB during the 
Second World War when the country was challenged to supfJort the war effort in 
Europe. This phenomenon was reversed during the Federal era in which mas-
sive infrastructure projects we;e financed by foreign resources. Import substitu-
tion programmes introduced under UDI (1965 to 1980) when the country was 
placed under UN sponsored sanctions brought with them a healthy CAB. From 
1976 to 1980 the liberation war in the country worsened the position. Tile CAB 
only recovered at Independence in 1980 when the country was readmitted into 
the international community. Populist fiscal programmes reversed the situation. 
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Given the generally negative CAB, the variable enters Equations A, 8, C, t 
E2, F, and H with the expected negative :.ign and its coefficient is statistically 
significant. Statistically this implies that a high CAB is should lead to deterio-
rating economic activity in the long run. For this reason, policies that promote 
improved export performance, not just openness to trade, should lead to im-
proved economic performance. It follows that economic policy in Zimbabwe 
must pay particular attention to the exchange rate policy, tariff policy as well as 
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the attendant Marshall-Lerner condition i.e. sum of elasticises of exports and 
imports need to be greater than one. These issues may req~ire validation by 
research. \ 
I will now turn to Long Run Structural Modelling (LRS~\. It is well-known 
that the Johansen approach does not always result in unitllue cointegration 
" 
vectors. In Equation E, the banking sector [BKA] comprisin~.-of the Reserve 
Bank of Zimbabwe, discount houses, commercial banks, and Merchant banks is 
introduced as an alternative indicator of the degree of financial development. 
Two long run relationships, denoted by cointegrating vector ~1 and E2, were 
identified. Table 16 captures the original results. 
Table 16 
Banking sector estimated cointegrated vectors 
Estimated Cointegrated Vectors in Johansen Estimation (Normalized in Brackets) 
Cointegration with restricted intercepts and no trends in the VAR 
·················~···························································· 
71 observations from 1928 to 1998. Order of VAR = 4, chosen r =2, 
List of variables included in the cointegrating vector, 
LPCY CIC G CAB BKA 
Intercept 
Vector 
' 
Vector 
' C,CY • .24667 . 025882 
I ·1.0000) I -1.0000) 
CIC .24399 . 038426 
• 90915) I •1.4847) 
G .083901 .47566 
.34014) I -18.3705) 
CAB .11417 - . 60081 
.46287) I 23.2139) 
B><A -1.1251 ·1.4027 
-4, 5613) 54.1973) 
Intercept 2.0305 • .39196 
8.2316) 15.1452) 
As there are two cointegrated vectors r = 2, VAR requires two exactly 
identified restrictions on each r cointegrating vectors to begin the long run re-
striction iterations (See Pesaran and Pesaran pp 124 and 138). Subsequent re-
strictions can be introduced gradually one after another. The following restric-
tions were applied to normalise the vectors and eliminate unlikely variables. 
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Al=l; A4=0 
Bl=!; B3=0 
Where A stands for the first vector, B for the second and AI stands for 
the first parameter in vector A, etc. 
LPCY is the dependent variable, therefore the vectors were normalised 
by LPCY. The restriction A4 = o was added to eliminate variable CAB on the 
basis of a wrong sign on the coefficient. The coefficient on CAB should have a 
negative sign as was discussed before. Earlier on it was noted that the variable 
G has a questionable relationship with economic performance in the model 
hence the restriction B3 = O. The estimates converge after two iterations to 
give results depicted in Table 17 below. 
Table 17 
Banking sector exactly identified cointegration vectors 
ML estimates subject to exactly identifying restriction(s) 
Estimates of Restricted Cointegracing Relations (SE's in Brackets) 
converged after 2 iterations 
Cointegration with restricted intercepts and no trends in the VAR 
........................................ ,. ........ ,. ••••• ·'* ....... ,. ................ ,. ••••• ,.. 
71 observations from 1928 to 1998. Order of VAR~ 4, chosen r ~2. 
List of variables included in the cointegrating vector: 
LPCY CIC G CAB BKJ\ 
Intercept 
List of imposed restriction(s) on cointegrating vectors: 
a1=1 ; a4=0; bh,11 b3=0 
................................. ,.,. ............................................... . 
Vector 
' 
Vector 
' LPC'I 1.0000 1.0000 
*NONE*) *NONE*} 
c,c 
-1.0395 - .94420 
.42938) .40121) 
' 
- • 72097 O .00 
.34550) *NONE•) 
"'" 
0 .00 -.87628 
*NONE*) .40247) 
'"' 
5.7567 3.4936 
1,4076) 1.4238) 
Intercept -8.0909 -8.3572 
.98713) 1.0292) 
***"***********"**•*••••••*••• ••• "******** .......... "**''**** •• ,. .............. ****** 
LL subject to exactly identifying restrictions= 412.3368 
.............. ,. ..................... ,. ................... ,. ...... ,. ................ ,. .... . 
In both vectors, all variables enter the equations with expected signs and 
are statistically significant. There is, therefore, no statistical basis for further re-
strictions on the cointegrated vectors. The appropriate model can be selected 
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on the basis of theory. The theoretical model underlying this research posits 
that financial aggregates have a strong causal effect on grm.vtO. Following upon 
this hypothesis, vector A (EQ. E1) is chosen ahead of Bas it g\ves the strongest 
relationship between financial intermediation and economic perormance. 
Credit aggregates are some of the widely used measures of financial de-
" 
velopment. Beck, DemirgG9-Kunt, Levine (1999) and King and Levine (1993) 
popularised their use. These aggregates relate real private sebtor credit issued 
by various categories of financial intermediaries to real GDP. In this rese::irch, 
no reliance was placed on credit aggregates for a number of(reasons. The t,. 
pothesis that Private S·actor Credit by DMB contains a unit root was statistically 
rejected. As shown in Table 9, unit root properties of PCOBI and PCDFI sug-
gest the variables are integrated to the orders 1(2)and 1(3) respectively. Incor-
porating these variables in VAR would give rise to the spectre of spurious coln-
tegration. I avoided the temptation to difference these series, .as the practice is 
known to wash away the long run information contained in the original level 
form. Private Sector Credit by the Banking Sector (PCBK) did not contain useful 
information about real economic activity. 
From a statistical perspective, the unit root properties of credit aggre-
gates might have been influenced by the poor quality of the various series, 
which were partly constructed from second hand sources. Future researchers 
should strive to locate original sources such as the "Economic and Statistical 
Bulletin (1933 -1954)" and the "Quarterly Bulletin of Financial Statistics" either 
' 
at the National Archives or at the Central Statistics Office:: The present re-
' 
searcher could not exhaust all possible leads as he was baied in Australia at 
the time this research was conceived. Although I was able to visit Zimbabwe for 
' data collection purposes the expedition lasted only two weeks .. 
Theoretically, credit aggregates in Zimbabwe might not contain useful 
information on real economic activity due to fundamental weaknesses. A series 
of subsidised and I or directed credit schemes have been instituted in Zim-
babwe whose repayment record has been disastrous to say the least. I concur 
with Fry (1997, p760) that directed credit programmes increase delinquency 
and default rates and fragility of the financial system. Kane and Rice (2000, p5) 
describe "zombie banks" which are allowed to operate even when their net 
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worth has evaporated. Credit accumulation might have no relationship to eco-
nomic performance, if the financial institution is all but insolvent. Given these 
issues there is high risk that credit aggregates may not bear any relationship 
real asset values. Although difficult to swallow, financial repression continues to 
thrive in Zimbabwe. The constraints distort price signals, and factor productiv-
ity. 
8.2 Selected institutional determinants of development 
The institutional environment in which financial institutions must operate 
influences prospects for financial development and by extension economic ac-
tivity. In order to assess the econometric importance of proxies for the institu-
tional framework, the variables were introduced one at a time. To start with, in-
::-'-'-
-¥ 
dicators of financial development were temporarily removed from the model. " 
This approach allows for the direct evaluation of the informational content of en-
vironmental proxies in their own right. The practice also curbs fast exhaustion of 
degrees of freedom in VARs by minimising prospects for over parameterisation. 
Before proceeding, it must be noted that not all potentially useful legal 
and institutional variables are amenable to vector autoregressions. ln section 
5.3 it was noted that some indicators such as legal origin maybe time invariant 
hence not informative in time series analysis based on a single country. This 
section thus zeros in on those variables that can realistically vary with time. 
In Section 5.3, this thesis proposes the logarithm of telephone lines per 
capita (L TECH) as a new surmgate for dynamic efficiency. In recent years fi-
nancial innovations, including point of sale, telephone banking, automated teller 
machines (ATMS) as well as e-banking, have increasingly become reliant on 
informational technologies. Lynch (1993, p15) argues that financial develop-
ment should be reflected in increased sophistication of financial products, effi-
cient pricing, and reduction in information asymmetry. Van Horne (1985) argues 
that true financial innovations make the market mure efficient and I or more 
complete. Increased choice would suggest increased market completeness. Fi-
nancial instruments, like market products facilitates price arbitrage across time, 
markets and countries. In a small developing economy such as Zimbabwe, 
L TECH approximates the market's capacity to adopt new technology or ideas. 
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In order to test the hypothesis that the rate of technological use affects 
economic activity, the variable LTECH is introduced into a nunnber of VARs. In 
Equation 20, the coefficient on L TECH has the expected sign rind is statistically 
significant. The hypothesis is accepted. The standard errors at in parentheses. 
LGPCY "'0.032029 LTECH + 0.054199 G- 0.092516 CAB-0.050581 CIC )\• (20) 
" [0.010359] [0.0290721 [0.034535] [0.019275) 1·.·. 
' 
As a starting point, no allowance has been made t8r intercepts and 
trends. The initial coefficient on G, however, is not statistically significant. The 
model in Equation 20 was then expanded to include restricted intercepts. 
Equation F, in Table 15 above, gives the revised estimates. The vector autare-
gressions yield a slight improvement on importance of G (t raiio increases from 
1.86 to 1.90) but the variable remains marginally insignificant. 
In Equation 21, the coefficient on variable G is restricted to zero, and the 
monetary sector [CIC] is excluded from the model to assess the robustness of 
the VARs results. The results show that LTECH significantly affects economic 
activity but the current account balance [CAB] is now statistically insignificant. 
LGPCY :: 0.031720 LTECH + 0.00 G - 0.036713 CAB - 0.046000 !ntercept (21) 
[0.0092560) [NONEl [0.020571] [0.009178] 
If the coefficient on CAB is restricted to zero, the variable L TECH is still statisti-
cally significant. Equation G, in Table 15, gives the relevant estimates. 
In an artificial model without intercepts and trends, a vector autoregres-
sion model involving LGPCY, L TECH, G, CAB and CIC had statistically signifi-
cant coefficients except for the CIC, the monetary base. The_l·respective coeffi-
cients together with the standard errors are reported in Equation 22. 
LGPCY :: 0.041915 LTECH +0.077472 G-0.098965 CAB- 0.016667 ClC (22) 
[0.010395) [0.030716] [0.038151] [0.012599] 
Although Equation 20 has identical variables with Equation 22, the pa-
rameters are different because the former model incorporates unrestricted in-
tercepts, whereas the cointegration relationship in the later contains no inter-
cepts or trends. Variable CIC is rendered statistically insignificant in Equation 
22. This result provides a statistical justification to restrict the coefficient on CIC 
to zero. Equation H, in Table 15 above, gives the resultant estimates. All the 
remaining variables are statistically significant. In classical theoretical para-
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-digms, insignificant monetary aggregates support the monetary neutrality view. 
There is no basis to draw strong conclusions to this effect in this study. 
Other important preconditions for financial sector developr,1ent are 
macro-economic stability and sound regulation. I agree with Lynch (1993, p12), 
however, that the financial system thrives "upon expectations, not regulation ... " 
Confidence or trust, whether fostered by good reputation, good governance, 
and I or contract enforcement is a key ingredient in financial intermediary devel-
opment. Given these issues, institutional variables that affect expectations and 
confidence should be potentially informative about both financial and economic 
development. Periods of armed conflict [\,VAR] and change in govern~ent 
[CGV] often bring with them sharp changes in perceptions. 
In what follows in this sub section, I will briefly consider these proxies. 
Equation I, in Table 15, duplicated as Equation 23 for exposition purposes, sug-
gests that both CGV and the banking sector [BKA] have a positive relationship 
with economic activity. The coefficients on CGV and BKA are statistically sig-
nificant and economically large. Intuitively, the sign on the coefficient of CGV is 
at best ambiguous. On one hand too much change in government might be a 
source of instability and uncertainty, hence could negatively impact on eco-
nomic activity. On the other hand, if governments are elected into office on the 
basis of expected performance, an occasional change in government is implic-
itly a function of the highest collective expected return. 
LGPCY = 4.0593 CGV + 5.8362 BKA- 4.4803 Intercept (21)) 
[1.6836} J1.9562] [1.0176] 
Equation J, in Table 15, expands on Equation 23 via addition of the vari-
able WAR. The results in J suggest that WAR is the only uninformative variable 
in the model. A different picture is portrayed in Equation K, represented by 
Equation 24 below. Although all the variables are statistically significant, the 
signs on the coefficients of L TECH and WAR appear to be reversed. There is 
no theoretical justification for the empirical relationship demonstrated therein. 
LGPCY = - 0.075535 LTECH + 0.048124 WAR +0.80058 RBZ- 0.065857 Intercept (24) 
[0.020572] [0.0162801 [0.17482] j0.024256] 
In Equation 25, corresponding to Equation L in Table 15, the coefficient of 
LTECH is restricted to zero, and Total Financial Assets (TFA] represents the 
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financial intermediary sector. To be precise, TFA is a summation of the assets 
of RBZ, DMB, OBI, insurance, and the Zimbabwe Developmem Bank (ZDB). 
LGPCY = 0.00 L TECH + 0.073525 CGV + 0.13266 TFA- 0.029547 Intercept I (25) 
[NONE] [0.0~1032] [0.051909] (0.010628] 
1: 
The coefficients of all variables in the model appear to have lborrect signs and 
" are statistically significant. The LR test suggests the restriction on L TECH can-
not be rejected. L TECH, therefore, seems not to be very inforM-ative when used 
simultaneously with indicators of financial development. Computations obtained 
in Equation M provide further support to this conclusion. To degin with, the co-
efficients on variable L TECH and the intercept were noted to be statistically in-
significant. L TECH remained statistically insignificant when the intercept was 
restricted to zero. Lastly the LR Test on restrictions on both LTECH and the in-
tercept cannot be statistically rejected. 
8.3 Exploratory remarks on financial efficiency 
There are no adequate time series data to assess the efficiency of the 
Zimbabwean Financial System in a vector autoregression framework. Thus, this 
section turns to descriptive and graphical techniques to draw insights on the ef-
ficiency of the financial system. In section 5.2, reference was made to three 
fr1rms of financial system efficiency discussed in The Campbell Committee's 
(1981) Final Report. Briefly these are allocative efficiency, operational or tech-
nical efficiency, and dynamic efficiency. This section focuse~ on technical effi-
ciency, which is typically assessed using bank level accountir,g data. Kam Hon 
Chu (1999, p754), for instance, uses profitability measures spch as returns on 
assets (ROA), deposits (ROD), loans (ROL), and net worth (ROK) as proxies for 
bank quality. Other standard indicators of performance used in the banking 
profession include the net interest margin (NIM); overhead costs etc. Bank level 
data is not readily accP.ssible in Zimbabwe. As a result, much of what follows 
relies on interest trends and spreads. 
Positive real interest rates are a fundamental precondition of financial 
development. Lynch (1993, p12-14) regards real deposit interest rates as the 
most important financial prices. Efficient pricing mechanisms are responsive to 
changing economic conditions. In Zimbabwe, the real interest rate on commer-
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cial banks' three months saving deposits has generally been negative over time. 
The trends in real commercial bank deposits rates (CMDR) captured in Figure 
10, suggests that pricing mechanisms in the Zimbabwean Financial System are 
inefficient. The difficult macroeconomic conditions experienced in the years 
1991/2 and 1998 to 2000 witnessed acute decreases in real deposit rates. For 
instance, CMDR was about - 27.09% in 1992 and - 30.8 % in 2000. 
% 
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Sources: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ); Central Statistic Office (CSO), Real inter-
est rates are own computations. 
Figure 10 Trends in commercial banks' real deposit rates 
Negative real deposit interest rates on savings are not confined to com-
mercial banks alone. Government has, by direct regulation, kept the nominal 
interests rates at building societies and the POSB at artificially low levels. 
Building societies and the state owned POSB are in direct competition as they 
are exposed to similar interest rates and target the same deposit base. 
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Figure 11 Trends in other real interest rates for savings 
Figure 11 shows the declining trend in real interest rates paid on saving 
deposits placed with building societies (BSSR) [top haln and the POSS (POSR) 
[bottom haln. The trends depicted by real interest rates suggest that "investors" 
loose value rather than preserve money placed in savings de~osits. It seems to 
me interest rates are not related to economic fundamentals and inefficient This 
' 
confirms the view that small depositors subsidise government; banks, or both. 
The spread between nominal deposit and lending interest rates is also 
indicative of the degree of financial development. According to Gurley and 
Shaw (1956, p259) the margin between financial intermediaries' borrowing and 
lending rates is their "compensativn for the special services they supply." Lynch 
(1993, p14) reiterates that a large discrepancy between nominal and real inter-
est rates as well indicates "a failure of interest rates to adjust fully to changes in 
inflation expectations." An efficient or developed financial system requires low 
transaction costs. Margins in efficient markets are low and turnover high to sup-
port optimal financial deepening. In the Zimbabwean context, the margin be-
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tween nominal deposit and lending rates (MGN) for commercial banks has been 
increasing since economic liberalisation in 1990. Figure 12 below for provides 
graphical details of the trend. Betwee,1 1950 and 1970 the spread was pegged 
within the range of 2.5 to 3.5 percentage points. The margin rose from 4.5 in the 
1970s to 4.75 percentage ~oints in the 1980s. And by year 2000 the margin had 
gone up to 60.5 percentage points. Low margins prior to liberalisation, suggest 
suppressed market forces rather than a once were efficient financial system. 
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Figure 12 Spread between deposit and lending rates 
The traditional measures of financial institutions efficiency discussed in 
this section so far are imperfect standards upon which to rank the intensity of 
focus with which the financial system supports real activity. According to 
Schumpeter (1936, p126) "the main function of the money or capital market is 
trading credit for the purpose of financing development." In his view the "pulse" 
of aggregate economic activity is first and foremost reflected in the money and 
capital markets. 
The money market is always, as it were, the headquarters of the 
capitalist system, from which orders go out to its individual divi-
sions, and that which is debated and decided there is always in 
essence the settlement of plans for further development. All kinds 
of credit requirements come to this market; all kinds of economic 
projects are first broui;,ht into relation with one another, and con-
tent for their realisation in it; all kinds of purchasing power, bal-
ances of every sort, flow to it to be sold. (Ibid) 
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Given these issues, I hereby propose a new measure of,efficiency, which 
presumably refiects the degree to which financial institutions ~upport real activ-
ity. Mathematically, Equation 26 below gives the new surrogat~ of efficiency: 
DRIFT= Excess Liquid Assets or Excess Liquid Assets
1
l!*IOO% (2G) 
Private Sector Credit Loans and Advances,\, 
" 
By way of justification, it will be remembered that Pri~ate Sector Credit 
" (PSC) is one of the several measures of the "activity" of finari'cial institutions .. 1 
will assume PSC, unlike total deposits for instance, embodie~ the mechanisms 
with which a financial system applies financial resources to real activity. Being 
an absolute measure of activity, it does not capture leakages or efficiency of the 
' financial intermediaries. In Equation 26, excess liquid assets (ELA) represent 
resources not channelled to the productive or real sector.x In practical terms, 
ELA are determined by the difference between actual liquid assets and pre-
scribed liquid assets. This definition assumes regulatory authorities know the 
right amount and type of liquid assets required to guarantee financial safety. In 
general liquid assets of the Zimbabwean commercial banks, for instance, com-
prise of (i) notes and coin, (ii) balances with the central bank, (iii) money at call 
with discount houses, and (iv) bills which may be Treasury, Trade, Parastatal, 
Municipal, and Cental Bank in origin. In a developing economy such assets are 
more beneficial to governn1ent rather than financing real sector development. 
It is my proposition that low values of DRIFT provide evidence of greater 
focus on financial intermediation activities beneficial to real activity and vice 
' 
versa. In theory DRIFT is an appropriate measure of efficiencY at least in devel-
' 
oping countries where loans and advances are the major soUrce of external fi-
nance. In these economies the market for sophisticated financial products such 
' 
as derivatives, commercial paper, etc. is not fully developed. Holmstrom and 
Tirole (1997) provide theoretical support that SMEs, which dominate developing 
economies, naturally depend on banks for credit. 
x "Money hoarded is seldom well spent," advises Bartlett (1987,p64). ln Myers and Rajan {1998) a very 
liquid stock increases managerial discretion and thus increases agency costs. There are well-known 
agency problems and moral hazard issues raised in financial literature against idle resources. Idle re-
sources encourage managers to indulge in effort aversion, and craft schemes that hinder the development 
of the market for corporate control. In Diamond and Rajan 's ( 1998) model, bank managers do not create 
value but merely redistribute cash flows once the loan is made. ll1erefore excesses liquid assets have po-
tential to decreases allocative, technical and dynamic efficiency. 
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A word of caution is proper. There is a hotly disputed trade off between 
financial stability and efficiency. Excess liquid assets are not necessarily idle 
resources. It is generally agreed that the main distinction between commercial 
banks and other financial institutions lies in the fact that liabilities of commercial 
banks act as a media of exchange. Gurley and Shaw (1955, p262) exude, 
As intermediaries, banks buy primary securities and issue, in 
payment for them, deposits and currencyY. As the payment 
mechanism, banks transfer title to means of payment on demand 
by customers. . .. As managers of the payments mechanism, 
banks cannot afford a shadow of insolvency. As intermediaries in 
a growing economy, the banks may rightly be tempted to wildcat. 
Solvency and liquidity of the financial intermediaries is valuable to the 
stability of the payment system. A high stock of liquid assets thus guarantees 
the safety of a financial institution. Although a high stock of liquid assets is as-
sociated with agency problems and moral ha:zard issues, Calomiris and Khan 
(1993), cited in Freixas and Rochel (1997, p17) on the contrary consider the 
"immediate withdrawability", that is ability to withdraw demand deposits on sight, 
as an adequate tool for disciplining managers. 
For practical purposes high liquidity may be associated with prudent 
banking. Kam Hon Chu (1999, p754) uses liquid assets as a proxy for the pro-
portion of risk-free assets held. Such an approach is based on a free market 
separating equilibrium where "a good bank signals its quality by offering a lower 
deposit rate and holding a higher proportion of liquid, risk free assets than a bad 
bank," (Ibid, p749). However, I agree with Goodhart (1988) who argued that in 
both the real and asymmetrical world, a higher rate of return signals either 
greater efficiency or greater risk. The market for lemons (i.e. second hand cars) 
modelled in Akerlof (1970), in which low quality cars drive out high quality cars, 
demonstrates that quality is difficult to observe. The true condition of financial 
institutions is even more difficult to evaluate. In banking circles, poor accounting 
standards; poor corporate governance; lack of accountability and transparency 
could disguise the level of non-performing loans and hence the true financial 
Y I however, agree wi.!1 Clarke ( 1986, p53 n5) who challenges accuracy of the view that primary securi-
ties are only issued by non-financial institutions since banks can access the capital markets should they 
wish and are authorisf:cl by regulatory authorities to be listed on the stock exchange. 
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condition of the institution. In developing countries there is however no reliable 
long series of bad debt provisions. ,I 
To recollect, I have proposed that holding excessive !liquid assets is a 
sign of inefficient intermediation. The measure focuses o~ excess liquidity 
rather than liquidity per se. This type of inefficiency, labelled pRIFT for easy of i 
identification, is given by the ratio of excess liquid assets (EtA) to Loans and 
u, 
Advances and expressed as a percentage. The Zimbabwe tir.iancial system is 
hereby evaluated against the new concept of inefficiency being hypothesised. 
Figures 13 to 16 set out the empirical measures of in~fficiency, charac-
terised as DRIFT, of the selected four financial institution categories. Analysis of 
the graphs indicates that the ratios of ELA to Loans and Adv8nces of commer-
cial banks (CELA), merchant banks (MELA), finance houses (FELA), and 
building societies (BELA) met with different but not entirely distinct experiences. 
The empirical evidence suggests that between 1975 and .1980 commercial 
banks and merchant banks (Figures 13 and 14) were not intensely focused on 
the type of financial intermediation envisaged to be beneficial to real activity. 
DRIFT was as high as 108.99% and 98.86% in 1975 and 1980 respectively for 
merchant banks. The respective DRIFT in commercial banks was 23.91% and 
27.91%. The two types of institutions were more focused between 1981 and 
1990. DRIFT was on average 8.37% for commercial banks and 15.36% for 
merchant banks. From 1986 to 1991 merchant banks had a DRIFT below 10% 
except for 1987 when a DRIFT of 10,58% was registered. Following introduc-
tion of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) in 1990, DRIFT 
on average remained low among commercial and merchant banks. Evidence 
based on the available data suggests that the situation changed dramatically 
from 1994 following the partial liberalisation of the capital account. Introduction 
of foreign currency denominated accounts (FCAs), market detemiined ex-
change rate, reduction in exchange controls, and the opening up of the ZSE to 
foreign investors brought with them new opportunities for the banks. All catego-
ries of financial institutions had more incentives to pursue lucrative investments 
in the money market at the expense of traditional loans and advances. This 
trend was more discernible in the memorable year of 2000, in which exorbitant 
interest rates fuelled a resurgent money market, at a time the real sector faced 
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near collapse. A controversial interest regime was introduced by regulation in 
2001. 
.• ~"· . 
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Figure 13 ELA to loans and advances: commercial banks 
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Figure 14 Excess liquid assets to loans and advances: merchant banks 
The interest regime introduced in 2001 is outside the scope of this analy-
sis. This said, its time to train my attention on finance houses and building so-
cieties. The empirical experiences of these financial institutions are captured in 
Figures 15 and 16. In comparative tenms, DRIFT was low in both finance 
houses and building societies relative to commercial and merchant banks prior 
to 1994. For the period under review, 1975 to 2000, finance house DRIFT has 
always been below 10%. The evidence suggests that finance houses have on 
average increased their support of real activity. Figure 15, however, shows that 
finance houses could not resist the temptation t.o join the financial-sector-wide 
shift to money market activities between 1998 and 2000. 
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Building societies had great focus on financing real activity prior to 1993. 
From 1975 to 1985 DRIFT was on average 6.08%. First signs gf departure were 
registered between 1986 and 1989 when on average DRIFlj rose to 11.40%. 
Following ESAP, there was a significant shift to monetary inst~ments. 
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Figure 15 Excess liquid assets to loans and advances: finance houses 
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Figure 16 Excess liquid assets to loans and advances: building socie-
ties r 
The trends in commercial and merchant bank DRIFT: appear to be in-
versely related to developments in real GDP. [This ls a descriptive comparison, 
and no causality is being suggested.] In Figure 17 GDP was on a downward 
trend from 1975 to 1978. In real terms the decade 1980 to 1990, was on aver-
age a period of prosperity. The Economic Structural Adjustment Programme 
[ESAP] (1990 to 1995) was accompanied by economic stagnation in real terms. 
There was a sharp decrease in economic activity for the period 1998 to 2000. 
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Figure 17 Trends in real GDP: 1975 - 2000 
/ Real GDP 
The Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe bases the Liquid Asset Requirements 
(LAR) on the respective institution's liabilities to the public as at previous month 
end. Table 18 !temises the prescribed LAR requirements and the actual liquid 
asset ratios of the respective institutions. From 1975 to mid 1978 ccmmercial 
banks in Zimbabwe had liquidity ratios of 30 to 40 % against a prescribed limit 
of 25 %. The RBZ was compelled to increase the minimum ratio to 35 % in May 
1979 when the commercial banks' liquid assets rose to 45 %. The intention then 
was to reduce domestic credit expansion. Merchant banks had actual holdings 
ranging from 40% to 70% against a 20 % statutory base. In contrast, the aver-
age LAR of finance houses was 23 % against a base limit of 20%. 
It is wrong to suggest that banks strive to keep a healthy buffer between 
the prescribed and actual LAR. High statutory ratios of the 1980s were accom-
panied by wide margins typical of the late 1970s. Although the prescribed LAR 
decreased dramatically to 10% in 1991 no corresponding buffer was witnessed 
until the advent of financial liberalisation in 1994. High nominal interest rates 
from 1999 to 2000 led to huge gaps between the prescribed and actual LARs. 
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Table 18 
Required reserves and liquid asset ratios - percentages 
1975 1976 1977 1918 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1"' 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
RRR: 
DMB 17.5 17.5 20.0 20.0 25.0 30.0 30.0 
FH 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 
LAR, 
Commercial: 
Prescribed 25 25 25 25 35 35 35 35 30 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Actual 40 37 35 41 53 48 42 40 37 .. 46 44 45 42 .. .. 11 13 15 29 31 26 27 23 31 25 
Merchant: 
Presaibed 20 20 20 20 30 30 30 30 30 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Actua! 61 60 49 63 64 60 52 .. 44 47 48 .. 49 43 41 47 18 25 36 
" " 
106 
" 
87 116 66 
F/Hoines: 
PresCfloed 15 15 15 15 15 15 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 15 15 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Actual 22 20 22 22 22 21 26 24 25 24 25 24 27 22 22 15 13 15 15 12 11 12 11 12 18 15 
BlSocleUes 
Prescribed 15 15 15 15 20 
- 20 20 -20··-·-20 15 15 15 15 15 15 ~ 15- 10 10·-10 -,, 10 - -:=:io.:::c·-::1(E'"------w=-ro- "--10 
Actual 18 19 20 21 25 25 23 Z7 23 18 22 23 21 25 24 20 15 13 36 55 67 65 81 51 62 75 
Sources: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) QESR Vol. 22 No. 3-4; International Monetary Fund [IMF] (2001) Country Report No. 01/13, p65. 
Notes: RRR = Required Reserve Ratio; DMB = Demand Deposit Banks; FH = Finance Houses; LAR = Liquid Asset Ratio; Commercial = Commercial Banks; etc. 
The base for LAR is liabilities to the public since May 1981(1MF advises). In contrast. the base for DRIFT is either private sector credit or loans and advances. 
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In January 2001, controversial regulations by monetary authorities forced 
the collapse of money market rates from about 80% to below 20%. This time 
around no changes were made to the statutory LAR. The RRR for demand de-
posit banks was, however, increased to 50% of total current and call deposits; 
and 20% of savings and fixed deposits. Furthermore, a credit scheme was put 
in place by the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe to prop up the real sector rather 
than curtail credit expansion. The statutory reserves placed with the Central 
Bank were made available to participating institutions for on lending to the ex-
port sector at 15% and the balance to the productive sector at 30%. Although it 
is too early to evaluate the merits and shortcomings of the "Statutory Reserves 
Facility", early indications are that the forced collapse of money market interest 
rates to levels several times below the rate of inflation fuelled speculative activ-
ity on the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE). 
For the stock market, measures of efficiency include stock traded value 
to GDP, TVT for short; and the turnover ratio (TOV), i.e. turnover value to mar-
ket capitalisation. To start with, the absolute size of the stock market. as meas-
ured by market capitalisation to GDP (SMC) in real terms is illustrated in Figure 
18. Very briefly, the stock market nearly collapsed in 1984 when market capi-
talisation fell lo 0.04% of real GDP. Except for the drought-induced dip in 1992, 
the 1990s were periods of increased activity. Opening up of the market to for-
eign investors from 1994 facilitated increased activity on the market. 
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Sources: IFC "Emerging Stock Markets Factbookff - various; The ZSE ~The Investor s' and fi· 
nancial Markets Handbook" - Issue Four 
Figure 18 Stock market capitalisation to GDP 
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Academic work on market microstructure theory measu,res stock market 
efficiency in terms of market liquidity. Typical dimensions of ~rrket liquidity are 
tightness, depth and resiliency. The Bank of International fettlements [BIS] 
(1999, p14) defines tightness as the gap between quoted prier and transaction 
prices. The quoted spreads are based on the quoted bid. and ask prices, 1\, 
whereas the effective spread relates to the actual transaction :!]rices. Market re-
,·., 
siliency "refers either to the speed with which price fluctuati9ris resulting from 
... 
trades are dissipated, or the speed with which imbalances i'n order flows are 
adjusted, (Ibid, p13)." Tightness and resilience are mentione~ herein for com-
pleteness because there is no readily available data to empirically evaluate the 
tightness and resilience of the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange. 
According to the BIS, depth has two attributes: (1) the amount of orders 
at a given time or (2) the volume of trade which can be undertaken without af-
fecting prevailing prices. The usual proxy for market depth is.given by turnover 
values per given period of time. Figures 19 and 20 capture some common 
measures of stock market efficiency for the ZSE. Although total stock value 
._, 
traded to GDP (lVT) has risen from 0.0012% in 1984 to 0.048 % in 2000, the !Ji 
proportion is still very insignificant. 
I lVT 
IFC "Emerging Stock Markets Factbook" - various; The ZSE "The lnvesto~ s' and financial Mar-
kets Handbook" - Issue Four 
Figure 19 Total value traded to GDP 
Buoyed by independence in 1980, international goodwill, and the resul-
tant lifting of UDI era sanctions, the equities industry registered a stock market 
turnover (TOV) of 19.2%, 17.48%, and 12.97% in 1981, 1982 and 1983 respec-
tively in contrast to 8.8% recorded in 1980. The retention of Rhodesian era strict 
223 
exchange controls barring foreign investors from the bourse, a civil war, and fis-
cal imprudence shot down the euphoria. The period 1984 to 1993 was charac- .;; 
f,, 
terised by stock exchange inactivity with an average turnover of 3.18%. Finan- ~ 
v 
cial liberalisation initiatives introduced in 1994 breathed a new lease of life on ) 
the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange. Early successes include the listing of the min- ; 
ing giant, Ashanti Goldfields in 1996. Since then there are signs that the ZSE is l 
increasing its contribution to economic activity. "i 
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5 
\lg7~5~~---~-,-t,~~.,.,-,,~~t--~=1. 
Years 
I TOV 
Sources: lFC "Emerging Stock Markets Factbook" - various; The ZSE "The Investor s' and fi-
nancial Markets Handbook" - Issue Four 
Figure 20 Stock market turnover 1980 • 2000 
Bayoumi (1999, pp 5 and 35) employs the real stock prices computed by 
dividing the main stock index by the GDP deflater as a determinant of real ac-
tivity. Figure 21 charts the profiles of the Zimbabwean Industrial Price Index 
(IPI) and the Value Traded Index (VTI) in real terms. The emerging pattern 
points to increasing economic activity from 1960 to 1975, 1980 to 1981, 1990, 
and 1994 to 2000. Economic expectations were low from 1976 - 9 and 1983 to 
1987. 
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I Real VTI 
Sources: Sources: Central Statistics Office (CSO) "Monthly Digest of Statistics" - various. The 
ZSE "The Investors' and financial Markets Handbook" - Issue Four 
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Figure 21 Real Industrial Price Index and Value Traded Index 
8.4 Short run dynamics 
' 
,I 
I 
I 
I 
Having dwelt at length on long run empirical regularitit's that character-
, . 
ises the Zimbabwean Financial System, it remains essenti3'\ to analyse the 
1r 
econometric importance of the model's short run dynamics. Th0re are too many 
permutations in this direction, given the number of cointegr.rting vectors esti-
mated through VAR analysis in sections 8.1 and 8.2. This research selects a 
few cointegration relationships for discussion due to space limitations. Precisely 
' 
this section will initially be confined to Equations A, B, and E from Table 15. 
Years 
' 
Figure 22 PP of the effect of a system-wide shock to Equation A 
I 
' 
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Figure 23 PP of the effect of a system-wide shock to Equation B 
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Figure 24 PP of the effect of a system-wide shock to Equation E 
Figures 22 to 24 plot the persistence profiles (PP) of the effect of a sys-
tem-wide shock to the respective equations to examine the length of time it 
takes the different systems to return to the equilibrium relationship. Figure 22 
indicates that Equation A converges after 5 years. About 85 % adjustment oc-
curs in Year 1. Equation B, which substitutes DMB in Equation A with LQL as 
the financial intermediation indicator takes about 7 years to eliminate the effect 
of a system-wide shock. Turning attention to Figure 24, which incorporates dif-
ferent indicators for both macroeconomic activity and financial intermediation 
reveals that shocks are more persistent. It takes cointegrating vectors (CV) E1 
and E2 approximately 25 and 30 years respectively complete the adjustment. 
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In the interest of lucidity and brevity, I will henceforth focys on Equation A 
to analyse the short run dynamics of the model. In Figures 25}o 29 the Gener-
alised Impulse Response (GIR) analysis is employed to deterrine the effect of 
variable or equation specific shocks on the cointegrating vect\r A. More specifi-
cally, the Figures plot the GIR of a unit, that is one standard arror (S.E.), shock 
1\ I 
on LGPCY, CIC, G, CAB, and DMB respectively upon the mo~eL No upper and 
,·., 
lower bands were considered. The negotive impact of a sh9,Ck in macroeco-
... 
nomic activity, LGPCY in Figure 25, lasts for about 6 years. A'one standard de-
viation in either the monetary base (CIC) or government si4e (G) leads to a 
positive impact on the cointegrating vector. The greatest imprbvement is within 
the first five years although the shock persists for about 12 Yetars. A unit shock 
on the trade sector, CAB, takes about 15 years to completely dissipate. 
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Figure 25 GIR to one S.E. shock in the equation for LGPCY 
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Figure 26 GIR to one S.E. shock in the equation for CIC 
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Figure 27 GIR to one S.E. shock in the equation for G 
I CV1 
From the GIR in Figure 28, the initial response to a shock on interna-
tional trade is negative, but is quickly rectified in the two to four years horizon. A 
positive ndjustment Is realised between the fifth and the seventh year. It seems 
that some cyclical fluctuations appear again in the year 8 to 15 horizon before 
the effect of the shock disappears altogether. 
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Figure 2ij GIR to one S.E. shock in the equation for CAB 
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Figure 29 GIR to one S.E. shock in the equation for DMB 
• 
Figure 29 suggests that the GIR for the financial intermediation indicator, 
DMB, generally results in increased macroeconomic activity up to year six. A 
small second year negative fluctuation is, however, experienced. The effect of 
the shock on the cointegrating vector disappears between year 12 and 25. In 
terms of magnitude, the adjustments after the six-year horizon are relatively mi-
nor. Overall, the GIR supports the view that financial sector development has a 
positive impact on macroeconomic activity. As in all impulse response analyses, 
the conclusions reached here must be interpreted with caution. Hoffman and 
Rasche (1997, p60) correctly point out that the patterns and length of adjust-
ment time are completely sensitive to the data used in the VAR model. 
I have so far considered the effects of system-wide and variable-specific 
' 
shocks on the cointegrating vector. Figures 30 to 34 preserit the dynamic ef-
' fects of a simulated shock on a given variable on all the individual variables in 
constituting the colntegrating VAR relationship. In some cases, the generalised 
impulse response functions (GIRF) fluctuate considerably at ~hart horizons. 
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Figure 30 GIRs to one S.E. shock in the equation for LGPCY 
S.E. 
0.10 
0.08 t7~;;;;;;;;:;;:;;:;;:;;:;;:;;:;;:;;:;;:;;:;;=: 
0.06 
0.04 
0.02 
0.00 Hl,-A.__..-=========~ 
-0.02 
-0.04 
-0.06 .l--1--+--+-+--±-+--+-+--+----l 
0 
Years 
After 
Figure 31 GIRs to one S.E. shock in the equation for CIC 
/ LGPCY 
/ CIC 
/ G 
/ CAB 
/ DMB 
The generalised impulse responses (GIRs) of the macroeconomic vari-
able, LGPCY, are given In Figure 30. A unit shock on LGPCY has a permanent 
positive impact on the variables LGPCY, CAB, and CIC - the monetary base. 
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Figure 32 GIRs to one S.E. shock in the equation for G 
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Figure 33 GIRs to one S.E. shock in the equation for CAB 
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Figure 34 GIRs to one S.E. shock in the equation for DMB 
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Negative adjustments are noted on government size (G) and the financial 
intermediation sector (DMB). Positive effects take between 10 to 15 years to 
reach the "stead state" values. Negative fluctuations require longer periods to 
adjust to their steady state values. The negative reaction of the financial sector 
to a shock in macroeconomic activity is not consistent with theory, because a 
thriving economy should logically foster financial sector development. In prac-
tice, the persistence of profitability in the Zimbabwean financial sector at times 
when economic fundamentals is yet another empirical puzzle. 
In Figure 31, the monetary base positively affects government size (G), 
the financial sector (DMB) and own variable (CIC). There is a strong negative 
reaction on the current account balance (CAB), which reaches its deepest point 
in year six. There is a strong adjustment to economic activity in year 1, but the 
shock is transitory. The pattern in Figure 31 suggests that LGPCY is the only 
variable whose effect eventually diminishes to zero. 
A different pattern emerges in Figure 32 where a unit shock on G yields 
negative, but close to zero, steady state values on LGPCY and CAB. A large 
negative effect is projected on the monetary base. The responses of DMB and 
the fiscal sector itself suggest large permanent positive effocts. Turning to Fig-
ure 33, a unit shock to the international trade sector generates a positive effect 
on all variables in the model. The shock generates relatively higher steady state. 
values in own variable (CAB) and the fiscal sector (G), while LGPCY and DMB 
complete their adjustments with values that are close to zero. 
Next, Figure 34 examines the dynamic effects of a simulated shock on 
the financial sector upon all other variables. The graph establishes that finandal 
aggregates positively affect the fiscal sector (G) and own variable (DMB). The 
response pattern suggests that the effect on the monetary base reaches zero in 
year four, before settling for a positive steady state value in the 10 and 15 years 
time horizon. The initial effect on the current account balance (CAB) in year 1 
(one) is positive, but jumps to a negative value in year 3. It reaches its deepest 
point in year 5. Turning to LGPCY, an indicator of macroeconomic activity, 
points to a response that fluctuates over time. Initially a shock in the financial 
sector produces a positive effect on economic activity up to year 4. Thereafter 
the adjustment is slightly negative, but settles for a steady state value close to 
232 
~: 
' 
' 
' 
' 
il 
' 
zero. This pattern suggests that a series of innovations in thy financial sector 
might be necessary to sustain long run positive responses in LGPCY. In theory, 
,I 
variable specific shocks are, however, ambiguous and may prsist forever, Pe-
saran and Pesaran (1997, p444- 5). In Figure 34, only LGP<JlY and CAB have 
steady state values close to zero, while the rest positive stJ~dy state adjust-
11., 
ments. Ideally standard error bounds (plus and minus one s(iilndard deviation) 
,:, 
could be computed and displayed around the point estimate~ ,to determine the 
... 
statistical significance of whether the response functions are bounded away 
from zero. There is no guidance in Microfit to this effect althvugh Garratt et al 
(1999, p18 n25) suggest otherwisG. 
Short run dynamics can also be analysed through the forecast error vari-
ance decomposition (VDC) analysis and the vector error correction model 
(VECM) specification. Impulse responses and VECM analysis are regarded as 
within-sample causality tests. Variance decomposition ana)yses are out-of-
sample causality tests, which quantify the forecast error variance of each vari-
able into components that can be attributed to innovations in each variable in 
the system including its own. In other words, VDC breaks down the variance of 
the forecast error for each variable into proportions that are accounted for by 
previous changes in each variable in the system. Generalised VDC, unlike or-
thogonalized variance decomposition, is philosophically attractive as it is not 
sensitive to the ordering of the variables. A deficiency of generalised VOC, 
however, is that there are no perfect percentage decompositions because the 
relative weights of the forecast error variance do not add up ~o 100%, contrary 
to the case with orthogonalized VDC. 
Table 19 below summarises the decomposition information attributed to 
each of the lagged variables over six different time horizons, viz Years 1, 5, 10, 
20, 30 and 50. The principal diagonal values in each horizon estimate the de-
gree of exogeneity for each variable. In fact, the diagonal measures the extent 
to which a variable's own variance is determined by innovations in its own vari-
able over the forecast horizon. A completely independent variable is exclusively 
forecast from its own lagged values. It follows that its forecast error variance is 
entirely explained by its own disturbances. In other cases, the contribution of 
other variables (extent of endogeneity) is explained by the off diagonal values. 
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Table 19 
Generalised Forecast Error Variance Decomposition Analyses 
Percentage of Forecast Variance Explained by Innovations In: 
Horizon LGPCY CIC G CAB OMB 
Relative Variance Jn: 
1 Year LGPCY 94.61 25.83 32.64 1.25 64.00 
CIC 10.99 79.45 5.32 0.42 18.29 
G 21.48 8.73 95.36 16.35 16.34 
CAB 1.02 0.20 5.68 97.42 3.17 
OMB 57.16 34.70 23.44 2.99 97.61 
LGPCY 86.18 22.34 30.47 4.72 61.67 
5 Years CIC 11.19 39.08 5.49 7.97 3.80 
G 14,63 11.63 77.93 37.53 20.90 
CAB 2.7!i 1.98 3.73 89.03 1.81 
OMB 38.19 23.33 19.15 5.60 86.93 
LGPCY 80.24 18.91 30.27 5.92 59.72 
10 Years CIC 12.10 28.16 6.09 10.10 2.20 
G 10.90 10.72 67.12 44.67 22.78 
CAB 2.90 3.75 3.30 84.87 1.31 
OMB 33.42 16.21 16.53 4.05 82.21 
LGPCY 71,10 14.39 29.44 8.81 55.14 
20 Years CIC 10.80 25.61 8.07 10.01 2.63 
G 11.:'12 9.63 65.30 44.30 27.12 
CAB 2.&3 4.64 2.42 83.54 0.90 
OMB 34.88 12.18 18.29 2.54 BO.BB 
LGPCY 65.BO 11.67 29.11 10.36 52.60 
30Years CIC 10.20 25.02 7.86 10.00 2.66 
G 11.56 9.28 64.96 44.00 28.64 
CAB 2.45 4.96 2.13 82.92 0.76 
DMB 35.40 11.10 18.94 2.12 80.58 
LGPCY 59.64 8.64 28.73 12.10 49.75 
50Years CIC 9.70 24.52 7.68 10.00 3.05 
G 11.75 8.99 64.68 43.77 29.89 
CAB 2.38 5.24 1.88 82.39 0.63 
DMB 35.78 10.29 19.43 1.81 80.35 
Notes: The results are based on a cointegration model with restricted intercepts and no trends 
in the VAR. 71 observations from 1928 to 1998. Order of VAR= 4, chosen r =1. The following 
restrictions were imposed on the underlying model a1=1, a3 = 0. 
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In Table 19, percentages in columns 3 to 7 depict the e~planatory power 
of the respective variables over the variables given by the ro.rs in a particular 
time horizon. In simple terms, columns explain influence on rrws. Focusing on 
the first year time horizon suggests that the financial intermfdi.ation indicator, 
DMB, is the leading variable in the VAR model. About 97.61 °'f of the variable's 
1,, 
own forecast error variance is attrit-utable to shocks in own l99ged values over 
,·., 
the forecast horizon. The exogeneity of financial intermediariE,~ persists across 
'" 
time with an own minimum influence of 80.35% in the 50 years time horizon. 
Financial intermediaries and the foreign trade sector (CAB) clpsely compete for 
dominance across all time phases. Vagaries of the internati6nal trade sector, 
CAB, are, however, the leading (most exogenous) long term yariable. In the in-
termediate term, macroeconomic activity (LGPCY) relaces the fiscal sector (G) 
as the third most influential variable. The monetary base (CIC) is the least ex-
ogenous variable in the model. Only 39.08% of own variance is attributable to 
movements in CIC come year 5. This percentage falls to a m·ere 24.52% in the 
50 years time horizon. 
Turning to endogeneity, with regard to the finance-growth nexus, Table 
15 suggests that financial intermediaries (DMB) account for 64 % of macroeco-
nomic activity (LGPCY) variance in the horizon year 1. In tum LGPCY explains 
57.16% of the variance in financial intermediaries in the same time band. 
Across all horizons, the financial intermediaries account for a larger proportion 
of macroeconomic activity than the reverse relationship. The disparity is more 
pronounced across higher time horizons. In the thirty-year titrie horizon, for in-
stance, financial intermediation explains 52.60% of LGPCY:· whereas the re-
verse influence is only 35.40%. When contrasted with other variables in the 
' 
model other than LGPCY itself, financial intermediaries consistently outperform 
the rest in accounting for the forecast error of macroecor.omic activity. Shocks 
to the current account balance (CAB) only have a significant long-term contribu-
tion to the fiscal sector (G) forecast error variance, and just that. The contribu-
tion of the monetary sector, CIC, appears insignificant across time. This said; 
the monetary sector accounts for more variability in the financial sector than 
does the financial intermediaries on the monetary sector. Fluctuations in the 
monetary sector could be important to the extent they affect financial develop-
ment. Positive real interest rates, for instance, can benefit the financial sector. 
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VDC analyses confirm the empirical findings from VAR and GJRs that fi-
nancial intermediation facilitates economic growth. These results are consistent 
with the main proposition in this study that financial sophistication has a positive 
impact on economic activity or growth. Generalised VDC results suggest that, in 
relative terms, causality runs from financial intermediation to economic devel-
opment rather than the other way round. Needless to say the findings are natu-
rally sensitive to quality of data and specification of the VAR model. 
The vector error correction model (VECM) is another form in which to 
characterise the direction of causality in a cointegrating VAR model. There are 
as many lagged error correction terms (ECT), as there are endogenous ~ari-
ables in the underlying VAR model. Tables 20 and 21 below provide computa-
tional details of the estimated error correction equations associated with the 
macroeconomic (LGPCY) and the financial intermediation (DMB) variables re-
spectively. Tile same procedure was followed to obtain results for all other vari-
ables. In all cases, several differenced variables were temporarily added to the 
OLS equation by Microfit in order to help map out the adjustment process. Ta-
bles 20 and 21, for instance, list some of the temporary variables added. 
The Microfit programme automatically generates diagnostic tests to as-
sist in the evaluation of serial correlation; the functional form; normality; and 
heteroscedasticity. The various diagnostic statistics, based on Chi-square and 
F-test statistics, are given at the bottom of Tables 20 and 21. Apart from non-
normal errors in some variables, the various diagnostic test statistics suggests 
that there is no evidence of statistical problems in the underlying variables. 
As illustrated in Tables 20 and 21, very few coefficients on the differ-
enced variables were found to be statistically significant. [Contrary to the gen-
eral trend, the ECT for the monetary sector (CIC) equation, however, contained 
several statistically significant coefficients on the differenced variables.] Statisti-
cally insignificant coefficients on the lagged temporary variables do not affect 
the validity of the underlying cointegrating VAR model because the ECM char-
acterise short run dynamics. In contrast, cointegration and theory are concerned 
with long run relationships. Intuitively, coefficients and signs of the error correc-
tion terms give the single lag magnitude and direction of short run dynamics es-
sential to correct for deviations from the long run equilibrium relationship. 
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Table 20 
ECM for variable LGPCY estimated by OLS based on coinl~grating VAR(4) 
······································~······························ ....... . 
ECM for variable LGPCY estimated by OLS baaed on cointegrating Vr:I•> 
Dependent variable is dLGPCY 
71 observations used for estimation from 1928 to 1998 · 
····································································J. ~······· 
Regressor 
dLGPCY1-
dCIC1 
a,n 
"""'" 
"""" dLGPCY2 
dCIC2 
"" dCAB2 
"""" dLGPCYJ 
dCIC3 
"" 
"''"" dDMBJ
ecml(-1) 
coefficient 
.28496 
,035233 
- .12588 
-.095523 
. 095975 
.14435 
.092987 
- .0022209 
- .028414 
-.24239 
.18095 
- .28808 
- • 041518 
- .0049351 
.41602 
·1,3600 
Standard Error 
.30496 
.16299 
.079594 
.064805 
.19967 
.23702 
.18765 
.075035 
, 066993 
.23068 
.13692 
.14549 
, 075924 
,064323 
.16767 
• 32197 
T-Rarbio[Proh) 
.93~,(3{.354] 
,21,6'.l.7 [ .930] 
-1.:l~i6[.ll9) 
-1.4'740(.146) 
,48066 [ .633] 
.60901[,545] 
.4~554 [. 622] 
- . 029,598 { . 976) 
-.42413 [.673] 
-1.0508[.298} 
1.3215 [ .192] 
-1.9801[.053] 
-.54'756(.596] 
-.076723(.939] 
2.4812(.016] 
-4, 2254 [. 000] [BCT 1] 
List of additional temporary variables created, 
dLGPCY = LGPCY-LGPCY(-1) 
dLGPCYl = LGPCY(-1)-LGPCY(-2) 
dCICl a CIC(-l)-CIC(-2) 
dGl = G(-1)-G(-2) 
dCABl CAB(-1)-CJ\B(-2) 
dDMBl DMB{-1)-DMB(-2) 
dLGPCY2 ~ LGPCY(-2)-LGPCY(-3) 
dClC2 CIC(-2)-CIC(-3) 
dG2 a G(-2)-G{-3) 
dCAB2 CAB(-2)-CJ\B(-3) 
dDMB2 DMB(-2) ·DMB(-3) 
dLGPCY3 = LGPCY(-3)·LGPCY(-4) 
dCIC3 CIC(-3)-CIC(-4) 
dG3 = G(-3)-G(-4) 
dCAB3 CAB(-3) ·CAB(-4) 
dDMB3 = DMS(-J)-DMB(-4) 
ecml = 1,0000*LGPCY -.064069*CIC 
- ,14407 
R-Squared 
S.E. of Regression 
Mean of Dependent Variabl~ 
Residual sum of squares 
Akaike Info. criterion 
ow-statistic 
.58908 
.093300 
-.0026461 
.47877 
60. 7277 
1. 9064 
-.OOOO*G -.05197l*CAB + .OSSSSS*DMB 
R-Bar-Squared .47574 
F-stat. F( 15, SS) 5.2349{.000] 
S.D. of Dependent variable ) .12896 
Equation Log-likelihood 76.7277 
Schwarz Bayesian Criterion 42.6263 
System LOg-likelihood 358.3104 
Diagnostic Tests 
**************•~······························**********•···········~···****** 
• Test Statistics * LM Version • F Version 
•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
• • • 
• A:Serial Correlation•cHSQ( 1)= .50738 [.476]*F( ,, 54) = .39867{.536) 
• • • 
• B,FUnctional Fa~ *CHSQ( ". 1. 2180 [ .270] *F ( ,, 54) = .94256[.336] 
• • • 
C:Normality *CHSQ( ,, . 4.9094(.086]• Not apPlicable 
• • • 
• D:Heteroscedasticity*CHSQ( 1)= .10203 [. 749] *F ( ,, 69)= .099296 [. 754} 
**************•••····························································· 
A,Lagrange multiplier test of residual serial correlation 
B:Ramsey's RESET test using the square of the fitted values 
C:Based on a test of skewness and kurtosis of residuals 
D:Based on the rPgression of squared residuals on squared fitted values 
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Table 21 
ECM for variable DMB estimated by OLS based on cointegrating VAR(4) 
ECM for variable DMB estimated by OLS based on cointegrating VAR(4) 
·································································~············ 
Dependent variable is dDMB 
71 observations u~ed for estimation from 1928 to 1998 
•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Regressor 
dLGPCYl 
dCICl 
dG> 
dCAB> 
dDMB> 
dLGPCY2 
dCIC2 
do, 
dCAB, 
dDMB, 
dLGPCYJ 
dCICJ 
dGj 
dCAJ33 
dDMBa 
ecm1(-l) 
Coefficient 
- .51153 
• -14572 
.051563 
• 063708 
.58944 
- .43109 
,045100 
, 019763 
.055483 
- .076047 
- ,21253 
. 083942 
.041035 
.079694 
- ,081589 
,98791 
Standard Error 
.35485 
.18965 
, 092616 
,075408 
• 23234 
.27580 
.21835 
.087312 
,077954 
.26842 
.15932 
.16929 
,088229 
.074848 
.19510 
,37453 
T-Ratio[Prob] 
-1.4415{.155] 
-.76835[.446] 
.55674(.580] 
.84485 [ .402] 
2,5370(.014] 
-1.5630(,124] 
,20655[.837] 
.22635 [. 8221 
,71174[.4!:!l] 
-.28331[.778) 
-1.3340 [.188] 
.49584 [ .622] 
.46510(.644] 
1.0647 [.292) 
-,41818(,677] 
2.6377[.0ll] [BCT 5] 
List of additional temporary variables created, 
dDMB m DMB-DMB(-1) 
dLGPCYl = LGPCY(-1)-LGPCY{-2) 
dCICl = CIC{-1)-CIC(-2) 
dGl = G(-1)-G(-2) 
dCABl = CAB(-l)-CAB{-2) 
dDMBl = DMB(-1)-DMB(-2) 
dLGPCY2 .. LGPCY(-2)-LGPCY{-3) 
dCIC2 = CIC(-2)-CIC(-3) 
dG2 = G(-2)-G(-3) 
dCAB2 CAB(-2)-CAB(-3) 
dDMB2 DMB(-2)-DMB(-3) 
dI.GPCY3 .. LGPCY(-3)-LGPCY(-4) 
dCIC3 CIC(-3)-ClC(-4) 
dG3 = G(-3)-G(-4) 
dCAB3 CAB(-3)-CAB(-4) 
dDMB3 ~ DMB(-3)-DMB(-4) 
ecml.. 1,0000*LGPCY -,064069*CIC -.OOOO*G -.05197l*CAB + ,085555*DMB 
-,14407 
R-Squared 
S.E, of Regression 
Mean of Dependent Variable 
Residual Sum of squares 
Akaike Info. Criterion 
OW-statistic 
Test Statistics • 
• 
A:Serial Correlation•CHSQ( 
• 
B: Functional Fom *CHSQ{ 
• 
C:Normality .,.CHSQ( 
• 
D:Heteroscedasticity•CHSQ( 
.25811 
.10856 
.014879 
,64825 
49.9690 
2 .0350 
R-Bar-Squared .055774 
F-stat. F{ 15, 55) 1.2757(.249] 
S,D. of Dependent Variable .11173 
Equation Log-likelihood 65,9690 
Schwarz Bayesian Criterion 31.8676 
System Log-likelihood 358.3104 
Diagnostic Tests 
LM Version • F Version 
• ,,. 
.52024{,471)*F( 1, 54)" ,]9859[,530] 
• 
1) = 1. 0727 [. JOO] .. F ( ,, 54)= .82837(.367) 
• 
2)= 25.0121{,000]* Not applicable 
• ,,. 
. 088294 [. 766] *F ( l, 69) .. ,085914(.770) 
...................................................................................... 
A:Lagrange multiplier test of residual serial correlation 
B:Ramsey's RESET test using the square of ths fitted values 
C:Based on a test of skewness and kurtosis of residuals 
D:Based on the regression of squared residuals on squared fitted values 
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The Error Correction Term (ECT) links the realised v91ue to the target 
value of a variable. Statistical significance of the coefficient o~ the error correc-
tion term, therefore, might affect the model's long run proferties. In simple 
terms, variables with statistically insignificant coefficients on t~r error- correction 
terms, as determined by the t-ratios, can be regarded as exo~enous or leading 
L• 
variables. Before proceeding, it will suffice to note that the VEG::M has two com-
, ' 1·., 
ponents relating to the standard VAR in first difference and t~~ single lag ECT. 
'" [See Section 7.4.] The subsequent discussion is confined to th'e ECT, which can 
be used to establish the quantitative importance of the shiprt run dynamics. 
Long run relationships have already been dealt with via VAR sYstems in levels. 
Table 22 
Summary results of error correction relations in the VAR model 
Dependent variable Error correction Coefficient Standard Error T· Ratio (Prob.) 
term (Ecn 
IJ.LGPCY ECT1 ·1.3600 0.32187 -4.2254 (O.OOOJ 
IJ.CIC ECT2 1.1784 0.27689 4.2560 {0.000] 
OG ECT3 0.81246 0.64650 1.2567 (0.214} 
IJ.CAB ECT4 0.47816 0.67964 0.70354 [0.485} 
!J.DMB ECT5 0.98791 0.37453 2.6377 [0.0111 
Notes: ECM ~ LGPCY · 0.064069 CIC· 0.0000 G • 0.051971 CAB+ 0,085555 DMB - 0.14407 
71 observaHons used for estimation from 1920 to 1998. The res\duals were tested for staHonarity by way ofunlt root 
tests and found to be satisfactory. 
' 
Table 22 provides a summary of the ECT coefficients knd standards er-
1· 
rors for al: variables in the model. These results establish that the error correc-
tion term is significant in the macroeconomic activity; monetary sector; and fi-
' 
nancial intermediation equations but not in the fiscal sector, ,and foreign trade 
equations. Technically, this suggests that the fiscal sector and the international 
trade sector are exogenous variables. [Influence of the fiscal sector was ren-
dered insignificant by design.} In terms of magnitudes, vicissitudes of the inter-
national trade sector, CAB, are, once again, confirmed as the leading (most ex-
ogenous) long-term variable, as was the case in VDC. The coefficient on the 
ECT in the foreign trade sector equation points to the least response in the CAB 
to variations in the long run relationship suggested by cointegration model. 
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In relative terms, it seems that indicators of macroeconomic activity 
(LGPCY) and the monetary sector (CIC) are the most endogenous variables in 
the model. There is evidence of rapid and highly statistically significant re-
sponses to deviations from the long-run relationship in the monetary sector and 
in macroeconomic activity. The negative and very significant coefficient on the 
ECT in the LGPCY equation suggests that negative fluctuations from the long-
run relationship are adjusted by an increase in macroeconomic activity. Con-
versely, negative deviations in the long run relationship would necessitate a 
negative adjustment in the monetary base to restore equilibrium. 
Turning to the indicator of financial intermediation, DMB, the coefficient 
on the ECT is statistically significant. This phenomenon suggests that financial 
intermediaries respond to deviations in the long run relationship implied by the 
model. The statistically significant response renders financial intermediation an 
endogenous variable. Furthermore, the positive sign on the ECT in financial in-
termediation equation supports the view that economic development or real ac-
tivity promotes financial development. Nevertheless, it has already been noted 
that the coefficient on the ECT in the real activity equation is highly statistically 
significant. This makes economic development an endogenous process capable 
of positive response to innovations in other variables such as financial interme-
diation. It follows that, it can safely be concluded that the possibility of reciprocal 
causality between financial intermediation and economic development cannot 
be ruled out. This as the case may be, does not put economic development and 
financial sophistication on equal footing. In comparative terms, the coefficient on 
the ECT in the real activity equation is 38% more responsive 60% more statisti-
cally significant than that on financial intermediation. Thus, the VECM results 
might imply that in relative terms net causality flows from financial intermedia-
tion to real activity. Logically it follows that policies and measures that enhance 
sophistication of the financial system would have a positive impact on real ac-
tivity in Zimbabwe. Conversely, poor performance by financial intermediaries 
would retard real activity to a gn~ater extent than economic decline would ham-
per the financial sector. Thus financial repression can be very costly for society. 
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9 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
,I 
I 
Nature will not betray those who approach her with an open h1~rl 
(, 
" . 1',1, 
. 
Wordsworth 
This research examines the theoretical links between '.financial intenne-
diation and economic performance. Empirical evidence on long-run relation-
ships and short-run dynamics is based on an array of multiJ.ariate time series 
analyses, using a newly constructed data set from Zimbabwe. More specifically, 
Vector Autoregression (VAR), Generalised Impulse Response Analysis (GIR); 
Forecast Error Variance Decomposition (VDC); and the Vector Error Correction 
Model (VECM) were employed. 
A number of factors motivated the adoption of a rich multivariate time se-
ries approach. In the first place, there is growing concern that bi-variate and tri-
variate VARs are misspecified because they do not capture the core economic 
sectors of the economy. There is high risk that conclusions from such studies 
are tainted by omitted variables. Secondly, cross-country and panel studies 
might be too generalised due to averaging, which renders causality difficult to 
interpret. Luintel and Khan (1999, p384) are obviously right that "aggregation 
blurs important events and differences across countries." According to them, 
Levine and Zervos (1996, p325) conceded that there are "measurement, statis-
' tical and conceptual problems" in cross-country studies (Ibid). Focus on one 
' country, for instance, avoids problematic currency conversion. Thirdly, most 
studies in leading journals tend to concentrate at advanced economies with 
similar development patterns. In my view, emerging and trahsition economies 
stand to reap great benefits from financial sophistication because demand cur-
rently outstrips supply of services. Finally, Beck, Demirgui;-Kunt, and Levine 
(1999), constructed a new financial database which provide an array of com-
plementary indicators through which finance might influence real activity. 
The econometric methodology applied in this study is described in great 
detail, in an effort to demystify time series analysis. An equally rigorous ap-
proach was followed to determine the nature of links between financial aggre-
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gates and economic activity both in the long run and short run. Evidence from 
the cointegrated VAR system supports the view that financial aggregates have 
a causal effect of economic activity in the long run. From a theoretical point of 
view, financial sophistication can improve real activity by increasing investment 
via deposit mobilisation, or through increased factor productivity emanating from 
competent project screening, monitoring and enforcement of sound corporate 
governance practices. Financial aggregates pertaining to size were found to be 
very informative; and had a positive impact on economic activity. Similarly liquid 
liabilities were found to have a causal effect on real activity. These findings 
support the growing recognition, since Schumpeter (1911 ), that financial so-
phistication positively affects real activity. Irving Fisher (1933),25 , Mishkin 
(1978), McKinnon (1973), Shaw (1973) and Levine (1997), for example, 
reached similar conclusions. Credit aggregates such as private sector credit 
(PSC) were, however, not informative about economic development in Zim-
babwe. Most of them were excluded from the model due to unsatisfactory unit 
root properties. On one hand this could imply that there is no clear-cut relation- j 
ship between credit aggregates and economic activity in Zimbabwe. On the 
other, the result merely reflects on poor quality of available data. 
In simulated short-run dynamics, the model with demand deposit banks 
(DMB) as a measure of financial intermediation converged faster than the alter-
native models incorporating liquid liabilities (LQL) and the entire banking sector 
(BKA). Evidence from forecast error variance decomposition analyses (VDC) 
suggests that financial intermediation (DMB) is the leading variable in the short 
horizon. ln the long term, the foreign trade sector, represented by the current 
account balance (CAB) takes over as the leading variable. Financial intermedi-
aries remain the second most important exogenous variable. The monetary 
base (CIC) turns out to be an endogenous variable. There is evidence of recip-
rocal causality between financial intermediation and economic activity. In rela-
tive terms, the impact of financial intermediation on macroeconomic activity is 
greater than the reverse relationship. In the VECM framework, the results are 
very similar to those obtained via variance decompositions. 
Due to data limitations, analysis of capital markets is largely based on 
graphical and descriptive techniques. In terms of costs and margins, the Zim-
babwe financial system is not very efficient due to structural constraints espe~ 
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cially on real interest rates. The persistence of bank profitab\lity in Zimbabwe 
during times of adverse macroeconomic developments c~n, among other 
things, be attributed to huge interest margins. Tobin (1963) ~emonstrated that 
the success of banks does not depend on their size but margi1a. 
Financial theory, e.g. agency risk and information asyrri~etry, has taught 
us economic activity does not take place in a vacuum or in perf.ect markets. This 
'·'. 
study provides case evidence that political institutions and thei~tate of corporate 
governance in Zimbabwe affect the pattern and prospects for both econorniC 
and financial development. LaPorta, Lopez--de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997, 2000) provide ample evidence to the effect that a country's legal tradi-
tion, for instance, determines financial development throug~ the rule of law, 
contract enforcement, and property rights. Beck, DemirgGG-Kunt and Levine 
(2001) focus on political structures as influential determinants of the degree of 
financial sophistication. The basic idea is that a group in power designs policies 
and institutions that guarantee self-entrenchment and self-enrichment. If the 
elite stand to benefit from free trade, they will enact laws and create institutions 
supportive of competitive markets. In contrast, centralised political systems in-
tolerant to competition, transparency, and accountability are bound to retard 
rather than encourage financial development. Once entrenched, authoritarian 
institutions are very difficult to eradicate. For instance, post independence rulers 
of what once were badly run colonies usually exploit the established institutions 
to their own advantage and profit. The POIVAD concept proposed in this thesis 
would help inform debate on persistent economic oppression i~ Zimbabwe. 
One Ralph Waldo Emerson, cited in Maital (1994, p3) reportedly saluted 
his fri,;mds with the question: What have you learnt since we last met? A num-
ber of constructive recommendations have been put forward throughout this 
study. It is hoped this thesis will prompt a broad and open discussion of issues 
raised. Innovative practices and constructive research might guide Zimbabwe to 
adopt economic and financial policies with a high probability of promoting sus-
tainable economic growth. Institutional areas of policy emphasis for Zimbabwe 
should include transparency, accountability, and good corporate governance. 
Unless prevailing wisdom can stand up to criticism, its aesthetic value may 
never be fully appreciated. I agree unreservedly with Davies (1991, p205) that, 
"Science progresses by betraying ancient principles for new insights." 
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10 SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Traditions are needed, and will persist, because they give continuity and form to 
J,'fe ... Without intellectual traditions, ideas would have no focus or direction. II 
However, it is part of academic life continually to explore the limits of such tradi-
tions, and foster active interchange between them. 
Professor Anthony Giddens (1999), "Tradition," BBC Reith Lectures 
There has been inadequate attention to financial reform in Zimbabwe. 
Rigorous analysis is required to determine whether continued financial repres-
sion in Zimbabwe has brought more harm than benefits. Notwithstanding wide-
spread agreement in financial literature regarding the causal effect of financial 
intermediation on economic growth, the financial sector formed a little part of 
government economic policy before and after independence. Government might 
have misunderstood the cardinal role of financial intermediation in economic 
development. In my view, authorities should leave no stone unturned to encour-
age financial innovation. Merton (1990, p270) regards financial innovation as 
"the engine driving the financial system on its prospective journey to economic 
efficiency." Even small benefits to individuals aggregate into enormous social 
gains for the economy as a whole. In the same vein the hours lost by Zimbab-
weans queuing for simple financial services aggregate into enormous loss of 
productivity at a national level. Van Horne (1985) agrees that true financial in-
novation makes the markets either more efficient or more complete by lowering 
intermediation costs or inconvenience casts, (p622). Recent advances in finan-
cial intermediation literature also suggest that a functional approach to financial 
architecture brings more economic benefits than the structural approach Zim-
babwe has traditionally followed. 
Zimbabwe has also run chronic fiscal deficits from one generation to an-
other. Economic theory suggests that fiscal deficits result in a short-term dete-
rioration of the curre:it account. A surplus is envisaged in the long term if deficit 
expenditure is utilized on investment. Apart from foreign borrowing, a deficit is 
either financed through money creation or domestic borrowing. Desperate reli-
ance on money creation may be highly inflationary. Since UDI the government 
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has occasionally relied on borrowing from the domestic ban~ing sector. Most 
economists argue that the practice results in crowding out of.private sector in-
vestment. Economic growth decreases while the r.urrent ac~ount deficit rises 
due to low exports. Successive devaluations have failed tojigalvanize export 
performance. Inelastic import and export demand imply that the Marshall-Lerner 
11.., 
Condition is never met, resulting in disastrous price increases'. following any de-
,·., 
valuation. From 1999 to 2001, economic activity in Zimbabwe '()'as, among other 
.. 
things paralysed by rampant inflation, foreign currency shortages, international 
isolation and financial disintermediation. Excessive liquidity in\ the financial sec-
tor confirms that banking institutions have abandoned their cOre business in fa-
vour of money market operations. The resultant economic, decadence was 
crowned with the reintroduction of a fixed exchange rate regime and price con-
trols. As a matter of policy Zimbabwe need clarity of purpose as to whether she 
is pursuing exchange rate or inflation targets. Moves by the RBZ to introduce 
higher denominations of banknotes such as the 2$200 and 2$500 notes will not 
solve this predicament. What may be required is to restructure the economy 
and introduce a new currency. However this question does not concern our im-
mediate needs but it could make an interesting subject of a separate study. 
Simulated short run dynamics conducted in this study provide strong evi-
dence that vicissitudes of the international trade sector is not responsive to in-
novations in other variables. A logical extension of this research would be to 
examine more sharply the determinants of this sector. One possibility is to ex-
plore developments on the current account balance (CAB) via the Marshall-
Lerner condition. This issue is import important given the cqnstant debate re-
garding an appropriate exchange regime for the Zimbabwe dollar. In addition, 
VAR analysis revealed that current account deficits are havi,! a negative long 
run impact on macroeconomic activity. 
Corporate governance and consumer protection in the Zimbabwe Finan-
cial System are other potential candidates for further research. Due to political 
unrest in Zimbabwe corporate governance analysis in this research is largely 
conceptual. Ideally, future researchers should gather detailed information from 
market participants on qualitative issues such as governance, legal issues, 
agency problems and dynamic efficiency of the Zimbabwe Financial System. A 
questionnaire moulded along Hellman et al (2000) targeting employees in 
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banking, students of finance, and other market participants might be used. It 
would be interesting to know what mechanisms cou!d be put in place to en-
hance consumer protection in Zimbabwe and how these can be enforced, given 
the numerous complaints of overcharging, poor service or outright exploitation. 
There is an urgent need for a project dedicated to the construction of an 
electronic time series database in Zimbabwe. I have in mind a database that 
covers financial, monetary, and economic aggregates for as long a span as 
possible. In Zimbabwe it is very difficult, for example, to obtain reliable bank 
level data going back to say 1995. The sensitive nature of financial information 
sometimes plays in the hands of political calculations. From December 1965 the 
RBZ was banned from publishing statements of its assets and liabilities, anl'lual 
accounts and reports. The first official Quarterly Economic and Statistical Re-
view (QESR) for the period appeared in September 1980. Unfortunately, the 
publication only traced the major economic and statistical trends back to 1975. 
"Stock Exchange Prices and Yields" first appeared in the RBZ QESR around 
March/June 1998. Although the series dates back to 1975, it has no figure for 
market capitalisation, for example. By the December 1999, when the QESR se-
ries was discontinued in favour of monthly and weekly publications, succeosive 
Governors of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe had not kept the Dr D. C. Krogh's 
(1980, p5)26 promise to extend the Reserve Bank's record of the country's fi-
nancial data series back 1965. I am not sure whether anything can be salvaged 
from the Quarterly Bulletins of Financial statistics oft cited in Sowelem (1967). 
Although the data gathering process is not a significant research output 
according to academic traditions, its contribution to research output and poster-
ity is immense. A good database is a powerful force to build sustainable interest 
in vector autoregressions, cointegration analysis and time series modelling. 
Statistically, researchers face a significant challenge to develop reliable 
techniques that can handle higher order integration. As the literature of cointe-
gration progresses, new techniques are emerging that do not require rigorous 
determination of whether variables are! (1) or I (0). In my view, the challenge to 
develop procedures that do not depend on fluid distinctions regarding the order 
of integration and extent of cointegration very is strong. 
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Appendix 1: Vague Concepts: capital and njbney 
1\, 
Capita! 
" !'.>, 
. 
I,! 
Arbitrary definitions of concepts such as capital, money, investment and 
governance render their consideration for purposes of analysi! problematic. Ac-
' 
cording to Taylor (2000, p144) living Fisher "defines wealth as anything material 
that is owned. Cap1!al is then defined as the stock of wealth at:any point in time, 
while income is defined as the flows of services generated from wealth." Bartl-
let (1987, p59) highlights that the concept of wealth changes with time. "Wealth 
is that which has value at a given time. Change time and the constituent ele-
ments of wealth must change or deteriorate in value." Taylor (2000, p xiii) learnt 
the hard way that the "search for a single concept of capital in the canon of 
economics" was problematic because there are several concepts of capital. 
Frankel (1938, p3.) had earlier on reached the same conclusion, "For capital is 
an abstract term, the careless use of which is apt to hide the real meaning of 
the process to which it refers." Use of the word without an adjective can refer to 
anything from human capital to "physical capital, capital goods, financial capital, 
working capital, circulating capital, fixed capital, etc," Taybr (2000, p xiii). In my 
view human capital is more than "the embodiment of invest~ent in human be-
ings" that Kindleberger and Herrick's (1977, p79) suggest. ;rhurow (1970) in 
' Jaffee (1990, p38) defines human capital as "productive skills, talents and 
knowledge." Kindleberger and Herrick's (1977, p79) definition pf financial capital 
as "liquid assets which can easily be exchanged for goods but are not the 
physical goods themselves " makes it indistinguishable from money. Even 
some of the greatest writers have struggled to pinpoint a single definition for the 
concept of capital. Taylor argues 
Vagueness and ambiguity concerning capital appear in the writ-
ings of all great capital theorists, whether Smith, Ricardo, Mane, 
Jevons, Walras, Bohm-Bawer!<, Clark, Wicksell, Schumpeter, 
Fisher, Hayek, Keynes, Hicks, Robinson, Samuelson or Solow. 
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Joseph Schumpeter's (1911, 1936 p116-27) concept of capital, for in-
stance, is surprisingly indistinguishable from both credit and money, for a man 
of his remarkable insight. Schumpeter equates capital to "a fund of purchasing 
power ... consisting of money, ... accumulated liquid resources ... and other 
assets calculated in money " as distinct from a "stream of income" in the living 
Fisher sense. Illuminated as a fund of purchasing power capital is easily con-
fused with money because it relates to real activity only as a medium of ex-
change. Schumpeter (p116) insists: 
Capital is nothing but the lever by which the entrepreneur subjects 
to his control the concrete goods which he needs, nothing but a 
means of diverting the factors of production to new uses, or of 
dictating a new direction to production. 
Although Schumpeter reiterates that means of payment not associated 
with development does not constitute capital but "exchange media ... for car- :i 
rying the customary exchanges"· he provides !ittle guidance to separate the 
phenomena. Taylor (2000, pp139-141) argues that Schumpeter had a credit 
theory of money (means of payment or generalised purchasing power) created 
by banks through the process of credit creation. I agree with this assessment 
because Schumpeter's (1936, p117 and 122) concept of capital seems to con-
verge with intermediation. 
The function of capital consists in procuring for the entrepreneur 
the means with which to produce. It stands as a third agent nec-
essary to production in an exchange economy between the entre-
preneur and the world of goods. It constitutes a bridge between 
them .... Capital, then, is an agent in the exchange economy. 
Money 
Over the years there have been chronic ambiguities in defining what 
constitutes as money. Money refers to anything that is generally acceptable as 
payment for goods and services. Some economists confine money to legal ten-
der, i.e. enforceable 3t law as means of payment for goods and services or in 
set!lement of debt Podolski (1986, p184) notes currency theories of money de-
fine money narrowly, often in terms of a commodity or quasi-commodity. Finan-
cial theories of money (for example by Keynes and Schumpeter) emphasise fi-
duciary and flexible money aspects. The general financial practice and custom 
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takes into account currency in crrculation and various categories of deposits to 
arrive at hierarchical definitions of money such as M1, M2 ... The constituent 
components of money categories vary over time as deposits at sundry institu-
tions are added, excluded or reclassified. Tobin (1963, p409) marvels at Shaw's 
cynicism that nobody really knows what the money supply is but whatever con-
stitutes it increases at a regular rate. 
Shaw (1f,73, pp6-7) observes that money, like other financial and non-
monetary assets, is characterised by multiple pricing. The four prices of money 
are unit of account, index of purchasing power {real money), explicit price (in-
terest rate), and ratios of exchange (i.e. four exchange rates - spot, forward, 
real and nominal) 
In Bartlett's (1987, p63) view, "Money, like blood, has two values": circu-
latory (infusion of life) and plasma. As a medium of exchange and the fulcrum of 
transactions, money facilitates economic activity. A worthwhile business activity 
should generate money if the enterprise is to survive. Unless profit has the po-
tential to be translated into money it is illusory. The circulation of money within 
and among various sectors of the economy is also essential for good economic 
growth. Money, when equated to plasma, takes a credit function that can be 
hoarded and canalised into deficient economic units. In real life the financial 
system consists of more than either monetary or credit aggregates. 
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Appendix 2: The complex root circle and eige11values 
,I 
(a) The complex unit root circle 1
1 
If z is a complex number, the solution (or roots) to the!~quation a(z) = O 
may exist as real and complex numbers. Following the repre~~ntation in David-
, 
son (1999, p85) a complex number z may therefore bi3 expressed as 
z = z = a -ib, where a and b are real numbers and i is a complex number. The 
absolute value or modulus of z is a real number representif1g "the radial dis-, 
tance ofz from the origin in the complex plane, in which a and b are measured 
on the coordinate axes," Davidson (1999, p85). Its magnitude is given by 
J z J= Fzi = ~a' + b' . When the modulus I z J> I, z is said to be outside the unit 
circle. (If J z I= I, then it is on, and if J z J< I it is inside the unity root circle.) 
(b) Eigenvectors and eigenvalues 
Given a square matrix M, say a matrix of coefficients, an eigenvector or 
characteristic vector (x) exist if there is a solution A to the equation Mx =A. x. 
Such a value ..i for which x cp. O is termed an eigenvalue. According to Kreyszig 
(1993, p387) the temn is derived from the German word Eigenwert in which "ei-
gen" means "proper'' and "wert," means "value." The eigen vector (x) exists if x 
* 0. To determine the eigenvalues of matrix M it is solved for its characteristic 
polynomial ,i given by (M-,! I )x = 0, where I is the identity matrix. There are n 
roots if M is n x n. Those roots are not necessarily distinct. A set of eigenvalues 
is referred to as the spectrum while the largest absolute value is termed the ra-
dius. The characteristic detemninant, det ( ,! ) = det(M-,l I), is a necessary and 
sufficient condition for A to be a characteristic root of M. If all the roots are non-
zero the matrix is non-singular, invertible or stationary. 
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Appendix 3: Standard Bank Staff Portraits 
1,1 Iii~ :!1 l-1i111d1 11'!.!1 ,.r,...,1rr/ .!Jr u'lfdu . ..t[,01,:-: nl!! (,-wdn .11.mrr,h J/ri!f r11 0.1:-r.mlw, JSY,i", f,r,m Ml f;) riJllU; 
Jj11J1,1.'.r, H~,'i!Jtam .. (1'1m .lfrJlr1JW.~IJ aml Tt10,;ovJ, 1111'!.!J Tr"r1,c,(;d ulm, in 1910, .._\,lf J,'JU I& E..:lf .~f~fCII Hi 
v:mnfll't' rh;- pm~.·111,ir ,'.xu1:tfm~ r~,· &,.t'.r i1e1/lille·J ro J11r1t ,irra arm Jub_io1rs..•m(r- uJitll<.'11 r.li,! /l!JI rn-.:, 
· liM!h'll,'.i in M1m1..~a.r11 .wd N11IrC!bi. 
(A) 
Note: The nameless man lying down in panel (A) probably cannot take the same pose as his 
"racial superior" work mates 
Source: Standard Chartered Bank (1967, p22) "Three Quarters of A Century ... " 
'/11r• Qta! Q111.• IJ1Tmd1 d,•(wt:r,·,l /1! 1,rnrm11 11/ 111,• ~i.1i1 of rl1r l'tl,rte of 11'.ih·~ /11 191.l. 1'~ r.taff In fm111. ie/1 ro 
flflrl.' To/!rwr. WritlrJ. f:urvu, f1rlf/wr .rm/ Vi<'lor. 
(B) 
Source: Standard Chartered Bank (1967, p38) ~Three Quarters of A Century ... H 
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,\fwtaM•'t allli Siaff tf rl1e S'ra,r,.i'J.rd {i1mk'.1 Salltbury Brtll!dl In Ot('('ifrba, 1915, 
(C) 
Note: Staff details not given. However as in panel A and B sitting arrangements appear institu-
tionalised. 
Source: Standard Chartered Bank (1967, p34) ~Three Quarters of A Century ... " 
Figure 35 Images of institutionalised racism at the work place? 
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Appendix 4: Sources of data 
POP-Population: 1901 to 1953 from B. R. Mitchell (1998) Table A5 pp 50-51; 
1954 to 1998 from Central Statistics Office [CSO] (2000) "National Accounts" 
Table 7.1 pp 33 - 37. Please note that this series in thousands and not millions 
as refiected on the CSO table. 
GDP -Gross Domestic Product: 1901 to 1952 from B. R. Mitchell (1998) Table 
J1 pp 1010 & 1024; 1954 to 1998 from Central Statistics Office [CSO] (2000) 
"National Accounts" Table 7.1 pp 33 - 37. 
CPI-Consumer Price Index: CPI data for 1914 to 1938 based on estimates by 
Mosley (1983, p 148); 1938 to 1974 from B. R. Mitchell (1998) Table H2 pp 954 
- 51; 1975 to 1998 from RBZ Quarterly Statistical and Economic Review - vari-
ous. Note that the based year is 1990. Thus CPI in 1990 = 100 
LPCY - Log real per capita GDP: Indicator of economic development. LGPCY, 
which stands for the log of growth in real per capita income (mathematically ex-
pressed as a log difference of real per capita GDP) measures economic activity. 
Deflation: Ideally financial balance sheet items (FBI) are defiated by end of 
year consumer price index (CPI) while the annual CPI defiates GDP. No reliable 
annual CPI is available in Zimbabwe for the period under review, thus end of 
period CPI was used to defiate GDP. All indictors of the size and activity of fi-
nancial intermediaries based on GDP as the denominator are given as ratios of 
average real financial balance sheet items to real GDP. Mathematically 
o.s(FBI, +FBI,_,) 
CP/1 CPl1_1 
GDP, 
CPI, 
Logarithms: The econometric evidence in this study is largely based on data in 
logarithm format. Where necessary, appropriate measures of financial interme-
diation size and activity are expressed into logarithm transformation as follows: 
o.s( FBI, +FBI,_,) 
-
_,_C:c:P..:I!.., _C_P_,I,::,.-• L In GDP, 
CPI, 
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G - Government Size: Real government expenditure to real GpP. Government 
expenditure for period 1895 to 1928 from Southern Rhodesia Official Yearbook 
,I 
No. 2-30 page 526. 1929 to 1984 from B. R. Mitchell (1998)'jfable G2 pp 889, 
893 & 897; 1985 to 1998 from RBZ Quarterly Statistical and ~conomic Review 
- various. The figure of £48 ($96) for the year 1948 appea{ to be an outlier 
),• 
hence may be replaced by an average of the adjacent figur~s'. No adjustment 
1·,, 
has been made to the figures to accommodate the decrease;~i1 Rhodesian ex-
,,. 
penditure during the period of the Federation. 
FSB - Fiscal Balance: obtained from log (central government I revenue) less log 
' (central government expenditure). 
' 
Open - Openness to Trade: calculated as ln . Data ( 
real ex.ports + real imports ) 
real GDP 
sources for exports and imports are as follows: 1900 to 1964 from B. R. Mitchell 
(1998) Table E1 pp 522, 528 & 535; 1964 to 1983 from Centr;al Statistics Office 
[CSO] (1983) "Summary of External Trade" Table 1. The series for 1985 to 
1998 is from CSO (2000) "Summary of External Trade" Table 7.12 p57. Later 
editions have revised some CSO publications between 1965 and 1980. 
CAB - Current Account Balance: derived from log (exports) minus log (imports). 
This approach circumvents the calculation of logarithms on negative values, 
which are inevitable on the convectional CAB. 
LTECH - Calculated as the logarithm of telephone lines per capita, is an indi-
cator the rate of usage of communication technologies. TelErphone tines data 
1922 to 1993 from B. R. Mitchell (1998) Table F8 pp 803 an~ 807. Missing ob-
servation is extrapolated. Comparable data for later years is kvailable from the 
World Development Indicators (WDI). 
CIC- Currency in Circulation: 1925 to 1990 from B. R. Mitchell (1998) Table G1 
pp 824 & 829; 1990 to 1998 from RBZ Quarterly Statistical and Economic Re-
view (QESR) Vol 21 No. 1&2 (1999); and various QESR. Figure for 1924 is own 
estimate. Figures for 1951 and 1952 are from Sowelem. 
z It must be noted that the time series data in Mitchdl prior to 1924 appears to be recorded against a one 
year lagged time period. This means that the realisation in Mitchell for year t corresponds to the observa-
tion for year t+ l in the original sources, such as The Official Year Book of the colony of Southern Rho-
desia No. 2- 1930. The same observation goes for government revenue recorded in Mitchell Table G6. 
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LQL-Liquid liabilities: 1979 to 1998 from IMF (1999, pp 956-957) "International 
Financial statistics Yearbook", line 551. 1900 to 1978 estimated via summation 
of currency in circulation; deposits with the central bank, commercial banks, 
merchant banks, finance houses, building societies, the POSS; and money at 
call with discount houses. Prior to 1946, commercial banl<s and the POSB were 
the main intermediaries. Demand deposits constituted the bulk of deposits. 
Data from B. R. Mitchell (1998) Table G2 pp 843 and 847; Table G3, pp 859 
and 863; Central Statistics Office [CSO] Monthly Digest of Statistics - various 
and from various RBZ QESR e.g. Vol 21 No. 1/2 or Vol 22 No. 3/4 (1999). 
RBZ - Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe: Central bank assets from 1924 to 1938 rep-
resented by currency in circulation. Assets of the Southem Rhodesia Currellcy 
Board take care of the period 1938 to 1955. By law the currency board's assets 
corresponded to its monetary liabilities. See Newlyn and Rowan (1954, p70) 
Table X. Period 1951 to 1963 from Sowelem (1967, p244) Table 9.1 lines 2 (a) 
(ii) and 2 (d) being external and internal assets. The Cental Bank was estab-
lished in 1956. 1964 figure is average of adjacent values. To generate a series 
1965 to 1974, total assets of the relevant institutions are netted out of the total 
banking sector" figure recorded in the CSO Monthly Digest of Statistics (MOS) 
for Dec. 1970, 1973, and 1978; 1975 to 1998 from RBZ QESRVol 2 (1999). 
DMB - Demand Deposit Banks: comprise of discount houses, commercial 
banks, and merchant banks also known as accepting houses. NB. RBZ figures 
for total assets of merchant banks from 1975 onwards are not comparable to 
records of the Registrar of Banking Institutions. RBZ series is net of accep-
tances whereas the Registrar's series includes acceptances. This research 
adopts the Reserve Bank's approach toward acceptances. 
OBI - Other Banking Institutions: refer to building societies, finance houses, 
and the POSB. NB. RBZ and the Registrar of Building Societies have a different 
approach to the components of capital and deposits of building societies. The 
Reserve Bank series regards subscription share capital as deposits while the 
Registrar treats fixed subscriptions as part of capital. 
""Th~ CSO the RBZ define the banking sector differently. The banking sector as defined by the CSO (see 
CSO MDS Dec 1973, p82) comprises of commercial banks, accepting houses, discount houses, finance 
houses, building societies, the AFC, and POSB. RBZ QESR define the baking sector as constituting of 
the Reserve Bank, discount houses, commercial banks, and accepting houses. 
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CMBA - Commercial Banks Assets: 1924 to 1935 estimate~ on the basis of 
bank liabilities, especially bank deposits. Data for 1936 to 1 ~
1
48 was obtained 
from CSO via a private source. Data for 1954 to 1975 is from pso MDS (1973, 
p50) Table 62 and (1980, p33) Table 28. The Ministry of Fin~nce's "Economic 
Survey of Rhodesia 1965 [ESR]" Table 10 fills the gap betweeh 1960 and 1963. 
11., 
In a few instances, liability side totals have also been used to fl'lake up for gaps 
.... 
on the asset side. Good data for 1975 to 1998 ex RBZ QESR. ii 
CMLA - Commercial Banks Loans and Advances: 1924 to 1938 constructed on 
the basis of best available data basis; 1939 to 1952 based on I movements in lo-
cal earning assets in Newlyn and Rowan (1954, pp 170-1), Table IV and Figure 
1. Efforts to obtain the original sources, viz "The Economic an~ Statistical Bulle-
tins" were not yet fruitful at the time of writing. Data for 1954 to 1975 is from 
CSO 1973 and 1978 Tables 10 and 21 respectively. Data from 1975 to 1998 
was taken from RBZ QESR. 
' CMLG - Commercial Banks Loans to Government series was constructed as t 
follows; 1952 to 1964 ex-Sowelem (1967, p221) Table 8.1 line 9 (b) (i), 1964 to 
1979 from CSO MDS (1970, 1973, 1978 and 1980). 
CMLQ - Commercial Banks Liquid Assets: 1954 to 1963 Ministry of Finance 
[MOF] ESR 1965. Data for 1961 to 1963 refers to bills of exchange only. 1965 
to 1975 data is from CSO records. And RBZ QESR takes care of period 1975 to 
1998. 
MB - Merchant Banks Assets: 1957 to 1975 CSO MDS (197Q, p45) and (1980, 
p37) Tables 55 and 32 respectively. 1975 to 1998 RBZ QESRj 
' 
MBLA - Merchant Banks Loans and Advances: 1957 to 1975 CSO MDS and 
RBZ QESR for the period 1975 to 1998. 
MBLQ- Merchant Banks Liquid Assets: Data for period 1957 to 1974 from the 
records of the Registrar of Banking Institutions. 1975 to 1998 RBZ QESR. 
DHA - Discount House Assets: 1960 to 1975 CSO MDS 1973 and 1978 Tables 
72 and 24 respectively. 1975 to 1998 RBZ QESR. 
FH - Finance Houses Assets: 1953 to 1963 based on Sowelem (1967, p185) 
Table 6.2 and National Archives. Efforts to obtain the original sources viz 
"Quarterly Bulletin of Financial Statistics" were not yet fruitful at the time of writ-
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ing. Data for 1964 to 1974 ex CSO MDS and MOF ESR; 1975 to 1998 RBZ 
QESR. NB Finance Houses total assets for the period 1994 to 1997 have been 
corrected for mathematically inaccuracy. 
FHLA- Finance Houses Loans and Advances: 1953 to 1963 as above. 
POSB - People's Own Savings Bank: Assets for period 1924 to 1965 estimated 
from the liability side of the balance sheet using the data in Mitchell and South-
ern Rhodesia Statistical Yearbook (1947); 1964 to 1974 CSO MDS - various; 
1975 to 1998 RBZ QESR. 
POLQ - POSB Liquid Assets: 1975 to 1998 RBZ QESR. 
BSA - Building Society Assets: 1951 to 1996 Registrar of Building Societies 
Annual Reports; and 1975 to 1998 RBZ QESR. 
BSLA - Building Society Loans and Advances: As in BSA 
BSLQ - Building Society Liquid Assets: AS in BSA 
AFC - Agricultural Finance Corporation: Originally known as the Land Bank; 
1924 to 1952 National Archives records and (1947) "Statistical Year Book"; 
1954 to 1998 from various e.g. CSO MDS (1973, p 62); (1987, p75); (1992, 
p45) and (1998, p59) Tables 75, 20.6, 18.6, and 19.10 respectively. 
AFLA - AFC Loans and Advances: Sources as in AFC above. 
INS- Insurance Assets: 1924 to 1946 from the Southern Rhodesia (1947) "Sta-
tistical Year Book"; 1953 ex- Sowelem; 1957 to 1962 cover the whole Federa-
tion; 1965 to 1998 records at rhe National Archives and Report of the Registrar 
of Insurance Companies - various. 
INPC - Insurance Private sector Credit: Constructed from (i) mortgages on 
property: (ii) loans on insurance policies; (iii) and loans on personal securities. 
Sources am as in INS above. 1929 to 1945 credit figures are estimates. 
PPF -Provident and Pension Funds: 1977 to 1998 ex-Registrar of Pension and 
Provident Funds Annual Reports 
PSC - Total Private Sector Credit; PCDMB, PCOBI, PCDFI; and PCNBFI re-
fers to DMB, OBI, DFI and NBFI Private Sector Credit respectively. 
IPI - Industrial Share Price Index: Main equity index on the Zimbabwe Stock 
Exchange. 1964 to 1976 from various CSO MDS; 1975 to 1998 RBZ QESR. 
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Date PDP 
W"8 3.610 
1959 3.730 
196(1 3.840 
1961 M70 
1962 4.100 
1963 4,ZJO 
19M 4.35-0 
1965 4.400 
1966 4.630 
1967 4.790 
1958 4.960 
1969 5.130 
191a 5.310 
1971 5.466 
1972 5.627 
1973 5.792 
197' 5.962 
1975 6.137 
1976 6.317 
1977 6.503 
1978 6.694 
1979 6.891 
1980 7.094 
1981 7.302 
1982 7.608 
1983 7.851 
1984 a.101 
1985 8,387 
1986 8,650 
1987 6.92.2 
19!8 9.202 
1989 9,491 
1t90 9,769 
1t91 10,096 
1992 10.413 
1993 10,779 
199.f 11.15-0 
1995 11.526 
1996 11,908 
1997 12.294 
"' 
"' 
"' ,w
·~ 
"' 
-
"' 
"' 
= 
,oo 
'" 1.001 
1,08C 
1,244 
1.419 
1,553 
1,861 
1,998 
2,166 
2,198 
2.359 
2.822 
3,441 
4.433 
5.197 
6,3C<I 
'·"' 9.097 
10.361 
11.200 
14,10'9 
17.S09 
21.494 
29.623 
34.392 
42.481 
56.159 
61.622 
84,759 
102.074 
1998 12.665 135,722 
"' 11.4 
11.7 
" 12.4 
,2.6 
02' 
13.1 
13.3 
13.7 
13.9 
14.2 
'" 
15.1 
15.6 
16.2 
16.8 
16.1 
19.5 
21.3 
n; 
24.8 
27.6 
,,, 
~· 35.7 
m 
52.8 
57.3 
65.5 
73.1 
78.2 
" ,oo
1Z3.3 
175.2 
223.6 
273.4 
335.1 
"'' 483.6 
' 
" 
.. 
·~ 
'" 
'" 
"' 
'" 
·~ 
"' OM 
~· 
"' 
"' 
''" 
~· 
"' 
~· 
'" 
"' m 
'" ... 
1198 
·~· 1682 
~" 
,~, 
2891 
"'" 4067 
REV Eiports lmpom 
'" 40.00 98.00 314.00 84.40 
40.00 114.00 300.00 66.40 
40.00 124.00 314.00 86.60 
42.00 142.00 31000 101.00 
50.0C' 146.00 286.00 116.80 
52.00 
94.00 
150.00 
148.00 
15"6.00 
166.00 
184.00 
=.oo 
213.00 
244.00 
27000 
318.00 
401.00 
492.00 
575.00 
573.00 
611.00 
829.00 
1128.00 
1513.00 
1866.00 
2033.00 
2353.00 
"""' 3405 00 
150.00 
274.SO 
322.80 
18800 
198.40 
192.30 
230.60 
259.70 
m.~ 
349.10 
389.10 
531.20 
531.30 
557.40 
550.80 
609.30 
715.70 
909.20 
971.70 
9ti8.40 
\151).20 
1453.00 
1795.50 
2170.30 
2371.40 
270.00 
216.60 
239.60 
169.5-0 
187.10 
207.10 
19'9.50 
235.00 
282.5-0 
274.70 
308.60 
438.30 
461.90 
382.70 
388.10 
403.70 
549.30 
80'9.40 
1017.70 
108180 
1061.60 
1200 70 
1446.5-0 
1640.40 
1741.70 
117.50 
119.10 
119.40 
12!L50 
123.70 
127.20 
129.90 
146.40 
150.20 
155.20 
194.80 
219.90 
Z!4.10 
279.JO 
300.00 
2"5.40 
4625 3974.00 
5589 4703.00 
6909 6011.00 
8232 8016.00 
\1574 \0064.00 
2965.!IO 2043.20 
3267.30 3438 10 
391.30 
428 20 
662.00 
695.90 
\015.60 
1006.90 
1053.70 
1156 50 
1241.40 
1370.60 
1476.40 
42'3T.30 45Z!! 30 - 2117.00 
55:.19.90 7397.20 4582.30 
7331.10 112)2.30 611190 
13442 11752-00 10161.10 11773.10 7180.5-0 
16583 14502.00 16251.5-0 18270.70 9852.20 
22000 18687.00 18359.10 23048.10 12123 . ..0 
29661 23781.00 24209.30 28095.10 14330.80 
36515 31226.00 30207.30 36555.10 19176.00 
'"~ '" 
••• 
124.60 239.82 24.34 
132.80 265.00 25.71 
13S.OO 266.44 27.13 
139 00 295.93 28.72 
146.00 304.00 28.02 
149.90 302.80 
159.40 305.36 
174.60 319.84 
190.80 364.17 
210.00 412.40 
20880 425.15 
241.30 508.33 
269.60 594.39 
294.70 663 07 
335.80 776.85 
400.70 690.21 
459.40 1007.47 
608.5-0 
658.50 
675.30 
700.10 
764.20 
980.90 
1227.JO 
1438.90 
1500.70 
1792.70 
2062.60 
2251.20 
1100.39 
1299.29 
1367.97 
1488.76 
1668.00 
2048.00 
22£5.00 
2695.00 
2135700 
=•oo 
~noo 
3941.00 
26.11 
"'" 
"'" 
"~ 
20.40 
28.60 
33.60 
,.., 
37.90 
44.40 
49.10 
6\.50 
66.90 
79.10 
83.90 
.. ~ 
108.00 
157.00 
199.00 
237.00 
227.00 
25900 
321.00 
380.00 
495.68 
559.85 
607.63 
63!L42 
670.82 
674.89 
672.10 
680.39 
733.44 
808.16 
865 27 
995.33 
1138.03 
1268.84 
1443.11 
1705.39 
1926.28 
2196.97 
2575.90 
2703.29 
2923.64 
3337.37 
3674.71 
4508.87 
5035.55 
5!!44.06 
6709.86 
1712.81 
3747.15 
2623.70 4878.00 389.00 1D420.29 
3189.90 5180.00 503.00 
3997.BO 7483.00 618.00 
475690 8991.00 no.oo 
6119.8-0 1007000 889.00 
12374.75 
15\90.90 
19207.37 
26700.69 
8062.00 1086500 861.30 33487.30 
14900.00 15758.00 1191.40 49891.30 
20274.60 21583.00 1432.40 65094.00 
24868 60 27768.00 1750.60 65597.86 
32647.',0 38243.00 23-42.40 114624.82 
48M7.50 49592.00 3395.90 156273.02 
217.90 
232.30 
253.90 
277.00 
3D4.60 
312.40 
328.90 
346.40 
373.00 
407.30 
405.70 
•oo~ 
50430 
573.40 
653.70 
807.80 
922.30 
1090.5-0 
1374.00 
1403.50 
1~67.20 
1715.90 
1823.90 
'''"' <'547.30
.!960.60 
332\.40 
3663.60 
3938.20 
4567.70 
5516.50 
6498.00 
8100.40 
12413.00 
16851.00 
29554.00 
39557.30 
=J.5.10 
67\90.70 
95346.30 
,., 
'" '" 
PCBI( PCDMB 
133.50 137.78 118.60 21.40 200.6 
143.!IO 167.75 137.20 22.60 232.03 
167.30 161.53 146.B-0 25.40 256.29 
176.00 175.02 158.50 27.80 265.94 
187.BO 171.Z! 165.00 30.00 266.56 
194.90 
209.80 
W.00 
"= 
28360 
278.5-0 
=.oo 
357.90 
m~ 
498.5-0 
613.00 
702.40 
866.40 
10!>4.70 
1103.50 
1201.60 
1324.60 
1395.70 
1602.30 
168.09 
159.30 
158.30 
174.90 
203.80 
243.20 
Jn.oo 
376.80 
405.50 
475.20 
551 00 
611.70 
661.5-0 
698.10 
745.30 
809.50 
893.90 
102040 
1186 40 
1851.40 12~640 
1945.00 1335.70 
2314.50 1511.00 
2609 90 1788.50 
vn.10 21Jo.00 
161.80 
15-0.00 
138.19 
147.54 
158.06 
112.n 
188.93 
208.83 
231.54 
256.61 
266.39 
324.ZS 
3M.87 
414.90 
457.09 
537.94 
602.67 
691.11 
n2.19 
32.60 
33.90 
37.50 
38.00 
'""" 4360 
43.90 
46.10 
57.40 
57.60 
00.~ 
68.00 
80.10 
88.90 
97.40 
109.00 
124.70 
139 30 
285 98 
921.35 320.50 
1124.66 423.10 
1389.06 488.40 
1712-21 548.50 
2055.45 624.70 
266.84 
271.64 
2620\ 
242.29 
258.79 
306.94 
340.11 
409.92 
481.55 
525.92 
615.25 
727.24 
773.69 
82039 
-" 881.57 
880.68 
9'62.84 
1378.8 
1739 
1874.48 
1888.39 
2054.16 
2461.38 
58.2 
68.4 
76.1 
"' 
"' 88.6 
101.1 
93.4 
73.7 
" 95.8 
97.1 
126.6 
157.1 
157 4 
189.4 
244.8 
274_7 
299.4 
,oo, 
'" 311 a 
"' 
-, 
880.9 
861.3 
172.2 
857.9 
1117.5 
3326.30 2513.30 2550.39 78890 2843.54 1261 
4145.70 3044.90 2998.25 815 10 3545.53 1703 4 
5022.5-0 3824.00 3951.60 915.50 4628.53 2240 6 
PCDBJ PCNBFI PCDFl 
75 46.60 20.80 
90.43 51.00 22.20 
101.39 53.60 25.20 
96.44 57.40 27.60 
9<.06 58.00 29.60 
89.97 
83.4 
79.9 
82.08 
95.59 
124.82 
153.99 
189.97 
=, 
259.17 
322.51 
368.JS 
369.62 
380 06 
385.55 
400.19 
419.33 
471.23 
514.67 
s11 as 
55.87 
53.74 
51.61 
48.81 
45.80 
43.42 
45.72 
47.85 
46.56 
48.95 
oo ... 
52.26 
55.07 
56.73 
~.~ 
5198 
47.15 
~ .. 
44.43 
37.10 
37.70 
38.40 
42.90 
.. ~ 
45.5-0 
49.20 
50.40 
52.40 
61.00 
74.30 
"" 
"~ 
93.40 
10240 
136.80 
~74 80 
42.45 303.80 
45 84 405.90 
45 43 467 60 
46.33 501.30 
52.44 543.50 
••• 
336.50 
675.00 
840.00 
918.00 
~,oo 
moo 
~,oo 
=oo 
591 00 
,Moo 
561.42 
603.17 
648.63 
747.94 
901.79 
1.133.88 
1,541.02 
62.9'6 61780 119400 
65.75 642.W 1504 00 
91.61 755.30 23,600 
"' 
72.27 
85.49 
93.8) 
111.43 
163.10 
222.15 
194.32 
195.99 
249.20 
=·" 
oo= 
271.07 
247.60 
190.96 
205 85 
301.47 
40582 
325 35 
171.14 
135.56 
11462 
227.75 
274 21 
·~« 
552.61 
869.13 
5~8-80 
7830.70 
5036.80 4964.71' 1099.40 - 596!!-.29 
64;,7.W 62868S 1563.30 9119.94 
.G!'t·~l,=1-~ 
4569.5 3.159.03 133.31 1258.10 
s.l__D.00 _2282 76 
7020 00 1953.61 
1on9.10 6121.10 N97.oo 241a.20 
22373.50 8367.00 9768.50 2201.80 
29705.10 11377.20 11577.W 2582.00 
11052.5 
13911.6 
15958.51 
5577.1 
8406.9 
9543.5 
3,462.00 
3,470 00 
4,119.5-0 
33811.70 17419.ilO 14353.16 2890.00 17760.91 9660.3 5.518.10 
52659.00 2433~ !'>O 16527 82 45"66.60 24147.17 12704 7.854.JO 
76170.',0 31884.10 22716.32 &346.30 39883.95 23027.4 11.883.30 
188.90 1824.50 3440 00 
290 90 1743.80 9937.00 
310.91 1984.60 15292.00 
:J.66.11 2:!16.40 1898800 
396.37 3193.10 39337.00 
443.05 4530 20 36222.00 
885.55 
2325.26 
318-080 
397262 
8786.26 
7196.43 
636.9 5-0107 43124.00 45208.20 593.W.OO 37343.20 67!163.!IO 53851.00 4265.20 205071.30 136500.10 99156.90 31697.00 28395.40 6478.00 55893.5 34842.5 14.469.70 53160 604970 4817000 5884.72 
260 
Table 24 
Transformed data set and proxies 
Date y BKA RBZA DMBA OBIA DMRB CIC TFA LQL RBZ DMB DBI NBFI DFI PCDMB PCOBI 
1924 215.69 -0.266659 -1.770020 ·0.518179 -3.316937 -0.251519 -3.384401 -1.576594 -1.941399 0.033898 -2.132560 -4.207658 -3.640334 -4.333482 -3.292028 
1925 192.31 -0.301189 -1.813670 -0.550115 -3.379757 -0.248926 -2.547292 -0.754581 ·1.172008 0.078293 -1.289409 -4.104025 -2.775532 -3.282402 -2.406508 
1926 244.9 -0.358207 -1.947161 
-0.586537 -3.437565 -0.228331 -2.712396 
-0.827317 -1.295838 0.066334 -1.397533 -4.238824 -2.803909 
-3.024821 -2.481201 
1927 3~2.85 -0.409819 
-1.925947 -0.657717 -3.393034 -0.247898 -2.802271 -0.867938 -1.386812 0.060601 -1.492739 -4.280926 -2.742135 -2.879282 -2.492402 
1928 333.33 -0.473525 -1.9n4B6 -0.724872 -3.421000 -0.251348 ·2.719164 -0.767549 ·1.338236 0.065822 ·1.460709 -4.175479 -2.535548 -2.635081 -2.395736 
1929 361.29 -0.485971 -1.989826 -0.737349 -3.455493 -0.251378 -2.657871 -0.674027 -1.281437 0.070069 -1.405736 -4.113834 -2.288704 -2.566917 -2.331279 
1930 371.43 ·0.508227 -2.141303 -0.725547 -3.530925 -0.217320 -2.616780 -0.550469 -1.180528 0.072996 -1.261573 -4.045052 -2.031406 -2.556534 -2.191584 
1931 295.08 -0.539507 -2.543747 -0.684258 -3.507409 -0.144751 -2.480543 -0.133519 -0.812355 0.083661 -0.835640 -3.651153 -1.530321 -2.159089 ·1.760095 
1932 342.34 -0.563370 -2.643243 -0.696839 -3.334665 -0.13347'0 -2.764771 -0.172878 -0.880479 0.062993 -0.663355 -3.590901 -1.533381 -2.179683 -1.844196 
1933 396.4 -0.587049 -2.666491 -0.720580 -3.159772 -0.133531 -~.955261 -0.301005 -2.971260 0.052021 -1.009958 -3.542104 -1.622749 ·2.327567 -2.043467 
1934 525.25 -0.551474 -2.630727 -0.685032 ·3.099224 -0.133558 -3.035420 -0.391448 -1.002725 0.047970 ·1.091398 -3.515896 ·1.715279 -2.491547 ·2.127232 
1935 594.06 -0.523123 -2.602404 -0.656678 -3.044522 -0.133554 -3.029661 -0.415576 -0.998986 0.048187 -1.086947 -3.488265 -1.773058 ·2.600910 -2.117448 
1936 629.63 -0.497189 ·2.515169 -0.639818 -2.993611 -0.142628 -2.973234 -0.419405 -0.951240 0.051142 -1.066825 -3.435757 -1.786799 -2.772084 -2.062933 
1937 716.98 -0.474062 -2.089040 -0.695826 -2.906939 -0.221763 -2.698255 -0.424965 -0.944990 0.067377 -1.093343 -3.372836 ·1.806189 -2.941942 -2.110764 
1938 807.62 -0.477584 -2.445769 -0.628069 ·2.818578 -0.150486 -2.703347 -0.439555 -0.976983 0.066981 -1.098603 -3.298307 ·1.829014 ·3.067869 -2.165172 
1939 1108.91 -0.456109 ·2.194380 -0.649480 -2.774807 -0.193371 -2.802906 -0.634737 -1.129249 0.052853 -1.274030 -3.430014 -2.039198 -3.351442 -2.330274 
1940 112621 -0.450677 -2.117409 -0.659995 -2.600770 -0.209318 ·2.465049 -0.573152 -0.957844 0.065391 -1.228004 -3.255044 -2.012819 -3.400990 -2.302'191 
1941 1207.55 -0.432630 -2.181574 -0.623644 -2.378934 -0.191093 -2.389123 -0.562601 -0.855503 0.066315 -1.203263 -3.040297 ·2.067176 -3.545454 -2.304000 
1942 1189.19 -0.395511 -2.213190 -0.572653 -2.269035 -0.177205 ·2.279101 -0.422671 -0.664846 0.072729 ·1.018739 -2.741369 -2.031271 ·3.654142 -2.330095 
1943 1152.54 -0.396987 -2.208074 -0.575424 -2.104672 -0.178490 -2.123496 -0.276890 -0.481211 0.083126 -0.850992 -2.4565':8 -1.978063 -3.731200 -2.460500 
1944 1170.73 -0.402111 -2.268358 -0.570286 -1.985632 -0.168084 -1.963920 -0.172378 -0.341638 0.089608 -0.745045 -2.211499 -1.932369 -3.773298 -2.332085 
1945 1301.59 -0.393701 -2.302201 -0.554225 -1.948344 -0.160524 -1.946350 -0.133638 -0.282008 0.068921 -0.695279 -2.099100 -1.943993 -3.845915 -2.232798 
1946 1465.65 -0.395765 ·2.316907 -0.554183 -1.940877 -0.158351 -1.990798 -0.150037 -0.296693 0.085452 -0.704240 -2.094522 -1.984168 -3.904140 -2.100393 
1947 1735.29 -0.397228 -2.482716 -0.529865 -1.997533 -0.132666 -2.036177 -0.221126 -0.364169 0.072596 -0.762296 -2.191757 -2.065074 -3.733477 -1.834970 
1948 1986.21 -:J.421717 -2.446997 -0.563292 -1.978863 -0.141522 -2.118002 -0.285272 -0.402874 0.053940 -0.631852 -2.273347 -2.110301 -3.559339 -1.762629 
1949 2116.13 -0.472372 -2.485999 -0.615698 -1.987639 -0. 143301 ·2.215412 -0.287337 -0.435196 0.063631 -0.877838 -2.270805 -2.054721 -3.229320 -1.665588 
1950 2463.41 -0.457896 -2.146302 -0.662235 ·1.980678 -0.204339 -2.398968 -0.329718 -0.547046 0.072668 -0.969756 -2.313670 -2.112320 -3.048821 -1.635952 
1951 2454.55 -0.4569?4 ·1.978505 -0.703357 -2.027938 -0.246383 -2.413210 -0.219931 -0.505456 0.102824 -0.903521 ·2.225115 -2.022190 -2.915350 -1.441410 
1952 2687.83 -0.489052 -1.983701 -0.743077 ·1.920218 -0.254025 ·2.527441 -0.232148 -0.627990 0.109336 -0.955771 -2.203144 -2.009057 -2.911150 -1.503492 -5.103698 
1953 2673.37 -0.518984 -1.966947 -0.786927 -1.804748 -0.267943 -2.554732 -0.153022 -0.701559 0.119081 -0.918724 -2.011370 -1.905412 -2.857122 -1.656897 -3.903031 
1954 3475.25 -0.596872 -2.039256 -0.866536 -1.579782 -0.269664 -2.834282 -0.297493 -0.810712 0.100000 -1.126344 ·1.975292 -2.006498 -3.094917 -2.148434 ·3.435984 
1955 3774.51 -0.664121 -2.113390 -0.931663 ·1.455248 -0.267542 -2.!;175063 -0.232382 -0.670656 0.099184 -1.133372 -1.743351 ·1.870927 -3.155985 -2.235530 -2.858479 
261 
Date y BKA RBZA DMBA OBIA DMRB CIC TFA LQL RBZ CMB OBI NBFI OFI PCDMB PCOBL 
1956 4257.14 -0.699216 -2.111869 -0.978264 -1.403497 -0.279048 -2.935564 -0.220645 -0.704781 0.09698i ·~.176703 -1.648167 -1.796671 -3.257951 -2.198128 -2.529038 
1957 4608.29 -0.726047 -1.860539 -1.104700 -1.339435 -0.378654 -3.029377 -0.171609 -0.729039 0.116107 -1.215450 -1.540361 -1.725253 -3.291850 ·2.147543 -2.305542 
1958 4625 -0.821894 -1.770363 -1.311829 -1.280258 -0.489935 -3.066145 -0.084924 -0.748552 0.148441 -1.290258 -1.393639 -1.573063 ·3.234997 -2.1osm -2.057043 
1959 4805.19 -0.879639 -1.845797 -1.358550 -1.205218 -0.478911 -3.099280 -0.050938 -0.788393 !i.155655 -1.386973 -1.291180 ·1.468496 -3.228111 -2.171961 -1.904611 
1960 5088.61 -0.872626 -1.948266 -1.289778 -1.208145 -0.417152 -3.127976 -0.032819 -0.782856 0.145150 -1.355421 -1.239541 -1.446358 -3.224442 -2.122299 -1.839070 
1961 5147.54 -0.834979 ·1.843876 ·1.288512 ·1.294096 ·0.453534 -3.113216 -0.008090 -0.768587 0.1492)5 ·1.297229 ·1.258645 ·1.414430 -3.162100 -2.057360 -1.847600 
1962 5120 -0.789501 -1.748038 -1.273123 -1.365563 -0.483622 ·3.115973 0.022453 -0.757859 0.170068 -1.258207 -1.307337 -1.375201 -3.097867 -2.022308 -1.904799 
1963 5228.35 -0.770265 -1.748111 -1.242063 -1.390074 -0.471798 -3.199701 0.013286 -0.7831.53 0.176438 -1.244262 -1.364398 -1.401942 -3.054929 -2.035358 -1.976094 
1964 5382.24 ·0.714653 ·1.730444 -1.164252 ·1.439618 -0.449599 -3.321155 -0.034147 -0.823399 0.169737 ·1.237079 -1.448348 -1.496998 -3.042823 -1.995118 -2.083932 
1965 5669.39 -0.675072 -1.740187 -1.097716 -1.458174 -0.422644 -3.434996 -0.104839 .. (J.876602 0.158796 -1.235318 -1.553679 -1.650572 -3.046580 ·2.043763 -2.218744 
1966 5437.04 -0.676167 -1.806096 -1.066335 -1.433531 -0.390167 -3.372034 -0.037935 -0.764429 0.163444 -1.119481 -1.483432 -1.636881 -2.967402 -2.171099 -2.204163 
1967 5797.1 -0.685210 -1.876901 -1.047195 -1.377621 -0.361985 -3.377965 -0.037482 -0.723271 0.152619 -1.093806 -1.441515 -1.655672 -3.033995 -2.349483 -2.198330 
1968 6028.47 -0.757428 -1.917281 -1.133624 -1.269157 -0.376196 -3.391720 ·0.0124l\8 -0.704413 0.148106 -1.102957 -1.333117 -1.633610 -3.021319 -2.272118 ·2.040661 
1969 6951.39 -0.792716 -2.036309 -1.132880 -1.160071 -0.340164 -3.472471 -0.074026 -0.764024 0.128428 -1.207257 -1.284103 -1.711515 -3.130118 -2.339631 -1.972633 
1970 7272.73 -0.812124 -2.048952 -1.155041 -1.103581 -0.342918 ·3.458270 -0.014176 -0.6733E.O 0.127824 -1.158622 -1.144214 -1.692576 -3.178182 -2.269497 -1.838817 
1971 8104.23 ·0.794275 ·2.133891 ·1.098014 -1.138274 -0.303739 -3.538934 -0.034618 -0.683012 0.119219 ·1.159629 -1.156071 -1.732204 -3.181177 -2.172804 -1.788111 
1972 8924.53 -0.791907 -2.229841 -1.062952 -1.110820 -0.271045 -3.541619 -0.046289 -0.679649 0.107616 ·1.125822 -1.170118 -1.760846 -3.205600 -2.199533 -1.745802 
1973 9412.12 -0.747235 -2.169576 -1.023184 -1.129814 -0.275950 -3.503713 0.012405 -0.623180 0.112491 -1.029169 -1.108486 -1.744645 -3.272174 -2.193691 -1.659435 
1974 10664.756 ·0.736475 ·2.170173 -1.008843 -1.1471'.)4 -0.272368 -3.518893 -0.025448 -0.674547 0.111322 ·1.041267 -1.164074 -1.808383 -3.369305 -2.151887 -1.685124 
1975 10627.66 -0.700443 -2.282742 -0.930488 -1.200324 -0.230045 ·3.438079 0.030288 -0.599529 0.111226 -0.937496 -1.143831 -1.758399 -3.296821 -2.040940 -1.687781 
1976 10617.647 -0.628473 -2.221668 -0.855719 -1.305592 -0.227246 -3.391923 0.095358 -0.553861 0.115868 -0.795725 -1.158079 -1.715666 -3.244236 -2.020933 -0.752605 
1977 9856.5022 -0.655500 -2.198442 -0.895983 -1.288438 -0.240482 -3.294009 0.184008 -0.498789 0.131833 -0.691223 -1.113148 -1.617828 -3.161127 -1.975527 -1.744839 
1978 9808.7318 -0.689474 -2.399347 -0.889009 -1.284168 -0.199535 -3.272193 0.175930 -0.502057 0.120184 -0.716532 ·1.1"10354 -1.557933 -3.130105 -2.019940 -1.790810 
1979 10770.992 -0.665245 -2.143464 -0.924073 -1.317344 -0.258827 -3.324670 0.103071 -0.581227 0.1154::!1 -0.803539 -1.197759 -1.599040 -3.185047 -2.192910 -1.928019 
1980 11!106.574 -0.700497 -2.149639 -0.968078 -1.281280 -0.267581 -3.263262 0.018584 -0.618847 0.119079 -0.927318 -1.280509 -1.672232 -3.261181 -2.398824 -2.045414 
1981 13682.099 -0.688781 ·1.918536 -1.034607 -1.335123 -0.345826 -3.216470 -0.082418 -0.719391 0.121735 -"i.084347 -1.391180 -1.800678 ·3.056308 ·2.350886 -2.194610 
1982 14785.206 -0.681489 -1.979072 -1.000581 -1.396263 -0.319092 -3.172462 -0.065891 -0.740936 0.130624 -1.102667 -1.452327 -1.815540 -2.841958 -1.990088 -2.314569 
1983 15844.221 -0.680034 -1.749946 -1.100164 -1.475970 -0.420130 -3.289633 -0.144774 -a.84sn8 0.134520 -1.192470 -1.578946 -1.818379 -2.834548 -1.967673 -2.458039 
1984 13245.088 -0.703192 -1.896702 -1.064384 -1.490806 -0.361193 -3.269188 -0.017898 -0.813781 0.159321 -1.100427 -1.501086 -1.629529 -2.640842 -2.045830 -2.392499 
1985 16524.9n -0.744436 -1.990575 ~1.083571 -1.~61505" -0.339134 -3.446526 -0.233465 -1.169264 · 0.113341 ·1.307672 ·1.709092 -1.771:87~- '-2.8e'S556=-=2'.412930----2.6"Z6323 
1986 16874.593 -0.798512 -2.021602 -1.147105 -1.412.::30 -0.348593 -3.387610 -0.230001 -1.158626 0.106895 -1.344709 -1.666663 ·1.706373 ·-2.87133'.l -2.354770 -2.697468 
1987 16161.616 -0.824745 -2.127515 -1.141894 -1.422158 -0.317149 -3.369356 -0.157635 -0.934984 0.107256 -1.302046 -1.574979 -1.584634 -2.766300 -2.242893 -2.610565 
1988 18650.364 -0.807915 -2.200264 -1.093587 -1.402190 -0.285672 -3.457430 -0.215175 -1.031468 0.092523 -1.331364 ·1.626778 ·1.627995 -2.866873 -2.257192 -2.631849 
1989 20943.78 -0.849064 -2.331090 -1.106769 -1.379164 -0.257705 -3.444109 -0.241732 -1.024814 0.081452 -1.342137 -1.631907 -1.621861 -3.006967 -2.188323 -2.577649 
1990 22744.974 -0.862640 -2.177071 -i.175472 -1.338523 -0.312832 -3.436058 -0.228341 -0.961086 0.084337 -1.368898 -1.583781 -1.576275 -3.062285 ·2.169308 -2.439453 
1991 26532.02 -0.765945 -1.762488 -1.226638 -1.422549 -0.460692 -3.572049 -0.261288 -1.129031 0.111073 -1.463549 -1.643461 -1.662572 ·3.109757 -2.117391 -2.403363 
1992 23043.216 -0.686756 -1.700929 -1.137275 -1.605914 -0.450519 -3.637739 -0.122601 -1.165476 0.156335 -1.306347 -1.626953 ·1.592156 -2.856663 -1.900552 -2.318011 
262 
Date y BKA RBZA DMBA OBIA DMRB CIC TFA LQL RBZ DMB DBI NBFI DFI PCDMB PCOBI 
1993 21304.413 -0.523628 ·1.938478 -0.801969 ·1.785551 .Q.273342 ·3.727919 .Q.028141 ·1.168148 0.157241 .Q.971030 ·1.726767 ·1.594751 ·2.891302 ·1.814317 ·2.491357 
1994 22599.195 -0.498082 ·1.888138 -0.784514 -1.744221 -0.286432 -3.755866 0.020225 ·1.106906 0.15C777 -0.n2696 -1.743na -1.658907 -3.154003 ·1.829996 -2.693090 
1995 20253.739 -0.519108 -1.954523 -0.790939 -1.592064 -0.271831 ·3.656196 0.197513 -0.917663 0.178274 -0.590321 ·1.465073 ·1.559318 -3.109911 ·1.849340 ·2.552983 
1996 22846.092 -0.534130 ·2.079253 ·0.774019 ·1.549564 -0.239890 -3.728363 0.161751 -0.949204 0.156259 -0.620279 -1.407799 ·1.643019 -3.136425 ·2.029342 ·2.547408 
1997 22925.098 -0.494089 ·2.097945 -0.718633 ·1.590125 -0.224544 -3.580175 0.277012 -0.847130 0.163297 -0.467035 -1.294017 -1.600675 -2.935579 -1.760569 -2.346612 
1998 24225.257 -0.407032 -1.703207 -0.726654 ·1.867110 -0.319622 -3.564351 0.286322 -0.951489 0.202857 -0.436307 ·1.432488 -1.666165 -2.908462 -1.554993 ·2.326797 
Date PCBK PCNBFl PCDFJ G OPEN PCY LPCY LGPCY FSE CAB LTECH FREE WAR DMD CGV MCGV COUP FED 
1924 -3.159968 -5.249772 -2.091434 -0.931237 227.28 5.426171 0.152742 0.115486 -0.228148 -1.557091 6.0 0 0 0 0 
1925 -2.137598 ·3.582419 -1.91287C -0.700819 199.49 5.295761 -0.130411 0.004701 -0.273568 ·1.572774 6.0 0 0 0 0 0 
1926 -2.050596 -3.100749 ·1.967256 -0.773249 250.15 5.522065 0.226305 0.049809 -0.462708 ·1.588214 6.0 0 0 0 0 0 
1927 ·1.998797 -2.941489 -2.001989 -0.787662 309.14 5.733793 0.211727 0.001494 -0.434286 ·1.621367 6.0 0 0 0 0 
1928 -1.836087 -2.683340 ·1.902247 -0.657196 317.16 5.759401 0.025606 ·0.001846 -0.418816 ·1.253715 6.0 0 0 0 0 0 
1929 ·1.790968 ·2.664600 ·1.687367 ·0.542596 336.40 5.818292 0.053891 -0.228189 -0.350121 -1.275363 6.0 0 0 0 0 0 
1930 -1.570141 -3.536994 ·2.700444 -1.480228 -0.475225 337.66 5.822046 0.003755 -0.180846 -0.362312 ·1.011601 6.0 0 0 0 0 0 
1931 ·1.028945 -2.450991 ·2.311150 -1.089617 -0.270480 259.98 5.560621 -0.261426 -0.200596 -0.421248 ·1.042923 6.0 0 ' 
0 0 0 
1932 ·1.087199 ·2.455958 ·2.372729 -1.192048 -0.546722 296.14 5.690846 0.130225 --0.270353 -0.364087 ·1.061257 6.0 0 0 0 0 0 
1933 -1.243476 ·2.556350 ·2.510666 -1.446342 -0.802736 334.23 5.811828 0.120983 -0.064428 -0.503773 -1.oa08n 6.5 0 0 0 0 
1934 -1.337028 -2.673695 ·2.597473 -1.233780 -0.847384 424.96 6.051999 0.240170 -0.680080 -0.387624 ·1.128171 6.5 
' 
0 0 0 
1935 -1.360088 -2.651249 -2.722096 -1.288806 -0.863316 463.02 6.137778 o.o85n9 -0.134220 -0.503437 -0.942348 6.S 0 0 0 0 0 
1936 ·1.361282 -2.579066 -2.929821 ·1.610432 -0.896435 476.27 6.165986 0.028208 -0.257910 -0.431984 -0.972293 6.5 0 0 0 0 0 
1937 -1.421807 ·2.599490 -3.083020 ·1.593167 -0.831823 527.58 6.268300 0.102314 -0.287437 -0.300069 -0.817575 6.5 0 0 0 0 0 
1938 -1.471546 -2.602804 ·3.199696 ·1.613790 ·0.799764 574.46 6.353432 0.085132 ·0.215843 -0.453548 -0.851574 6.5 0 0 0 0 0 
1939 -1.666766 -2.794629 ·3.491660 -1.n9574 ·1.091248 767.94 6.643717 0.290284 -0.390171 -0.430391 -0.724092 6.5 0 0 0 0 
1940 ·1.652521 ·2.769860 -3.544391 ·1.679620 -0.987344 no.as 6.647495 0.003779 -0.252407 -0.147114 -0.602265 6.5 0 0 0 0 
1941 -1.699438 ·2.841057 -3.706490 -1.557090 -0.870283 804.50 6.690215 0.042720 -0.340531 -0.106390 ·0.511492 6.5 0 0 0 0 
1942 ·1.711523 -2.797978 -3.799991 -1.392632 -0.751582 765.74 6.640839 -0.049376 -0.229043 0.051357 -0.440189 6.5 0 0 0 0 
1943 -1.769671 ·2.741135 ·3.887349 -1.329871 -0.674212 717.65 6.575979 -0.064860 -0.129000 0.135051 -0.378436 6.5 0 0 0 0 
1944 ·1.689484 -2.678939 -3.969355 ·1.121158 -0.610384 702.72 6.554959 -0.021020 -0.297252 -0.070858 -0.328104 6.5 0 0 0 0 
1945 -1.630284 ·2.704754 -3.827716 -1.147151 ·0.607629 753.23 6.624375 0.069416 -0.133531 0.080043 -0.284600 6.5 1 0 0 0 0 
1946 ·1.593640 ·2.80(1911 -3.910942 ·1.307490 -0.641503 847.20 6.741932 0.117557 -0.232112 -0.223144 -O.L11649 6.5 0 0 0 0 0 
1947 ·1.434947 ·2.850038 -3.879194 ·1.474087 -0.722964 938.00 6.843747 0.101815 -0.149036 -0.552069 -0.209721 6.5 0 0 0 0 0 
1948 -1.366381 ·2.!1'50768 -3.662452 -0.884696 -0.754791 968.16 6.895847 0.052101 -0.320599 -0.542324 -0.110348 6.5 0 0 0 0 0 
1949 -1.250319 -2.810031 -3.293310 -0.843833 -0.777986 1012.50 6.920180 0.024332 -0.480973 -0.810930 -0.044017 6.5 0 0 0 0 0 
1950 ·1.223949 ·2.921118 -3.091663 -1.459119 -0.829439 1135.21 7.034577 0.114397 -0.391562 -0.55~1n 0.100742 6.4 0 0 0 0 0 
1951 ·1.058759 ·2.848037 -2.950103 ·1.369886 -0.722116 1053.45 6.959829 -0.074748 -0.510826 -0.870828 0.147384 6.4 0 0 0 0 0 
263 
Date PCBK PCNBFI PCDFI G OPEN PCY LPCY LGPCY FSB CAB LTECH ~REE WAR OMO CGV MCGV COUP FED 
1952 -1.075025 -2.813059 -2.940458 -1.292n1 -0.760268 1106.10 7.008599 0.048770 -0.644357 -0.693147 0.243511 6.4 0 0 0 0 0 
1953 -1.097666 -2.708779 -2.880260 -1.107304 -0.635686 1056.67 6.962875 -0.045724 -0.503905 -0.493658 0.380114 6.4 0 2 1 0 
1954 -1.371813 -2.809856 -3.110635 -1.360977 -0.884052 1096.29 6.999689 0.036815 -0.479573 -1.067114 0.569035 6.4 0 2 0 0 0 
1955 -1.295687 -2.694165 -3.174389 -1.854889 -1.108111 1154.28 7.051236 0.051546 -0.325422 -1.120591 0.639759 6.4 0 2 0 0 0 1 
1956 -1.208701 -2.652284 -3.287357 -2.491793 -1.315339 1286.92 7.160010 0.108774 -0.305382 -1.197703 0.777737 6.4 0 2 1 0 0 1 
1957 -1.118726 -2.603175 -3.319193 -2.478065 -1.295749 1316.66 7.182850 0.022840 -0.302281 -1.115707 0.875469 6.4 0 2 1 0 0 1 
1958 -0.991106 -2.485222 -3.259745 -2.399889 -1.279099 1281.16 7.155524 -0.027326 -0.182322 -1.164426 0.978055 6.4 0 2 1 0 0 1 
1959 -0.943008 -2.431655 -3.251169 -2.427244 -1.335905 1288.26 7.161()<15 0.005ti21 -0.223144 -0.967584 1.044446 6.4 0 2 0 0 0 1 
1960 -0.904562 -2.445075 -3.237083 -2.451000 -1.333251 1325.16 7.189287 0.028243 -0.300105 -0.929111 0.733969 6.4 0 2 0 0 0 
1961 -0.877613 -2.426450 -3.169653 -2.382960 -1.284159 1296.61 7.167508 -0.021779 -0.389465 -0.780745 0.749466 6.4 0 2 0 0 0 
1962 -0.876978 -2.406189 -3.108277 -2.350399 -1214633 1248.78 7.129923 -0.037586 -0.182322 -0.672385 0.763765 6.5 0 3 0 0 
1963 -0.912100 -2.456163 -3.064589 -2.387475 -1.205034 1236.02 7.119648 -0.010274 -0.175891 -0.587787 0.777001 6.5 0 3 0 0 0 
1964 -0.951151 -2.542645 -3.053355 -2.072743 -0.896150 1237.30 7.120684 0.001036 -0.192904 0.237991 0.781116 6.5 0 3 1 1 0 0 
1965 -1.034619 -2.657035 -3.059280 -1.688238 -0.580127 1267.13 7.144506 0.023822 -0.089231 0.298062 0.810683 6.5 0 3 0 1 0 
1966 -1.067686 -2.681642 -2.976738 -1.428816 -0.593382 1174.31 7.068433 -0.076074 -0.239230 0.103589 0.828297 6.5 0 3 0 0 0 
1967 -1.161179 -2.827692 -3.045725 -1.469466 -0.855115 1210.25 7.098583 0.030150 -0.143101 0.006924 0.849383 6.5 0 3 0 0 0 0 
1968 -1.097526 -2.943277 -3.037179 -· .474499 -0.880015 1215.42 7.102843 0.004260 -0225550 -0.074145 0.932291 6.5 0 3 0 0 0 0 
1969 -1.129998 -3.111792 -3.145103 -1.480435 -0.952316 1355.05 7.211591 0.108748 -0.298493 0.145737 0.937507 6.5 0 3 0 0 0 0 
1970 -1.059035 -3.139221 -3.191611 -1.484977 -0.901422 1369.63 7.222295 0.010704 -0.166677 0.096084 0.910625 6.5 0 3 1 0 0 0 
1971 -1.027407 -3.250489 -3.268892 -1.591262 -0.946592 1482.66 7.301595 0.079300 -0.222204 0.026892 0.947628 6.5 0 3 0 0 0 0 
1972 -1.036133 -3.370691 -3.349564 -1.701909 -0.952351 1586.02 7.368982 0.067387 -0.028285 0.239679 0.987118 6.5 1 3 0 0 0 0 
1973 -1.002375 -3.437084 -3.408329 -1.768844 -0.909062 1625.02 7.393276 0.024294 -0.032790 0.231790 1.016111 6.5 1 3 0 0 0 0 
1974 -1.021459 -3.584388 -3.485747 -1.782248 -0.906595 1788.79 7.489294 0.096018 -0.093021 0.192235 1.059503 6.5 3 0 0 0 0 
1975 -0.978975 -3.616682 -3.381698 -1.656316 -0.808189 1731.74 7.456879 -0.032415 -0.034317 0.139978 1.064862 6.5 3 0 0 0 0 
1976 -0.999078 -3.655736 -3.308841 -1.516924 -0.782736 1680.81 7.427028 -0.029851 -0.091237 0.376032 1.101195 6.5 1 3 0 0 0 0 
1977 -0.959739 -3.675963 -3.206538 -1.291381 -0.703138 1515.69 7.323623 -0.103405 -0.157375 0.350109 1.108355 6.5 1 3 0 0 0 0 
1978 -1.016707 -3.791788 -3.225372 -1.164485 -0.714751 1465.30 7.289817 -0.033806 -0.336223 0.411639 1.094521 5.5 1 1 0 0 
1979 -1.173143 -4.036495 -3.360854 -1.209667 -0.810929 1563.05 7.354396 0.064:Jnt -0.365961 0.264616 1.095075 4.5 1 1 0 0 
1980 -1.317214 -4.354589 -3.355824 -1.201879 -0.812927 1678.40 7.425597 0.071201 -0.368189 0.116272 1.104142 3.4 0 1 0 0 
1981 -1.338886 -4.642833 -3.083039 ~1.2645i4 -IJJf3909Y 1873.75 7.535695 0.110099 -0.142687 '-0.04625~ 1.1209'13 - er.,; - ~=!)" _::,.. ~:: 1-==------a==----0 - 0- 0 
1982 -1.205666 -4.783901 -2.888912 -1.186020 -0.820349 1943.38 7.572182 0.036487 -0.218241 -0.110736 1.132046 3.5 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1983 -1.243183 -4.955054 -2.881824 -1.152620 -0.829740 2018.12 7.609919 0.037737 -0.108090 0.080159 1.146162 4.5 1 1 0 0 0 0 
1984 -1.216727 -4.935077 -2.683333 -1.019622 -0.676095 1634.99 7.399395 -0210525 -0.224618 0.190726 1.106686 4.5 1 0 0 0 0 
1985 -1.529312 -5.286444 -2.932436 -~208981 -0.870296 1970.31 7.585945 0.186551 -0.205911 0.216137 1.084161 4.6 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1986 -1.525242 -5.345829 ·2.985602 -1.193770 -0.817495 1950.82 7.576005 -0.009940 -0.175687 0.279925 1.085033 4.6 0 0 0 0 0 
1987 -1.441373 -5.2704il-1 -2.960024 ·1.101177 -0.730853 1811.43 7.501874 -0.074131 -0.177661 0.308619 1.136516 5.6 0 0 0 0 
1988 -1.487945 -5.389818 -3.108134 -1.178586 -0.799028 2026.77 7.614200 0.112326 -0.151703 0.372663 1.137476 6.5 0 0 0 0 0 
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Date PCBK PCNBFI PCDFI G OPEN PCY LPCY LGPCY FSB CAB LTECH FREE WAR OMO CGV MCGV COUP FED 
1989 -1.459310 -5.411630 --3.222008 -1.234037 -0.854110 2206.70 7.699253 0.085053 -0.172600 -0.050955 0.242661 6.4 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1990 -1.410286 -5.270345 -3.284248 ·1.238125 -0.862701 2323.52 7.750840 0.051567 -0.139234 -0.067837 0.236437 6.4 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1991 -1.363823 -5.4026':IO -3.342274 -1.362504 -0.916158 2627.97 7.873968 0.123128 -0.026589 -0290932 0.221558 5.4 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1992 -1.212754 -5.363290 --3.106969 -1.244066 -0.790060 2212.93 7.702072 -0.171897 -0.139797 ·0.426668 0.198547 5.4 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1993 -1.223924 -5.187902 -3.152535 ·1216954 -0.769960 1976.47 7.569070 -0.113002 -0.134361 -0.147251 0.171845 5.5 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1994 -1.321275 -5.222405 ·3.401757 ·1.319750 -0.764050 2026.63 7.614230 0.025160 -0.134092 -0.116498 0.213229 5.5 0 0 0 0 0 
1995 -1.291192 -5.202199 -3.374120 -1.165358 -0.596567 1757.22 7.471489 -0.142741 -0.163214 -0.227458 0.236416 5.5 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1996 -1.402915 -5.398576 -3.453021 -1.1933::!2 -0.693004 1918.55 7.559325 0.067836 -0.220946 -0.148858 0.217417 5.5 0 1 0 0 0 0 
1997 -1.173415 -5.491239 ·3.282181 ·1.128042 -0.626810 1864.74 7.530876 -0.028449 -0.156472 -0.190737 0.198939 5.5 0 0 0 0 0 
1998 ·1.045968 -5.623045 -3.245750 -1.145008 -0.600669 1909.76 7.554731 0.023855 -0.150081 -0.272174 0.180875 5.5 0 1 0 0 0 0 
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